THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

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THE 


Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful 


BEING 


Outlines  of  the  History  of  ^Esthetics 


BY 

WILLIAM    KXIGHT 

PROFESSOR   OF   PHILOSOPHY    1 X    THE    INIVEKSITY   OF   ST.    ANDREWS 


Beauty,  Good,  and  Knowledge  are  three  sisters 
That  doat  upon  each  other,  friends  to  man, 
Living  together  under  the  same  roof. 
And  never  can  be  sunder'd  without  tears, 

Texwsox, 


NEW    YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBXER'S    SONS 

743   &   745    BROADWAY 

1S91 


PREFACE 


This  book  originated  in  a  course  of  lectures  delivered 
to  the  Philosophical  Institution  of  Edinburgh  in  1889, 
and  afterwards  to  a  University  Extension  audience  in 
London,  and  at  Cheltenham.  In  these  lectures  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  Philosophy  of  Beauty,  and  an  attempt  at 
constructive  theory,  preceded  an  outline  of  the  History 
of  Opinion,  and  a  critical  analysis  of  the  chief  theories 
of  Esthetic.  The  former  section  of  the  course  was 
longer  than  the  latter,  and  it  was  my  original  intention 
to  expand  both  of  them,  in  somewhat  equal  proportions, 
into  a  connected  Treatise. 

In  making  a  more  minute  study  of  the  literature  of 
the  subject,  however,  the  works  of  many  minor  writers 
had  to  be  examined,  as  well  as  those  which  have  a  claim 
to  rank  as  major.  Although  they  have  not  added  any- 
thing absolutely  new  to  the  philosophy  of  Esthetics, 
they  have  usually  restated  the  problem,  common  to  them 
all,  in  such  a  way  as  to  entitle  them  to  mention — and  to 
honourable  mention  —  in  any  History,  that  lays  claim 
to  be  even  approximately  complete.  In  such  a  matter, 
finality  is  of  course  impossible ;  but  fulness,  as  well  as 
accuracy,  is  essential  in  every  record  of  opinion. 

I  have  therefore  judged  it  most  expedient  to  omit 
the  discussion  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  in  the 
present  volume,  except  in  so  far  as  it  comes  out  in  the 


vi  Preface 

critical  estimate  of  theories,  and  to  confine  myself  in 
the  main  to  a  historical  sketch  of  past  oi)inion  and 
tendency.  In  this  form,  and  as  a  work  of  reference,  it 
may  probably  be  of  greater  use  to  the  students  of  the 
subject,  than  the  constructive  theory  with  which  I  in- 
tend to  follow  it  by  and  by. 

One  or  two  remarks,  however,  on  the  L^eneral  prob- 
lem of  the  IJeautiful  may  serve  to  bring  out  the  relation 
in  which  the  speculative  discussion  of  the  subject  stands 
to  its  historical  treatment. 

From  the  dawn  of  Philosophy,  greater  interest  has 
been  felt  in  ^^letaphysics  and  in  Ethics,  than  in  what  is 
no\v  commonly  known  as  /Esthetics.  It  has  been  thought 
that  the  cpestions  which  arise  in  the  two  former  spheres 
are  graver,  more  radical,  and  also  more  soluble,  th.an 
those  which  belong  to  the  latter.  It  is  one  aim  of  the 
following  pages  to  disprove  this,  by  showing  how  the 
problems  of  all  the  departments  interlace,  and  more 
especially  to  point  out  the  close  bearing  which  the 
answers  given  in  the  last  of  them  have  upon  the  ques- 
tions raised  in  the  other  two.  To  see  the  correlation  of 
the  spheres  of  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good,  is 
quite  as  important  to  the  students  of  each  of  them,  as  it 
is  to  note  the  distinction  and  the  independence  of  their 
provinces  :  for,  as  Tennyson  puts  it — 

Beauty,  Good,  and  Knowledge  are  tliree  sis'x-rs 
That  doat  upon  each  other,  friends  to  man, 
Li\inL^  tof^ether  under  the  same  roof, 
An'l  never  can  be  sundier'd  without  tears. 

These  lines  of  the  chief  seer  amongst  poets  now  living, 
embody  the  central  thought  of  this  book. 

The  word  '/Esthetic'  is  not  a  ])articularly  hajipy 
one.  It  is  often  vaguely  used  in  Philosophy,  as  well  as 
in  ordinary  s];eech  :  and,  in  some  quarters,  it  has  be- 
come   a    byword   of  opijroljrium  —  a   sort   of    symbol    of 


Preface  vii 

intellectual  weakness.^  The  same  is  true,  however,  with 
many  other  philosophical  terms.  The  realist  and  the 
idealist,  the  catholic  and  the  eclectic,  have  each  been 
laughed  at ;  and  the  best  way,  as  some  one  has  said,  to 
rob  philosophic  nicknames  of  their  sting,  is  for  sensible 
men  to  take  them  up,  and  use  them.  The  Greek  term 
auTdrjCTLs,  of  which  it  is  the  English  equivalent,  denoted 
simply  perception  by  the  senses  ;  and  as  it  was  employed 
till  the  close  of  last  century  (even  by  Kant  in  his  Kriti- 
keii),  the  original  Greek  idea  was  retained.  Since  the 
time  of  Baumgarten,  however  (sec  p.  51),  most  writers 
have  limited  the  term  '  aesthetic '  to  that  section  of 
knowledge  and  feeling,  which  concerns  the  Beautiful  in 
all  its  aspects,  including  the  Sublime  along  with  the 
Picturesque,  and  embracing  Art  as  well  as  Nature.  In 
this  definite  sense,  the  word  may  now  be  said  to  be 
almost  naturahsed  in  the  languages  of  Germany,  France, 
England,  Italy,  and  HoUand. 

Jjut  is  there  a  philosophy,  or  a  science,  of  /Esthetics 
at  all  ?  There  are  some  persons  who  have  a  profound 
appreciation  of  Beauty,  who  do  not  care  to  theorise 
about  it.  They  distrust  a  philosophy  of  the  Beautiful, 
imagining  that  if  we  try  to  get  at  its  secret,  its  charm 
will  vanish ;  and  they  think  that  reflection  upon  it 
should  be  confined  to  what  one  of  our  English  writers 
called — it  was  the  title  of  his  book — an  "analytical 
enquiry  into  the  principles  of  taste."  This  is  not  only 
a  reaction  from  the  synthetic  treatment  of  the  subject, 
it  involves  the  abandonment  of  all  theory  or  philosophic 
speculation  regarding  it ;  and  it  is  not  a  little  remarkable 
that  an   agnostic  attitude  of   mind  in  reference  to  the 

1  The  home  of  '  the  esthete  '  is  easily  caricatured  ;  but,  underneath 
the  eccentricities  of  this  type  of  the  dilettante,  there  has  been  a  real 
love  of  the  Beautiful,  a  feeling  for — as  well  as  an  aspiration  after  it — 
which  only  require  the  alliance  of  robustcr  elements  to  give  increased 
harmonv  to  our  niiicteentli-centurv  life. 


viii  Preface 

Beautiful  is  adopted  by  some  of  the  most  ardent  up- 
holders of  the  a  priori  ox  intuitional  doctrine  of  Know- 
ledge and  of  ]\Iorals.  Amongst  contemporary  idealists 
there  are  philosophers  of  renown  who  think  we  cannot 
reach  any  satisfactory  conclusion  in  the  field  of  cTsthetics. 
They  point  to  the  discord  of  the  schools,  their  rival 
theories,  the  vagueness  of  argument  —  a  maximum  of 
debate,  with  a  minimum  of  result.  They  remind  us 
Iiow  it  was  the  ambition  of  every  aspirant  in  philosojihy, 
in  his  undergraduate  days,  to  solve  the  problem  of  the 
Beautiful;  and  they  say,  with  the  astronomer-poet  of 
Persia,  Omar  Khayyam — 

Myself  w'nen  young  did  eagerly  frequent 
Doctor  and  saint,  and  heard  great  argument 

About  it  and  about ;  but  evermore 
Came  out  by  the  same  door,  wh.ere  in  I  went. 

The  study  of  History,  as  well  as  of  Philosophy, 
shows,  however,  that  this  agnostic  attitude  in  reference 
to  the  Beautiful  is  quite  as  irrational  as  is  the  dogmatic 
attitude  of  tiie  doctrinaire.  There  are  moods  of  mind, 
as  every  one  knows,  in  which  one  does  not  require  a 
theory  of  Beauty  ;  but  neither,  in  these  moods,  do  va' 
rerpiire  a  theorv  of  the  True,  or  of  the  Good.  It  must 
also  be  admitted  tiiat  when  our  intellectual  discern- 
ment is  clearest — and  when,  in  conserpience,  a  thcor\' 
emerges — tlie  underlying  mystery  of  things  is  often  more 
vividly  realised  than  it  is  at  other  times.  A  thetiry  is 
(jnly  a  transient  interj)retation  of  tlie  Universe  by  the 
Oetofio^.  the  onlooker  ;.  and  the  fiict  that  he  has  happened 
to  look  on  it  from  a  luminous  point  of  view  does  not 
}>revent  his  seeing  the  veil  of  mystery  behindi. 

"But  tlie  spc'ulative  jjuzzle  as  to  what  underlies  our 
theories  —  whether  they  relate  to  Truth,  Cloudness,  or 
beauty  —  never  troul^les  us,  till  we  double  back  upon 
our  primary  instincts,   and  scrutinise   them,   or  ask   for 


Preface  ix 

their  justification.  As  soon  as  we  do  so,  our  ignorance 
is  disclosed  to  such  an  extent  that  many  prefer  to 
theorise  no  longer,  to  give  up  the  philosophic  quest, 
and  return  to  the  earlier  state  of  mere  recipiency  and 
enjoyment.  So  true  is  it  of  all  ultimate  things,  as  St. 
Augustine  said  of  Time,  "  What  is  it  ?  If  unasked,  I 
know;  if  you  ask  me,  I  know  not."  Our  apprehension 
of  these  ultimata  may  be,  to  adapt  a  phrase  of  Plato's, 
"something  more  dusky  than  knowledge,  something 
more  luminous  than  ignorance,"  and  we  may  wisely 
prefer  a  twilight  view  of  things,  if  our  eyes  are  not 
specially  adapted  for  a  direct  vision  of  the  sun.  It  is 
almost  a  commonplace  to  affirm  that  all  our  knowledge 
of  existence  lies  between  two  opposite  realms  of  ignor- 
ance. Certainly  we  at  present  stand  upon  a  small  (occa- 
sionally sunlit)  promontory,  stretching  out  from  the  land 
of  primal  mystery  whence  we  came,  into  the  ocean  of  a 
still  vaster  ignorance,  over  which  we  must  set  out ;  and 
to  many  minds  there  is  an  equal  fascination  in  the  girdle 
of  darkness,  and  in  the  zone  of  light. 

Agnosticism — as  the  formulated  creed  of  nescience 
—  never  lasts,  either  with  the  individual  or  with  the 
race.  It  is  familiar  as  a  passing  mood  to  all  who 
recognise  the  final  inscrutability  of  things.  But  if  any 
one  adopts  it  as  his  creed,  he  abandons  reason,  or 
pronounces  its  exercise  to  be  illusory.  Neither  the 
individual,  nor  the  race,  has  ever  acquiesced  in  such  a 
view  of  its  powers,  for  any  length  of  time  ;  and  specu- 
lation as  to  the  ultimate  essence  of  things — admittedly 
mysterious  —  always  revives,  after  every  temporary  sup- 
pression. The  overthrow  of  an  accepted  dogma,  its 
demonstrated  failure  to  exhaust  the  subject  with  which 
it  deals,  instead  of  preventing  the  rise  of  a  new  one, 
rather  promotes  it.  All  history  shows  that  the  world 
soon  tires  of  its  best  theories,  and  that  it  would  rather 
dispense  with  philosophising,  than  be  tied  down  to  one 


X  Preface 

philoso])hy.  Solution  afier  solution  is  struck  out  by  the 
mind  of  the  race,  like  those  vital  products  evolved  by 
the  ani)iia  minidi,  which  live  and  perish  in  the  struggle 
for  existence.  Tliey  "  have  their  day,  and  cease  to  be,'' 
but  the  organic  thought  of  the  world  moves  on,  demand- 
ing a  fresh  interpretation  of  the  mystery  of  things  : 
and  it  wearies  of  agnosticism,  sooner  than  it  becomes 
tired  of  any  single  tlieory,  however  imperfect.  That  its 
instincts  are  on  the  side  of  the  positive  and  the  con- 
r-iructive,  rather  than  of  the  negative  and  the  destructive, 
Avill  be  abundantly  seen  in  the  historical  outlines  which 
follow. 

It  may  be  asked,  however,  why  we  should  care  to 
record  all  the  theoretic  guesses,  conjectures,  and  approxi- 
mate solutions — recorded  in  books  and  essays,  as  well 
as  in  larger  treatises — wlien  the  main  point  is  the 
u'oal  to  which  each  has  tended,  and  the  discoveries 
that  have  very  gradually  resulted  from  them  ?  The 
answer  is  at  hand.  It  is  because  there  is  no  final  goal  ; 
and  because  every  stage  reached  in  the  evolution  of  the 
nrind  of  the  race,  wiiile  dealing  with  the  problems  of 
Pldlosophy,  has  an  almost  equal  interest.  To  the 
student  of  History,  these  are  not  only  links  in  a  chain 
which  can  never  be  completed,  they  are  also  the  pro- 
gressive unfolding  of  the  Universal  Reason — which  im- 
measurably transcends  that  of  the  individual,  and  is 
sievertheless  its  deepest  essence.  As  such,  the  theoretic 
luesses  of  the  curliest  generations  —  wiiich  we  can 
recover  by  analogy  when  statistics  fail  us  —  are  much 
more  interesting  than  the  fossil  remains  of  a  still 
earlier  life,  which  we  find  in  the  rock  strata  of  the  earth  : 
and  as  memorials  of  past  insight,  they  contain  a  piartial 
key  to  the  theories  of  to-day. 

Accurate  knowledge  of  previous  speculation  is  always 
our  best  guide  in  the  study  of  a  problem  that  is  peren- 
nial ;   and  while  the  b.istorv  of  I'hiliMStMihv  sliows  that  the 


Preface  xi 

most  perfect  theory  is  doomed  to  oblivion,  no  less 
certainly  than  the  imperfect  ones,  and  that  they  all 
revive  after  temporary  extinction,  we  can  contribute 
nothing  of  value  to  the  controversies  of  our  time  by 
striving  after  an  originality  that  dispenses  with  the 
past. 

Before  we  begin  the  examination  of  these  theories, 
it  is  perhaps  worthy  of  note  that  a  study  of  the  Beautiful, 
and  its  appreciation,  has  often  proved  a  counteractive 
to  cynicism,  and  to  the  despair  of  reaching  conclusions 
that  are  verifiable  in  other  provinces.  It  is  obvious 
that  tlie  study  cannot  be  either  begun,  or  carried 
on,  in  the  ;;//  ad/jiirafi  mood  of  the  cynic.  Even 
when  the  search  for  "  first  principles  "  lias  been  aban- 
doned, meta])hysics  given  up,  and  tlie  "categorical 
imperative "  deemed  baseless,  a  reliable  footing  has 
been  found  in  the  sphere  of  the  Beautiful,  whence  a 
way  may  be  discovered,  leading  back  into  that  of  the 
True  and  the  Good.  Matthew  Arnold  represented 
Goethe  as  saying 

The  end  is  everywhere, 
Art  still  has  truth,  take  refuge  there. 

Certainly  some  have  found  it  possible,  after  the  dis- 
integration of  belief  in  the  intellectual  and  moral 
sj)here,  to  resist  further  loss  by  holding  fast  to  what 
can  be  proved  within  the  sphere  of  Art ;  and  they  have 
afterwards  found  some  help  in  the  solution  of  other 
problems  by  means  of  it.  The  light  which  it  casts 
on  the  central  inquiry  of  Theism,  I  hope  to  show  in  my 
second  volume. 

In  the  brief  analyses  which  follow — both  of  the  major 
and  the  minor  writers — I  have,  in  all  important  cases, 
added  a  critical  estimate  to  the  resume  given ;  and, 
unless  when  the  opposite  is  indicated  by  quotation 
marks,   my  account  of  the  theory,   the  treatise,   or  the 


xii  Preface 

essay  is  one  for  which  I  am  to  be  held  responsible,  and 
not  the  author.  Some  books  dealing  with  the  several 
Arts — Poetry,  ]\Iusic,  Painting,  Architecture,  and  Sculp- 
ture—  which  have  not  been  analysed,  will  be  referred 
to  in  the  subsequent  discussion  of  these  Arts  in  detail. 

A  Guide  to  the  Literature  of  y-Esthetics,  by  ^Messrs. 
Gayley  and  Scott  (University  of  California),  containing 
a  mass  of  most  useful  bibliographical  information, 
reached  me  after  these  sheets  were  in  the  press ;  and  an 
interesting  series  of  papers  of  a  similar  kind,  by  F.  ^^^ 
Foster,  in  Notes  afid  Queries,  8th  September  to  lyth 
November  1888,  has  only  just  become  known  to  me. 
The  perusal  of  these,  while  too  late  to  be  of  use  in  this 
volume,  has  shown  me  that  some  lacu.nae  remain,  especi- 
ally in  the  more  recent  literatures  of  Germany,  Italy,  and 
France ;  and  I  have  not  been  able  to  deal  with  that  of 
Russia,  though  aware  that  it  is  a  field  which  ought  to  be 
explored.  It  is  less  likely  that  works  of  importance  in 
ancient,  mediruval,  or  modern  philosophy,  up  to  the  last 
decade,  have  been  overlooked. 

The  German  histories  of  '  Aesthetik '  are  more  ela- 
borate than  those  of  France,  or  any  that  we  possess  in 
England ;  but  in  this,  as  in  other  departments  of  Pliilo- 
sophy,  German  writers  confine  themselves  in  the  main  to 
their  own  countrymen.  If  more  learned,  they  are  some- 
times less  catholic  than  the  historians  of  other  lands. 
ITom  the  tendency  to  dwell  too  much  on  one"s  own 
literature,  few  can  escape  ;  and  wliile  it  has  been  my  aim 
to  study  the  philosophy  of  each  race  dispassionately,  and 
to  give  i)rominence  to  all,  it  will  be  found  that,  in  tliis 
volume,  the  British  section  is  longer  than  the  others. 

W.  K. 


COiNTENTS 


PAGE 

Prefack  ,.,..-    v-xii 

CHAP. 

I.     IXTRODUCTORY                    .                   .                   ,  ,                    •             I 

TI.   Pretiistoric  Origins             .             .  .             ,         7 

III.  Oriental  Art,  and  Speculation 

1.  Egypt      ......       12 

2.  Semitic  Tendencies           .               .  .14 

3.  A.siatic  Art           .              .              ,  .16 

IV.  Tii;:  riiiLCsoriiY  of  Greece 

1.  Introductory         .               .               .  .               .        l8 

2.  Socrates  and  Plato            .              .  .              .22 

3.  Aristotle                .              .              ,  .              -        27 

V.  The  Negteatonists 

1.  Plotinns  .              .              .  .              .30 

2.  Proclus    .              .              .              .  .              -33 

\T.   The  Gr/Eco-Roman  Period 

1.  Introductory         .              .              .  .              -35 

2.  Lucretius,  Virgil,  Cicero,  etc,      .  .              .36 

3.  \'itruvius  to  Philostratus                .  .               .40 

VH.    MeDI-EVAI.ISM 

1.  The  Patristic  Writers       .              .  .43 

2.  The  Thirteenth  Century  .              .  .              .44 

3.  The  Fifteenth  Century     .               .  .               .46 


CHAP. 
VIII. 


Contents 


I'lIII.OSOi'HV    OK    Gf.RMANV 

Lcihnii/.  lo  LcssiiiL,' 
Mendelssohn  to  Kani 
Ilcnlcr  l(j  Iliunljoldi 
SchclIinL;  to  Sclilcierniachcr 
Hegel  lo  Carriire 
Schopenhauer  and  Ilarlniann 
Lotze  to  Juiigmann 
The  Literature  of  Denmark 


65 
70 

So 


TllK 

I. 


PHILOSOI'IIY    O!-'    I'RAXCK 
Descartes 
Crousaz  to  Ruffier 
Anche  to  J)iderot 
Montesquieu  to  Cousin    . 
Lamennais  to  [ouflroy 
Swiss  writers  ;    Topfler  to  Cherhuliez 
Levecjue  to  TliDre 
\  eron,  Coster,   \'allet,  etc. 
Gu'.au,  etc. 


91 

94 
1 00 
106 

113 

H7 
I -J 
1 3" 

i;S 


X.   The  I'mi.osoi'HV  of  Iiai.v 


Leon  Latti.-^ta  Alberti  to  J.   P.  Bcllori 
Rosniini  to  Maniiani 


XII. 


The   I'liiLOsoi'iiY  ok  IIoi.i.anw 

TitK     I'lIlI.OSOl'HY    Ol'    LlUIAIX 

1.    IJaciin  ti)  Ilutcheson 
Ik-rkeley  to  Hogarth 
lim-ke  to  Sir  Joslnia  RcNiKild-. 
Lord  Kainies  tn  Thimias  l\ei< 
AHson  to  W.  Thonix.ii    . 
Lrasnius  Dai'wiii  tn  S.  T.  T'olcridge 
David  Wilkii-  tn  Sir  William  Haniiltni, 
MA'icar  tn  (  len'-e  Lani:-ay 
CiM-lyle  m  Ku.kin 
l.nid   I.ind-ay  In  l'rn|i>snr   D.iiii  . 
\\'ir;i.un  Ik   Senlt  to  (lini-lc^  Darwin 


+  .-1 


140 
■53 


ir.4 
170 


/  3 


"ki 

200 

2r-.S 
2)6 


Contents  xv 


CHAT, 


XII.  TiiK  raiLosorifY  ok  Bkitaix  [contiiuicd')  page 

12.  Herbert  Spencer  to  Mr.  Sully      .              .  239 

13.  Canon  Mozley  to  Mr.  Grant  Allen           ,              .  246 

14.  William  Morris  to  W.  P.  Ker     .              .              .  254 

15.  ^^'.  Ci.  Collini;\voocl  to  J.  A.  Symond^    .              .  259 

XIII.   The  PiiiLosornY  ov  America 

1.  1S15  to  1849        .....  269 

2.  1867  to  1S76        .....  273 

3.  1S80  to  1890        .....  277 

Imje.\  .......  28^ 


CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

To  present  even  an  outline  of  philosophical  opinion  on  the 
subject  of  the  Beautiful,  it  will  not  suffice  merely  to  state 
the  chief  theories  in  chronological  order,  presenting  them 
in  their  technical  framework.  Nor  will  it  be  possible  to 
proceed  by  way  of  exact  quotation  from  the  more  important 
treatises  that  have  come  down  to  us  from  antiquity. 
However  admirable  in  themselves,  literal  extracts — even 
from  the  greatest  writers  of  the  world — become,  like  the 
volumes  from  which  they  are  taken,  dry -as -dust.  A 
"golden  treasury"  of  disconnected  wisdom  soon  loses  its 
character,  and  becomes  one  of  iron  or  of  clay.  To 
deal  in  a  vital  manner  with  the  history  of  opinion  on  any 
subject,  it  is  necessary  to  show  how  theories  have  been 
evolved,  how  they  have  been  the  outcome  of  social  as  \\ell 
as  of  intellectual  causes,  and  have  often  been  the  product  of 
obscure  phenomena  in  the  life  of  a  nation. 

In  the  department  of  ^Esthetics  especially,  many  germs 
of  subsequent  theor)'  will  be  found  in  the  primitive  Art  of 
the  world.  The  earliest  attempt  at  ornament  of  any  kind 
was  due  to  much  more  than  casual  fancy,  or  choice.  It 
was  the  result  of  a  real  perception  of  the  beautiful, 
however  rude  ;  while  each  success  in  embellishment  gave 
new  insight  to  the  worker.  After  many  efforts  and 
failures,  he  paused  to  reflect  on  his  work  ;  and  out  of  this 

B 


2  TJic  Plu'losophy  of  the  Bemitifid         chap. 

reflex  process — doubling  back  on  the  primitive  perception 
of  Nature,  and  judging  critically  of  Ornament — the  earliest 
theorisings  as  to  Beauty  arose. 

In  the  poetry,  music,  and  art  of  each  nation  and  peiiod 
\ve  ha\-e  evidence  that  the  general  mind  of  the  race  has 
from  the  first  been  struggling,  as  it  were,  with  ideas  on  the 
subiect  of  the  Beautiful  —  ideas  which  it  has  never  been 
able  fully  to  grasp,  but  which  it  has  discerned  f  ;r  a  time, 
then  dropped  or  lost  sight  of,  under  the  pressure  of  other 
interests.  These  ideas  have  not  been  created  hy  the  Itis- 
toric  evolution  of  the  race.  They  have  been  with  it  from 
the  commencement  of  its  history,  although  they  have  some- 
times been  latent,  and  although  their  possessors  have  been 
often  quite  unconscious  of  them. 

In  those  countries  and  periods,  however,  in  which 
creative  Art  has  liourished  most,  the  criticism  of  Art  has 
been  most  fragmentary  and  least  adccjuate.  The  reason  is 
evident.  When  original  insight  is  present  and  active  in 
a  people,  it  sweeps  criticism  before  it,  as  a  hindrance  or 
an  irrelevancy  ;  but  as  soon  as  the  flood  has  spent  itself, 
and  the  tide  begins  to  el)b,  reflection  upon  the  past  is 
natural  and  inevitable.  Men  proceed  to  take  stock  of  their 
inheritance,  and  to  aj^praise  what  they  cannot  no^\■  produce. 
There  were  no  treatises  on  the  art  of  Sculpture,  for  exrunple. 
written  in  the  age  of  Pericles  :  and  no  criticism  of  the  art 
of  Painting  appeared  in  the  Medicean  jjeriod. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  the  chief  artistic  periods 
in  history  have  not  been  the  iy.'>st  notable,  monilly  and 
politically.  An  appreciation  of  the  Beautiful  has  followed, 
rather  than  accomjKuiied,  the  times  of  greatest  n;itional 
aspiration  and  success.  It  h.as  sometinies  been  their  fruit. 
In  the  Athenian  and  Spartan  states,  so  long  as  political 
freedom  was  esteemed  the  most  precious  thing  a  nation  could 
cniriv.  and  so  Ion,;-  as  the  struggle  for  it  lasted,  there  was 
mu.rh  less  intere-t  in  the  Ik'aiuiful  than  afterwards.  In  the 
Periclean  ])eriod.  when  the  old  robur>tnes5  had  died  out.  th.e 
appreciation  of  .\rt  set  in.  Similarly  in  ]\ome.  after  the 
stern  work  of  tlie  legions  had  ended,  when  law  and  oi-d.er 
were   established,  a   certain   amount   of  effemir.acv  ;\as   the 


I  Introductory  3 

result  of  the  peace  that  followed  ;  and  then  it  was  that 
the  appreciation  of  Art  was  greatest.  Parallel  illustra- 
tions may  easily  be  found,  both  in  oriental  and  in  modern 
history. 

It  is  almost  a  corollary  from  this  to  say  that  no  nation 
has  ever  been  at  the  time  aware  of  its  own  artistic  decline. 
Xay,  its  critics  and  art-workers  have  even  sometimes  inter- 
preted, what  posterity  has  seen  to  be  a  regress,  as  a  forward 
movement,  or  as  an  ascent.  This  remark  applies  to  national 
decadence,  not  only  in  Art,  but  also  in  every  other  direction 
— in  philosophy,  in  morals,  in  political  life,  and  in  religion. 

An  important  difference  between  the  history  of  Esthetics, 
and  that  of  almost  every  other  branch  of  philosophy  must, 
however,  be  pointed  out.  In  following  the  course  of  the 
logical  and  metaphysical  thought  of  the  world,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  take  account  of  all  the  co-operating  causes 
which  have  been  at  work  in  the  intellectual  life  of  each 
nation.  We  can  detach  the  speculative  effort  which  has 
been  directed  to  these  problems,  from  that  which  has  been 
]3e=.towed  on  others,  without  injury  to  the  treatment  of  the 
former,  and  often  with  distinct  advantage.  It  is  true  that 
in  dealing  with  Ethics  we  must  always  take  into  account 
the  effect  of  moral  theory  on  practice,  and  on  social  life 
generally.  It  will  be  found  almost  impossible,  however, 
to  detach  the  history  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Beautiful 
from  the  theory  and  the  practice  of  the  several  Arts. 
The  evolution  of  speculative  thought  on  the  subject  of 
Beauty  is  mirrored  to  us  in  the  development  of  Art, 
and  it  is  thus  perhaps  that  its  tendencies  are  best 
understood.  We  see  the  working",  and  at  times  the 
fermenting  activity,  of  a  particular  aesthetic  theory  in  the 
subsequent  history  of  an  art -school,  and  not  only  in  the 
literature  of  a  period,  but  in  the  very  customs  of  society. 
The  two  are  so  closely  upbound  that  a  theory  of  Ileauty  is 
at  the  same  time  a  doctrine  of  Art,  while  every  doctrine  of 
Art  is  based  upon  a  theory  as  to  the  nature  of  I^eauty  ;  and 
the  history  of  the  two  run  on  parallel  lines,  and  often  on 
the  same  ones.  Being  thus  so  closely  kindred  in  origin, 
and  evolved  together,  it  is  evident  that  a  knowledge  of  the 


4  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

history  ot  Art  is  essential  to  a  knowledge  of  the  theory  of 
-•Esthetics. 

In  the  historical  outlines  which  follow,  it  wi!!  some- 
times be  found  that  a  philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  lies  by 
implication  within  a  speculative  system,  when  it  is  not  ex- 
plicitly announced.  Even  if  Plato  had  never  touched  the 
subject  in  any  of  his  dialogues,  it  would  have  been  possible, 
from  a  study  of  his  ideal  theory,  as  unfolded  in  the 
T'necEtctiis.  the  Sophist,  and  the  Par)>ienidcs.  to  foresee  more 
than  the  outward  form  which  a  philosophy  of  the  Beautiful 
would  assume,  in  any  school  which  drew  its  inspiration 
from  him.  St.  Augustine's  work  De  Apto  ct  Pu^chro  has 
perished,  but  we  can  without  difficulty  reconstruct  his 
theory  from  other  passages  in  his  writings.  The  sentences 
of  Thomas  Aquinas  on  the  subiect  are  like  the  fragmentary 
bones  of  the  mammoth,  found  as  fossils  in  the  drift,  but  a 
whole  volume  may  be  written  (and  has  been)  on  his  doctrine 
dc  puIcJiro.  Descartes  wrote  nothing  directly  on  the  sub- 
ject, nor  did  Leibnitz  ;  but  neither  the  Cartesian  nor  the 
Leibnitzian  doctrine  on  the  nature  of  the  Beautiful  is 
difficult  to  find.  This  will  be  seen  more  fully  in  its  proper 
historical  place. 

It  will  be  further  seen  that  the  constancy  with  which 
the  two  great  schools  of  philosophical  thought  on  this 
suljject  appear  and  reappear  in  history — in  e\ery  country 
arising',  falling,  and  rising''  again,  in  every  literature 
assuming  new  phases,  but  in  each  showing"  thoni-elves 
su])erior  to  the  assaults  that  seemed  for  a  time  to  over- 
throw them — is  the  best  evidence  that  there  is  a  funda- 
mental truth  at  the  heart  of  each,  as  well  as  an  integral 
place  for  .Esthetics  within  the  liierarch\'  of  the  science?. 

Taking  then  the  history  of  opinion  on  the  suljject  of  the 
Beautiful,  along  with  the  Art  which  has  reflected  it,  we 
might  roughly  divide  its  periods  as  follows.  (In  the  tw(3 
first  what  we  have  chieily  to  note  is  the  embodiment  of  the 
Beautiful  in  Art.  It  is  not  till  the  third  is  reached  that 
pliilosf<phical  refiection  upcjn  it  strictly  Ijegins.)  (T )  The 
beginnin,,;-  of  Art.  as  seen  in  pakeoJithic  ornament,  wood 
and  bone  car\ing,  and  decorative   work   of  all   kinds.      (2) 


I  Introdiictory  5 

Oriental  Art,  and  speculation  of  the  simplest  kind  ;  includ- 
ing, as  subsections,  (a)  the  Egyptian,  {U)  the  Semitic  or 
Hebrew,  {c)  the  Assyrian,  (<'/)  the  Persian,  {e)  the  Indian, 
(/)  the  Chinese,  and  {g)  the  Japanese.  (3)  The  Greek 
Philosophy  and  Art.  (4)  The  Alexandrian.  (5)  The  Graco- 
Roman  period.  (6)  The  Mediaeval.  (7)  The  Philosophy  of 
Germany.  (8)  The  Philosophy  of  France,  including  that  of 
Switzerland.  (9)  The  Philosophy  of  Italy.  (10)  The 
Philosophy  of  Holland.  (11)  The  philosophical  writers 
and  literary  critics  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland.  (12)  The 
Philosophy  of  America.  (13)  That  of  Denmark,  Russia, 
and  other  countries. 

It  is  scarcely  possible  to  exhibit  the  progress  of  philo- 
sophical theory  on  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful,  or  the 
progress  of  the  Art  which  has  embodied  it,  in  exact 
chronological  order,  by  merely  passing  from  century  to 
century,  and  noting  each  important  doctrine  or  treatise,  and 
each  great  art-product,  in  the  precise  order  of  their  appear- 
ance. If  this  could  be  done,  it  would  doubtless  show  how 
the  organic  thought  of  the  world  has  evolved  itself  along 
particular  lines.  In  thus  tracing  the  wider  evolution  of  the 
mind  of  the  race,  the  sequences  of  national  development 
would,  however,  be  lost  to  view  ;  and  the  progress  of  the 
Philosophy  of  each  nation,  within  its  own  area,  and  its 
characteristic  type  of  x\rt,  are  quite  as  significant  as  is  the 
growth  of  organic  thought  and  cosmopolitan  art.  It  is 
therefore  every  way  most  convenient  to  deal  with  the 
history  of  opinion  within  broad  national  areas  successively. 
The  one  disadvantage  in  this  method  of  procedure  is  that 
if  we  follow  the  stream  of  doctrine  within  each  country 
from  its  beginning  to  its  close,  and  note  every  writer  of 
importance,  there  cannot  fail  to  be  occasional  repetitions. 
This  will  perhaps  be  forgiven  if  we  find  in  the  end  that, 
while  there  is  "  nothing  new  under  the  sun  "'" — alike  in  philo- 
sophical theory  and  in  artistic  work  —  in  another  sense 
everything  is  new,  in  virtue  of  the  local  phases  it  assumes, 
and  the  characteristics  which  mark  it  off,  both  from  its 
predecessors  and  its  successors. 

In  tracing  the  sequence  of  opinion  in  each  country  we 


6  TJic  Pliilosopliy  of  the  Beautiful       chap,  i 

must  note  the  influence  of  foreign  as  well  as  of  native 
thought.  German  speculation,  for  example,  told  directly 
upon  that  of  France,  in  the  development  of  the  type  ot 
philosophy  which  arose  in  Paris  at  the  beginning  of  this 
century  ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  understand  the  iniellcctua; 
position  of  Jouffroy  and  Levcque  without  some  knowledge 
of  Kant,  Schelling,  and  Hegel.  The  affinity  of  genuine 
philosophy  in  all  ages,  and  the  solidarity  of  the  tliought 
of  the  world,  are  nowhere  seen  more  clearly  than  in  the 
history  of  ^esthetic  theon.-. 


CHAPTER    II 

PREHISTORIC    ORIGINS 
Primi/ive  Mati 

So  far  back  as  we  can  go,  by  the  help  of  the  memorials 
which  survive,  and  by  the  further  Hght  of  analogical  infer- 
ence, it  would  seem  that  primitive  man  had  a  real,  although 
a  dim  and  rudimentary,  appreciation  of  the  Beautiful.  As 
soon  as  the  qualities  of  objects  were  perceived,  as  distinct 
from  their  quantity  or  bulk,  their  aesthetic  side  was  also 
noted.  Beauty  was  recognised  as  a  fact,  and  etibrts  were 
even  made  to  reproduce  it  in  ornament,  in  a  rude  sort  of 
way.  Accepting  the  analogy  between  the  development  of 
the  faculties  of  a  child,  and  the  evolution  of  the  race  at  large, 
we  may  trace  in  the  infantile  stage  of  the  latter  a  love  of 
brilliance,  of  warmth,  and  of  vivid  contrasts  of  all  sorts,  alike 
in  colour  and  in  sound.  Bright  flowers,  gaily  plumaged 
birds,  clear  strong  notes,  and  all  natural  products  that  were 
vivid  (whatever  their  other  features),  attracted  primitive 
man,  apart  from  their  titility.  No  doubt  the  discernment 
of  use  would  enhance  the  sense  of  beauty  at  the  very  outset  ; 
but,  from  the  first,  use  was  not  the  sole  interest  or  the 
primary  charm  ;  it  was  only  a  secondary  and  an  accessory 
one. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  a  savage — at  the  time  when 
his  home  was  a  cave  or  a  forest  grove — amusing  himself 
in  the  bright  weather  by  imitating  the  voices  of  birds,  or 
by  scratching  rude  outlines  of  them,  and  of  other  animals, 
on  the  walls   of  his   dwelling,  or  on  the   rock -faces  around. 


8  The  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful         chap. 

It  would  be  the  natural  outcome  of  a  joyous  mood  of  feeling 
on  a  bright  day  ;  and  the  excitement  of  the  play-impul=e — 
the  spiti-tru'b,  of  which  Schiller  makes  so  much  in  his 
.•Esthetic  Letters — would  urge  him  on.  The  recognition  of 
the  Beauty  of  Nature,  however,  springs  from  a  source  much 
deeper  than  this  spiel-t>'icb  ;  and  there  canncn  be  a  doubt 
that  prehistoric  man  showed  a  real  appreciation  of  orna- 
mental forms.  The  representation  of  animal  and  vegetable 
products — such  as  the  antlers  of  deer,  and  the  leaves  of 
plants  and  trees — on  the  sides  of  the  cave- dwellings  is 
proof  of  this.  Probably  the  appreciation  of  colour  was  still 
earlier,  although  no  record  of  it  survives  ;  but  on  their  tiint- 
arrows  and  the  handles  of  their  knives  there  were  rude 
attempts  at  carving,  or  decorative  ornament,  of  a  ])urely 
imitative  kind.  It  was  most  natural  that  the  bravest  or 
most  honciured  in  a  tribe  of  savages,  the  primitive  chief 
should  wish  to  possess  some  mark  of  distinction,  that  he 
should  wear  as  a  trophy  some  memorial  of  an  animal  slain 
(a  feather  or  a  horn),  and  that  he  should  have  his  weapons 
made  ornamental  as  well  as  useful.  The  most  useful  shape 
for  the  primitive  weapon  would  first  be  di5co\'ered.  and  that 
it  should  afterwards  be  ornamented,  if  the  orr;ament  did  not 
lessen  the  use,  followed  almost  as  a  matter  of  course. 

The  absence  of  highly  developed  art  in  the  memorials 
of  primitive  man  has  been  taken  as  an  evidence  against 
the  descent,  and  in  favour  of  the  ascent  of  the  race.  It 
has  been  said  that  had  we  "  lapsed  from  higher  place.'' 
the  art  of  the  primitive  world  wcnild  ha\e  been  more 
{jerfect  than  any  that  the  world  has  subsequently  kn(.)wn. 
Be  this  as  it  may,  it  is  evident  that  to  the  rudimentary 
instinct  of  se!f-pre~er\'ation — \\"hich  \\'as  at  work  from  th.e 
nrst — there  was  added  very  early  the  instinct  of  adornment 
or  beautincation.  These  two  instincts  have  always  worked 
together,  although  the  second  was  longer  in  becoming 
visible.  Its  development  may  have  been  delayed  until  it 
was  cjuickened  by  the  rise  of  a  new  want.  As  is  well  known, 
the  higher  any  organism  is,  the  more  numerous  are  its 
wants.  As  the\"  multiply,  they  \  ary  ;  and  as  they  wary,  they 
become   refined.       Primitive   man,   engaged   mainly   in   the 


n  Prehistoric  Origins  g 

struggle  for  existence,  was  not  highly  intellectual.  He  had 
comparatively  few  things  to  record  beyond  his  efforts  at 
self-maintenance,  and  no  great  variety  of  feelings  to  express. 
Neither  intellect  nor  emotion  was  as  yet  evolved  into  com- 
plexity ;  but  as  soon  as  their  evolution  began,  with  the 
growth  of  mind  came  differentiation  of  faculty,  and  it  v,-as 
only  to  be  expected  that  the  play-impulse  and  the  art-impulse 
would  be  evolved  together  as  twin  tendencies,  and  that  the 
cave  -  dwellers  should  amuse  themselves  by  carving  and 
decoration,  as  much  as  by  dance  and  song. 

Primitive  art  was  to  a  certain,  extent  an  imitation  of 
Nature,  but  while  imitation  guided  it,  the  copying  became 
creative.  Its  purpose  was  to  produce  something  which  the 
mere  looking  on  Nature  did  not  yield,  else  why  have  copied 
it  ?  Why  not  ha\'e  l^een  content  with  gazing  at,  or  with  hand- 
ling, the  things  copied  ?  From  its  earliest  phases,  in  tracing 
rude  outlines  of  figures  on  walls,  to  the  carving  of  wood 
and  bone  with  flint-knives,  from  this  to  the  moulding  of 
vessels  in  clay,  or  the  twisting  of  vegetable  fibre  into  baskets, 
and  thence  to  primitive  metal  work,  not  only  did  use  direct 
the  art  of  savages,  but  a  sense  of  ornament  also  guided  it. 

Another  element  seems  to  have  been  conjoined  with  this, 
somewhat  early  in  the  history  of  man.  As  nature-worship 
was  probably  one  of  the  earliest  forms  of  religion,  primitive 
art  represented  Nature  for  a  religious  purpose,  and  of 
necessity  made  use  of  symbols.  This,  however,  was  not 
developed  to  any  great  extent,  until  we  reach  the  historic 
period  ;  and,  so  far  as  surviving  memorials  guide  us  in  our 
reading  of  history,  the  principal  thing  to  be  noted  in  the  art 
of  savages  is  that  at  a  very  early  period  a  sense  of  beauty 
was  added  to  that  of  utility.  Occasionally,  though  rarely, 
the  use  was  lessened  by  the  ornament  ;  more  frecjuently  the 
beauty  was  sacrificed  to  the  use.  Ornament,  however,  was 
seldom  thrust  in  unnecessarily.  It  was  put  in  for  a  pur- 
pose, and  left  to  tell  its  own  tale  ;  while  an  artistic  spirit 
is  sometimes  seen,  even  in  the  way  in  which  things  were 
left  unfinished. 

r\Ir.  Andrew  Lang  is  of  opmion  that  the  theory  of  the 
earliest    Art    being    "  the    disinterested    expression    of   the 


ro  T]ie  PJiilosophy  of  tJie  Beautiful         chap. 

imitative  faculty,"  is  "  scarcely  warranted  by  the  little  we 
know  of  art's  beginnings  "  {Custom  and  MytJi^  p.  276).  The 
earliest  art  was,  he  thinks,  decorative  rather  than  imitative  : 
and  he  points  out  that  some  aboriginal  races  distinguish 
their  families  by  plants  or  animals,  from  which  they  fancy 
they  have  sprung,  and  that  they  occasionally  blazon  their 
shields  or  tattoo  their  breasts  with  images  of  these  creatures 
— which  custom  he  thinks  may  be  the  origin  of  heraldry. 
That  primitive  art  was  never  imitative  for  any  other  than  a 
practical  purpose,  may  perhaps  be  an  extreme  position.  It 
is  difficult  to  see  v/hy  the  pakcolithic  men  of  the  Dordogne 
should,  50,000  years  ag'o,  have  carved  figures  of  the  reindeer 
on  their  knife -handles  for  a  purely  practical  purpose.  The 
ornament  did  not  help  them  in  the  sulssequent  use  of  the 
knife.  May  not  some  real  perception  of  beauty  of  form, 
a  desire  to  copy  it,  and  to  retain  it  because  it  was  "a 
thing  of  beauty "  as  well  as  a  successful  copy,  have  guided 
them  from  the  first  ? 

All  that  Mr.  Edward  B.  Tylor  has  written  on  the  subject 
of  Primitive  Man  is  worthy  of  special  consideration.  In 
1890  he  wrote:  "We  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  say 
anything  clear  and  definite  as  to  the  principles  of  beauty 
as  apprehended  by  primitive  man.  The  savages  who  re- 
present primitive  man,  like  the  mammoth  period  men,  show 
clearly  by  their  artistic  works  that  they  had  ideas  of  what 
was  beautiful,  but  we  do  not  know  what  led  them  tcj  think 
their  ornamental  patterns  beautiful.  I  do  not  even  know 
what  led  them  to  think  a  necklace  of  berries,  or  a  feather 
in  their  nose,  a  beautiful  appendage.  At  the  Pitt  Ri\er> 
Museum  we  are  working  out  some  evidence  that  oina- 
ments  are  often  broken  -  down  representations  of  men. 
dogs,  cords,  plaiting,  etc.,  with  a  sense  rather  of  utility  than 
of  decoration." 

To  this  may  l^e  added  what  Mr.  Owen  Jones  has  said  of 
savage  ornament  :  "The  ornament  of  a  savage  tribe,  being 
the  result  of  a  natural  instinct,  is  necessarily  always  true  to 
its  purpose;  whilst  in  much  of  the  ornament  of  civilised 
nations,  the  first  impulse  which  generated  received  forms 
being   enfeebled    by   constant    repetition,   the    ornament    is 


II  PreJiistoric  Origins  ii 

oftentimes  misapplied,  and  instead  of  first  seeking  the  most 
convenient  form,  and  adding  beauty,  all  beauty  is  destroyed, 
because  all  fitness,  by  superadding  ornament  to  ill-contrived 
form.  If  we  would  return  to  a  more  healthy  condition,  we 
must  even  be  as  little  children,  or  as  savages  ;  we  must  get 
rid  of  the  acquired  and  artificial,  and  return  to  and  develop 
natural  instincts"  {G^-anuiiar  of  Ornament^  p.  i6). 


CHAPTER    III 

ORIENTAL    ART,    AND    SPECULATION 
I.  Egypt 

A  WIDE  interval  separates  the  art-work  of  prehistoric  man 
from  the  earliest  known  relics  of  the  P2gyptian  and  Assyrian 
artists  ;  and  the  links  of  connection  between  the  two  are 
irreparably  lost.  In  examining  what  survives,  we  start 
with  a  really  high  state  of  civilisation.  At  the  very  dawn  of 
history,  both  in  Egypt  and  Assyria,  Architecture  is  already 
developed  on  a  colossal  scale,  alike  in  Pyramid  and  Temple, 
with  statues  corresponding.  We  find  sculptured  walls  and 
painted  tomlas.  We  find  picture-writing',  and  hieroglyphics 
of  many  kinds,  on  slab  and  column  ;  while  in  Ii^gypt  there 
was  certainly  some  appreciation  of  landscape  beauty.  In 
pictures  which  still  survive,  we  have  representations  of 
houses  with  gardens  attached,  containing  ponds,  and  parks 
with  game-preserves,  in  which  the  element  of  beauty  is  as 
evident  as  that  of  utility. 

In  the  remarkable  k^gyptian  figure  of  the  scril:)e,  now  in 
the  Louvre,  the  pupils  of  the  eyes  are  formed  of  rock- 
cr)vstal,  placed  in  white  (piartz.  lie  is  lepresented  as  look- 
ing up  to  a  speaker  ;  and  tlie  expression  of  the  countenance 
is  not  much  inferior  to  that  of  the  best  Greek  statues.  It 
belr)ngs  prol^ably  to  the  jieriod  of  the  sixth  dynasty.  Such 
a  work  of  art,  however,  is  excejitional  ;  and  it  is  to  be 
obsci\-ed  that,  as  a  rule,  tlie  artist  was  not  honoured  in  Egy])t, 
as  he  came  to  be  in  Greece.  He  was  usually  one  of  the 
working  chiss.      The   artist  was  lost  in  the  house-painter  or 


CHAP.  Ill       Oriental  Art,  and  Speadation  13 

decorator,  the  architect  in  the  mason  or  builder.  This 
may  partly  explain  the  monotony  and  the  repetition  which 
characterise  Egyptian  art.  Its  features  were  stereotyped  (the 
lotus-flower,  for  example),  and  copied  mechanically  for  ages. 

While  the  earliest  surviving  art  of  Egypt  is  the  most 
perfect,  Mr.  Owen  Jones  is  of  opinion  that  all  that  remains 
shows  it  to  us  in  a  state  of  decline  ;  and  that  monuments 
which  were  set  up  2000  years  B.C.  are  only  the  ruins  of 
more  perfect  ones.  He  thinks  that  the  earliest  known  Art 
of  Egypt  is  inferior  to  the  still  earlier  unknown  Art,  and 
that  ''the  Egyptians  were  inferior  only  to  themselves'' 
{GramiJiar  of  Ornajnent,  p.  22).  This  judgment  is  more 
than  doubtful,  but  in  connection  with  it,  it  is  worthy  of 
note  that  we  find  no  trace  of  foreign  influence  at  work  in 
Egyptian  Art.  Its  primary  root  seems  to  have  been  the 
imitation  of  a  few  natural  forms,  which  were  immensely 
varied  (and  to  that  extent  idealised),  but  in  the  main  always 
true,  and  always  symbohc. 

The  animal-worship  of  Egypt  perhaps  fostered  the  re- 
cognition of  the  beautiful  ;  but  it  is  to  be  observed  that,  to 
the  Egyptians,  the  divine  element  in  the  world  was  seen  in 
life  simply  as  such,  not  in  the  characteristics  of  life.  They 
appreciated  quantity  rather  than  quality  ;  and  we  find  no 
trace  among  the  populace  of  delight  in  Beauty,  certainly 
no  enthusiasm  for  it  ;  while  the  Sublime  in  Nature  seems 
to  have  awakened  a  feeling  of  awe  and  repulsion,  rather 
than  of  attraction. 

The  decorative  art  of  Egypt  was  chiefly  used,  not  to 
ornament  the  house,  but  to  enrich  the  Temple,  and  there 
is,  in  consequence,  a  certain  austere  gravity  and  severity 
in  it,  which  contrasts  notably  with  the  ease,  the  freedom, 
the  lightness,  and  the  grace  of  Greek  art.  Like  the  enig- 
matical sphinx,  it  is  massive,  ponderous,  mysteriously  great. 
It  was  drawn,  it  is  true,  from  Nature  ;  but  in  Egypt  Nature 
dominated  over  man.  The  stupendous  river,  with  its  mys- 
terious annual  flood,  and  the  not  infrequent  sand-storms 
from  the  desert,  made  him  feel  his  insignificance  in  a  ^\•ay 
in  which  it  was  impossible  for  any  one  to  feel  it  in  Greece, 
or  even   in   Palestine.      But — as  a  compensation  for  this — 


14  T/ie  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful         chap. 

there  is,  in  all  the  art  of  Egypt,  an  explicit  recognition  of  a 
sphere  beyond  the  visible,  and  of  an  existence  above  the 
merely  phenomenal  life  of  tlie  present. 

One  of  the  most  accomplished  of  Egyptologists,  ■  Mr. 
Edouard  Naville  of  Geneva,  assures  me  that  there  is  no 
Egyptian  writing  bearing  on  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful,  in 
the  abstract,  apart  from  the  concrete  objects,  in  which  the 
artists  of  the  country  have  tried  to  realise  their  conceptions 
of  it.  This  is  precisely  what  we  would  expect  a  pfior:. 
The  first  Eg}-ptian  philosophising  on  the  subject  was  in  the 
Xeoplatonic  school  at  Alexandria. 


2.   Semitic  Tendencies 

Within  the  Semitic  race  a  higher  note  was  struck.  There 
was  probably  a  greater  appreciation,  both  of  the  beautiful 
and  the  sublime,  in  Palestine,  than  in  any  other  country  to 
the  east  of  Greece.  Evidence  of  this  will  be  found  in  the 
Hebrew  books,  especially  in  the  Psalter,  the  Book  of  Job, 
the  Song  of  Solomon,  and  the  writings  of  some  of  the 
prophets.  It  is  of  course  only  in  stray  passages  that  it 
comes  out,  but  these  passages  show  that  the  finer  spirits  of 
the  Jewish  race  had  a  perception  of  Beauty,  and  could 
record  it  in  a  way  that  is  not  surpassed  in  the  contempor- 
aneous literature  of  the  West.  On  the  other  hand,  we  ha\e 
no  evidence  that  Nature  was  appreciated  by  the  Meljrews 
for  its  own  sake.  It  was  chietly  \'alued  as  yielding  a  scries 
of  illustrations  or  revelaiions  of  a  higher  Nature  detached 
from  it,  and  yet  controlHng  it.  It  was  thought  of  as  an 
area,  the  separate  pro\'inces  of  which  were  inhaljited.  not 
l:)y  a  multitude  of  deities,  but  by  one,  and  that  one  ■•half 
concealed  and  half  revealed  "'  within  it.  It  was  a  vast  antl 
\-aried  keyboard,  touched  at  interxals  by  the  hands  of  an 
unseen  i)layer.  This  gave  a  character  of  its  own  to  the 
Hebrew  poetry.  It  was  dualistic  and  anti-pantheistic  lo 
the  core. 

It  is  eijually  important  to  note  that  Beauty  was  inti-o- 
duced,    as   decorative   Art,  into   the   forefront  of  the   Jewish 


Ill  Oriental  Art,  and  Speculation  15 

religion,  and  became  the  close  ally,  if  not  an  essential  part 
of  its  ritual.  "Cunning"  workmanship"  in  architecture,  as 
well  as  in  the  construction  of  utensils  for  the  temple-service, 
splendour  in  decorative  work- — ornament,  in  short — was  a 
necessary  adjunct  of  the  ceremonial. 

But  the  average  Hebrew  mind  had  no  appreciation  of 
the  Beauty  of  Nature  for  its  own  sake.  If  the  peasantry 
ever  thought  of  such  things  as  "the  sweet  influence  of 
the  Pleiades,''  it  would  be  from  some  utilitarian  reason 
connected  with  their  life  as  agriculturists.  If  the  reli- 
giously disposed  ever  really  "  considered  the  lilies  of  the 
field,"  it  was  as  a  parable  conveying  some  lesson  for 
themselves.  It  is  easy  to  see  why  a  race  expressly  for- 
bidden to  make  use  of  "  graven  images,"  and  constitu- 
tionally apt  to  take  "  the  sign  for  the  thing  signified," 
should  not  have  attained  to  the  distinction  of  others  (of  the 
Greeks,  for  example)  in  Sculpture.  The  finest  statuary  of 
the  age  of  Phidias,  supposing  it  to  have  been  transferred 
to  Palestine,  would  probably  have  been  broken  to  pieces  by 
the  people  in  a  fit  of  solemn  wrath,  at  the  instigation  of  one 
of  their  prophets.  But  it  is  less  easy  to  explain  the  want 
of  an  appreciation  of  simple  Beauty  in  the  world  of  sight 
and  sound.  In  its  physical  features  Palestine  in  some 
respects  resembled  Greece.  It  was  "a  land  of  fountains 
and  depths,  that  spring  out  of  valleys  and  hills  "  ;  but  the 
charm  of  the  green  earth  and  the  silent  sky,  the  glory  of 
sunrise  and  sunset,  seem  to  have  been  little  felt  ;  while  the 
sublimest  ravine  in  the  hill  country  was  to  the  popular 
imagination  but  "the  valley  of  the  shadow  of  death."  We 
may  perhaps  account  for  it  when  we  recollect  that  the  main 
element  in  the  education  of  the  Hebrew  race  was  the 
recognition  of  a  Power  superior  to  Nature,  and  controlling 
it.  Hence  it  was  an  ethical,  not  an  esthetic  idea  that  held 
the  central  place  in  Palestine,  and  ruled  the  life  of  the 
nation.  The  chief  function  of  the  teacher,  or  prophet,  was 
to  restrain  the  people  in  their  tendency  to  sink  from  the 
moral  toward  the  ceremonial  ;  and  it  is  worthy  of  note 
that,  when  he  failed,  and  the  people  resorted  to  image 
worship,  those  which  they  constructed  were  not  beautiful. 


1 6  The  PliilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful         chap. 

This  want  of  beauty  in  the  images  used  in  rehgious 
worship  apphes,  however,  to  the  orientals  generally. 
Scarcely  one  of  them,  in  Assyria  or  India,  had  any  beauty. 
It  may  have  been  partly  due  to  the  way  in  which  the  god 
was  separated  from  the  element  over  which  he  was 
supposed  to  preside,  or  to  control.  There  was  a  cleft  in 
the  popular  imagination  between  natural  objects  and  the 
powers  that  were  supposed  to  irihabit  them.  Had  there 
been  a  closer  identification  of  the  two.  and  the  Divinitv 
been  regarded  a-  the  very  soul  of  the  element,  the  '•  graven 
images'-  might  have  been  truer  to  Nature. 


3.   Asiatic  Art 

The  Assyrian  and  I^abylonian  Art  was  not  original,  pro- 
gressive, or  specially  distinctive.  It  was  artificial,  borrowed, 
and  retrograde.  It  was  an  Egyptian  development,  but  it 
was  a  copy  of  Egypt,  not  in  its  prime,  but  in  its  decadence. 
Besides,  it  was  conventionalised  in  the  eftbrt  to  convey 
instruction.  This  is  usually  the  case  whenever  Art  becomes 
a  homily,  or  is  designed  with  a  view  to  teach  lessons  to 
the  peopie. 

The  Art  of  Persia  again,  perhaps  also  derived  originally 
from  Egypt,  and  some  of  it  transmitted  through  Assyria, 
worked  itself  clear  of  the  rigidity  of  the  former,  and  the 
mannerism  of  the  latter.  In  decorative  work,  in  Painting 
as  well  as  in  Ornament,  and  in  Poetry  as  well  as  in 
Painting,  the  genius  of  the  Persian  race,  while  ri.cci\-ing 
ideas  from  outside  and  assimilating  them,  has  taken  a  line  oi 
its  own.,  in  which  beauty  predominates.  This,  howe\  er,  is 
a  relatively  late  feature  in  the  art  of  Persia.  In  the  earlier 
times,  the  sense  of  Beauty  slumbered,  as  it  did  in  India, 
and  amongst  the  Aryan  races  generally.  It  is  perhap-  the 
more  remarkable  that  it  should  not  have  awakened  earlier 
in  India,  wh.en  we  remember  that  almost  all  the  distinctive 
types  of  philosophical  thought  had  sprung  up.  that  a 
moni-tic  as  well  as  a  dualistic  conception  of  the  wurkl 
prevailed  alongside  of  the  popular  polytheism  and  nature- 


Ill  Oriental  Art,  and  speculation  17 

worship.  But  there  is  scarcely  a  trace  of  a  feeling  for  the 
Beautiful  in  the  Brahminical  or  Buddhist  writings.  The 
testimony  of  Professor  Max  Miiller  on  this  point  is  more 
valuable  than  the  conjectures  of  those  who  cannot  speak 
with  his  authority.      In  June  1890  he  wrote  : — 

"The  question  which  you  ask  has  occupied  my  mind  for  many 
years.  I  remember  Humboldt,  when  he  was  writing  his  Kosiiios, 
asking  me  what  the  Indians  thought  of  the  Beautiful  in  Nature.  I 
gave  him  several  descriptions  of  Nature,  which  I  believe  he  publislied, 
but  I  had  to  tell  him  that  the  idea  of  the  Beautiful  in  Nature  did  not 
exist  in  the  Hindu  mind.  It  is  the  same  with  their  descriptions 
of  human  beauty.  They  describe  what  they  saw,  they  praise 
certain  features  ;  they  compare  them  with  other  features  in  Nature  ; 
but  the  Beautiful  as  such  does  not  exist  for  them.  They  never 
excelled  either  in  sculpture  or  painting.  Their  sculpture  is  meant 
to  express  thought,  and  they  do  not  mind  giving  a  god  ever  so 
many  arms  to  indicate  his  omnipotence.  When  painting  comes  in, 
they  simply  admire  its  mirroring  and  life-likeness.  \Yith  regard  to 
actions,  again,  they  speak  of  them  as  good  or  bad,  brave  or  mean, 
but  never  as  simply  beautiful.  ...  It  would  be  quite  impossible 
to  render  rh  KoXhv  in  Sanskrit.  Beautiful,  sobhana,  means  bright  ; 
pesala,  variegated  ;  rania^nya,  pleasant.  The  beauty  of  poetry  is 
expressed  Ijy  iiiadhihii,  the  sweet  tilings  ;  the  beauty  of  Nature  by 
sobha,  splendour.  Of  course  there  is  a  goddess  of  beauty,  Sii,  and 
Laks/i/ui,  but  they  are  both  late,  and  they  represent  happiness 
rather  than  simple  beauty.  Even  this  negative  evidence  may  be 
useful  as  showing  what  is  essential  for  the  development  of  the 
concept  of  the  Beautiful.  But  it  is  strange,  nevertheless,  that  a 
people  so  fond  of  the  highest  abstractions  as  the  Hindus,  should 
never  have  summarised  their  perceptions  of  the  Beautiful.  I  wish 
I  could  have  given  you  a  more  satisfactory  answer,  but  ein  Schelm 
giebt  mehr  als  er  hat. 

"  F.  Max  MiJLLER." 

With  this  ciuotation  from  Mr.  Max  Miiller  we  may 
return  from  the  East  to  Europe.  The  large  questions 
involved  in  the  development  of  Turanian  Art,  its  history  in 
China  and  Japan,  can  only  be  dealt  with  by  specialists  : 
but  while  the  story  of  the  evolution  of  the  sense  of  beauty 
and  of  the  art-spirit  in  these  lands  is  extremely  mteresting, 
we  have  no  analysis  of  it  in  their  literature,  no  philosophy  of 
the  Beautiful. 


CHAPTER    IV 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE 
I.   Introductory 

OXE  of  the  cliicf  contrasts  lictwcen  the  oriental  and  the 
\vc:^tern  Art  of  the  world  is  that  the  former  has  been  S(j 
much  niore  stationary  than  the  latter.  It  has  m()\-ed 
slowly,  austerely,  and  in  a  narrow  groove  ;  while  with  ihe 
austerity  and  narrowness  the  orientals  ha\'e  been  content. 
Tiieir  artists  have  worked  on  from  generation  to  generation 
in  a  mechanical  fashion,  repeating  old  designs,  alike  un- 
conscious of  the  theory  of  their  own  work,  and  ignorar.t  of 
that  of  other  nations.  'I'liey  ha\-e  not  redected  on  their 
procedure,  and  could  gi\-e  no  theoretical  account  of  it. 
'["lie  western  spii'it,  on  the  contrary,  lias  been  usua:l\- 
active,  and  sometimes  restless.  Hence  its  Art  d(j\elop- 
ments  have  In-en  niore  nipid,  and  various,  than  tlio^e  of  ti;e 
I-'.ast,  They  have  gone  through  se\'eral  cycles  of  rise, 
decline,  and  tall  :  and  all  the  while  the  mind  of  ITu'ope 
has  specu.latetl  upon  its  w<.)rk,  and  evolved  art-iheoiies  in 
number. 

The  two  great  art- periods  in  European  history  have 
been  that  of  (ireece  in  the  age  of  Pericles,  and  that  of  the 
Italian  Renaissance  in  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  ; 
but  the  philo-ophical  tendency  that  imd.erlay  these  periods 
lias  been  very  difl'erent.  It  may  perhaps  be  said  that,  in 
the  firmer.  s\'nthesis  prevailed  o\'er  anal}'sis  ;  while,  in  the 
la:t'r.  analysis  lia-  jfredominated.  The  tendency  in  (ireece 
ahnoat  from   the  first  was   a   tendency  to   unite,  or   combine 


CHAP.  IV  TJic  Philosophy  of  Greece  19 

details  in  a  harmonious  whole.  The  tendency  of  the 
modern  world,  on  the  contrary,  has  been  to  di\ide,  and  to 
subdivide,  till  it  has  almost  missed  the  unity  that  underlies 
division. 

Generalisations  are,  however,  very  often  deceptive,  and 
it  is  always  wise  to  test  them  by  a  subsequent  examination 
of  the  facts  on  which  they  are  based. 

In  doing  so  in  this  case,  it  is  desirable  to  note  that  the 
monism  of  Greece — which  was  the  prevailing  type  of  its 
philosophical  thought — inasmuch  as  each  philosopher  took 
his  one  principle  as  explanatory  of  the  whole  of  Nature — 
was  quite  consistent  with  the  recognition  of  hJeauty,  as  an 
objective  reality.  Pervading  the  universe  as  a  whole,  it 
was  supposed  to  have  localised  itself  (as  it  were)  in  certain 
places  and  in  certain  things.  But  it  was  a  sense  of  the 
unity  and  ultimate  identity  of  all  the  particular  things 
which  reveal  the  IJcautiful — in  virtue  of  the  elements  they 
possess  in  common — which  underlay  the  consciousness  of 
the  Hellenic  race,  felt  rather  than  expressed,  that  dis- 
tinguished it  from  others.  Probably  no  nation  ever  felt 
that  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good  are  one,  in  the 
same  simple  instinctive  way  that  the  Greeks  felt  it  ;  and 
the  philosophical  conviction  that  everything  true  is  also 
beautiful  at  its  root,  and  that  everything  beautiful  is  also 
essentially  good,  must  have  greatly  quickened  the  aesthetic 
sense  of  the  nation. 

It  is  more  than  doubtful  if  any  modern  nation  has 
had  the  same  delicacy  of  perception  and  even  sensitiveness 
to  Beauty  as  the  Greeks  had  ;  and  it  is  probable  that  the 
intellectual  ideas  of  the  people  had  a  good  deal  to  do  with 
this.  The  sense  of  symmetry  and  proportion,  of  order,  and 
moderated  energy,  was  caisfifutuvtal  with  them  ;  and  we 
trnd  it  embodied  in  their  architecture,  illustrated  in  their 
sculpture,  and  the  very  soul  of  their  poetry.  We  see  it  in 
their  daily  life  and  institutions,  in  their  games,  nay,  even  in 
the  construction  of  their  philosophical  systems.  Perhaps  the 
most  significant  thing  about  it  is  that  the  greatest  results  were 
reached  with  scarce  a  sign  of  effort.  The  instinctive  way  in 
which  its  great  artists  went  straight  from  the  actual  world, 


20  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  citap. 

with  its  multitudinous  types  and  symbols,  to  a  world  thai  tran- 
scended it,  made  Greece  pre-eminently  the  land  of  the  ideal. 

It  is  an  extremely  interestinL,'',  and  a  very  ditncult.  ciues- 
tion  in  historical  criticism  how  this  characteristic  of  the 
Greek  civilisation  was  produced.  Mariy  causes  doubtless 
co-operated  to  bring  it  about.  It  was  partly  due  to  the 
inherent  vigour  of  the  earliest  settlers  on  the  peninsula  of 
Plellas.  and  to  the  mingling  of  diverse  races,  as  wave 
after  wave  of  populatio:i.  and  of  concjuest.  swept  westwards 
from  the  r)ld  home  of  the  Aryans,  or  southwards  from 
a  Eur(jpean  source.  Climatical  causes  would  co-operate 
with  those  of  race.  The  physical  features  of  the  land,  its 
usually  serene  climate,  reacted  on  the  people  :  arid  the 
result  was  that  in  Greece  Nature  in  no  sen-c  subdued  man. 
On  the  contrary,  man  very  easily  became  the  interpreter 
of  Nature,  and  the  deft  manipulator  of  her  forms.  The 
natural  affmity  of  the  Greek  mind  with  excellence  of  ever\" 
kind,  and  its  rapid  assimilative  power,  must  also  be  taken 
into  account.  Athens  had  an  eye  always  open  to  the  East  : 
and  it  received  influence  both  from  .Syria  and  from  Iigyjjt. 

The  development  of  the  most  distincti\'e  features  of  the 
nation  was.  however,  more  an  evolution  from  witliin  than 
a  graft  from  without.  Physically  the  Greeks  were  more 
beautiful  th.an  any  of  thicir  contemporaries.  Their  g\r.mas- 
lics  doubtless  hel])ed  to  strengtlien  their  physical  tyj^.  ar.d 
the  race  had  a  jxission  for  the  possession  of  Ileauty.  'i'r.ere 
were  '•  contests  for  Beauty,'"  both  amon,.,st  the  men  arid  the 
women  of  Hellas  ;  wliile  the  national  honcvjr  gi\en  to  tl:e 
artists  of  the  beautiful,  in  contrast  with  the  n.ienial  rank  rif 
these  men  in  other  lands,  helped  forward  the  a;)preciation 
of  the  people.  .V  sophist  might  be  despised,  but  a  great 
Gi'cek  scul])tor  was  honoured  of  gods  and  men.  I'anb,-  for 
this  reas')n,  the  beautiful  and  the  useful  were  identiiled  in. 
the  pojiular  mind. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  each  one  of  the  arts, 
as  it  rose  into  eminence,  helped  the  otliei's  that  had  pre- 
ceded, or  were  contemporaneous  with  it.  Tlie  poetry  of 
Cireece  reacted  on  its  painting,  its  sculpture,  and  its  arcld- 
tecture  :   and  the  sccral  arto  reacted  on  the  public  life  of 


IV  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Greece  21 

the  nation.  The  Panathenaic  procession  was  an  epitome 
of  all  that  was  most  characteristic  of  the  race,  and  tlie 
frieze  of  the  Parthenon,  on  which  tliat  procession  was 
represented  by  Phidias,  is  the  most  splendid  specimen  of 
the  art  of  Greece. 

Throtigh  the  mingling  of  the  diverse  elements  that 
entered  into  the  Hellenic  character  —  each  holding  the 
other  in  check — the  culture  of  the  nation  became  many- 
sided  and  harmonious.  National  syiinnctry  was  its  out- 
come ;  and  the  beauty  which  lies  in  moderation,  or  the 
golden  mean  between  extremes,  was  not  only  the  aim  of 
the  artists,  but  it  was  also  to  a  very  large  extent  reflected 
in  the  social  life  of  the  people. 

It  may  also  be  noted  that  imagination  and  reason 
were  combined  in  Greece  as  they  had  never  been  com- 
bined before.  It  was  not  the  love  of  Beauty  alone  that 
fired  the  imagination  of  the  (jreeks.  The  speculative 
instinct  was  also  at  work  ;  and,  as  the  people  delighted  in 
clear  intellectual  views,  as  well  as  in  agile  mental  move- 
ment of  all  sorts,  they  could  not  fail  to  direct  the  latter  to 
the  problem  of  Peauty.  Beauty  was  everywhere  before 
their  eyes,  in  their  daily  life  ;  and  into  all  their  temple 
worship  it  entered,  as  an  absolutely  necessary  elem.ent. 
They  could  not  understand  a  religion  from  which  the 
beautiful  was  absent  ;  and  it  had  a  place  in  their  marketing 
and  games,  as  well  as  their  conflicts  by  sea  and  land. 

It  was  therefore  to  be  expected  that  in  Greece  we 
should  find  the  beginnings  of  a  literature  of  /T-^sthetics  ;  but 
it  is  only  a  beginning"  that  we  do  find.  The  nation  was  too 
busy  with  the  work  of  creating  Beauty  in  all  the  Arts,  to 
devote  very  much  of  its  time  to  a  reflective  analysis  of  its 
nature.  It  is  usually  so,  in  these  periods,  when  originality 
is  great,  and  the  productive  impulse  strong.  Underneath 
the  creative  spirit,  however,  there  lurked  the  critical  ;  and 
the  speculative  habit  was  developed  so  early  in  Greece,  the 
love  of  synthesis  and  of  clear  theoretic  views  was  so  persist- 
ent, that  the  founders  of  all  the  great  schools  of  Philosophy 
could  not  fail  to  speculate  on  the  meaning  of  Beauty,  as 
well  as  on  the  nature  of  Knowledge  and  of  Conduct. 


The  PJiilosophy  of  the  Beautiful         chap. 


2.    Socrates  and  Plato 

Passinf^  over  the  anticipations  of  later  thoui;ht  to  be 
found  amoni,^st  tlie  Pythagoreans  —  who  emphasised  the 
principle  of  order  and  symmetry — we  may  begin  the  history 
of  Greek  opinion  with  Socrates. 

The  theory  of  Beauty  suggested  by  him — so  far  as  it  can 
be  called  a  theory — is  a  very  defective  one.  It  was  not  in 
this  direction  that  the  insight  of  the  great  morali-t  lay.  If 
Socrates  did  not  identify  the  Beautiful  with  the  useful,  he 
certainly  made  their  utility  the  test  of  beautiful  things  ;  just 
as  in  his  ethics,  after  his  quarrel  with  the  doctrine  of  Aris- 
tippus,  he  fell  back  upon  a  utilitarian  test  of  the  morality  of 
actiiMii.  This  was,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  sign  of  his 
catholicity.  On  the  other  hand,  with  all  his  intellectual 
eminence — and  perhaps  just  because  of  his  greatness  as  a 
moralist — Socrates  did  not  appreciate  Beaut}',  in  and  for 
itself  It  had  little  glory  to  him,  "  because  of  the  glory  that 
excelled  it ''  in  human  conduct.  It  \\'as  the  purj:)ose  which 
beautiful  things  subserved  that  chieily  interested  him. 

In  his  McDtorabilia  (iii.  8)  Xcnophon  narrates  a  con- 
versation between  .■\ristij)pus  and  Socrates,  in  %\'hich  the 
latter  says,  "  Whatsoever  is  beautiful  is  for  the  same  reason 
good,  when  suited  to  the  purpose  tor  which  it  was  intendetl." 
"Whatsoever,"  he  adils.  "is  suited  for  the  end  intended, 
with  respect  to  that  end  is  good  and  fair  ;  aiul  contrariwise, 
it  mu>l  be  deemed  evil  and  deformed,  when  it  departs  from 
the  purpose  which  it  \\'as  designed  to  jn'omote."  He  goes 
on  to  apply  this  theory  of  fitness  to  the  beauty  of  such 
things  as  houses.  Those  houses  are  most  beautiful  which, 
are  most  convenient. 

This  is  woX.  a  ])artial  theory,  it  is  an  altogether  erroneous 
one,  as  will  be  abundantly  seen  in  the  sequel  :  but  it  is 
worthy  of  note  that  Socrates  seems  to  have  realiseil  that 
the  beauty  of  expression  is  superior  to  any  other  kintl  of 
lieauty.  In  another  passage  of  the  same  chapter  of  the 
Mt))U'i\d>ii!-i  it  is  recorded  that  he  went  one  day  into  the 
atelier  of  the  sculptor  Clito — he  had  himself  been  a  sculptor 


IV  TJie  Philosophy  of  Greece  23 

in  his  boyhood  —  and  remarked  to  him  that  the  best 
sculptor  was  the  man  whose  statues  best  expressed  the 
inner  workings  of  the  mind. 

As  all  the  world  knows,  Socrates'  chief  pupil,  Plato, 
developed  his  master's  philosophy  along  many  lines,  draw- 
ing out  its  latent  significance  and  its  hidden  implicates  : 
and  it  is  with  his  name,  more  than  with  that  of  any  other 
thinker,  that  future  generations  have  associated  Ideaitsm, 
both  in  Philosophy  and  in  Art.  Consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously, all  idealism  draws  its  inspiration  from  Plato  ;  and 
if  his  theory  of  the  Beautiful  was  not  fully  wrought  out 
(which  it  was  not),  this  was  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  he 
lived  in  such  a  constant  atmosphere  of  Beauty,  both  artistic 
and  literary,  that  he  did  not  care  to  analyse  it  speculati\ely 
in  the  same  way  that  he  analysed  the  nature  of  the  true 
and  the  good.  The  intellectual  and  moral  theories  of  his  day 
were  sectarian  and  full  of  flaws  ;  while  the  pursuit  of  know- 
ledge was  as  fitful  as  the  standard  of  duty  was  capricious. 
He  did  not  nnd  so  much  amiss  in  the  art  of  the  period.  It 
was  the  age  of  Pericles. 

In  the  Gorgias  it  is  affirmed  that  things  are  beautiful 
'•  with  reference  to  some  standard  ''  (474),  but  in  this  dia- 
lri:(ue  Beauty  is  measured  by  the  standard  of  "  pleasure  and 
utility." 

In  the  Ilippias  Major — and  no  question  need  here  be 
raised  as  to  the  genuineness  of  this  dialogue,  or  of  its  place 
in  the  Platonic  canon — Socrates  is  represented  as  discuss- 
ing with  Hippias,  a  peripatetic  sophist  from  Elis,  amongst 
other  things,  the  cjuestion  of  the  Beautiful.  \'arious  theories 
are  started,  and  all  are  rejected  as  inadequate.  Socrates 
asks  Hippias,  What  is  Beauty?  What  is  the  common  cjuality 
in  which  beautiful  things,  each  very-  diverse  one  from  the 
other,  all  agree  ?  en  oe  koX  ooksl  ctol  avro  ro  KaXov  oj  ko.I 
raXXa  —dvra  kvkjjj^Ito.l  ko.I  KO.Xa  (jja.Li'eraL  (2S9).  After 
many  turnings  and  windings  of  the  dialogue,  an  answer  to 
the  question  is  found  in  this  :  The  common  element  is  the 
becoming,  the  suitable,  or  the  fit,  to  —pkrrov.  But  immedi- 
ately another  question  arises,  which  shows  that  the  solution 
just  given   is   inadequate.      Is   Beauty  a   reality,  or  only  an 


24  TJie  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chat'. 

appearance?  The  "becoming'"'"  may  be  only  that  which 
makes  things  appear  beautiful.  But  is  ]3eauty  only 
apparent,  only  seeming?  In  answer  to  this  question, 
Socrates  lays  hold  of  the  old  principle  of  the  useful,  ru 
Xfr/jaiji-o}',  the  serviceable  ;  and  he  goes  on  to  ask,  on  \\  hat 
does  this  usefulness  or  serviceableness  depend?  lie 
answers  that  it  depends  upon  the  latent  capacity  of  things, 
their  ovvaiiLs  ;  and  so  he  concludes  dvi'u.jj.is  j)-lv  apo.  K>/.Aor 
imwajiui.  61  (d<T\p(')v  (295)  :  latent  power  or  strength  is 
always  beautiful,  and  weakness  always  ugly.  I  kit  he  at  once 
perceives  an  objection  that  may  be  urged,  and  adds  that 
the  power  or  energy  of  a  thing  cannot  lie  beautiful  undcss  it 
is  Tit//  directed,  directed  to  an  end  that  is  good  ;  and  so 
the  beautiful  and  the  good  become  intcr-rclated  as  cause 
and  effect. 

Yet  again — perceiving,  doubtless,  the  incomplcicness  of 
the  latter  doctrine — I'lato  makes  Socrates  fall  back  on  a 
cjuasi-materialistic  ^•iew  of  the  origin  of  Beauty,  vo  /ccAor 
tVrrt  To  St'  uKo/'/9  re  k<A  oCeio-i  ijov  (29S).  Beauty  lies  in 
the  pleasure  of  sight  and  of  hearing.  In  reference  to  this 
new  definition,  we  ha\"e  again  to  find  the  clcmcrii  that  is 
lommon  to  sight  and  to  hearing' ;  and  also  to  determine 
why  the  pleasures  which  reach  us  through  these  two  senses 
are  superior  to  those  which  reach  us  through  any  others,  so 
that  they  are  raised  to  a  sort  of  intellectual  throne  abo\c 
the  others.  This  Plato  tries  to  determine  in  the  re>t  of  the 
dialogue,  in  which  there  is  a  great  deal  of  detached  and 
very  stimulating  thinking  about  Beauty,  although  no  consist- 
ent theory  of  it  is  reached.  The  Ilippias  is  pre-eminently 
a  ■•dialogue  of  search."'" 

The  i)rimary  theme  of  the  Symposiian  is  lo\'e.  but  it  is 
a  love  which  rises  from  the  lower  ]:)lane  of  sense  to  tin; 
appi'cliension  of  what  is  abst)lutely  beautiful.  Beytmd  in- 
dividual objects,  in  the  vast  intermediate  >ea  of  beautihil 
things,  we  reach  that  which  is  intrinsically  beautiful  -  that 
which  does  not  wax;  or  wane,  which  does  not  become 
more  or  less  beautiful,  but  is  absolutely  and  always  the 
sanic. 

■■He  who   would    proceetl   aright    in    this   matter   should 


IV  The  PJiiloscpJiy  of  Greece  25 

begin  to  visit  beautiful  forms  ;  soon  he  will  perceive  that  the 
beauty  of  one  form  is  akin  to  the  beauty  of  another  ;  and 
then,  if  beauty  of  form  in  general  is  his  pursuit,  how  foolish 
would  he  be  not  to  recognise  that  the  beauty  in  every  form 
is  one  and  the  same.  And,  when  he  perceives  this,  he  will 
become  a  lover  of  all  beautiful  forms  ;  and  next  he  will  con- 
sider that  the  beauty  of  the  mind  is  more  honourable  than 
the  beauty  of  things  outward."  (He  will  go  on  to  the  beauty 
of  laws  and  institutions,  and  thence  to  the  beauty  of  the 
sciences,  understanding  that  the  beauty  of  them  all  "  is  of 
one  family.'"')  "  At  length  the  vision  will  be  revealed  to 
hini  of  a  single  science,  which  is  the  science  of  Beauty 
everywhere  ...  a  thing  of  wondrous  beauty,  which  is  e\er- 
iasting,  not  growing  and  decaying",  or  waxing"  and  waning 
.  .  .  but  beauty  absolute,  separate,  simple,  and  everlast- 
ing, which,  without  diminution  and  without  increase,  is 
imparted  to  the  ever-growing  and  perishing  beauties  of  all 
other  things."  .  .  .  He  learns  "  to  use  the  beauties  of  earth 
as  steiis  along  which  he  mounts  upwards,  going  from  fair 
forms  to  fair  jDractices,  and  from  fair  practices  to  fair  notions, 
until  from  fair  notions  he  arrives  at  the  notion  of  absolute 
Beauty,  and  at  last  knows  what  the  essence  of  Beauty  is." 
"If  man  has  eyes  to  see  the  true  beauty,  he  becomes 
the  friend  of  God  and  immortal''"  {^^ymp.  210-212). 

In  the  P/iaedrits  the  same  theme  is  continued  ;  and  the 
.\bsolute  Beauty  is  recognised  as  a  supersensible  essence, 
discerned  by  the  mind  when  thi"0wn  into  ecstasy  in  its 
presence.  This  intellectual  vision  of  Beauty  so  purifies 
sensation  as  almost  to  transfigure  it  ;  while,  from  its  non- 
sensuous  character,  the  intuition  which  we  experience  here 
and  now  is  looked  on  as  the  reminiscence  of  a  former  life. 
We  sa:j  the  Beautiful  in  an  ante-natal  life.  Here  we  per- 
ceive it,  only  "through  a  glass  darkly,"  shining  through  the 
apertures  of  sense  ;  and  this  explains  how  its  perception 
fills  the  soul  with  a  kind  of  awe,  and  moves  the  percipient 
to  reverence.  "  Coming  to  earth,  we  find  her  (Beauty) 
shining  in  clearness  through  the  doorways  of  sense.  .  .  . 
This  is  the  privilege  of  Beauty,  that  she  is  the  loveliest, 
and  also  the  most  palpable  to  sight"  {P/iaedri/s,  250). 


26  TJic  PJiilosopliy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

In  the  PJiiicbus  (51-65,  66).  perhaps,  a  still  higher  note 
is  struck.  The  Ijeautiful  is  rei^arded  as  an  evolution  or 
development  out  of  the  non-beautiful,  by  the  liarmony  of 
opposites,  an  idea  also  hinted  at  in  the  Lysis  (216).  In 
the  Republic  there  are  stray  suggestions  and  reflections 
on  the  Beautiful,  but  no  complete  discussion  of  it.  The 
idea  of  proportion,  or  harmony,  seems  the  radical  idea  con- 
nected with  it,  both  in  this  and  in  all  the  other  Platonic 
analysis  of  the  subject.  In  the  5th  Book  of  the  Republic 
we  are  told  that  few  are  able  to  attain  to  the  vision  of  the 
Absolute  Beauty  ;  that  he  who  has  never  seen  it — though 
he  may  be  familiar  enough  with  beautiful  things — is  like 
one  in  a  dream,  and  not  awake  :  but  that  he  who  can  dis- 
tinguish absolute  Beauty  from  the  indi\'idual  objects  thai 
partake  of  it,  or  participate  in  it,  is  relatively  wide-awake. 
He  has  attained  to  knowledge  (eVtrrrvy////),  wliile  others 
have  only  reached  o]:»in!on  (i^<'^<'.)  (4/6).  And  what  is  it  tb.at 
he  knows  ?  It  is  this  :  that  all  visible  things  are  types,  in 
which  are  mirrored  to  us  the  features  of  certain  archetypes, 
and  are  therefore  the  mere  shadows  of  higher  realities. 
The  cesthetic  education  of  man  consists  in  his  learning  tiius 
to  rise  from  the  type  to  its  archetype. 

These  are  fragments  of  Plato's  teaching  on  the  subject  of 
the  Pieautiful.  It  is  somewhat  curious,  however,  that  one 
with  whose  name  idealism  in  Art  is  so  indissoiuI)ly  associated 
should  not  have  given  us  a  fully  elaborated  theory  of  it  in 
any  of  his  writings  :  that  he  should  not  have  written  a  special 
dialogue,  of  which  tu  xaXny  was  the  distinctive  theme  : 
and  that,  in  consequence,  his  teaching  on  the  sul)iect  re- 
quires to  be  gathered  out  of  several  of  the  dialogues,  in  ;ome 
of  which  it  occiu's  almost  incidentally.  The  essential  part 
of  his  teaching  m<ay  perhaps  be  stated  thus  :  In  e\ery 
beautiful  object  two  things  are  conjoined -  — the  sensible 
pb.enomenon  (the  f)rm).  and  the  idea  which  it  embodies, 
and  which  underlies  the  form.  The  one  is  ip.di\idual.  arid 
coucrete  ;  tlic  other  general,  and  abstract.  Tlie  foi'mer  is 
visible,  and  transient  ;  the  latter  in\-isible,  and  permanent. 
The  chief  use  of  the  lower  is  to  lead  on,  and  to  lead  up  to 
the  higher  ;    as   tlie   supreme   function   of  Philosophy   is   to 


IV  Tlie  PJiilosopJiy  of  Greece  27 

conduct  us  from  phenomenal  types  to  noumenal  archetypes, 
and  in  this  particular  case  to  the  one,  universal,  and  abso- 
lute archetype,  viz.  to  that  Beauty  which  cannot  appear  or 
disappear,  but  which  always  is,  always  was,  and  always 
will  be,  at  the  very  core  of  things,  and  at  the  centre  of  the 
universe. 

Plato's  banishment  of  the  poets  from  his  ideal  Republic 
is  easily  explained.  Nothing  else  was  possible.  He  made 
the  chasm  between  the  ideal  and  the  real  so  wide,  that 
he  could  not  admit  any  actual  p7-oducts^  such  as  Poetry  and 
Art,  into  the  former  realm.  In  the  other  sphere,  that  of  the 
actual,  every  great  system  and  every  great  religion  creates 
its  own  poetry  and  its  own  art.  The  Greek  civilisation 
did  this,  so  did  Christianity.^ 

There  were  several  Greek  artists  who  wrote  on  their 
art  (or  left  dicta  upon  it),  and  other  art-critics — whose 
works  liave  perished,  and  the  date  of  whose  lives  is  to  a 
certain  extent  obscure — wliose  names  may  be  remembered 
a-  'links  in  the  chain  of  Hellenic  opinion  and  art,  as  they 
were  probably  Plato's  contemporaries.  Of  these,  Parrhasius 
— referred  to  by  Pliny  as  great  in  expression  as  well  as  in 
symmetry,  and  also  mentioned  by  Ouintilian  and  Xenophon 
—and  Pamphilus,  who  wrote  several  works  on  Art,  were 
the  most  important. 

3.  Aristotle 

When  we  pass  from  Plato  to  Aristotle  we  find  that — on 
this  subject,  no  less  than  on  others — the  tide  of  philosophic 
thought  had  turned.  A  reaction  from  the  teachings  of 
idealism  toward  matter-of-fact  experience  was  inevitable. 
Instead  of  a  metaphysical  intuition  of  first  principles  by  a 
direct  speculative  glance,  a  pr/iri,  we  have  now  a  psycho- 
logical analysis  of  concrete  facts,  a  posteriori.  It  is  some- 
wh;it  remarkable  that  Aristotle  wrote  no  treatise  on  the 
Ileautiful,  as  he  wrote  separate  books  on  Logic,  Metaphysics, 
Psychology,  Ethics,  Politics,  Rhetoric,  and  the  art  of  Poetry, 

■'•  An  able  analysis  of  the  teaching  of  Plato  on  the  beautiful  will  be 
found  in  Arnold  Ruge's  Die  Platonische  Ae^thctik  11832). 


28  The  PliilosopJiy  of  the  Bemitiful  chap. 

as  well  as  on  several  of  the  sciences.  He  refers  to  the  sul)ject 
in  many  of  his  works,  in  the  Poetics^  the  Rlieioric,  the  Mctti- 
physics.  and  the /V/zV/Vx  He  knew  nothing  of  an  absolute 
Beauty,  above  and  Ijeyond  the  relative  things  that  shadow 
it  forth.  His  philosophy  did  not  seek  to  unite  the  phenomena 
of  Sense,  bringing  thcni  within  the  category  of  a  single  prin- 
ciple, but  rather  to  divide  them  furtlier  and  further,  antl 
after  analysis  to  arrange  them  as  independent  provinces  or 
subsections  in  the  map  of  knowledge.  Accordingly,  he  did 
not  identify  the  Beautiful  with  the  (jood,  as  Plato  had  done. 
On  the  contrary,  he  carefully  distinguished  the  one  from  the 
other.  His  whole  philosophy  was  analytic,  rather  than 
synthetic  ;  or,  as  it  may  perhaps  be  better  put,  any 
synthesis  he  ever  reached  was  the  late  result  of  a  lifelong- 
analysis.  He  saw  that  the  provinces  of  the  Bcauiiful  and 
the  Good,  to  a  certain  extent,  overlapped  each  other  ; 
but,  while  the  Good  could  only  be  realised  in  action  or 
achievement — which  was  a  state  of  motion — the  Beautiful 
could  exist  in  a  state  of  repose,  in  still  life,  or  a  state  of 
actual  rest. 

Aristotle  distinguished  the  Beautiful  from  the  fit  and  the 
useful  ;  and  he  drew  a  fruitful  distinction  between  an  admira- 
tion for  beautiful  things,  and  those  desires  arising  from  the 
senses,  which  cra\e  possession  of  objects.  There  is  no 
necessary  desire  for  possession,  in  contemplating  a  beauti- 
ful object.  The  emotion  is  disinterested.  This  distinc- 
tion is  a  most  im|)orlant  one,  and  it  reappears  in  man\- 
forms  within  the  school  which  he  founded,  and  has  (juite 
recenth'  been  emjjha.-^ised  in  the  empirical  i)sychol(>gy  cf 
I'higland. 

Ari.-iotle's  anahsis  of  the  ultimate  elements  of  Beauty 
seems,  however,  to  conduct  us  in  the  end  to  a  doctrine 
not  very  far  i'emo\ed  from  that  of  Plato.  .So  far  as  he 
reaches  a  ])rinciple  at  all,  it  is  that  of  order  and  s}'mmcti\', 
Ta.'q[s^  and  the  phenomena  of  the  beautiful  certainly  \icld 
a  ver)-  significant  illustration  of  his  great  principle  of  th.e 
/lOToTij^:  —  the  mean  between  extremes  —  and  one  much 
more  remaikable  tlian  Aristotle  was  himself  aware  of. 
His    discussion    of  the    essential    nature    of   Beautv   is    ex- 


IV  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Greece  29 

trcmely  slight,  although  througliout  his  works  there  is 
much  interesting  discussion  on  Art,  and  its  subsections 
and  correlations.  Aristotle  had  a  distinct  perception  of 
the  sphere  of  a  science  of  ;esthetics,  a  clearer  one  perhaps 
than  Plato  had,  although  he  did  not  recognise  a  philosophy 
of  the  Beautiful. 


CHAPTER    V 

THE    NEOPLATONISTS 
I.   rio/hii/s 

In  the  Neoplatonic  school — which  arose  at  Alexandria  in 
the  beginning  of  the  third  century  A.D.,  and  passed  thence 
to  Rome  and  to  Athens — the  plnlosophy  of  Plato  was 
allied  with  other,  and  mainly  with  Eastern  elements.  There 
was  a  decline  in  scientific  rigour,  and  a  reaction  from 
Aristotle's  severe  analysis  of  fact  ;  while  ecstasy,  rather  than 
reason,  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  organ  of  apprehension, 
by  which  we  know  the  reality  of  things.  I'lato  had 
developed  his  idealism,  chiefly  within  the  intellectual  and 
moral  sphere  ;  and  his  aesthetics  were,  at  their  best,  only  a 
subordinate  chapter  of  his  ethics.  The  pro'ulem  of  the 
Beautiful  was  wrought  out,  however,  more  synnnetritally, 
if  not  more  satisfactorily,  amongst  the  Xcoplatoni.^ts,  and 
amongst  them  most  notably  Ijy  Plotinus  (205-270  a.d.). 
The  root  of  his  system  was  that  we  do  not  get  to  know  the 
essential  truth  of  things  by  reason,  but  by  a  liigher  Ivind  ot 
vision,  or  Ijy  intellectual  and  moral  intuition.  Through  this 
intuition  the  Inluiite  realises  itself  within  us,  and  all  separa- 
tion between  us  and  the  Absolute  is  overcome  in  a  ])rocess 
of  mystic  illumination. 

I'lotinus's  theory  starts  from  the  recognition  of  an 
absolute  reason  {vov^)  within  the  uni\'erse,  in  itself  perfect, 
bin  which,  whenever  it  begins  to  realise  itself  in  matter, 
meets  with  hindrance.  Hence  it  cannot  be  mirroix'd  to  us, 
as  it  is  in  itself.      It    is   the    barrier   of  the    material   that 


CHAP.  V  TJie  Neoplatonists  31 

presents  an  obstacle  to  this  perfect  reflection  of  the  essence 
of  things.  But  the  mind  of  man  is  able  to  rise  above 
matter,  and  to  grasp  the  ideas  that  flow  into  it  directly,  as 
they  proceed  from  a  supra-material  source.  It  is  thus  that 
we  rise  from  the  actual  to  the  ideal.  We  do  not  reach  the 
ideal  by  a  process  of  generalisation  from  the  actual.  We 
obtain  a  vision  of  it  direct  from  ifs  own  source.  Beauty 
does  not  lie  in  material  substance,  but  in  those  eternal  ideas 
which  material  forms  very  inadequately  reflect.  It  is  to  be 
seen,  not  with  the  outward,  but  with  the  "inward  eye."  In 
the  material  world  there  are  countless  dim  mirrors  of  the 
absolute  Beauty,  which  is  only  very  partially  disclosed  (as 
the  immanent  underlying-  essence  of  things),  in  their  pheno- 
menal forms.  But  the  ideas,  thus  mirrored,  pass  from  the 
objects,  in  which  they  transiently  appear,  into  the  mind  of 
man  ;  and,  as  soon  as  they  arrive,  they  rouse  other  ideas 
from  their  latency,  and  move  the  soul  to  admiration.  The 
following  is  the  most  explicit  passage  in  the  E7i7ieadcs  bearing 
on  the  subject  : — "  That  which  sees  must  be  kindred  and 
similar  to  its  object,  before  it  can  see  it.  The  eye  could  never 
have  beheld  the  sun,  had  it  not  become  sunlike.  The  mind 
could  never  have  perceived  the  beautiful,  had  it  not  first 
become  beautiful  itself.  Every  one  must  partake  of  the 
di\ine  nature,  before  he  can  discern  the  divinely  beauiiful " 
(yK)ineades,  i.  6,  9).^ 

Beauty  is  thus  the  eternal  Aoyos,  the  word  or  reason 
of  the  Universe,  dimly  shadowed  forth  by  symbols  in  matter. 
Objects  are  ugly  when  they  are  devoid  of  this  Aoyos. 
They  are  beautiful  when  they  are  filled  with  it  ;  and  the 
soul  of  the  artist,  if  susceptible  to  Beauty,  drinks  it  in,  and 
becomes  filled  with  the  Aoyos  of  the  Universe.  The  result 
is  that  his  creations  may  be  finer,  richer,  and  more  beautiful 
than  the  beauty  of  Nature  itself  is.  But  all  of  us  (whether 
artists   or  not),    looking   around   on  Nature,  can   easily  see 


TO  yap  opLov  TTpos  TO  opw/j.evoi'  (jvyyeves  kul  b/j.oioi>  TroL-qaaixf^Pov  del 
iTn[3dXKeiv  tjj  dea.  ov  yap  av  TrunroTe  elSev  d<p9aX/J.ds  rfkiov  T]\Loei5rjs 
fx'q  yeyevrifxevos,  ovo^  to  Ka\bv  av  lool  ^vxv  I^V  kuXyj  yevo/jLeur]. 
yeviaOu)  ov;  Trpicroi'  OeoeiOris  nds,  Kal  Ka\bs  ttSs  el  /xeWei.  dedaaadai 
6ebv  re  Kal  KaXov. 


32  Tilt  PhilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

tiiar  the  actual  and  the  ideal  do  not  harniordse.  T::e  id.ea! 
t'.anscer.d;  th.e  actual  :  and  as  soon  as  the  indi\-idi;al  mind 
has  a  g!in.ip~e  of  the  former,  the  hatter  no  h."in_;er  satisfies  it, 
but  a  pursuit  hiegins.  which  can  oitly  be  satisned  by  some 
sort  of  identihcation  with  the  ideal.  Each  individual  obiect 
in  the  realm  of  tl;e  actu.il.  ho\ve\'er  beautiful  it  may  be — 
and  even  although  an  artiticial  halo  of  tlie  beautiful  n\iy 
gatlier  round  it  —  is  oi  use  only  as  yielding'  a  poir.t  of 
departure  t. -wards  the  absolutely  and  infmitely  beautiful. 

Uut  now.  in  wliat  does  the  beauty  of  single  ob'ects. 
individual  and  exterrial.  consist  ?  In  his  rlight  to  tlte 
transcendent.  Plotinus  does  not  ignore  this  question.  He 
explicitly  raises,  ar^d  at  least  tries  to  ariswer  it.  Does  it 
cor.sist.  as  Arist-nle  thou^r.t.  in  symmetr\'  .-  The  Xeo- 
plator.ist  answers  '-Xo."  And  why?  First,  bec.iuse 
otvects  i!idi\'idually  Ijeatuiful  are  n.ot  all  ••  made  i:p  "  of  pai'ts. 
symmetrically  adjusted  and  correlated.  They  are  whole?, 
in  which  the  parts  are  taken  up.  and  lost  to  view.  And 
secondly,  because  parts  that  are  symmetrically  adjusted 
mav  be  indi\dduallv  uulv.     Xo.      It  is  onlv  wlien  the  external 


mirrors 


th 


e    internal 


when   matter 


radiant   with    mind. 


when  intelligence  permeates  the  unintelligent,  when  the 
ideal  (din'erent  from  and  detached  from  the  actual)  is  supcr- 
im})Osed  upon  it.  and  p)er\"ades  it  for  the  time  being,  tliat 
any  individual  thingf  CLCC-iKiS  beautiful.  X'ature  is  thus  a  con- 
tinuous itiirror  of  v/hat  transcends  itself.  ;ind  it  is  only  wlien  it 
redccts  trie  transcetidient  that  aiiy  sin.gle  ob-ect  has  beauty. 
The  merit  of  the  Xeoplatonic  pliilosophy  is  the  merit 
of  idieali-m  in  general.  It  is  not  the  particular  doctrine 
wliicli  it  taught,  luit  its  taking  us  away — alike  in  the 
intellectual,  mnral.  and  .tsthetic  sphere — from  ntanifolduess. 
frona  scattered  ••  opiniotis."  miscellaneous  "principles."' 
detached  ••  points  of  view."  bundles  of  "  ideas.''  sug'ge-ti\'e 
••notiiins."  ct  ?.<::  i^i'r.us  a;:;::,  to  that  unity  where  no 
division  is.  and  therefore  to  the  rock  that  is  higher  than 
we.  In  contrast  with  this,  the  experience  philoso})hy — 
whetlier  in  knowledge,  morals,  or  taste — g'i\'es  us  p.iultipilicity 
withiv.;;  \:nity.  the  lieterogeiicnus  without  the  homi\_:enci  ais. 
the   associated  without   the   associatin..;    bouid.       Idealism   is 


V  The  Neoplatonists  33 

always  needed  as  a  counter-weight  in  the  scale  over  and 
against  this  doctrine  of  conglomerates,  which  denies  an 
underlying  unity.  So  far  good,  and  so  far  we  are  indebted 
to  Plotinus  and  to  Plato  ;  but  that  is  not  enough.  We 
must  also  find  some  link  of  connection  between  the  two 
realms,  between  the  one  and  the  many,  the  ideal  and  the 
actual  ;  and  to  be  adequate,  the  link  must  be  an  organic 
one.  It  is  unfortunately  the  case  that  the  theory  of  Plotinus 
does  not  bridg"e  the  chasm  any  more  satisfactorily  than 
Plato's  did,  six  centuries  earlier.^ 

2.  Prod  lis 

A  contemporary  of  Plotinus  wrote  a  v.-ork,  — ept  x-lox%,  on 
the  Sublime.  This  work,  ascribed  to  Longinus  (213-273), 
is  well  known,  and  has  often  been  edited  and  annotated. 
It  contains  no  real  light,  however,  on  the  philosophy  of  the 
subject.  On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  to  revert  from  the 
Xeoplatonic  teaching  to  the  doctrine  of  the  founder  of  the 
Academy.  Homer  and  Plato  are  the  writers  whom  Longinus 
chiefly  quotes.  In  describing'-  the  Sublime  as  that  which 
"  strikes  home ''  (sec.  i)  and  that  which  "  sinks  deep,''  which 
"transports  one's  soul,  and  exalts  one's  thoughts"''  (sec.  7), 
as  that  which  '-pervades,  and  throws  an  audience  into 
transport,"  we  manifestly  do  not  get  far  beyond  the  com- 
monplace, despite  the  praise  of  the  critics. 

Proclus  (412-485)  wrote,  amongst  other  works,  a 
treatise  on  the  theology  of  Plato  ;  the  twenty-fourth  chapter 
of  the  1st  Book  of  which  is  "concerning  divine  Beauty, 
and  the  elements  of  it,  as  taught  by  Plato.'"  He  recognised 
a  primary  suprasensible  Beauty  which  is  the  cause  of  all 
the  secondary  or  derivative  beauty  of  the  world,  whether 
seen  in  mind  or  matter.  It  is  the  bond  of  union  in  the 
suprasensible  realm.  A  certain  delicacy  or  ethereality 
characterises  it  ;  also  a  splendour  and  loveliness  which 
make  it  the  object  of  love.      It   is   this   sovran  beauty  that 

^  An  "  examen  critique  "  of  the  doctrine  of  Piotinus  will  be  found 
in  J.  Barthdemy  Saint-Hilaire's  L' Acole  d' Alexandrie  (1845). 

D 


34  J-  fi-e  PJiilosopIiy  of  the  Beaut  if  ill       chai-.  v 

moves  and  attracts  the  things  of  sense,  that  causes  them 
to  energise.  The  infinite  Beauty  moving  through  tlie 
world  is  the  source  of  finite  splendour,  and  by  love  men 
are  drawn  toward  it,  and  participate  in  it.  Proclus  saw 
clearly  the  fallacy  of  the  imitative  theory  of  Art.  "  He  who 
takes  for  his  model  the  forms  which  Nature  produces,  and 
keeps  to  a  literal  imitation  of  these,  can  never  reach  what 
is  perfectly  beautiful.  Nature  is  full  of  disproportion,  and 
falls  short  of  the  true  standard  of  Beauty." 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE    GR^CO-ROMAN    PERIOD 
I.  hitrodiictory 

We  have  no  discussion  of  the  philosophy  of  Beauty  in 
Latin  hterature.  In  ahnost  all  the  classic  writers  there 
are  allusions  to  the  subject,  in  Cicero  especially  ;  and  the 
poets  Lucretius  and  Virgil  glance  at  it  ;  but  "  let  others 
study  Art,"  said  Virgil  in  the  ^neid,  "  Rome  has  somewhat 
better  in  hand,  viz.  Law  and  Dominion."  The  love  of 
Beauty,  and  its  passionate  pursuit,  had  done  its  work  in 
Greece.  It  passed  away,  giving  place  to  a  different  ideal  ; 
and,  while  the  Roman  world  could  not  ignore  the  beauti- 
ful, it  contented  itself,  for  the  most  part,  by  utilising  it.  The 
aim  of  Greek  Art  was  to  reach  the  ideal  and  express  it, 
the  artist  being  forgotten  in  his  work.  In  Roman  Art,  the 
aim  was  a  kind  of  splendour  or  magnificence  that  reflected 
back  both  on  the  artist  and  his  patron.  Rome  enriched 
herself  by  bringing  Beauty  into  her  service,  and  made  it 
tributary,  without  loving  it  supremely  ;  and  when  Greece 
became  a  dependency  of  Rome — as  part  of  Italy  had 
once  been  IVIagna  Grcecia — the  Art  then  in  the  ascend- 
ant was  more  imitative  than  original.  Sculpture  still 
flourished,  and  far  exceeded  in  amount  the  early  splendour 
of  the  Periclean  age  ;  but  while  we  have  the  Venus  de 
Medici  and  the  Apollo  Belvidere  as  its  outcome,  the  ideal 
grace  of  the  Phidian  art  had  vanished.  Every  great  Roman 
had  statues  innumerable  in  his  villa,  but  it  was  the  age  of 
the  dilettante  and  the  connoisseur.       Collectors  laid  their 


2,6  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

efieminate  hands  on  Art,  and  almost  killed  it.  So  far  as 
there  was  any  attempt  at  originality,  it  was  as  a  chronicle 
of  the  greatness  of  the  Latin  race  that  Art  was  made  use  of. 
It  was  a  record,  not  an  inspiration. 

Every  ancient  writer  on   Art  refers  to   Euphranor  ( 

362  B.C.)  as  a  master.  The  date  of  his  birth  is  uncertain, 
but,  as  the  subject  of  one  of  his  paintings  was  the  battle  of 
Mantinea,  he  cannot  liave  died  before  363.  He  was  both 
painter  and  sculptor,  and  he  wrote  a  work,  so  Pliny  tells 
us,  De  Sy}):i)ictria  ct  Coloribus  ;  and  fronr  I'liny  down  to 
Hirt  {GescJiicJite  d.  Bild  Kunst.')^  the  symmetrical  excellence 
(_.f  his  own  work  has  been  noted.  Philostratus  praises  him 
much  as  an  artist  ;  so  does  Pliny.  His  value  to  the  student 
of  the  progress  of  philosophical  thought  lies  in  the  fact  that 
he  developed,  both  in  his  teaching  and  practice,  those 
principles  of  Art  which  Greek  Philosophy  had  inculcated  in 
its  prime. 

A  century  and  a  half  latei",  during  the  time  of  the  Second 
Punic  War,  Plautus,  the  chief  writer  of  Roman  comedy, 
flourished.  The  only  reason  for  referring-  to  him  is,  that 
the  teachings  of  idealism  come  out  in  his  assertion  that  the 
poet  seeks  for  that  which  does  not  as  yet  exist  anywhere, 
and  finds  it.  How  then  docs  he  come  by  it?  He  ol)tains 
it  from  within,  from  his  own  mind,  ^liiis,  too.  it  is  that  the 
idealist  is  the  best  historian,  because  he  is  the  best  inter- 
preter of  what  exists.  He  combines  {e.g.  in  a  drama  or  in 
a  novel)  what  no  individual  lite  presents,  but  what  is  truer 
to  Nature,  and  a  far  better  mirror  of  his  age,  than  the 
prosaic  chronicle  of  the  lives  of  the  majority  of  the  men  and 
women  that  exist  would  be. 

2.  Lucrciius.,   Virgil,  Cicero,  etc. 

Another  century,  and  we  reach  two  Ronian  writers 
whose  works  cast  some  light  both  on  the  opinions  of  the 
eduf^ated  few,  and  on  the  attitude  of  the  national  mind 
toward  Xature  and  the  Pjcautiful,  viz.  Lucretius  and  \"irL^il. 

Perhaps  no  poet  of  the  ancient  world  coml>incd.  so  well 
as  Lucretius  did,  the  intellectual  survey  of  Xature  with   an 


VI  TJie  GrcEco-Roman  Period  37 

imaginative  study  of  it  as  the  mysterious  abode  of  an  in- 
scrutable power.  He  was  the  philosophical  poet  of  antiquity 
paj'  excelle7ice.  He  did  not  deal  primarily  or  directly,  how- 
ever, with  the  Beautiful  in  Nature.  His  great  work,  De 
Reriiin  Natura,  is  a  scientific  poem  on  the  origin  of  things, 
and  their  characteristics  in  the  ever-evolving  life  of  the 
cosmos.  A  somewhat  diluted  Neoplatonism  was  the  intel- 
lectual atmosphere  of  his  age  ;  but  Lucretius  was  far  more 
scientific  than  Plotinus  or  Proclus  were.  He  invariably 
kept  much  nearer  to  reality  ;  and,  by  a  half-speculative  half- 
imaginative  flight,  he  rose  to  a  more  uniformly  consistent 
idea  of  law  and  order  than  any  other  of  the  ancients,  while 
an  sesthetic  view  of  the  universe  was  contained  within  the 
scientific  one.  The  atomic  theory,  and  the  doctrines  of  the 
constancy  of  the  sum  of  existence,  and  the  indestructibility 
of  force,  carried  with  them  the  idea  of  harmony  or  cosmic 
order,  and  implied  a  doctrine  of  the  sublime.  His  genuine 
appreciation  of  Nature,  his  sympathy  with  it  in  all  its 
changing  moods — "the  reign  of  law"  being  everywhere 
recognised — is  noteworthy  ;  but  Lucretius  saw  both  beauty 
and  sublimity  behind  the  laws  of  Nature,  as  in  later  years 
Oersted  saw  them.  Far  more  than  Virgil  did,  he  rejoiced  in 
Nature  for  its  own  sake;  and,  while  the  desire  "  rerum 
cognoscere  causas  ''  was  dominant,  there  is  also  throughout 
his  great  poem  the  feeling  for  Nature,  and  an  occasional 
sense  of  its  charm,  that  seem  almost  to  anticipate  the  deeper 
appreciation  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

The  Latin  race,  however,  theorised  less  than  the  Greeks 
had  done  on  the  phenomena  that  called  forth  their  admira- 
tion or  delight.  Relatively  speaking,  there  is  no  theory  of 
Beauty  at  all  to  be  found  in  Roman  literature  ;  but  it  does 
not  follow  that  the  finer  spirits  of  the  nation  appreciated  it 
the  less  on  that  account.  There  is  ample  evidence,  even  in 
Catullus,  and  much  more  in  Virgil  and  Horace,  of  these 
poets'  joy  in  Nature,  in  her  various  phases  and  her  changing 
moods,  throughout  the  day  and  year,  from  sunrise  to  sunset, 
and  from  spring  to  winter  ;  and  not  only  of  a  delight  in 
Nature  in  general,  but  of  the  charm  of  landscape.  As  the 
late  Professor  Sellar  put  it,  "  The  love  of  natural   scenery 


38  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  tJie  Bccmtiful  chap. 

and  of  country  life  is  certainly  more  prominently  expressed 
in  Roman  than  in  Greek  poetry.  .  .  .  The  conscious  en- 
joyment of  Nature  as  a  prominent  motive  of  poetry  first 
appears  in  the  Alexandrian  era.  The  great  poets  of  earlier 
times  were  too  deeply  penetrated  by  the  thought  of  the 
mystery  and  the  grandeur  in  human  life  to  dwell  much  on 
the  spectacle  of  the  outward  world.  Though  their  delicate 
sense  of  beauty  was  unconsciously  cherished  and  refined  by 
the  air  which  they  breathed,  and  the  scenes  by  which  they 
were  surrounded  ;  yet  they  do  not,  like  the  Roman  poets, 
yield  to  the  passive  pleasures  derived  from  contemplating 
the  aspect  of  the  natural  world"  i^TIie  Romari  Poets  of  tlie 
Republic,  pp.  17,  18,  ed.  1S81). 

Throughout  the  Georgics — at  once  a  book  of  Nature,  and 
a  book  of  the  Farm — this  delight  in  the  ever-renovating 
life  of  the  world  comes  out.  But  in  A'irgil,  perhaps,  the 
most  noteworthy  passage  bearing  on  the  subject  is  that 
stately  one  in  the  speech  of  Anchises  towards  the  close  of 
the  6th  /Eneid,  in  which,  after  yielding  the  supremacy  to 
other  nations  in  Art,  he  claims  for  Rome  the  g'overnment  of 
the  world  (II.  847-853).  It  is  thus  that  ^Ir.  Sellar  traces 
the  difterence  between  \"irgil  and  Lucretius:  "  The  secret  of 
the  power  of  Lucretius  lies  in  his  recognition  of  the  sub- 
limity of  natural  law  in  ordinary  phenomena.  The  secret 
of  \'irgirs  power  lies  in  the  insight,  and  long-practised 
meditation,  through  which  he  abstracts  the  single  element 
of  beauty  from  common  sights,  and  the  ordinar)-  operations 
of  industry"'  {The  Ronm7i  Poets  of  tJie  Augustan  Age, 
p.  23  I,  cd.  1877).  Again,  in  T/ie  Ro)>ia}i  Poets  of  the  Republic 
(pp.  18,  19)  he  writes:  '-Lucretius,  while  contemplating 
the  majesty  of  Nature's  laws,  and  the  immensity  of  her 
range,  is  at  the  same  time  powerfully  moved  to  sympathy 
with  her  ever-varying  life.  He  feels  the  charm  of  simply 
living  in  fine  weather,  and  looking  on  the  common  aspects 
of  the  world — such  as  the  seashore,  fresh  pastures,  and 
full-fiowing  rivers,  or  the  new  loveliness  of  the  early 
morning." 

In  Horace's  enjoyment  of  his  Sabine  farm  and  the 
Bandusian    fount,    etc.,    and    in    Catullns's    delight    in    the 


V!  Tiie  GrcBco-Roman  Period  39 

"Venusta  Sirmio,"  we  have  a  genuine  appreciation  of  the 
charm  of  Nature  ;  but,  in  addition  to  this,  Horace  has  a 
special  claim  on  the  student  of  the  development  of  ideas, 
as  he  was  perhaps  the  first  to  arrange  the  several  Arts  in 
anything  like  order.  We  have  no  such  arrangement  of  them 
in  Greek  literature,  as  in  the  Ars  Poetica.  Aristotle  in  his 
Poetics  refers  to  painting,  music,  and  the  drama,  as  well  as 
to  poetry  (it  is  curious  that  sculpture  and  architecture  were 
omitted,  when  their  triumphs  were  so  obvious  around  him)  ; 
but  it  was  Horace  who  first  drew  out  the  parallel  or  com- 
parison between  poetry  and  painting. 

Cicero's  allusions  to  the  subject  of  Pitlchritudo  must 
not  be  forgotten,  and  in  Cicero  we  get  a  somewhat  distant 
approach  to  an  analytic  treatment  of  the  subject.  In  the 
De  Officiis  (i.  §  36)  he  tells  us  that  "  Beauty  is  of  two  kinds, 
one  of  which  consists  in  loveliness,  the  other  in  dignity.'"' 
In  the  4th  Tusculan  disputation  (31)  he  defines  a  par- 
ticular type  of  Beauty  as  "  the  apt  configuration  of  body, 
with  a  certain  delicacy  (suavilas)  of  colour  superadded"; 
and  when  discussing,  in  the  De  Orafore,  the  characteristics 
of  the  perfect  orator,  he  illustrates  his  thesis  by  an  example 
drawn  from  the  sculptures  of  Phidias.  He  says  :  "  My  con- 
viction is  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  world  so  beautiful 
that  it  cannot  become  more  beautiful  ;  whence  it  follows 
that  what  cannot  be  disclosed  by  the  eye,  or  the  ear,  or  any 
of  the  senses,  can  be  understood  by  the  mind,  or  expressed 
by  the  countenance.  So  too  with  respect  to  the  statues  of 
Phidias,  which  are  the  most  perfect  specimens  of  the  art 
of  sculpture  that  we  possess,  and  the  other  paintings  I  have 
mentioned,  we  can  conceive  things  still  more  beautiful. 
Phidias  himself,  when  he  was  at  work  upon  his  Jupiter  or 
}ilinerva,  had  no  model  before  him  from  which  he  con- 
structed a  likeness  ;  but  he  had  in  his  mind  an  ideal  of 
beauty,  the  constant  vision  of  which  guided  his  hands  in 
their  executive  work.  As,  therefore,  in  every  form  and 
figure  there  is  something  perfect  which  is  not  beheld  by 
the  sense  of  sight,  so  it  is  by  the  mind  that  we  perceive 
the  ideal  of  oratory  ;  it  is  only  its  image  that  we  hear  with 
our  ears." 


40  Tlie  P!iilosop]iy  of  tlic  Beautiful  chai'. 


3.   VHruvius  to  Ptiilostratus 

In  the  reiyn  of  Augustus  a  Roman  writer  on  the  theory 
of  Art  became,  and  for  many  generations  continued  to  be. 
the  chief  authority  in  Italy  and  elsewhere  on  the  subject  of 
Architecture.  A'itruvius  (M.  Vitruvius  Pollio),  contemporary 
of  Diodorus  Siculus,  composed  his  treatise,  JDe  Ardiittctura, 
some  time  between  the  years  20  and  11  B.C.  He  was  him- 
self an  architect,  but  the  only  building  known  to  have  been 
designed  by  him  is  the  basilica  at  Fanum.  His  treatise  deals 
with  military  as  well  as  with  civil  architecture,  and  is  technical 
rather  than  speculative  ;  but  its  design  was  to  furnish  his 
patron  Augustus  with  certain  principles  by  which  he  might 
judge  of  existing  buildings,  and  determine  the  plans  of  new 
ones.  He  discusses  the  education  of  an  architect,  the 
materials  for  building,  the  orders  of  architecture,  and  the 
decoration  of  houses.  The  first  of  his  ten  ]]ooks  is  the 
most  interesting  to  the  student  of  the  theory  and  history  oi 
Art.  In  the  first  chapter.  Architecture  is  discu-sed  in  two 
wa\'s,  '"ex  fabrica.  et  ratiocinatione,''  but  the  two  are  not 
kept  distinct.  \"itruvius's  style  is  extremely  terse  and  ob- 
scure. In  the  second  chapter  he  says  :  "  Architectura  autem 
constat  ex  ordinatione,  quae  (h-aece  ~a'qi%  dicitur,  et  ex 
dispositione,  banc  autem  ("iracci  oiiWe(rLV  \-ocant,  eurythmia. 
et  symmetria,  et  decore,  et  distributione,  quae  CJraece  oIko- 
vojj.ia  dicitur.''  Thus  his  five  principles  of  composition,  or 
rules  of  art,  are — (i)  utility,  rdqii  ;  (2)  proportion,  harmony, 
and  symmetry  ;  (3)  disposition,  or  tl;c  arrangement  and 
construction  of  forms,  oidOedLS ;  (4)  the  distribution  of 
forms  in  a  distincti\'e  style,  oIkovoij.ui.  ;   (5)  Decor. 

It  is  in  the  discussion  ot  "proportion,''  under  his  second 
head,  that  \'itruviu3  is  theoretically  most  explicit.  Sym- 
metry results  from  proportion,  and  proportion  is  the  har- 
mony of  the  parts  of  a  thing''  with  the  whole  of  it.  He 
deals  first  with  the  proportion  of  a  single  whole  within  a 
larger  unity,  and  next  with  the  proportion  of  a  whole  com- 
posed of  several  minor  unities.  The  laws  of  symmetry 
were  deduced,  he   thinks,  by  the   great   artists   of  antiquity 


VI  TJie  Grccco-Roman  Period  41 

from  the  human  body,  and  then  appHed  to  architecture  ; 
and  he  traces  an  analogy  between  the  relations  of  the  parts 
to  the  whole  in  the  human  body,  and  in  all  well-constructed 
buildings.  The  abiding  interest  of  the  book  is  that  it  is 
a  treatise  on  Architecture,  based  on  the  principle  of 
proportion. 

There  is  almost  nothing  in  the  writings  of  the  Roman 
Stoics  on  the  subject  of  Art,  although  in  his  58th  epistle, 
§;^  15-1S,  Seneca  draws  a  distinction  between  t'Sea  and 
etSos,  which  should  be  noted  in  passing.  The  original,  in 
the  mind  of  the  painter  or  sculptor,  is  the  I'oea  ;  the  copy, 
transcript,  or  likeness  of  which  is  the  eTdo?. 

In  the  lith  Book  of  Ouintilian  (42-118  A.D.),  on  "Ex- 
pression," we  have  an  account  of  the  progress  of  Greek  Art 
from  Polygnotus  to  Apelles,  and  from  Phidias  to  Lysippus. 
It  is  an  excellent  specimen  of  historical  statement,  clear 
and  terse,  with  no  word  wasted  ;  but  Quintilian  does  not 
discuss  the  theory  of  the  Beautiful. 

In  the  35th  Book  of  the  Hisioria  Naiuralis  of  the 
elder  Pliny  we  have  some  interesting  details  about  ancient 
paintings  and  Art  ;  but,  while  there  is  a  mass  of  informa- 
tion as  to  details,  there  is  no  discussion  of  principle  in  Art. 
Pliny  is  an  unreliable  authority,  and  is  only  to  be  trusted 
when  he  is  giving  a  quotation,  if  even  then  I 

In  the  lirst  chapter  of  the  30!  Book  of  Arrian's  Discourses 
of  his  master  Epictetus  ('E77tKT>;TOu  AturpL/SaL),  vrritten 
probably  in  the  latter  half  of  the  second  century  a.d.,  a 
thing  is  described  as  beautiful  when  it  is  "most  excellent 
according  to  its  proper  nature.'"'  "  As  the  nature  of  each 
is  different,  each  seems  beautiful  in  a  different  way."  But 
if  what  makes  each  thing  beautiful  is  its  possession  of  the 
excellence  peculiar  to  it,  it  surely  follows  that  what  makes 
one  creature  beautiful  may  make  another  ugly. 

A  little  after  the  middle  of  the  second  century,  Galen,  the 
great  physician  and  one  of  the  most  voluminous  authors  of 
antiquity,wrote  his  book  — ept  roj^'lTr-oKparous  kuI  IIAarojvos 
Aoy/xdrcjv  (On  the  dogmas  of  Hippocrates  and  Plato).  In 
Philosophy  he  was  a  follower  of  Aristotle,  but  he  united  some 
of   the   best    things    in    Xeoplatonism  with    the  traditional 


42  TJie  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful      cuav.  vi 

teach in.i^s  of  the  Stagirite.  In  the  5th  section  of  the  above 
book,  (ialen  writes  (he  is  speaking  of  Chrysippus)  :  "  He 
behaves  that  Beauty  is  not  to  be  found  in  separate  things, 
taken  one  by  one,  but  in  the  symmetry  of  members,  e.g.  in 
the  suitable  arrangement  of  one  finger  with  another,  of  all 
the  fingers  with  the  palm  and  the  wrist,  of  palm  and  wrist 
with  the  elbow,  of  the  elbow  with  the  arm,  and  in  fact  of  all 
the  members  with  each  other,  as  is  laid  down  in  the  canon 
of  Polycleitus." 

Philostratus,  who  belonged  to  the  second  and  third  cen- 
turies A.D. — who  wrote  the  life  of  Apollonius,  and  of  the 
Sophists  —  wrote  also  a  work  which  he  called  EtKore^' 
{l/nagi/ies).  In  this  he  explains  a  series  of  sixty-four 
paintings,  which  he  represents  as  existing  in  a  villa  in  which 
he  resided  near  Naples.  In  the  preface  he  says  that  a 
knowledge  of  human  Nature  is  nccessaiy  for  supremacy,  or 
even  for  any  achievement  in  the  art  of  painting".  The 
g-enius  of  the  painter  must  make  the  outward  e.xpress  the 
inward.  He  must  understand  how  to  make  the  physical 
frame  express  the  mind  within  it.  He  refers  to  the  idea 
of  the  ancients  that  the  key  to  the  art  of  painting  is  to  be 
found  in  "  symmetry,''  which  is  a  harmony  or  balance  of 
the  spheres  of  the  outward  and  the  inward  ;  and  traces  a 
jjarallel  between  the  art  of  poetry  and  the  art  of  painting. 

]\Iaximu5  Tyrius,  a  Greek  writer  of  the  age  of  the  .\nto- 
nines — the  date  of  whose  birth  and  death  is  unknown — 
wrote  A(a/\e^€t5  {Disscr/afiofies)  on  "warious  philosophical 
subjects.  He  is  chietly  interesting  to  the  student  of  tlie 
history  of  art -theory  from  the  fact  that  he  endorsed  the 
root-principle  of  idealism,  that  the  beauty  which  painters 
give  us,  drawn  from  every  quarter,  is  a  beauty  which  it  is 
impossible  to  find  in  any  single  natural  body.  He  therefore 
held  that  Nature  was  inferior  to  Art. 


CHAPTER    VII 

MEDI/EVALIS.M 

I.  The  Patristic  Writers 

During  the  long  period  of  meditevalism — which  separates 
the  close  of  ancient  philosophy  from  the  rise  of  the  modern 
spirit  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries — there 
were  comparatively  few  writers  who  dealt  with  the  problem 
of  the  Beautiful,  or  seem  to  have  thought  it  worthy  of 
serious  treatment.  When  interest  in  knowledge  for  its  own 
sake  had  dwindled,  and  the  stream  of  civilisation  was 
stopped  in  certain  quarters  altogether,  and  in  others  made 
artificial  by  alien  causes,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that 
much  interest  should  be  taken  either  in  Nature  or  in  Art. 
In  traversing  those  centuries,  and  seeking  for  any  casual 
notices  of  the  subject  in  out-of-the-way  treatises,  we  must, 
as  Hegel  says,  put  on  seven-league  boots,  or  perhaps  one 
might  rather  say  that  we  must  make  a  flying  leap  from 
century  to  century. 

As  soon,  however,  as  we  see  any  sign  of  a  revival  of 
Philosophy,  within  the  shelter  of  Catholicism,  interest  in 
the  problem  of  the  beautiful  returned  as  one  of  its  elements. 
It  was  present  as  a  latent  factor,  influencing  all  other 
problems  more  or  less,  although  it  scarcely  showed  itself 
in  the  active  discussion  of  the  schools. 

Passing  over  Clemens  Alexandrinus,  who  touched  its 
margin  in  his  Paedagogus  (iii.  i),  the  most  important  treat- 
ment of  the  subject  in  Patristic  literature  was  by  St.  August- 
ine.     At  the  age  of  twenty-six  or  twenty-seven  he  wrote  a 


44  TJic  Philosflphj'  of  the  Bcaniiful  chap. 

little  book  De  Apto  ct  FulcJiyo.  It  was  his  earliest  work,  and 
he  dedicated  it  to  a  Roman  orator,  Hierius.  The  book 
has  unfortunately  perished.  In  his  Epistolae^  Book  i.  3,  St. 
Augustine  writes  :  "  Quid  est  corporis  pulchritudo  ?  Con- 
gruentia  partium  cum  quadam  coloris  suavitate."  In  the 
Cflfifessiofies,  he  followed  Socrates  in  identifying  the  beauti- 
ful with  the  useful.  "  Videbam  in  ipsis  corporibus  aliud 
esse  quasi  totum,  et  ideo  pulchrum  ;  aliud  autem  quod 
ideo  dcceret,  C[uoniam  apte  accommodaretur  alicui,  sicut 
pars  corporis  ad  universum  suum  "  (lib.  iv.  cap.  13).  There 
is  another  passage  in  which  he  modifies  his  teaching  thus  : 
"  Pulchrum  esse  quod  per  se  ipsum  ;  aptum  autem  cjuod 
ad  alicpiid  accommodatum  dcceret"  (lib.  iv.  cap.  15).  His 
views  on  music  are  to  be  found  in  his  De  Vera  Ke/igione, 
and  De  Miisica.  St.  Augustine  was  a  Christian  Platonist, 
who  regarded  the  Divine  Nature  as  the  fountainhcad  of 
Beauty  ;  and,  in  a  slightly  Neoplatonic  fashion,  he  taught 
that  in  our  approach  to  and  contact  with  the  fountainhcad, 
Beauty  is  disclosed  to  man  directly. 

About  a  hundred  years  after  St.  Augustine,  we  find  a 
scholar  of  the  fourth  century,  a  man  of  real  genius,  but  an 
eccentric  virtuoso  and  dilettante — Cassiodorius  (468-562  ?) 
—  who  wrote  many  works  on  many  themes.  Amongst 
these  was  one  on  Liberal  Studies,  which  was  a  sort 
of  compendium  of  the  Seven  Arts  (which  were  supposed 
to  exhaust  the  curriculum  of  knowledge),  and  which  was 
for  a  long  time  an  authority  in  the  Middle  Ages.  lie 
discussed  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful  very  imperfectly. 
And   not    much   more    can   be    said    of   Alartianus    Capella 

(490 ),  whose  work  was  a  sort  of  encyclopedic  analysis, 

summarising  the  knowledge  of  the  IMiddle  Ages,  in  which 
the  principles  of  the  seven  Liberal  Arts,  which  were  supposed 
to  be  the  o)iuie  scibih\  are  discussed.  It  is  an  ill-assorted 
miscellany, 

2.  TJic  Tln7-icc7ith  Century 

Scattered  through  the  writings  of  the  subtlest  thinker 
of  mediicvalism,   Thomas   Aquinas  (1227-1274),  there    are 


VII  McdicBvalisDi  45 

reflections  on  the  subject  of  Beauty,  which  some  of  his  dis- 
ciples regard  as  the  profoundest  in  philosophical  literature. 
The  Abbe  P.  Vallet,  for  example  (see  p.  133),  has  written 
an  elaborate  work,  Lld-Je  dii  Bccni,  da)is  la  philosopJiic 
de  Saint  TJwnias  d^Aquin,  In  almost  every  word  of  his 
master,  Vallet  finds  the  germs  of  a  theory.  The  discussion 
on  "  Pulchritudo  "  in  the  Suvwia  is  meagre  ;  but  Aquinas 
wrote  '-  De  Pulchro  "  in  his  Ofiuscula,  and  there  are  sentences 
in  his  commentary  on  Lombard's  Book  oj  the  Sciiicnces,  in 
his  Co}itra  Ge?ifcs,  and  elsewhere,  which,  when  taken  to- 
gether, and  mutually  compared,  yield  a  tolerably  complete 
doctrine  of  Beauty.  There  is,  of  course,  a  great  risk  of  our 
reading  later  developments  of  thought  into  Acjuinas,  just  as 
he  used  sometimes  to  interpret  both  his  "  philosophus ''' 
(Aristotle),  the  Hebrew,  and  the  Christian  books  ;  but 
whatever  we  make  of  his  theory,  we  may  agree  with  P. 
Vallet  that  he  opens  up  to  us  "  immense  horizons "  of 
thought. 

Perhaps  the  two  aphorisms  of  Acjuinas  which  are  most 
to  the  point  are  "  Pulchritudo  habet  claritatem  "  (Covim.  in 
Sent.  I.  dist.  31,  cj.  2,  s.  i)  and  "Ratio  pulchri  consistit 
in  cjuadam  consonantia  diversorum "  {Opusc.  dc  Fulcliro). 
Pie  also  defines  Pulchritudo  as  "  Resplendentia  formae 
super  partes  materiae  proportionatas  vel  super  diversas  vires, 
vel  actioncs."  This  rcsplcnde7ttia  formae^  the  brilliance,  or 
cclaf^  communicated  to  matter  by  the  ideal  form  it  assumes, 
and  by  which  it  is  clothed  as  well  as  permeated,  is  a  very 
significant  feature  of  the  Beautiful  ;  and,  as  stated  by 
Ac^uinas,  it  is  a  characteristic  attempt  to  define  the  ultimate 
mystery.  In  the  Sum/iia  he  says:  "Ad  pulchritudinem 
tria  requiruntur ;  primo  quidem  integritas,  sive  perfectio  ; 
quae  enim  diminuta  sunt,  hoc  ipso  turpia  sunt"  (I.  qu.  39) 
In  the  5th  quaestio  in  1°  he  defines  Perfectio  thus  :  "  Illud 
est  perfcctum,  cui  nihil  deest  secundum  modum  suae  per- 
fectionis."  Again  :  "  Tunc  unaquaque  res  optime  disponitur, 
cum  ad  suum  finem  convenienter  ordinatur.  Finis  enim 
uniuscujus  est  bonum  "  {Cont.  Gent,  proeem.  c.  i).  Again, 
in  the  De  PulcJiro  :  "  As  for  beauty  of  body,  a  certain  fit 
proportion  of  members,  and  colour  superadded,  is  necessary 


46  TJie  P]Lilosop]iy  of  tlie  Bcmitijul         cjiap. 

— without  which  there  is  no  beauty — so  for  Beauty  uni- 
versally, to  the  proportion  of  the  parts  and  of  the  whole 
there  must  be  added  a  certain  '  claritas  formae.'  "  Again  : 
"  Pulchritudo  non  consistit  in  componentibus,  sicut  in 
materialibus,  sed  in  resplendojtia  forviae  sicut  in  formali; 
et  haec  est  quasi  differentia  specifica,  cornplens  rationem 
pulchri."  Again  :  "  Pulchrum  nunquam  separatur  a  bono, 
sicut  pulchrum  corporis  a  bono  corporis,  et  pulchrum  animae 
a  bono  animae." 

There  are  passages  in  the  Convtto  and  in  the  ViLi 
Niiova  (§  20)  of  Dante  (1265-1321),  and  also  in  the  Divitia 
Comnicdia,  bearing  indirectly  on  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful  ; 
but  the  subject  was  grasped  by  him  intuitively,  not  dis- 
cussed speculatively.  In  his  grief  for  Beatrice  he  turned 
to  Philosophy  for  consolation  ;  and  seeking"  for  silver,  he 
found  gold.  But  it  was  not  into  the  sphere  of  abstractions 
that  Dante  rose,  by  the  help  of  the  philosophic  formula;  of 
the  understanding.  He  ascended  to  a  higher  realm  by  the 
sheer  force  of  intuition.  By  "  the  power  of  a  peculiar  eye," 
he  saw  separate  things  embraced  within  a  higher  unity,  that 
"  unity  where  no  division  is." 

3.  The  Fifteenth  Century 

Dante's  great  successor,  Savonarola  (1452-149S) — for 
successor  he  was  in  the  illustrious  brotherhood,  not  only  of 
"the  makers  of  Florence,"  but  of  the  grcit  men  of  the 
Italian  renaissance — was  pre-eminently  a  religious  teacher  ; 
and  it  has  even  been  supposed  that  he  was  an  iconoclast  as 
regards  the  Fine  Arts.  This  is  unjust,  and  has  led  a 
pcrfervid  admirer,  M.  Rio,  to  represent  him,  in  his  Art 
Chretien,  as  a  sort  of  reviver  of  Christian  as  opposed  to 
Pag'an  art.  The  latter  is  a  preposterous  statement, 
although  the  breach  between  Savonarola  and  the  natural- 
istic art,  which  was  chiefly  in  vogue  with  the  Medici,  did 
not  lead  the  former  into  any  opposition  to  Art  in  general. 
The  classical  renaissance,  which  Cosmo  de  Aledici 
favoured,  was  a  type  of  art  that  had  departed  far  from 
the  ideal  of  Fra  Angelico  ;  and  it  was  to  that  earlier  ideal. 


VII  Medicevalism  47 

enhanced  by  the  rol^uster  quahties  of  Buonarotti,  that 
Savonarola  turned.  He  did  more,  however,  than  sympa- 
thise with  a  new  ideal  of  Art.  He  also  spoke  and  wrote 
on  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful.  In  one  of  his  sermons, 
for  the  third  Sunday  in  Lent,  he  asked,  "  In  what  does 
Beauty  consist?  In  colour?  No.  In  Form?  No. 
Beauty,  as  regards  composite  things,  is  born  of  the 
correspondence  of  parts  and  colours.  The  beauty  of 
simple  things  is  in  their  light.  Behold  the  sun  and  the 
stars,  their  beauty  is  in  the  light  they  shed  ;  behold,  the 
spirits  of  the  blessed,  their  beauty  consists  of  light  ; 
behold,  God  is  light.  He  is  Beauty  itself.  The  beauty  of 
man  and  woman  is  greater  and  more  perfect  the  more 
resemblance  it  hath  to  primary  beauty.  What  then  is 
this  Beauty?  It  is  a  quality  resulting  from  the  proportion 
and  correspondence  of  the  members  and  parts  of  the  body. 
Thou  dost  not  call  a  woman  beautiful  on  account  of  her 
beautiful  nose  or  hands,  but  when  all  is  in  harmony.  What 
is  the  source  of  this  beauty  ?  On  investigation,  thou  wilt 
see  that  it  emanates  from  the  soul."  It  is,  as  in  another 
sermon  he  says,  when  the  soul  shines  in  the  beauty  of  God, 
that  a  divine  charm  is  given  to  the  body. 

To  Savonarola  the  moral  and  religious  interest  was 
supreme,  but  he  wrote  a  small  book  on  the  "  Division  and 
Utility  of  all  the  Sciences,"  in  reply  to  a  request  from  his 
scholar  friend  Agolino  Verino,  one  section  of  which  is 
"An  apology  for  the  art  of  Poetry."  His  aim  in  the  little 
book  was  to  show  that  poetry,  like  every  other  branch  of 
culture,  had  its  place  of  value.  He  held  that  the  essence 
of  Poetry  was  philosophic  thought,  but  that  the  purpose 
of  Poetry  was  to  persuade  by  example.  He  then  proceeds, 
however,  most  narrowly  to  denounce  the  classical  poets  of 
antiquity,  and  would  have  had  them  all  as  ruthlessly  con- 
demned, and  their  works  placed  in  an  index  exptirgatoruis, 
as  Plato  would  have  had  them  banished  from  his  ideal 
Republic. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  general  strain  of  the 
teacliing  of  Savonarola  was  alien  to  an  appreciation  of 
the  Beautiful.      It  could  hardly  have  been   otherwise.      He 


48  The  PJiilosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

had  other,  and  relatively  to  his  day  perhaps  more  important 
work  to  do. 

No  other  writer,  either  of  the  earlier  or  the  later 
medi;cvalism,  dealt  with  the  theory  of  Beauty  ;  and  one  of 
the  most  distinctive  features  of  those  centuries  now  known 
as  the  "  Dark,"  was  the  want  of  an  appreciation  of  the 
Beautiful,  whether  in  art  or  in  life,  its  alasencc  from  the 
thought,  the  style,  and  the  character  of  the  times. 

Albrecht  Diircr  (1471-1528)  was  perhaps  the  first 
European  artist  who  studied  Nature  carefully,  for  its  own 
sake,  and  with  a  view  to  make  it  a  subject  for  Art.  lie 
was  the  founder  of  the  landscape  art  of  Europe,  althou,<_;'h 
also  and  eminently  a  figure  painter.  He  had  studied 
\'itruvius  (sec  ]x  40),  and  himself  elaborated  a  theory  of 
])roportion,  of  which  he  wrote,  and  which  he  tried  to 
practise.  His  two  chief  works  were  his  JH)ok  of  Mcasjire- 
iiients  and  Book  of  Ilinnan  Proportions.  In  these  he  did 
not,  however,  lay  down  any  dogmatic  proposition  as  to 
Beauty.  He  saw  the  immense  variety  of  its  types,  noting 
even  that  tv\'o  human  figures  might  both  be  beautiful,  and 
yet  neither  resemble  the  other,  in  any  single  point  or  part. 
He  said:  "No  man  liveth  who  can  grasp  the  whole  beauty  oi 
the  meanest  living  creature."  ..."  Men  deliberate,  and 
hold  numberless  different  opinions  about  Beauty,  and  they 
seek  after  it  in  many  different  ways.  I  certainly  know  not 
what  the  ultimate  measui^e  of  true  Beauty  is  .  .  .  but  we 
must  find  perfect  form  and  Beauty  in  '  the  sum  of  all.'  "... 
'*  I  have  heard  how  the  seven  sages  of  Greece  taught  a 
man  that  measure  is  in  all  things  (physical  and  moral)  tlie 
best.  Those  arts  and  methods  which  most  approximate  to 
measurement  are  the  nol)lcst."  ..."  ]5cauty  dcpcndcth 
upon  many  things.  When  we  wish  to  bring  it  into  our 
work,  we  find  it  ^cry  hard.  We  must  gather  it  together 
from  fir  and  wide.  .  .  .  Out  of  many  beautiful  tilings 
something  good  may  be  extracted,  even  as  honey  is 
gathered  from  many  fiowcrs.  The  true  mean  lieth  between 
too  much  and  too  little.  ...  I  apply  to  what  is  to  be 
called  beautiful  the  same  touchstone  as  that  by  which  I 
decide  what  is  right"   (M.S.  \W\i.  Mus.  IV.).      Diirer   else- 


\-ii  MedtcB'i'altsm  '  49 

where  wrote  :  "  Use  is  a  part  of  Beauty,"  and  "  The  accord 
of  one  thing  with  another  is  beautiful."'  More  important 
are  liis  words:  "Depart  not  from  Nature,  neither  imagine 
of  thyself  to  invent  aught  better,  for  Art  standeth  firmly 
fixed  in  Nature,  and  whoso  can  thence  rend  her  forth,  he 
only  possesseth  her."  "  We  find  in  Nature  a  Beauty  so  far 
surpassing  our  understanding,  that  not  one  of  us  can  fully 
bring  it  into  his  work.'"' 


CHAPTER    VIII 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GERMANY 

I .  LcilniHz  to  Lcssino- 

Ix  the  philosophy  of  LcilMiitz  (i  646-1 71 6),  who  led  the 
idealistic  reaction  in  Germany  along"  a  track  of  his  own,  we 
have  no  explicit  discussion  of  the  problem  of  the  Beautiful  ; 
but  some  of  the  most  characteristic  features  of  the  Leibnitzian 
teaching  gave  rise  to,  and  reappear  in,  the  subsequent 
'  aesthetik '  of  Clermany.  Leibnitz  held  that  we  rise  from  a 
sort  of  sub-consciousness,  or  confused  groping,  into  the 
explicit  realisation  of  things.  An  indistinct  percej^tion 
yields  to  a  distinct  one  ;  and,  although  there  is  a  difter- 
cncc,  there  is  no  chasm  between  the  two.  The  clear  jier- 
ception  of  the  harmony  of  the  Universe  is  an  intellectual  or 
scientific  grasp  of  it  ;  but,  in  the  vague  or  obscure  realisa- 
tion of  the  same,  we  perceive  its  beauty.  Thus,  the 
perception  of  ISeauty  is  an  unconscious  or  half-conscious 
discernment  of  harmony  ;  and  our  knowledge  of  the  true 
and  the  beautiful  is  distinguished  sim|)ly  as  the  clear  and 
the  dim  percepiion  of  the  same  thing.  (Cf  J^ii/itipcs  dc 
la  X(!/i{?'l\  c/c.^  1714.)  .As  one  of  the  most  appreciative  of 
I.eil)nitzian  scholars  ])uts  it,  tlie  sphere  of  the  JJeautiful  in 
poetry  and  art  is  ''  on  the  bortlcrland  of  the  imconscious  and 
conscious  ;  it  lies  in  the  twilight  of  the  perceiving  and 
sentient  soul.  The  great  world  of  the  fhiifcs  f>r/-i,-/)/iojis,  the 
h.df-illuniinated  storehouse  of  our  mind,  where  the  ideas 
h()\er  when  they  merge  out  of  darkness  into  full  light —  this 
is  the  home  of  the  ISeautiful''  (J.  T.   Merz,  l.tibinz,  p.  185). 


CHAP,  viii        Tlic  PJiilosophy  of  Germany  51 

It  is  only  the  germ  of  a  doctrine  of  the  Beautiful,  how- 
ever, that  is  to  be  found  in  Leibnitz.  The  first  to 
elaborate  a  theory  on  the  sul^jcct  was  Alexander  Gottlieb 
Baumgarten  (1714-1762).  He  was  the  younger  of  two 
brothers,  both  of  whom  became  teachers  at  Halle.  Reared 
in  a  school  which  was  prejudiced  against  both  Wolft^  and 
Leibnitz,  he  ultimately  became  their  intellectual  disciple. 
He  developed  the  Wolfian  doctrine,  however,  along  a 
special  line  ;  and,  although  he  discussed  Philosophy  in 
almost  all  its  aspects,  he  will  probably  be  remembered 
chietly  as  having  been  the  first  in  Germany  to  call  attention 
to  Beauty  as  a  distinct  branch  of  knowledge.  His  book — 
which  virtually  created  the  science  in  Germany — was  called 
Aestketica,  and  published  at  Frankfort  on  the  Oder  in  1750- 
republished  in  1758. 

Baumgarten  identified  the  Beautiful  with  the  perfect, 
and  defined  it  veiy  vaguely  as  Perfection  apprehended 
through  the  channel  of  sense.  He  classified  the  provinces 
of  philosophical  incjuiry  as  respectively  those  of  the  True, 
the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good.  Cousin's  classification  of 
them  (Du  Vrai,  du  Beau,  et  du  Bien)  was  derived  from 
I5aumgarten  ;  but  the  latter  distinguished  the  True  (or  the 
sphere  of  Logic)  from  the  Beautiful  (or  the  sphere  of 
.Esthetic)  simply  as  two  sections  of  knowledge,  the  former 
of  which  was  clear,  and  the  latter  obscure.  In  contrast 
with  the  clear  knowledge  which  Logic  gives,  Esthetics 
gives  us  only  dim  or  confused  knowledge  (verworrene 
\'orstel!ungen).  ^Esthetic  is  at  one  and  the  same  time, 
however,  perception  through  the  senses,  and  a  discernment 
of  the  P)eautiful,  the  scieiitia  cog/iitioais  sejisHivae  being  the 
same  as  ars  fi(IcJi7-e  cogitandi ;  the  faciiltas  dejudicandi 
enabling  us  to  see  unity  in  variety,  or  agreement  in 
difterence.i  Baumgarten  wholly  ignored  the  side  of  feeling, 
or  emotion,  in  the  apprehension  of  the  Beautiful,  em- 
phasising the  intellectual  side  only.  His  adoption  of 
Leibnitz's  doctrines  of  optimism  and  pre-established  harmony 

1  Baumgarten's  treatise  begins :  "  Acsthetica  .  .  .  ars  pulchre  cogi- 
tandi .  .  .  est  scientia  cognitionis  sensitivae."  Again  he  says  :  "  Per- 
lectio  cognitionis  sensitivae  ...   est  pulchritiido." 


52  TJlc  PhilosopJiy  of  tlie  Beautiful  chap. 

!ed  him  into  a  sort  of  a-sthctic  fatalism,  which  harked  l^ack 
to  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  tliat.  as  it  is  in  Nature  that  we 
find  the  higliest  disclosure  of  the  Beautiful,  the  chief  pur- 
pose of  Art  i.T  to  imitate  Nature.  Baumgarten  reco-nised 
the  Beautiful  as  an  intellectual  element  existing"  in  Nature, 
but  he  did  not  connect  it  with  the  life  of  Nature  or  the 
aniDia  nunuii.  Had  he  done  so,  he  would  have  seen  tliat 
it  is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  actual  (i)  because  life 
and  change  are  synonymous,  and  (2)  because  the  vitai 
type  is  kept  up,  and  is  even  strengthened,  by  specific 
departures  from  it  in  individual  cases. 

A  pupil  of  ]]aumgarten,  and  his  biograplier,  Friedrich 
Meier  (1718-1777),  developed  his  doctrine  in  his  Ajifano^s- 
^c^?i'i;ide  (h-r  ScJiouai  Wisseuscliaftcii  (1748).  It  was  at 
liis  instigation  that  Baumgarten  gave  his  Ac.^tlictica  to  the 
world,  and  Meier  cared  more  for  this  than  f  )r  any  other 
jxirt  of  his  master's  philosopliy.  He  opposed  the  realistic 
teaching"  of  the  Aristotelii'.n.s  of  his  day — Batteux,  etc. — 
that  successful  art  is  an  imitation,  of  Nature  ;  and  held  that 
in  obiective  l>eauty  we  see  jJcrR-ciion  mirrored  to  us,  so  far 
as  that  is  possible,  in  sensuous  fjrms. 

Friedrich  Nicolai  (1733-1S11),  of '•  Uni\-crsal  Lil)rary '' 
fame,  bcg"an  his  literary  career  b}'  writing'  Letters  u/ivi  tt.c 
Present  Si  lie  of  tice  I'lre  ^-Ir/s  i/i  Germany  (1755),  but 
a'though  he  had  been  a  iiupil  of  Baun"igarten.  a:ul  imbibed 
his  spirit,  and  although  hi^,  chief  interest  was  in  the  depart- 
ment of  ast!"ietic.  he  contributed  nothi!"ig  to  the  ad\"ance- 
ment  of  philosophical  theory. 

Son"ie  years  afterwards  (1771),  Joiiann  Georg  ,Sul:ar 
('l  720-1  777)  wreej-  a  theory  of  th.e  l-"ine  .\rts.  .-l/'L^eneine 
'I'licorie  tier  Se/e're::  A'ursie.  He  followed  AVo'.ff.  in  lindirig 
the  essence  of  Beauty  in  jierfection.  which  was  also  the  one 
in  the  manifjkl  ;  and  he  points  out  that,  as  thin,-  are 
beautiful  in  themselves,  and  not  merely  in  su:)jecti\"e  ta-tc, 
.csth-f-tic  pleasure  is  much  higher  than  any  sense  enjoyment 
can  be.  Altliough  Ins  book  v.'ent  through,  f'ur  editions, 
and  was  subsequeritly  added  to  by  three  ni  his  literary 
frici^d-;,  as  v.-ell  as  translated  into  French.  .Suk-cr's  v."as.  on 
the   v.'kole,    a   sterile   discussion.       It    is   soniewhat    curious 


viii  The  PJiilosophy  of  Germany  53 

that  for  many  a  year  the  Germans  considered  Sulzer  their 
chief  authority  in  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful,  although  he 
did  not  advance  aesthetic  theory  beyond  the  position  to 
which  it  was  raised  a  decade  earlier  by  his  friend  Breitinger 
in  his  preface  to  J.  J.  Bodmer's  Critisclie  BetracJitungeti  iiber 
die  poetischeii  Gemdlde  der  Dichtcr  (1741). 

In  1764,  Johann  Joachim  Winckelmann  (17 17-1768) 
published  his  GescJdchie  der  Kiinst  des  Aliertlmuis.  This 
was  the  first  German  work  on  the  history  of  Art,  and  was 
almost  an  epoch  -  making  book.  Winckelmann  was  a 
Prussian,  educated  first  at  Dresden,  and  afterwards  at 
Rome,  where  he  lived  with  Cardinal  Albani,  and  was  made 
prtefcct  of  antiquities  in  the  city.  Amid  the  ruins  of  the 
world  of  Ancient  Art,  in  the  metropolis  of  Italy,  he  planned 
the  work,  which  gave  his  countrymen  their  earliest  and  what 
is  still  one  of  the  freshest  delineations  of  that  world.  It  might 
without  exaggeration  be  defined  as  a  divination  of  the  spirit 
of  Hellenic  Art  by  a  nature  of  kindred  simplicity,  penetra- 
tion, and  strength.  One  chapter  of  his  book  is  entitled 
"The  Essential  in  Art,"  and  in  it  he  discusses  the  nature 
of  the  Beautiful.  He  finds  it  easier — as  many  others  had 
done — to  say  what  it  is  not,  than  what  it  is  ;  but  he  tells  us 
that,  during  all  his  historical  studies  in  Greek  Art,  Beauty 
seemed  to  beckon  to  him.  "  I  cast  my  eyes  down  before  it, 
as  did  those  to  whom  the  Highest  appeared,  believing  that 
I  saw  the  Highest  in  this  vision."  He  tried  to  unite  all 
single  beauties  into  one  figure.  He  failed  in  this  ;  but  he 
recognised  the  truly  beautiful — which  was  felt  by  sense,  but 
recognised  by  the  understanding — as  one,  and  not  manifold. 
He  held  that  the  essence  of  Beauty  consists,  not  in  colour, 
but  in  shape — colour  might  assist  it,  but  did  not  constitute 
it — and  further,  that  Beauty  is  different  from  that  which 
merely  pleases  or  charms  us.  A  person  or  an  object  might 
possess  charm  without  being  beautiful.  He  rejected  the 
theory  that  Beauty  lies  in  the  harmony  of  any  single 
thing  with  the  object  of  its  being,  or  in  the  harmony  of  the 
parts  of  a  thing  with  the  whole  of  it  ;  and  held  that  the 
highest  Beauty  was  "  like  an  essence  extracted  from  matter 
by  fire."      It  was  always  heightened  by  simplicity,  and  there 


54  ^"/''^'  Pliilosophy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

"ivas  also  the  absence  of  individuality  in  it.  so  far  as  in- 
dividual traits  introduce  an  element  of  limitation.  In  this 
connection  Winckelmann  made  use  of  the  ilgure,  Beauty 
should  be  '-like  the  best  kind  of  water,  drav.n  from  a 
spring' :  the  less  taste  it  has,  the  more  healthful  it  is,  because 
free  from  forciLj'n  admixture.'"  Since  all  individual  objects 
had  some  fault  or  defect,  the  excellence  of  ancient  Art 
seemed  to  him  to  consist  in  this,  that  "as  the  bee  gathers 
from  many  flowers,  so  were  the  ideas  of  beauty  br(ju_;l,t 
together  from  nrany  difterent  quarters.''  The  selection  Cif 
the  most  beautiful  elements,  and  their  harmonious  union, 
produced  the  ideal,  which  was  the  highest  possible  beauty, 
and  which  existed,  not  in  outward  nature,  but  in  the  mind 
alone. 

Winckelmann  found  it  easier  to  say  li'Iicre  Beauty  resides, 
than  to  tell  us  in  what  it  consists.  He  selected  "  the  youthful 
form,  in  which  everything  is  and  is  yet  to  come,  in  which  it 
appears  and  yet  does  not  appear."  It  is  obvious  that  this 
is  a  partial  tlieory,  from  the  fact  that  there  is  beauty  in 
maturity,  as  well  as  in  youth,  and  even  in  extreme  age.  In 
addition,  it  is  narrowed  by  its  limitation  to  beauty  of  form, 
or  mere  outline.  He  did  not  take  account  of  expression,  or 
the  incarnation  of  thougln  and  feeling  through  form.  His 
illustration  of  Beauty  as  pure  spring  water  is  the  root  of  a 
fallacy.  Ideal  Beauty  according'  to  that  symljol  v.'ould  be 
stitTand  inflexible,  a  rigid  uniform  entity.  The  th.eory  was 
acutely  criticised  by  Hermann  Hettner  in  the  AVtv/c'  Mod-srne, 
January  i  S66. 

Winckelniann's  theory,  however,  and  his  critical  estimate 
of  Greek  art,  had  an  effect  far  beyond  the  department  to 
which  his  book  was  devoted  ;  and  we  find  it  telling  soon  on 
th.e  literary,  the  philosophical,  and  the  archa:ological  study 
of  his  time.  It  suggested  much,  for  example,  to  Lessing. 
The  charm  of  his  really  great  book  is  that  Winckelmann  was 
no  mere  archa;ologist,  or  dry  chronicler  of  facts,  but  aii 
ardent  enthusiast  for  the  Beautiful,  a  philosophic  ])oet,  v.ho 
ln\'ed  Ijeaut}"  for  its  own  sake. 

Ill  1769,  fi\'e  \'cars  cafter  the  Licsclu'ckfc  tier  I\u>i.<t 
dss    Al/ai/n/ms     aj^peared.     Gotth.old     I-"phraini      Lessing 


VIII  The  PJiilosopliy  of  Germany  55 

(1729- 1781)  published  his  Laokoon^  one  of  the  finest 
fragments  of  aesthetic  criticism  in  the  hterature  of  Ger- 
many. It  was  chrected  against  the  idea  embodied  in  the 
maxim  sit  7tt  pichera  pociiui^  and  its  purpose  was  to  bring 
out  the  distinction  of  the  plastic  arts  from  poetry.  Lessing 
may  be  described  as  an  eighteenth -century  Aristotelian, 
who  maintained  that  the  function  of  Art  was  solely  and 
simply  to  reflect  the  Beautiful.  But  he  points  out  that  the 
Greek  artists  would  paint  nothing  but  the  beautiful.  They 
were  idealists  in  the  sense  that  they  would  not  reproduce 
the  real  if  it  was  ug'ly.  "  Who  would  paint  you,  when  nobody 
will  look  at  you?"  expresses  the  rule  of  their  work.  He 
has  drawn  out  the  provinces  of  Poetry  and  Painting  in  the 
Laokoon  with  much  felicity.  As  sculpture  and  painting 
represent  what  is  coexistent  and  permanent,  they  are  more 
limited  than  poetry  is.  Form  and  colour  have  no  range 
at  all  comparable  to  that  which  Poetry  can  traverse  ;  the 
scope  of  the  latter  being  practically  limitless. 

The  name  of  Anton  Raphael  Mengs  (1728-1779)  should 
be  mentioned  here  in  ^oassing.  He  was  a  German  artist  ; 
court  painter  to  Augustus,  King  of  Saxony  ;  a  friend  of 
Winckelmann  (to  whom  he  was  of  great  ser\ice  at  Rome)  : 
and  a  writer  on  art.  His  definition  of  Beauty,  however, 
was  vague  enough,  "visible  perfection,  an  imperfect  image 
of  the  supreme  perfection.'"' 

2.  McitdehsoJin  to  Kant 

In  1783  a  friend  of  Nicolai,  Johann  August  Eberhard 
(1739-1809),  published  a  Theory  of  the  Fine  Arts  and 
Sciences^  and  in  1S03-1805  a  Handbook  of  /Esthetics  in 
four  volumes.      These  works  call  for  no  special  remark. 

A  much  more  important  writer  was  Tyloses  INIendelssohn 
( 1 726-1 786),  who  must  be  regarded  as  the  intermediate 
I'nk  between  L.essing'  and  Kant.  In  his  I\Iorgenstu7iden 
(17S5),  Mendelssohn  called  attention  to  a  feature  of  the 
Beautiful  which  Kant  adopted,  or  to  which  he  was  at  least 
much  indebted,  in  the  working  out  of  his  greater  theory. 
"It  is  customary,"  he  writes,  "to  distinguish  the  cognitive 


56  The  PJdlosopIiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

faculty  from  the  faculty  of  desire,  and  to  include  the  feelings 
of  ple;isure  under  the  latter.  1  between  cognition  and  desire, 
however,  it  seems  to  me  there  lies  that  satisfaction  of  the 
soul  which  is  widely  separated  from  desire.  We  look  upon 
the  Beauty  in  Nature  and  Art  with  pure  pleasure  and  satis- 
faction. This  is  a  mark  of  the  Beautiful  that  we  contemplate 
it  with  quiet  satisfaction.  It  pleases  us  though  we  do  not 
possess  it,  and  can  never  possibly  make  use  of  it.  When 
we  think  of  a  beautiful  thing  in  relation  to  ourselves,  then 
desire  to  have  it  springs  up,  but  not  till  then  ;  but  this 
desire  to  possess  is  very  difterent  from  the  enjoyment  of  the 
Beautiful  itself" 

In  an  earlier  work  0)i  the  Mtiin  Principles  of  tlie  Fine 
Arts  and  Sciences^  and  On  tl'.e  Sublime  and  Xaive  in  the 
Arts  and  Sciences  (1761),  Mendelssohn  drew  a  fruitful  dis- 
tinction between  the  symbols  which  the  several  Arts 
employ,  and  the  aims  they  have  in  view. 

We  come  now  to  a  greater  name  in  German  philosophy 
than  any  of  the  preceding''.  The  general  aim  of  the  philo- 
sophy of  Kant  (1724- 1 804)  was  to  establish  the  principles 
of  knowledge  on  an  a  priori  basis.  The  Kantian  is  the 
critical  philosophy  par  excellence,  inasmuch  as  it  criticises 
experience  with  a  view  to  show  that  it  contains  elements 
that  are  anterior  to,  and  underived  from,  experience.  In 
I  78  I  the  Critic  of  tiie  Pure  Reason  appeared  ;  seven  years 
later,  the  Critic  of  t lie  Practical  Reason  ;  wh.ich  was  followed 
in  1790  by  the  Critic  of  Judgjncnt.  It  is  in  tliis  last  work 
(the  Kriiiic  der  O'rteilsknft)  that  Kant  discusses  the  nature 
of  Beauty  and  .Sublimity. 

Writing'  to  his  friend  Reinhold  he  said  :  "  I  am  at  pre- 
sent engaged  on  a  critique  of  Taste,  and  I  have  been  in 
this  way  led  to  the  discovery  of  another  kind  of  a  priori 
principles  than  I  had  formerly  recognised.  For  the  faculties 
of  the  mind  are  three  —  the  faculty  of  knowledge,  the 
faculty  of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  the  will.  I  have  dis- 
covered the  a  p'iori  principles  for  the  first  of  these  in  the 
Critic  of  tlte  Pure  Reason,  and  for  the  third  in  the  Critic  of 
tJie  Practical  Reaso?i  ;  but  my  search  for  such  a  similar  prin- 
ciple  for   the   second   seemed   at  fu'st  fruitless.    ...    I  TiOw 


VIII  TJlb  Philosophy  of  Germany  57 

recognise  three  parts  of  Philosophy,  e?-cli  of  which  has  its 
own  a  priori  principles." 

This  recognition  by  Kant  of  three  eciuivalent  and  eciually 
important  departments  of  philosophy  is  noteworthy  ;  and  he 
seems  to  have  regarded  the  third  and  last  as  a  sort  of  con- 
necting link  between  the  other  two.  In  the  intellectual 
sphere,  reason  is  the  faculty  which  traverses  the  ground  to  be 
explored  ;  within  the  moral  sphere  the  will  is  the  faculty  ; 
])ut  "  we  can  feel  what  we  can  neither  know  nor  will "'  ; 
and  by  this  mediating  principle  Kant  thought  that  we  get  a 
link  of  connection  between  the  phenomenal  and  the  real. 
When  we  cannot  penetrate  to  the  world  beyond  phenomena 
by  the  exercise  of  reason,  and  while  the  energy  of  the  will 
is  of  necessity  quite  subjective,  we  may  be  conscious  of 
objects  beyond  us,  which  create  a  certain  harmony  within 
us.  The  aesthetic  line  of  incjuiry  is  therefore  not  only 
difterent  from  the  intellectual  and  the  moral,  it  is  the  only 
pathway  that  conducts  us  to  the  terra  /irina  of  objective 
and  substantial  reality. 

In  his  Critic  of  Judgment  Kant's  first  endeavour  is  to 
find  out  the  a  priori  element  or  elements  in  our  aesthetic 
consciousness.  (i)  When  we  say  of  an  object  that  it  is 
beautiful,  we  are,  first  of  all,  conscious  of  pleasure ;  but  it 
is  a  disinterested  pleasure.  We  do  not  pronounce  it  to  be 
beautiful  because  we  wish  to  possess  it.  Our  only  desire 
is  to  be  in  its  presence,  and  to  know  more  about  it.  (2) 
Next,  we  recognise  that  others  as  well  as  ourselves  should 
thus  judge  of  it  and  feel  regarding  it.  We  universalise  our 
own  judgment  and  feelings  toward  it  ;  and  we  do  this 
because  we  recognise  the  faculties  of  all  men  as  radically  or 
constitutionally  the  same.  We  can  only  say  that  others 
should  agree  with  us,  in  our  judgments  and  feelings  as  to 
beauty,  if  we  possess  a  common  nature.  (3)  Further,  when 
we  say  a  thing  is  beautiful,  we  express  the  relation  in  which 
it  (the  object)  stands  to  us  (the  subject)  ;  but  we  do  not 
pronounce  as  to  any  other  relation,  in  which  the  object 
before  us  stands  to  other  objects.  We  do  not  construe  any- 
thing as  beautiful  because  of  the  end  or  purpose  it  subserves 
(whether  objective  or  subjective),  although  we  may  perceive 


yS  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

that  it  is  always  adapted  to  some  end.  We  judge  it  to  ho. 
beautiful  because  of  what  it  is  in  relation  to  ourselves.  It 
follows — and  here  we  come  to  an  illogical  inference — that 
Beauty  does  not  lie  in  the  power  which  objects  have  to 
move  us  ;  nor  docs  it  consist  in  any  perfections  we  perceixe 
to  exist  in  them.  \\'e  call  them  beautiful  because  ou.r 
faculties  work  harmoniously  in  regard  to  them. 

The  sublime  is  different  from  the  beautiful.  The  objects 
which  we  recognise  as  sublime  do  not  soothe  or  rest  our 
faculties,  but  stir  them.  They  excite  the  imagination  in  an 
indeterminate  manner.  The  beauty  in  objects  appeals  to  us 
directly  by  what  it  is,  the  sublime  appeals  to  us  indirectly 
by  what  it  suggests.  The  great  outlying  and  surrounding' 
forces  of  Xature,  which  we  cannot  manipulate  or  resist  (but 
which  nevertheless  cannot  crush  us  under  tliem).  excite  in 
us  the  feeling  of  the  sublime.  The  sublime  may  be  a  quan- 
titative clement  of  mere  magnitude.  We  may  go  on  adding 
element  to  element,  and  the  more  elements  we  take  in,  the 
greater  the  sublimity  ;  but  at  length  we  reach  a  limit,  and 
can  combine  no  more.  The  thought  of  the  Infinite,  as 
transcending  the  finite,  brings  in  the  sublime  ;  and  the 
sublimity  of  the  Infinite  is  an  absolute  sublimity.  Another 
kind  is  relati\'e.  An  o!)jcct  may  be  great,  not  intrinsically, 
but  only  relatively  to  us  :  v.'hile  we  do  not  feel  that  we  arc 
altogether  subdued  before  it.  Finally,  the  recognition  f)f  a 
su])lime  power  be\-ond  us  in  Xature  awakens  in  nian  a  sense 
of  corresponding  power  within  him,  and  leads  him  to  find 
the  root  of  the  sublime  within  his  cnvn  nature. 

Kant"s  teaching  as  to  the  Deauiiful  and  Sublime  was  an 
effort  to  unite  what  had  been  left  broken  up  and  divided  in 
his  two  previous  Kritikoi.  He  saw  in  Xature  something 
that  resembled  human  rea.-on  and  intelligence.  The  diffi- 
culty was  to  find  the  connecting  link  Ijctwccn  them.  He 
lield  that  the  only  ground  on  which  we  can  universalise  our 
judgments  as  to  the  Beautiful,  or  regard  them  as  valid  for 
others,  was  th;it  they  were  the  outcome  of  the  Uni\'ersal 
Reason.  We  could  not  exjicct  any  one  to  agree  with  us  in 
our  judgments  as  to  Beauty  unless  we  ourselves  discerned 
this  universal  reason  in  Xature,  and  saw  in  it,  not   a   blank 


1^111  The  Philosophy  of  Germany  59 

pleasure-producing  apparatus,  but  a  mirror  which  reflects  our 
own  nature  at  its  highest  point  of  development. 

It  is  in  this  act  of  universalising  our  experience  that  we 
transcend  the  subjective  and  phenomenal  sphere.  At  first 
all  is  subjective  and  phenomenal.  In  the  pure  disinterested 
pleasure  which  comes  to  us  ab  extra,  without  the  element  of 
desire,  we  do  not  transcend  the  phenomenal  sphere.  But 
whenever  we  say  that  this  Beauty,  which  gives  us  a  pure  dis- 
interested pleasure,  ought  to  please  others  also,  we  bring  in 
l)Oth  a  rational  and  an  ol)jective  element.  We  could  not 
unixcrsalise  a  pleasant  thing  merely  because  it  v/as  pleasant. 
Recognising  something  in  us,  however,  that  is  common  to 
the  race,  and  something  in  each  member  of  the  race  that  is 
not  his  own,  but  is  universal  proj^crty,  we  are  freed  from 
our  former  confinedness  and  limitation. 

Kant's  system  of  /Esthetic  is  far  from  complete.  Its 
defects  were  pointed  out  by  contemporary  critics  (notably 
by  Herder  in  his  Kalligone),  and  by  many  subsec[uent  ones.^ 
Kant  made  the  charm,  or  that  which  pleases  us  in  beautiful 
things,  diametrically  distinct  from  the  Beauty  itself;  and 
hence  he  said  that  Colour  (which  pleases  the  eye)  is  an 
unessential  element  in  Beauty,  whereas  Form  is  of  its 
essence.  But  surely  form  "  pleases  the  eye,"  just  as  colour 
does  ;  and  the  sequences  of  sound  in  music,  and  its  har- 
monies, please  the  ear,  as  the  rhythmic  cadence  of  words  in 
poetry  does.  This  sharp  dualistic  separation  of  provinces  is 
faulty.  Compare  Friedliinder's  criticism  of  Kant  in  the 
Pr^itssisc/ie  Jakrbiic/ier^  xx.  2.- 


3.  Herd.T  to  JJuiiiboldt 

The  work  of  Herder  (Johann  Cottfried,  i  744-1  803)  be- 
longs much  more  to  Literature  than  to  Philosophy,  although 
five  volumes  of  philosophical  writings  were  published  in  his 

^  Ilcgel  lias  some  most  appreciative,  and  at  tlie  same  time  aptly 
critical  remarks  on  Kant's  theory. 

'^  Kant  in  seinem  Verhdltniss  sur  Kii?ist  luid  schonen  Natur.  See 
also  a  very  appreciative  estimate  in  Kant's  Begrilndung  der  Aesthetik, 
by  Von  Hermann  Cohen,  of  Marburg  (1889). 


6o  The  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

complete  works.  He  -was  trained  by  Kant,  but  they 
divcrj4'ed  widely  in  their  views  of  Nature.  In  his  Ka'li^^onc 
(iSoo)  this  difterence  is  explicit,  although  in  his  Metak^-itik 
cw  A''r////(' (published  in  1799)  the  antagonism,  and  even 
bitterness,  was  greater.  He  was  one  of  three  men,  younger 
contemporaries  of  Kant  (Harnann  and  Jacobi  being  the 
other  two),  who  emphasised  feeling  rather  than  reason,  as 
the  organ  by  which  we  obtain  a  direct  apprehension  of 
reality.  They  were  philosophical  mystics,  each  in  a 
different  way — Hamann,  in  his  AcstJietica  in  ?iiice  ;  Herder, 
in  his  Kalligone  ;   and  Jacobi,  in  his  David  Hu})ie,  etc. 

Kiint's  great  contemporary,  Goethe  (i  749-1 S32),  chief 
poet  of  Germany,  wrote  much  that  is  suggestive  on  the 
suijject  of  the  Beautiful.  Casual  reflections  in  fugitive 
l)ieces,  detached  sayings  in  Willuiiii  Mtistcr  and  other 
works,  stray  remarks  in  his  correspondence  with  Schiller, 
I'leinhard,  Woltmann,  and  others,  and  in  the  conversations 
v.hich  Eckermann,  Riemer,  and  Luden  have  recorded, 
show  that  he  sought  to  steer  a  wise  middle  course  between 
the  idealists  and  realists.  The  following  are  some  of  his 
almost  aphoristic  dicta  on  the  subject,  collected  from 
many  sources  : — "  The  Beautiful  is  an  elementary  pheno- 
menon, which  is  never  incorporated,  but  v/hose  reflex 
becomes  visible  in  a  thousand  various  revelations  of 
creative  genius,  as  various  indeed  as  Nature  herself. 
I  am  not  of  opinion  that  Nature  is  beautiful  in  all  her 
creations.'''.  .  .  '•  A  creation  is  beautiful  when  it  has  reached 
the  height  of  its  natural  development ''"  (in  th.at  period  of 
growth  which  perfectly  expresses  its  peculiar  character;. 
"  Ue^er  taught  me  that  the  ideal  of  Beauty  is  simplicity  and 
tranquillity.'  "The  spirit  of  the  real  is  the  true  ideal,  but 
the  artist  is  higher  than  art,  and  higher  than  his  object.'' 
"  The  greatest  artists  are  bohU-st  in  the  royal  prerogative  of 
ennobling  the  vulgar,''  and  "in  every  artist  there  are  germs 
of  audacity."  "  •  Beauty'  is  neither  light  nor  darkness  :  it 
is  twilight,  the  medium  between  truth  and  untruth.  .  .  . 
"  Beauty  is  inex})licable  :  it  is  a  hovering,  floating,  and 
glittering  shadow,  whose  outline  eludes  the  grasp  of  defini- 
tion.''     Goethe  did  not  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  specula- 


VIII  T]ie  PJdlosophy  of  Germany  6i 

tive  or  scientific  analysis  of  the  Beautiful.  He  puts  the 
case  thus  : — "  Mendelssohn  and  others  tried  to  catch  Beauty 
as  a  butterfly,  and  pin  it  down  for  inspection.  They  have 
succeeded  in  the  same  way  as  they  are  likely  to  succeed 
with  a  butterfly.  The  poor  animal  trembles  and  struggles, 
and  its  brightest  colours  are  gone  ;  or,  if  you  catch  it 
without  spoiling  the  colours,  you  have  at  best  a  stiff  and 
awkward  corpse.  But  a  corpse  wants  the  life  which  sheds 
beauty  on  everything."  Again  :  "  The  Beautiful  is  the  mani- 
festation of  secret  laws  of  Nature,  which,  but  for  this  dis- 
closure, had  been  for  ever  concealed  from  us.'' 

One  of  Goethe's  letters  to  Schiller  contains  the  following 
reference  to  Diderot: — "Jena,  August  7,  1797.  I  have 
during-  these  last  days  been  looking  into  Diderot,  Sitj- 
la  Pei/ifure,  in  order  to  strengthen  myself  in  the  in- 
spiriting company  of  his  genius.  It  seems  to  me  that 
it  is  the  same  with  Diderot  as  with  many  others  who  hit  y  V 
the  truth  with  their  feelings,  but  often  lose  it  again  through 
their  reasoning.  In  his  resthetic  works,  I  think,  he  still 
looks  too  much  to  foreign  and  moral  aims  ;  he  does  not  seek 
these  sufficiently  in  the  subject  itself  and  in  its  representa- 
tions. To  him  the  beautiful  work  of  Art  must  always  serve 
some  other  purpose.  ...  I  believe  it  to  be  one  of  the 
advantages  of  our  modern  system  of  Philosophy  that  we 
have  a  simple  formula  for  expressing  the  subjective  effect 
of  lesthetic  without  destroying  its  character." 

Goethe's  contributions  to  philosophy  were,  however,  only 
indirect  and  unsystematic.  Those  of  his  great  compeer 
in  poetry  and  criticism,  Schiller  (i  759-1 805),  were  more 
direct,  and  have  been  more  fruitful.  In  his  letters  on 
ccsthetic  culture,  Briefe  iiber  die  dsthetisclie  Ej'sie/urng  des 
Mensche}i  (1793-95),  he  enriched  the  literature  of  his  country 
with  an  admirable  work.  It  should  be  noted  that  they  were 
written  after  the  political  turmoil  of  the  previous  decade 
(1785-95),  in  a  time  that  was  to  Germany  like  a  great  calm 
after  storm.  Schiller's  letters  are  a  Kantian  development, 
and  rest,  as  he  tells  us  in  the  first  of  them,  on  Kantian 
i;)rinciples  ;  yet  Schiller  was  not  a  disciple  of  Kant.  He  had 
imbibed  the  spirit  of  the  critical  philosophy,  but  he  had  come 


62  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  ciiAr. 

under  the  inilucnce  of  Leibnitz  and  Rousseau,  before  he  was 
influenced  by  Kant.  He  dissented  on  some  points  both  from 
the  experience  and  the  a  priori  philosophy,  from  the  doctrine 
that  all  our  knowledge  has  its  origin  in  sensation,  and  from 
the  doctrine  that  we  objectify  our  own  understanding-  in  the 
interpretation  of  Nature. 

.Scliiller  held  that  we  reach  the  realm  of  the  objective  by 
a  direct  a  priori  affirmation  or  judgment.  A  phrase  of 
Kant's  was  the  origin  of  his  theory  of  the  "  play-impulse  " 
'Spicl-tritp,  which  is  the  centre  of  his  aesthetic  doctrine.  He 
was  influenced  first  by  Lessing,  next  by  Kar.t.  and  then  by 
Aristotle  ;  but  Kant  remained  his  chief  master  to  the  end, 
e\'er.  wlien  he  dissented,  and  left  Inm  behind.  The  sa\  ing  of 
Kant's  was  as  f  illows  :--■•  Art,  compared  with  Labour,  may 
be  considered  as  play."'  Pondering  this,  .Schiiler  found 
two  impulses  at  work  within  us — the  first  a  sense-impulse, 
the  second  a  form-impulse.  The  former,  which  arises  from 
our  physical  nature,  receives  impressions  from  wiih.out,  and 
always  seeks  change  ;  the  latter,  arising  out  of  the  activity 
of  the  self  or  ego,  acts  from  within,  and  seeks  repose.  The 
two  are  reciprocal,  and  act  reciprocally  ;  but,  when  they 
work  in  harmony,  a  new  impulse  is  generated  out  of  them, 
which  .Schiller  called  the  play-impulse.  "The  object  of  the 
sense-impui.^e  is  life  ;  the  object  of  the  form-impulse  is 
shape  ;  that  of  the  play-imjjulse  is  li-viii^^  sJio.po,  which,  in 
its  widest  signification,  is  ]]eauty.'"'^  Thus  Leauty  results 
from  the  reciprocity  of  two  opposite  impulses,  and  we  must 
seek  its  highest  ideal  in  the  most  perfect  possible  alliance 
of  them.'-  The  evolution  of  the  play-imj^ulsc  is  not  tl:e 
evolution  of  a  mere  desire  for  pleasure,  or  of  any  desire 
whatsoever.  It  is  the  development  of  lesthetic  a]:)j)reciation 
in  the  appreliension  of  the  Leautiful. 

The  spid-trieb,  however,  is  no  explariation  of  the  rise  of 
our  appreciation  of  the  l)eautiful.  .Schiller,  in  his  thenr\\ 
greatly  widens  the  meaning  of  the  word  spiiel.  What  lie 
aims  at.  and  describes,  is  really  the  harmonious  e\-ohuion  or 
development  of  human  nature.  "That  only  is  jilay.''  says 
he,  "  \\"hi(  h  'rimpletes  man.  and  e\"ol\'es  his  doubde  nature."-' 
^    r^T-icfe  10,  '-   r.:-A:i"c  rj.  ^    P.ricfc  i  ;. 


VIII  TJie  PJnlosopJiy  of  Germany  63 

On  the  whole,  it  must  be  said  that  Schiller's  aesthetic  letters 
are  very  misty-margined  indeed.  Although  his  notion  of 
the  play-impulse  has  given  rise  to  some  subsequent,  and 
quite  recent,  speculation  in  England,  the  outcome  of  his 
nebulous  theory,  in  his  own  poems,  is  far  better  than  the 
theory  itself.  In  Dcr  Filgrvn,  for  example,  a  search  for 
the  Beautiful  is  made,  and  it  is  found,  not  in  the  phenomenal 
world,  the  world  of  the  concrete,  but  beyond  it.  Das  Ideal 
U7td  das  Lebe7i  carries  us  from  the  actual  to  the  transcend- 
ental. Das  Mddchc7i  imd  der  Freittid  and  Der  spicle7ide 
KTiabe  are  also  similarly  significant.  Schiller's  poetry 
resembled  that  of  Wordsworth,  in  its  finding  within  material 
things  the  symbols  of  the  spiritual. 

Jean  Paul  Richter  wrote  an  introduction  to  ^Esthetics, 
VorscJtuIe  der  Aest/tc/ik,  which  has  no  speculative  value.  His 
ser\'ices  to  his  country  were  literary,  rather  than  philosophical. 

In  1794,  Friedrich  von  Schlegel(i  772-1  829),  the  youngest 
of  five  brothers  who  were  all  illustrious,  published  a  work 
on  the  Limits  of  the  IJeautiful.  He  was  intluenced  by  P'ichte 
and  Jacobi  against  the  Kantian  position,  but  he  broke  away 
from  them  in  an  almost  erratic  individualism.  The  spiel-trieb 
of  Schiller  seems  to  have  charmed  him,  and  in  it,  and  in 
giving  free  play  to  instinctive  tendency,  he  found  the  way  out 
of  the  fetters  of  dualism.  In  his  book  on  the  Limits  of  the 
Beautiful  he  laments  that  Beauty  is  presented  to  us  in  frag- 
ment ;  and  then  tries  to  unfold  its  elements  in  Nature,  in 
Love,  and  in  Art,  so  as  to  show  that  it  is  in  the  union  of 
the  three  that  the  highest  Beauty  resides.  The  Beautiful 
cannot,  he  thinks,  be  considered  as  distinct  from  the  True, 
or  from  the  fulness  of  life,  the  exhaustless  fund  of  life,  that 
is  e\'er  developing  itself  in  Nature;  nor  can  it  be  se\"ered 
from  the  good,  or  detached  from  her.  The  most  character- 
istic feature  of  Nature  is  its  perennial  vitality,  its  ever-flowing 
exuberance  of  life  ;  while  the  fundamental  features  of  Art 
are  unity,  harmony,  and  symmetry.  To  define  Art  as  the 
mere  imitation  of  Nature,  strikes  at  its  very  root  ;  and  as 
Nature  is  inexhaustible,  Art  is  illimitable.  With  all  its  sug- 
gestiveness,  however,  Schlcgel's  discussion  is  too  rhetorical, 
and  ends  in  rhapsody. 


64  The  PJiilosophy  of  the  Beautiful         chai-. 

Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  (1767-1 S35)  held  in  the  main 
to  the  Kantian  doctrine,  but  he  applied  the  critical  philo- 
sophy popularly.  In  1S25  he  founded  the  Union  of  the 
Friends  of  Art  in  I'rusiia,  and  he  wrote  an  annual  report 
for  it.  He  was  rather  averse  to  abstract  thinking,  and 
avowed  his  aim  to  be  the  attainment  of  a  '•  harmonious 
wholeness"  (totalitiit).  In  1795  ^^^  published  two  essays  in 
Schiller's  Horcii — (i)  on  the  irifluence  of  a  difference  of 
sex  in  organic  nature,  and  (2)  on  the  male  and  female 
forms.  In  179S  he  wrote  his  AcstJiciiscJic  VcysiicJie.  His 
opinions  on  the  Beautiful,  however,  are  to  be  gathered 
chiefly  from  his  essay  on  (ioethe's  Ilen/ian}!  ttiid  DorofJict^, 
from  his  yearly  reports  to  the  Society  of  the  Friends  of  Art, 
and  from  the  prefatory  essay  to  his  correspondence  with 
Schiller  in  1830.  Humboldt  starts  from  two  tendencies  in 
man — the  first  to  "totality.''  the  second  the  tendency  to 
refer  everything  to  the  thinking  subicct  ;  but  he  held  that 
xsthetic  character  is  formed  in  us  by  a  knowledge  of  the 
great  works  of  Art,  while  Art  itself  is  "  the  faculty  of  making 
Ima^L^ination  producti\e,  according  to  law.''  The  artist's 
function  is  to  keep  imagination  alive  and  acti\-e  within  us. 
'■  -Man  belongs  to  a  better  world  than  that  of  realii;/,  viz. 
the  realm  of  ideas.''  The  ideas  set  forth  l^y  the  artist 
lead  man  into  his  own  world,  that  wlrich  is  his  by  right. 
Descending  into  the  realm  of  actuality,  we  are  led  a'.va\- 
from  ourselves.  He  discusses  the  ideal  of  beauty,  and  theri 
proceeds  to  his  theory  of  the  Arts,  dealing  (i)  with  their 
relations  to  each  other,  (2)  with  their  ditlercnces.  They  ail 
meet  at  a  focus.  ''  He  who  would  receive  Art  into  himself 
with  all  h.is  senses,  must  place  himself  in  tlie  middle  of 
them  all  :  mu-t  regard  the  work  of  the  painter  poetically, 
and  that  of  the  ])oet  with  the  eye  of  a  pairiter.'" 

Fricdrich  Douterwek  ( i  7(')6-i  828),  a  di>ciplc  of  Kant, 
who  allied  to  his  teaching  ideas  gathered  from  Jacobi,  wrote 
an  .■EstJictic  in  1S06,  and  a  MctapJiysics  of  tlic  Hcaiitijitl  m 
I  807.  There  is  not  mucli  of  ])ermanent  value  in  either  work. 
A  1,U(M-  writer,  I-'rieclrich  Calker.  tried,  in  a  'J'Jicory  of  //.■,' 
oyiyiiiit'  Ijt:c  of  tJic  7'nu\  GoolL  a/id  lltautiUil.  to  combine 
the  teaching  of  Kant  and  Jacobi  still  further  :   wliile  another 


VIII  TJie  PJiilosopliy  of  Germany  65 

of  the  minor  Kantians,  Bernhard  Bolzano  of  Pra<^ue  (1781- 
I  848),  wrote  a  treatise  on  Tlie  Idea  ofiJie  Beautiful  in  i  843, 
and  one  on  The  Division  of  the  Fine  Arts  in  1847.  These 
works,  however,  have  no  special  value. 


4.  Schelling  to  Schleiermacher 

The  German  philosopher,  after  Kant,  whose  name  is 
specially  associated  with  the  discussion  of  the  Beautiful, 
is  Schelling.  We  have  already  seen  how  Schiller  broke 
with  the  Kantian  subjectivity,  but  Schelling  did  so  in  a 
more  philosophical  manner  ;  and  perhaps  the  influence  of 
no  writer  in  German  philosophy  has  been  ecjual  to  that  of 
Schelling'  in  throwing  emphasis  on  the  Beautiful  as  a  distinct 
source,  or  sphere  of  knowledge.  Like  Kant's,  Schelling's 
philosophy  was  tripartite  ;  dealing  successively  with  the  in- 
tellectual, the  moral,  and  the  aesthetic  consciousness.  The 
centre-point  of  his  whole  philosophy  was  the  identity  ot 
subject  and  object,  of  self  and  the  world,  which  are  unified 
in  the  Absolute.  The  unconscious  products  of  Nature  re- 
semble the  conscious  ones  of  man.  It  is  mind,  not  blind 
mechanism,  that  we  see  in  Nature,  and  the  products  of  art 
resemijle   those   of  unconscious   Nature.      Ikit  it   is   only  in'  "j   /.i 

works  01  Art  that  human  mtelligence  nnds  tlie  contradictions 
between  itself  and  the  world  removed,  and  mysteries  re- 
solved. The  chasm  between  self  and  not  self,  between  man 
and  nature,  between  the  conscious  and  the  unconscious,  is 
done  away  with  by  Art.  \\hich  bridges  the  gulf,  and  conducts 
us  from  the  vestibule  of  knowledg'e.  as  it  were,  to  the  shrine. 
The  Absolute  reveals  itself  to  the  artist  in  his  creative 
moods,  and  thus  his  .Art  —  which  to  him  is  higher  than 
Philosophy — is  a  sort  of  rending  of  the  veil  of  Nature,  or  the 
opening  of  a  door  into  her  secrets.  It  is  by  itsthetic  insight 
that  we  reach  the  transcendental,  as  an  objective  reality. 

Schelling's  philosophy  has  both  obscurities  and  incon- 
sistencies, and  it  underwent  considerable  development  as  his 
life  advanced  ;  while  in  the  application  of  his  philosophy  to 
the  arts  he  was  not   successful.      He  had,  however,  a  much 

F 


66  TJic  PliilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  cuAr. 

wider  and  deeper  knowledge  of  Art  than  his  philosophical 
contemporaries,  and  than  his  great  predecessors  Kant  and 
Fichte.  He  drew  some  philosophic  inspiration  from  Kant, 
but  his  iL'sthetic  insight  came  to  him  in  part  from  Schiller, 
and  still  more  from  Winckelmann,  '•  the  unsurpassed  and 
unsurpassable.''  and  from  the  brothers  Schlegel.  Perhaps  the 
most  noteworthy  thing  in  his  Aestlictik  (written  in  1802)  is 
its  reaction  from  the  subjective  position  to  which  Fichte  had 
logically  brought  the  doctrine  of  Kant.  So  far  as  his  teaching 
united  or  bridged  over  the  chasm  between  the  object  and  the 
subject,  the  real  and  the  ideal,  it  did  good  service  ;  and  this 
was  a  service  still  further  carried  out  hx  Solger  (who.  how- 
ever, fell  l:)ack  almost  to  the  position  of  Plato).  Each  living 
unit,  in  developing  its  life,  carried  out  the  type  of  the 
species  to  which  it  belonged.  The  type  was  the  standard  ; 
but  every  individual,  diverging-  somewhat  from  it,  mediated 
between  the  essence,  which  underlay  its  deviation,  and  all 
the  other  individuals  which  also  departed  from  it  in  various 
ways.  -Schelling's  was  a  really  comprehensive  attempt  to 
unite  the  Aristotelian  with  the  Platonic  view  of  the  world. 

The  fourteenth  lecture,  in  his  Method  of  University 
.Studies  (Metliodc  dcs  ak'uieJiuscJioi  Siudiuius^  1S03),  is  on 
'•The  Science  of  the  Fine  Arts.''  In  it  he  teaches  that  Art 
is  not  a  mere  miriister  to  the  pleasures  of  sense,  l-;Owe\-er 
retlned.  It  is  to  the  philosopher  a  mirror  of  wliat  is  di^•ine, 
disclosing  the  absolute  Beauty  through  a  relative  medium. 
Art  is  related  to  Philosophy  as  the  real  is  to  the  ideal  : 
they  are  type  and  antitype.  According  to  Schelling.  tlie 
philosop'ner  sees  more  in  Art  than  the  mere  arti-t  can.  and 
the  essential  nature  of  Art  cannot  be  known  excepting 
through  Philosophy.  He  held  that  the  jjliilo-opher.  and  lie 
alone,  was  aljle  "to  follow  Art  to  its  secret  and  ])rimiti\e 
source,  to  the  llrst  workr^hops  of  its  creation.''  And  so,  th.e 
genius  of  Art  is  self-derived.  It  is  no  slave  to  precedent, 
it  oi'iginates  new  ideals  ;  and  it  sets  authority  aside,  not 
ijccause  it  is  lawless,  but  because  it  is  its  own  authorit}". 
S'.diehing  goes  on  to  ask,  is  the  philoso])her  ecjually  coni- 
i)cii-nt  to  deal  wit'.i  the  relative,  the  historical,  and  ir.e 
technical    sid.e   of  Art  ?       He   mav   be    able    to   rise   to    the 


viii  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Germany  67 

Absolute  by  the  help  of  the  relative  ;  but  can  he  afterwards 
discern  it,  illumining  the  relative  ?  Schelling  replies  that 
if  we  get  to  a  unity  underlying  the  different  phases  which  Art 
has  historically  assumed,  this  unity  will  abolish  the  antithesis 
between  them.  That  which  is  common  to  all,  cancelling  the 
difference  of  the  successive  periods,  will  at  the  same  time 
show  how  each  particular  form  arose.  It  will  at  once 
transcend,  and  comprehend  or  explain  them. 

A  disciple  of  Schelling,  Georg  A.  F.  Ast  (i 778-1 841), 
wrote  a  Handbook  of  ^-Esthetics  in  1805,  but  it  has  no 
special  philosophical  significance. 

One  of  the  prominent  names  in  German  literature  should 
be  mentioned  at  this  stage,  viz.  Ludwig  Tieck  (1773-1853), 
a  romance-writer  and  poet  of  considerable  fame.  As  one 
of  the  young  enthusiasts  who  gathered  round  the  brothers 
Schlegel,  at  Jena,  he  showed  more  originality  than  any  of 
them.  In  1799  he  wrote  :  "  It  is  a  noble  aim  to  create  a 
work  of  art  that  transcends  the  utilities  of  life,  a  work  of 
beauty  which  shines  with  its  own  splendour,  and  complete 
in  itself  The  instinct  to  produce  such  a  work  more  directly 
points  to  a  higher  world  than  any  other  instinct  of  our 
nature.'"'  He  defined  Beauty  as  "  a  unique  ray  out  of  the 
celestial  brightness  "  ;  but  he  added,  "  in  passing  through 
the  prism  of  the  imagination  of  the  people  of  different 
zones,  it  decomposes  itself  into  a  thousand  colours,  a 
thousand  different  degrees.'' 

In  Johann  Friedrich  Herbart  (1776-1841)  we  find  the 
pioneer  of  a  new  realism.  It  was  a  reaction  from  the 
idealism  of  Fichte  (whose  pupil  he  had  been)  and  the 
absolutism  of  Schelling ;  and  into  his  own  realism  he 
interwove  elements  derived  from  Plato  and  from  Leibnitz. 
Herbart  held  the  Chair  of  Philosophy  at  Konigsberg 
(Kant's  Chair)  from  1809  to  1833.  The  function  of 
Philosophy,  as  unfolded  by  him,  is  "the  elaboration  of 
concepts.''  It  lies  behind,  and  yet  is  contained  in,  all  the 
sciences.  Logic  is  that  part  of  Philosophy  which  dis- 
tinguishes and  co-ordinates  our  concepts,  making  them 
clear.  But  our  concepts  have  also  to  be  corrected  and 
transformed,  with  a  view  to  the  removal  of  contradictions  ; 


68  The  PJiilosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

this  is  the  work  of  ?^Ict;iphysics.  Other  concepts  do  not 
call  for  revision  or  correction,  but  simply  for  reduction  to 
principles  ;  this  is  the  domain  of  .4-Lsthetic.  Thus  while 
-Aletaphysic  doubles  back  upon  our  original  ideas,  so  as  to 
make  them  vindicate  themselves,  and  briny  them  into 
harmony  with  the  world  and  with  one  another.  .-Esthetic 
simply  asserts  or  afnrms — our  judc,nnents  as  to  Beauty  being 
involuntary  ones.  Herbart  deals  almost  exclusively  with  the 
elemental  and  abstract  intellectual  relations  of  the  Beautiful. 
He  did  not  see  the  equal  importance  of  sentiment  or  feeling. 

Two  of  flerbart's  disciples  may  be  mentioned  at  this 
stage,  although  somewhat  out  of  their  chronological  place. 
Adolf  Zeising,  in  his  AestJietiscJic  Fof-schioi^^tti  (I!^'55). 
dG\'e!op5  flerbart's  teaching  as  to  the  elemental  relations 
of  the  Beautiful,  although  he  does  not  directly  borrow 
from  him.  The  golden  section  of  a  line  is  that  which  cuts 
it  so  that  the  smaller  section  is  to  the  larger  as  the  larger 
is  to  the  whole.  It  is  thus  that  Uebcrweg  characterises 
Zeising''.  He  "' tinds  in  the  so-called  'golden  section"  the 
division  of  a  line  (=i)  into  two  such  parts  {a  and  /') 
that  a  :  0  :  :  0  \  I.  an  jcsthetic  significance,  in  that  it  fur- 
nishes the  most  perfect  means  between  ab-o!ute  equality 
and  absolute  diversity,  or  between  expressionless  symmetry 
and  proportionless  expression,  or  between  rigid  re_ui''arity 
and  unregulated  freedom.''  Robert  Zimmermann.  Pr()^;^^or 
of  Philosophy  in  tlie  Uni\-ersity  of  Prag,  also  f)llo\s"ed 
flerbart,  and  endorsed  his  fundamental  concejition.  He 
wrote  an  elaborate  GescJiicJife  dcr  jlcstiictik  a's  /)/iilnso/ ii- 
i.<cJicr  ]Visscji>c}i.'(ft  (1858).  Two  volumes  of  an  .-Icstlu-tik 
followed  in  1S65,  and  Studioi  loui  Krif ;!:■:>!  zur  Piiilosopliic 
loid  Aestliciik  in  1S70.  Zimmermann's  history  is,  however, 
Ijetter  than  his  system.  It  is  a  really  comprehen-ixe  sur- 
\-e\-  of  the  course  of  philosophical  thought  on  the  subject 
from  Plato  to  I.otze  ;  and  discus-es  the  Xec)platoniais.  the 
Dutch,  French,  and  English  theories  of  Beauty,  as  well 
as  those  of  Germany.  .Some  of  his  successors  conthie 
themselves  cxclu5i\-eiy  to  their  own  countrymen. 

In  the  posthumous  Lectures  on  /Esthetics  {I'orlcsioio^cn 
iibcr  Acstlictil:),   by   Professor   U.    \\'.    F.    Solger  of  Berlin 


VIII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Germany  69 

(17S0-1819),  \ve  find  the  philosophy  of  Herbart  developed 
along-  a  special  line.  Solger  had  been  a  disciple  of 
Schelling,  and  he  was  influenced  by  the  Schlegels.  His 
Erwhi  is  a  Platonic  dialogue,  somewhat  heavy  in  con- 
struction, wanting  all  the  grace  and  naivete  of  the  Greek. 
There  are  four  interlocutors — Anselm,  who  takes  up  the 
position  of  Schelling  ;  Bernhard,  who  is  Fichtean  ;  Adel- 
bert,  who  is  Solger  himself;  and  Erwin,  a  youth  as  yet 
unattached  to  any  school.  The  first  two  dialogues  are 
metaphysical,  on  the  nature  of  Beauty  ;  the  last  two  are  on 
the  nature  of  Art.  Beauty  is  represented  as  an  immediate 
revelation  of  God.  "  Only  then  is  beauty  discerned,  when 
we  see  in  it  the  living  moving  spirit  of  the  all-compassing 
Deity."'  In  keeping  with  this  theosophic  view  of  the 
Beautiful,  Solger  teaches  that  in  the  beauty  of  the  body  the 
soul  appears.  It  is  not,  however,  by  any  one  special  organ 
that  we  apprehend  the  Beautiful.  It  is  by  an  intuitive 
gaze  of  the  whole  nature  that  the  realm  of  pure  being  is 
entered,  and  one  of  the  characteristics  of  pure  being  thus 
discovered  is  its  beauty.  In  reference  to  Art,  he  affirms 
that  it  is  all  symbolical,  ancient  Art  dealing-  for  the  most 
part  with  objective  symbols,  and  modern  Art  with  subjective 
ones.  As  a  revelation  of  the  divine  Idea,  he  held  that 
Beauty  is  on  one  side  essence,  and  on  the  other  appearance  ; 
and  the  arts  of  poetry  and  music  disclose  the  former  more 
perfectly,  those  of  painting,  architecture,  etc.,  realise  the 
latter.  Solger  emphasises  the  fact  that  every  apocalypse  of 
the  Beautiful  is  of  necessity  evanescent  ;  but  his  teaching 
is  full  of  crotchets,  e.g.  the  doctrine  that  the  beautiful  is 
doon-ied  to  extinction,  because  the  ideal  always  transcends 
the  actual,  and  that  the  essence  of  all  true  art  is  irony,  "  the 
self-destruction  of  the  idea  brought  about  by  the  appearance 
of  prototypal  beauty."' 

Karl  C.  F.  Krause  (178 1- 1832),  an  absolutist  who 
started  from  the  position  of  Spinoza  and  Schelling,  modi- 
fied their  doctrine,  both  in  its  metaphysical  and  ethical 
aspects,  and  added  some  ideas  derived  from  Kant  and 
Fichte.  The  foundation  science  may  be  indifterently  named 
ontology,  theology,  cosmology.      It  deals  with  the  absolute 


70  TJic  PJiilosopJty  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

anil  the  essential.  After  it  come  Mathematics,  Logic, 
.'1-^sthetics,  Ethics.  .Esthetics  is  a  formal  science,  because 
llcauty  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  the  Infinite  and 
Absolute  :  and  as  realised  in  Art,  it  is  the  harmony  of  the 
nianifold  in  the  one.  Its  highest  characteristic  is  self- 
sufficiency,  and  this  marks  it  otT  from  the  useful  and  also 
from  the  symbolical.  Krause  diftcrs  here  from  Solger. 
A  thing  ■'  is  beautiful  for  what  it  is,  not  for  what  it  symbol- 
ises." In  the  ascending  stages  of  organic  perfection  in 
Nature  we  find  a  scale  of  natural  beauty,  which  ends  in  the 
"  beauty  of  God,'''  in  whom  all  things  are  united.  To  us 
the  Beautiful  is  that  which  actively  engages  and  satisfies 
our  reason,  understanding,  and  fancy,  according  to  law. 
and  which  fills  the  mind  with  disinterested  complacency. 
Kant's,  Schiller's,  and  Solger's  definitions  are  variously 
combined  by  Krause. 

Another  of  the  modern  German  Platonists,  who  caught 
the  inspiration  of  Schelling,  must  be  mentioned  at  this  stage  : 
although  he  was  more  distinctively  an  ethical  writer. 
.Schleiermacher  ( i  7 6S-i  834).  According  to  .Schlciermacher, 
we  know  the  Absolute,  not  by  thought,  but  l)y  feeling. 
Religious  feeling  is  the  highest  channel  of  human  know- 
ledge ;  and  while  Art  was  to  him  the  language  of  religion. 
it  may  be  said  that  his  etliics  were  esthetic.  Instead  of 
beginning  with  the  individual  arts,  he  starts  with  the  notion 
of  Ijcauty,  and  defines  aesthetics  as  '-thie  science  of  the 
Beautiful  in  Art."'  In  his  description  of  the  se\'eral  arts 
seriatim  there  are  some  shrewd  comnients  but  no  •■  open 
vision.'"      He  was  more  of  an  enthusiast  than  an  expert. 


5.  Ilcgcl  to  CiVriire 

We  now  reach  a  greater  than  Sch.elling  and  his  discij;les. 
and  the  third  illustrious  name  in  German  philosopln"  from 
Kant,  viz.  Hegel.  Hegel's  philosophy,  like  that  of  his  i\\o 
great  predecessors,  falls  into  three  sections — the  fir.-t  deal- 
ing \v\{h  what  he  deemed  the  logical  evolution  aiui  develop- 
ment  of  the   Absolute,   as   pure   thought  (the   philosophy  of 


VIII  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Gcrinmiy  71 

r^Iind)  ;  the  second,  with  the  evokition  and  development  of 
thought  in  the  external  world  (the  philosophy  of  Nature)  ; 
and  the  third,  with  the  return  of  thought  from  this 
objectivity  to  itself  (the  philosophy  of  Spirit). 

Hegel  wrote  a  very  elaborate  treatise  on  Aesthetik,  per- 
haps the  most  elaborate  in  German  philosophical  literature. 
It  is  divided  into  three  sections.  The  first  discusses  the 
philosophy  of  the  Beautiful,  both  in  the  abstract  and  in  the 
concrete,  the  Ideal  in  Art  and  its  realisation  ;  the  second 
deals  with  the  development  of  the  art-impulse  in  its  various 
types,  symbolic,  classic,  romantic  ;  while  the  third  treats  of 
the  several  Arts  in  detail. 

Beauty,  according  to  Hegel,  is  the  disclosure  of  mind, 
or  of  the  idea,  through  sensuous  forms  or  media  ;  and  as 
Mind  is  higher  than  Nature,  by  so  much  is  the  beauty  of  Art 
higher  than  the  beauty  of  Nature.  Natural  beauty  is  but  the 
reflection  of  beauty  of  mind.  It  appeals  to  all  the  powers, 
to  the  senses,  to  feeling-,  to  perception,  and  to  imagination  : 
and  '■■  its  forms  are  as  manifold  as  its  phenomena  arc 
omnipresent."  We  may  generalise  the  forms  which  Beauty 
assumes,  and  we  find  that  in  all  cases  it  is  "the  unity  of 
the  manifold  ''  ;  but  while  it  is  to  be  found  in  all  Nature, 
and  especially  in  vital  Nature  (organised  living  structures), 
it  is  most  perfectly  disclosed  to  us  in  and  through  Art. 
The  art-products  of  the  world  register  the  insight  of 
the  human  race  into  Beauty,  and  the  nations  of  the  world 
have  left  their  profoundest  intuitions  and  ideas  thus  em- 
bodied. Art  gives  to  phenomenal  appearances  "a  reality 
th.at  is  born  of  mind  ''  ;  and  through  Art  they  become,  not 
semblances,  but  higher  realities.  It  is  thus  that  Art  breaks, 
as  it  were,  through  the  shell,  and  g^ets  out  the  kernel  for  us. 

It  comes  to  this,  that  the  great  plastic  power  which 
works  in  Nature  has  evolved  certain  definite  types,  which 
(on  the  last  analysis)  are  thoughts,  notions,  ideas,  mind- 
forms,  disclosing  the  mind's  essence.  And  these  are  not 
merely  a  series  of  detached  existences,  but  all  that  has 
lieen  evolved  has  a  certain  fitness  of  relation  and  definite- 
ness  of  proportion.  In  this  fitness  and  proportion  there 
is   Beauty.       At    the   best,    however,    it    is    a    lifeless    type 


-2  Tlie  PJiilosopJiy  of  tlic  Bcaiitiful  ihap. 

of  Beauty.  It  is  only  when  life  animates  a  perfectly 
developed  form,  that  I]eauty  discloses  itself  to  the  full. 
Life,  in  the  tlrst  instance,  shapes  the  forms  of  Nature, 
moulding  and  evolving  them.  But  they  are  not  the  life 
itself  It — the  formati\'e.  shaping  power — moves  on.  in 
manifold  de\elopment,  to  animate  other  forms  ;  and  it  is 
in  this  evolving  and  protean  life  that  the  highest  Beauty 
resides.  Beauty  is  thus  the  .Absolute  realising  itself  in  the 
relative.  It  is  the  Absolute  pa-sing  out  of  latency  into  ^elf- 
manifestation  and  self-realisation  ;  and  in  this  process  the 
lustre  of  the  idea,  breaking  through  the  barrier  of  the 
material,  illumines  it.      This  is  Beauty. 

In  every  wcjrk  of  Art  possessing  Beauty,  we  must  dis- 
tinguish the  external  form  from  that  which  lies  bi  neath  it, 
viz.  the  inner  spirit  by  which  a  soul  is  breathed  into  the 
body  of  the  work.  A  work  of  art  is  not  made  up  of  or 
exhausted  in.  a  series  of  lines,  curves,  surf  ice-forms,  colours, 
sounds.  It  is  nothing  if  it  does  not  disclose  feeling  and 
thought  ('mind;. 

Hegel  criticises  Plato"s  idealism,  and  finds  it  too  abstract, 
and  empty  of  content.  The  aim  of  his  own  philosophy  was 
to  reconcile  the  extremes  of  the  universal  and  the  particular. 
He  wished  to  get  hold  of  some  fertile  jM-inciple,  which  was 
able  to  do  this,  by  showing  how  the  particulars  were 
contained  within  the  unixersal.  and  how  a  uni\'ei'sal  was 
illustrated  by  the  particulars.  To  this  end  he  heifl  that  the 
artist  had  to  impress  the  seal  of  his  inili\-idual  being  r,])i>n 
external  things,  and  to  rind  represented  in  ihem  what  was 
most  characteristic  of  himself  Hence,  tlniugh  a  \\(irk  of 
Art  addresses  itself  lirst  of  all  to  sensuous  aj)prehcn-:on 
(to  sight  and  sound),  it  soon  liber;ites  itself  from  these 
trammels,  and  the  whole  region  of  >ense  is  seen  to  be  a 
sort  of  =;had')w-'A-orld.  Art  is  no  mere  iinitation  or  mirroring 
of  nature.  It  is  a  transcendence  of  Nature,  i.e.  of  the 
actual.  PN'ery  great  artistic  work  mu:^t  h.a\'e  Nattu'c  foi'  its 
ba~is  ,and  its  starting-]ioint  :  but.  in  pro]ioi-tion  to  its  great- 
nes-,  it  ri-es  from  this  founclaticn.  It  lives  and  mo\'e~.  as 
it  were  amphibiously,  in  the  two  worlds  of  the  actual  and 
the  ideal. 


VIII  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  Germany  73 

Hegel  has  many  profound  remarks  on  the  different 
types  of  Art — the  symboHcal,  classical,  and  romantic — and 
their  historical  succession  and  development.  At  first,  and 
specially  in  Egypt,  the  land  of  symbol,  thought  was  sug'- 
g"csted,  not  expressed.  Next  in  Greece,  it  found  expression 
in  the  fulness  of  finite  form  ;  and  as  man  rose  in  intelligence, 
his  gods  became  more  human.  Next,  when  the  higher 
spirit  broke  through  the  trammels  of  material  form,  the 
anthropomorphism  of  classical  art  gave  place  to  the  new 
ideal  which  we  find  in  romantic  art.  Thus  the  stages  in 
the  development  of  mind  are  mirrored  for  us  in  the  historic 
evolution  of  Art. 

In  his  classification  of  the  separate  Arts,  Hegel  rises 
from  the  groundwork  of  the  natural  toward  the  spiritual, 
and  arranges  them  on  somewhat  parallel  lines  to  the  sym- 
bolic, classical,  and  romantic  series,  (i)  Architecture,  in 
which  the  sensuous  element  (the  material)  is  necessarily 
present  in  excess,  and  in  which  symbol  dominates.  (2) 
-Sculpture,  in  which  the  material  is  less  forcibly  present,  as 
sculpture  is  a  representation  of  life,  a  step  towards  ideality — 
an  art  which  attained  its  zenith  in  the  classical  period. 
(3)  Painting,  an  art  which  deals  with  and  represents  Life, 
both  in  form  and  in  colour.  In  this  we  reach  the  romantic 
sphere,  which  is  still  further  attained  (4)  in  ?vlusic,  an  art 
which  dispenses  with  the  material  more  than  painting  does, 
and  is  the  most  subjective  of  the  arts  ;  and  (5)  in  Poetry, 
the  most  universal  and  spiritual  of  them  all.  .Music  apjx-als 
more  to  the  emotions,  and  Poetry  more  to  the  intellect. 
The  medium  of  the  latter  is  not  sound,  but  speech,  and 
speech  as  the  vehicle  of  ideas. 

In  his  attempts,  however,  to  find  a  historical  evolution 
of  aesthetic  ideas  running  parallel  to  his  three  forms  of  the 
.Symljolic,  the  Classical,  and  the  Romantic,  it  must  be 
confessed  that  Hegel  often  reads  into  history  a  meaning  of 
his  own.  We  find  romantic  elements  both  in  the  classical 
and  the  symbolic  periods  ;  and  we  find  symbolic  ideas  in  the 
special  eras  of  classicalism  and  of  romance.  Perha])s  the 
supreme  value  of  Hegel's  Aestlietik — which  is  one  of  his 
greatest  works — is  not  the  residuum  of  propositions,  or  data 


74  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  tJic  Bemitifnl         ctiap. 

which  he  has  proved,  but  the  extraordinary  wealth  of  his 
critical  insiyht  into  the  several  Arts,  and  their  various 
problems. 

Of  all  the  disciples  of  Hegel  no  one  developed  his  aesthetic 
teaching-  so  well  as  F.  Theodor  \'ischer  (1S07-1SS7).  He 
made  the  discovery  of  a  doctrine  of  the  Beautiful  almost 
the  sole  labour  of  his  life.  A  short  study,  Ucbcr  d-is 
Erliabeiie  imd  I\o?>n'scIie  (the  sublime  and  the  humorous), 
1S37,  '^^■''is  followed  by  his  great  book,  AcstJictik  odc)- 
IVissenscIiaft  des  ScJidncii  (1846-51),  and  by  several 
later  works.  He  both  elaborated  Hegel's  doctrine,  and 
evolved  it  in  many  directions.  The  one  disfigurement  of 
his  AcstJictik  is  his  assumption  that  only  a  pantheistic 
theory  of  the  universe  can  do  full  justice  to  the  Ilcauiiful. 
He  too  frequently  tries  to  break  a  lance  with  the  theistic 
interpretation  of  the  world.  The  artist,  according''  to 
Vischer,  does  not  find  the  Beautiful  by  any  imitation  of  the 
actual.  He  does  not  indulge  in  the  mere  copy -work  ot 
the  photographer,  nor  does  he  find  it  by  imaginatively 
breaking  with  Nature,  for  that  would  only  yield  the  fantastic. 
He  does  something  very  difterent.  He  pierces  to  the  core 
of  Xature.  He  finds  its  secret  by  getting  to  its  centre,  and 
apprehending''  its  ideal.  In  all  objects  that  seem  to  l^e 
beautiful,  there  is  an  actual  form  which  approximates  to  the 
ideal  ;  but  \'ischer  thus  distinpj'uislies  the  normal  from  the 
aljnormal  in  Xature.  The  normal  is  that  which  conforms  to 
law,  and  therefore  to  the  type  in  Xature  :  the  alDnnrmal  is 
that  which  departs  from  law.  and  therefore  from  the  t\'pc. 
I5ut  if  all  the  actual  forms  in  Xature  corresponded  to  the 
tx'jjc.  there  would  be  nionotony,  and  therefore  ugliness.  It 
is  tiirough  partial,  though  very  slight,  departures  from  the 
type  in  each  individual,  along  with  a  mirroring  of  the  type 
by  those  very  departures,  that  the  Beautiful  is  kncwn — in 
other  words,  by  a  retention  of  the  typii^al  form  by  all,  while 
at  the  same  time  each  individual  renounces  it  in  part. 

\'i-'^cher  trieci — even  more  than  Schelling.  or  his  inime- 
diate  ma-^ter  Hegel — to  unite  the  I'latoivic  and  tlie  Ai'isto- 
telian  view  of  thing-,  the  ideal  and  the  real.  It  is  wheii 
the   two   are   conjoined,    then   and  then   only,   according  to 


vin  The  Philosophy  of  Germany  75 

X'ischer,  that  we  have  Beauty.  The  absokite  Beauty,  of 
which  the  IMatonists  tell  us,  existed  ab  initio  ;  but  it  has 
mirrored  itself  to  us  in  two  streams  of  phenomena.  It  has 
disclosed  itself  in  external  Nature,  and  in  the  mind  of  man. 
When  the  ,q;erms  of  Beauty  fructify  in  any  individual,  he 
immediately  discerns,  by  contact  with  it,  the  beauty  of  the 
external  world  ;  and  thereafter  the  mind  ascends  (that  is  to 
say,  it  may  or  can  ascend)  to  the  primal  source  of  Beauty 
in  the  archetypal  world.  No  individual  mind  can  ascend 
to  it,  or  grasp  it  directly  —  at  first  hand,  as  it  were. 
Each  individual  must  begin  with  the  actual  Beauty  that 
is  mirrored  in  individual  things.  Afterwards  it  can  rise 
to  the  Source,  and  it  is  impelled  to  do  so  by  the  imperfec- 
tion which  mingles  with  all  the  actual  forms  that  manifest 
the  Beautiful  to  it. 

As  individual  objects  that  possess  it  are  beheld  by  us 
one  after  another,  the  successive  experience  heightens  our 
general  sense  of  Beauty.  This  is  not  due,  however,  to  a 
process  of  mere  idealisation  of  the  objects,  but  simply  to 
the  fact  that  surrounding  each  single  thing  (which  is  itself 
imperfectly  beautiful)  there  is  a  sort  of  halo,  which  connects 
it,  in  its  isolation  and  particularity,  with  the  entire  sphere  of 
the  Beautiful.  The  ceaseless  experience  of  imperfection, 
associated  with  what  is  fair,  leads  us  to  detach  the  features 
tb.at  are  imperfect,  and  thus  to  reach,  as  it  were,  the  type 
of  the  class,  separate  from  those  things  that  mar  it.  It 
is  thus  that  we  obtain  a  relative  standard,  or  criterion  of 
the  Beautiful  which  is  higher  than  any  actual  lo\'eliness 
mirrored  to  us  in  out\\ard  things.  As  our  ideal,  howe\'er. 
is  always  expanding,  it  is  equally  evident  that  no  final 
standard  can  be  reached  by  us. 

In  the  first  part  of  his  AcstJictik,  Vischer  treats  of  the 
Meta]3h\sics  of  the  Beautiful  ;  in  the  second,  of  Beauty  in 
Nature  and  in  the  mind  of  man  :  and  in  the  third,  of 
Beauty  in  Art.  The  last  is  the  amplest  part  of  the  treatise, 
and  to  it  two  volumes  are  de\-oted.  Art  in  general  is  first 
discussed,  and  then  the  separate  arts  seriatim.  He  classifies 
the  Arts  very  much  as  Hegel  had  classified  them.  There 
is  (i)  the   objective  class,  which   appeal  to   us  through  the 


76  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  tJic  Bcardifiil  chap, 

eye,  viz.  Architecture,  Sculpture,  and  Paintinc,'' ;  12)  the 
subjective,  that  appeal  to  us  through  the  ear.  Mu-ic  ;  and 
(3)  that  which  is  bnth  objective  and  sul^jective.  viz.  Poetry. 

A  colleague  of  \'ischer,  Karl  Kbstlin,  published  an 
AcstJictik  at  Tiibingen  in  1863-69  which  dealt  chiefly  with 
the  constructive  Arts  and  with  music.  He  discussed  the 
beautiful  in  Nature  more  fully  than  Hegel  had  done. 

Christian  Hermann  Weisse  (1S01-1866),  at  first  a 
Hegelian,  gradually  broke  with  his  master's  doctrine  and 
became  an  opponent,  especially  objecting  to  the  rank 
assigned  to  Logic,  and  endeavouring  to  graft  a  niy?tic 
element  on  the  purely  rational  one  of  Hegel.  In  1S30  he 
issued  his  System  d-:r  Aesthctik  ah  Wissoiscltaff  t'-v/  dcr 
Idee  des  SehiUie?!.  In  his  doctrine  of  the  Absolute  .Spirit, 
Hegel  virtually  made  formal  logic  the  crown  of  the  edifice 
of  knowledge,  but  subordinated  both  art  and  religion  to 
science.  Weisse  opposes  this.  His  AcsiJietik  treats  of  the 
Beautiful  ( I )  as  subjective  and  universal,  (2)  as  objective 
and  special  in  the  several  arts,  and  (3)  as  subjectivo-oljject- 
ive,  existing  in  the  mind  and  character  of  man  ;  whence 
the  transition  is  made  to  religion  and  theology.  In  the 
tlrst  section  he  discusses  the  sul)iect  of  the  ugly  more  fully 
than  it  had  been  dealt  with  before,  connecting  it  with  tbic 
humorous.  This  was  afterwards  elaborated  by  J.  Karl  1". 
Ro-enkrantz  (1805-1879).  the  Konigsljcrg  Hegelian,  who 
held  Kant's  Chair  after  1833.  and  who  has  been  the  repre- 
.icntative  of  the  centre  of  that  school,  in  his  esthetics  of 
the  Ugly  [Aestiietik  des  HdssUcJieJU  1853).  He  recognises 
Weisse's  merits,  but  objects  to  the  stress  of  the  antithesis 
being  laid  between  the  humorous  and  the  r^ublinie.  The 
Beautiful  is  a  genus  comjjrehending  under  it  the  agreeable 
and  the  sublime.  The  ugly  is  opposed  to  all  of  them,  while 
the  distasteful  is  opposetl  to  the  agreeal)le,  and  the  ordinary 
to  the  sublime.  The  lunnorous  can  seize  tlie  ugly,  and 
tran-form  it  into  the  pleasing,  by  the  way  it  deals  \\ith  it. 
The  ugly  is  formless,  incorrect,  ;uid  inharmorrious. 

K.  Kuni)  i;.  Fischer  (i  S24 ).  a  partial  Hegelian,  re\erL- 

ing  to  Plato  and  to  Kant,  who  in  1849  wrote  PifHii:,'..  die 
Idee    des    Seku/ie?u    mav    be    rc'arded    as    a    successor   of 


VIII  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  Germany  77 

Vischer.  In  addition  to  Dio/inia  he  has  written  aesthetic 
essay's  on  various  subjects  —  on  Schiller,  on  Lessing's 
Nathan  der  IVeise,  on  Shakespeare,  on  luiusi,  etc. — but 
has  done  little  to  ad\ance  itsthetic  theory. 

Another     Hegelian,    Moritz     Carriere    (1817 ),    who 

taught  philosophy  both  at  Giessen  and  at  Munich,  and  who 
followed  on  somewhat  similar  intellectual  lines — taking  up 
a  position  resembling  that  of  Weisse  and  K.  Fischer — has 
done  much  more  for  a:sthetic.  In  1854  he  wrote  Das 
JVlSc/i  und  die  J'onncn  der  Poesie.  His  aim  in  this  book 
was  to  show  that  we  can  only  reach  a  true  theory  of  Art 
when  we  transcend  a  commonplace  Pantheism  and  a 
commonplace  Deism,  in  the  apprehension  of  a  Divine 
Essence,  which  is  everlastingly  revealing  itself  in  Nature 
and  in  History.  In  the  first  part  of  his  Aesilietik  (1859) 
he  treats  ( i )  of  the  Idea  of  the  Beautiful,  (2)  of  Beauty 
in  Nature  and  in  the  mind  of  man,  (3)  of  Beauty  in 
Art.  In  the  second  part  he  deals  with  the  Arts  seriafnH, 
under  the  heads  of  (i)  Plastic  Art,  (2)  Music,  (3)  Poetry. 
Throughout  his  book  Carriere  not  only  diverges  from,  but 
wages  war  with  the  doctrine  of  Hegel,  and  Heg'el's  chief 
disciple  \"ischer,  which  was  pantheistic.  Carriere  maintains 
that  the  pantheistic  view  of  the  universe  prevents  an 
intellectual  recognition  of  its  Beauty,  both  in  general  and  in 
detail.  He  held  that  the  special  function  of  Philosophy 
was  to  unite  the  opposite  theories  of  transcendence  and 
inunanence,  the  dualistic  and  the  pantheistic.  The  Beauti- 
ful consists  in  a  certain  unity  of  idea,  underlying  the  mani- 
fold individual  and  concrete  forms  of  sense  ;  its  unity 
being  evidenced  by  our  very  desire  that  others  should 
agree  with  us  in  our  judgments  regarding  it.  But  to 
evoke  the  sense  of  the  Beautiful  in  us,  we  require  the 
stimulus  of  novelty,  and  with  this  the  return  of  the  mind 
upon  itself,  and  the  perception  of  itself  in  all  it  sees.  In  a 
later  work,  Ari  hi  coniiection  ivith  the  Development  oj 
Cidture,  and  the  Ideals  of  Hmnanity.,  in  fi\-e  elaborate 
volumes,  Carriere  traces  the  whole  philosophy  of  History 
from  the  ;ijsthetic  side.  He  may  be  best  described  as  an 
ideal  realist,  his   chief  aim  being  to  escape  from  dualism, 


78  Tlic  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

\vithout  landing  in  a  pantheistic  thcor)-.  He  held  that  if  we 
adopt  a  theory  of  immanence,  not  only  the  Beauty  of  Nature 
but  Beauty  in  itself  is  unintelligible.  The  influence  both  of 
Hegel  and  of  Lessing  may  be  traced  in  much  that  Carricre 
has  written  of  the  Arts  and  their  historic  stages,  especially 
of  Poetry. 

6.    Scliopcnhaun'  and  Harfjiiojui 

Arthur  Schopenhauer  (i  788-1  S6o),  founder  of  the  most 
distinctive  school  of  German  philosophy  since  Hegel,  pub- 
lished in  1S19  Die  Welt  ah  Willc  unci  Vorsiclhing,  a 
work  which  excited  little  interest  when  it  appeared.  It 
was  a  recoil  from,  and  a  vigorous  criticism  of,  the  post- 
Kantian  schools,  especially  of  Hegel  ;  and  it  was  sent  forth 
as,  on  the  one  hand  a  return  to  Kant,  and  on  the  other 
a  legitimate  and  normal  development  of  his  philosophy,  as 
opposed  to  the  illegitimate  developments  of  other  schools. 
Its  two  main  positions  were  (i)  that  the  world  exists  for  us 
only  as  it  subjectively  appears  to  us.  It  is  only  the 
presentation  of  things  that  we  know.  We  do  not  know 
ourselves  (as  subjects)  and  things  beyond  us  (as  objects) 
separately.  The  object  does  not  create  the  suljjcct,  as 
materialism  asserts  ;  nor  does  the  subject  create  the  obicct, 
as  idealism  aftlrms.  The  subject  and  the  olji'ect  are  known 
together  ;  each  is  necessary  to  the  rither,  and  they  imply 
each  other;  but  we  have  no  knowledge  of  the  essence  of 
either — the  Ding-an-sicJi — all  that  we  know  is  the  ])rescnta- 
tion  (vorstellung).  (2)  This,  however,  is  only  one  half  of 
the  truth,  that  half  wliich  refers  to  our  Knowledge.  The 
second  half  refers  to  the  second  sphere,  that  of  tlie  Will, 
which  is  a  consciotis  power,  operating  from  witliin.  It  is 
only  by  it — by  volition,  or  the  uni\'ersal  will — that  we  reach 
the  realm  of  reality,  the  Ding-cDi-sicJi.  Tlie  essence  of 
m;itter  is  force,  and  all  force  within  the  Universe  is  in 
e.-sence  will. 

.Schopenhauer's  philosophy  has  many  aspects,  but  it  is 
only  as  bearing  on  Aesthetik  that  it  concerns  us  h.ere. 
He  holds  that  Will  does  not  show  itself  in   the  Uni\'erse   in 


VI 11  TJie  Philosophy  of  Gcr7na7iy  79 

fleeting  phenomenal  changes,  but  in  the  enduring  species, 
the  persistent  genera,  which  renew  themselves  after  their 
kind.  "  The  individual  withers,  but  the  race  is  more  and 
more.''  The  type  survives,  while  the  individuals  only 
approximate  to  it.  The  generic  will  of  the  Universe,  the 
only  real  Ding-an-sicJi^  is  an  archetypal  idea,  behind  all 
inch  vidua.  In  so  far  as  individuals  approximate  to  it,  they 
are  beautiful ;  and  in  so  far  as  the  artist  seizes  it  by  intuition, 
he  "sees  into  the  life  of  things  "  ;  and,  his  spirit  "into  the 
mighty  vision  passing,"  he  is  transfused  with  the  object  he 
contemplates,  becoming  one  with  it.  Self,  the  narrow  in- 
dividual self,  is  annihilated  ;  but  he  finds  a  larger  self  in 
the  beauty  of  the  cosmos. 

It  is  not  by  sense  perception,  nor  by  the  scientific  under- 
standing, nor  by  any  process  of  reasoning",  that  an  object  is 
discerned  to  be  beautiful,  but  by  intuition  ;  and  this  intui- 
tion apprehends  its  object,  not  as  an  isolated  phenomenon, 
an  individuum,  but  as  a  generic,  typical,  or  ideal  thing, 
which  is  not  considered  by  us  as  regards  its  uses,  but  as 
regards  itself,  in  its  own  distinctive  self-sufficingness.  In 
our  intuition  of  the  Beautiful  the  energy  of  the  will  is  at  rest, 
desire  ceases,  the  mind  regards  the  object  disinterestedly, 
out  of  all  relation  to  the  wish  to  possess  ;  and  it  is  thus 
that  we  reach  the  sphere  of  the  beautiful  as  the  sphere  of 
the  permanent.  It  is  through  a  kind  of  ecstasy,  which  from 
the  very  first  annihilates  self,  that  the  artist  attains  his  best 
result  ;  the  narrowness  of  his  individual  being  is  outstepped. 
Thus,  in  order  to  any  great  artistic  result,  the  will  must  be 
detached  from  the  intellect.  Personal  desire  must  be 
crushed  under  the  energy  of  the  impersonal  reason.  The 
obtrusion  of  his  own  personality  mars  the  work  of  the  artist. 
"A  work  of  genius  is  not  a  thing  of  utility.  To  be  useless 
is  its  very  patent  of  nobility.      It  exists  for  itself  alone." 

Scho[)enhauer  has  also  dealt  with  the  subject  in  others 
of  his  works,  in  his  MctapJiysik  dcs  Sch'onen  tind  Aesthetik^ 
etc.,  but  all  the  essential  points  of  his  teaching  are  given  in 
Die  Welt  ah  Wille  und  Vorstelluvg. 

None  of  the  recent  German  writers  on  Aesthetik  has 
discussed  the    subject  more  brightly   or   suggestively  than 


8o  The  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

Eduard  von  Hartmann.  In  1868,  in  his  twenty-seventh 
year,  he  pubUshed  his  Pliilosopluc  dcs  U?ibci^'usste?i.  Hart 
mann's  system  is  briefly  an  attempt  to  bring  the  HeL;elian 
logic  (or  doctrine  of  "the  idea'')  and  Schopenhauer's  doc- 
trine of  "will''  into  harmony,  as  co-ordinate  functions  of  a 
single  (but  unconscious)  world-essence — an  ultimate  c^'smic 
principle,  like  that  of  the  Eleatics,  or  Erigena,  or  Spinoza. 
He  thinks  that  his  doctrine  of  TJie  Uiitonscious^  and  its 
dex'clopment  as  a  cosmic  principle,  casts  light  on  all  othci' 
problems,  psychological,  physiolog^ical.  ethical,  religious,  and 
aesthetic. 

in  the  second  section  of  his  book  there  is  a  chapter 
(the  fifth)  on  "  The  Unconscious  in  aesthetic  judgment. 
and  in  artistic  production."  In  it  he  refers  to  the  two 
historical  schools,  which  have  given  rise  to  opposite  tend- 
encies— -the  first  (dating  from  Plato),  which  affirms  that  in 
Art  we  are  able  to  transcend  the  beauty  of  Nature,  and 
that  we  find  in  the  soul  a  criterion  of  what  is,  and  what  is 
not,  beautiful  in  Nature  ;  the  second,  which  says  that  all  we 
can  do  in  Art  is  to  collect  and  combine  the  Pieauties  which 
Nature  exhibits.  He  holds  that  each  of  these  is  partly 
right  and  partly  wrong.  The  empiricists  are  right  in  laying- 
stress  on  the  psychological  and  physiological  elements  in 
aesthetics  ;  but  they  only  succeed  in  ]ir()\'ing  the  ••  world- 
citizenship ''"  of  the  beautiful.  The  idealists,  again,  are 
right  in  tracing  the  origin  of  aesthetic  judgment  to  some- 
thing which  lies  beyond  consciousness,  antecedent,  and  a 
prio7-i.  The  abstract  ideal  of  the  intuitionalists,  as  a  \ague 
unity,  is  untenable.  The  Beautiful  must  incarnate  itself  in 
the  concrete,  and  can  thus  only  be  understood.  Neverthe- 
less iosthetic  carries  with  it,  and  in  it,  a  formal  principle  ; 
and  it  is  only  when  the  ideal  is  u/ico)isci(Uisly  Diade  real, 
when  the  abstract  is  embodied  in  the  concrete,  that  the 
Tjeautiful  is  understood.  I]oth  "the  discovery  of  the 
Heautiful,  and  the  creation  of  the  Beautiful  by  man,  proceed 
from  tDiconscious  processes,''"  the  results  of  which  become 
conscious.  "  The  underlying  unconscious  process  is  en- 
tircU"  u'ithdrawn  front  introspection.'" 

Eigliteen  years  after  the  publication  of  the  first  edition  of 


VI 11  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  Germany  8i 

the  Pkilosophie  des  Unbewiissten,  von  Hartmann  issued  at 
Berlin  Die  deiitscJie  Aestheiik  seit  Katit  (1886).  In  this 
v.-orlc  he  tells  us  that  he  considered  Kant  as  the  source  of 
all  subsequent  aesthetic  science  in  Germany  ;  and  he  goes 
on  to  discuss  (i)  the  history  of  German  Aesthetik,  as  an 
evolution  of  Kantian  thought,  and  (2)  the  treatment  of  such 
questions  as  the  ugly,  the  comic,  the  tragic,  and  the 
humorous,  ending  by  a  discussion  of  unsolved  problems, 
such  as  the  relation  of  Architecture  to  the  other  Arts,  the 
different  tendencies  in  }.Iusic,  the  classiiication  of  the  Arts, 
and  their  unity. 

In  the  following  year  a  much  more  elaborate  contribu- 
tion to  the  PldlosopJiie  des  Schbne7t  was  made  by  von 
Hartmann,  in  the  "  zweiter  systematischer  Theil "  of  his 
Aesthetik.  In  the  first  part  of  this  volume  he  discusses  the 
conception  of  the  Beautiful,  its  contraries,  its  modifications, 
its  place  in  r\Ian  and  in  Nature  ;  and  in  the  second  part  he 
treats  of  Beauty  as  realised  in  Nature,  in  History,  and  in 
the  Arts.  He  opposes  the  two  extremes  of  the  ultra-object- 
ive and  ultra-subjective  view  of  the  nature  of  Beauty.  A 
work  of  Art  is  objectively  real,  but  only  its  subjective  effect 
is  beautiful.  The  Di!iij;-a7i-sich  is  not  beautiful.  The  artist 
deals  v.ith  the  thing  in  itself,  which  is  not  beautiful,  and 
transforms  it  into  beauty. 

Hartmann's  theory  of  iusthetic  beauty  is  expressed  in 
the  word  "  Schein,"  to  which  he  gives  a  peculiar  meaning. 
The  aesthetic  "shine"  is  not  either  in  outward  objects 
(landscape,  picture,  air-vibrations,  etc.)  or  in  the  mind.  It 
is  occasioned  by  outward  objects,  made  by  artists  or  other- 
wise, and  is  capable  of  summoning  the  "  shine  "  before  the 
mind  of  all  normally  constituted  people.  He  talks  of  eye- 
shine,  ear-shine,  imagination-shine,  and  in  this  "shine" 
only  is  beauty  present.  The  subjective  phenomenon  alone 
is  beautiful.  No  external  reality  is  essential  to  it,  provided 
only  this  a;sthetic  shine  is  set  up  by  whatever  means.  In 
natural  beauty,  however,  the  shine  cannot  be  dissevered  from 
the  reality.  A  painter  sees  the  "shine"  at  once,  as  some- 
thing different  from  the  real  obiects  ;  so  may  we,  if,  for 
evample,  we  look  at  a  landscape  with  inverted  head  !      This 

G 


82  TJic  PJiilosophy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chat. 

plan,  however,  does  not  answer  in  a  room  !  It  is  only  the 
subjective  i)henomenon,  however,  absolved  from  reality,  that 
makes  an  a'sthetic  relation  possible. 

The  "  shine  "  does  not  pretend  to  be  triic^  in  any  sense. 
\Vc  must  avoid  the  expression  "phenomenon,"  •■  appcar- 
aiice,"  in  connection  with  it,  as  this  suggests  objective 
reality,  which  is  quite  irrelevant.  The  "shine''  is  not  a 
mental  perception,  it  does  not  deal  with  an  idea,  '•  the  idea  of 
the  beautiful '' ;  and  no  supersensuous  idea  of  the  beautiful  is 
at  all  necessary.  In  fact,  the  pretensions  of  transcendental 
aesthetic  have  brought  the  study  int(j  disrepute.  "  Shine  ''  is 
not  the  same  as  a  picture,  unless  picture  be  taken  in  a 
psychical  or  intellectual  sense;  otherwise,  a  "picture''  is  a 
real  thing,  while  "shine''"  is  not.  It  is  also  to  be  distin- 
guished from  "form." 

As  a  picture  stands  to  the  thing  pictured,  as  forn.i. 
stands  to  substance,  so  does  aesthetic  shine  stand  to  the 
subject.  The  subject  disappears  before  it  ;  not  only  do  the 
interc--ts  of  self  disappear,  but  the  very  ego  itself.  The 
subject  disappears  from  the  subjecti\'e  side  of  consciousness, 
and  it  emerges  again  on  the  objecti\'e  side.  The  cC-sthetic 
"shine''  is  thus  a  disintegration  of  the  ego.  }-ei  it  is  not  an 
illusion.  It  is  a  reality  of  consciousness.  iieauty  reveals 
itself  to  us  in  a  series  of  steps,  but  at  the  ki-t  it  remains  a 
mystery,  and  \vithout  mystery  there  \\-<u:ld  Ije  no  beauiy. 
Tliei'c  mu:-t  be  in  e\"ery  \\(irk  of  art,  ;is  well  as  iii  e\ery 
material  obiect  that  is  beautiful,  something  that  we  feel  ijut 
do  not  know,  something  that  we  ajjprehend  but  do  not 
comprehend. 

7.    Lof::c  to  Ju!i'^)}huni 

Rudolf  Hermann  Lotze  (i  8  I  7-1  t'S  i ),  befoic  he  wrote  tlie 
work  by  which  he  is  chied\'  knmvn.,  the  MitroLOs/nus,  liad 
issued  two  books  on  .-lChtlu:tic — the  fn'st  On  tlie  Coiu'cplioii 
cf  F>i(Uit\\  in  1 846;  and  the  second  On  tJic  Co>utitii')i.s  of 
/'■r  i.'i/v  !/!  .-Irt.  in  1S48.  In  1868  he  wrote  the  LJtscliLIitc 
iter  ^Icsth.ctik  in  iJciitscJiIand,  which  was  the  part  he  \\-as 
asked    to    take   in    the   elabonite  JIi.\toiy  of  the   Scie/iccs  in 


VIII  The  Pliilosopliy  of  Germany  83 

Germany,  prepared  by  several  contributors,  for  the  Royal 
Academy  of  Sciences.  This  work  has  three  main  divisions 
— (i)  the  history  of  the  standpoints  froni  which  the  Beauti- 
ful has  been  discovered,  (2)  the  history  of  the  fundamental 
esthetic  ideas,  and  (3)  the  history  of  the  theories  of  Art.  It 
is  a  critical  history  throughout.  In  the  Microcostiius  there 
is  a  chapter  (VIII.  iii.)  on  "Beauty  and  Art.''  In  it  he 
treats  somewhat  rhetorically  of  Eastern  vastness,  Hebrew 
sublimity,  Greek  Beauty,  Roman  elegance  and  dignity,  of 
the  individuality  and  fantastic  elements  in  Media;valism, 
and  of  Beauty  and  Art  in  modern  life.  Notes  of  the 
Lectures  on  /Esthetic,  which  he  delivered  in  1856,  were 
revised  by  M.  Rehnisch,  and  published  in  1884  ;  but  Lotze's 
specific  teaching  on  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful  is  not  nearly 
so  valuable  as  his  criticism  of  the  philosophical  theories  of 
others.  He  held  that  the  things  we  call  beautiful  do  not 
please  us  as  individuals  only,  they  please  the  universal 
spirit  in  us.  The  beautiful  in  itself  cannot  be  a  character- 
istic conunon  to  all  beautiful  objects.  Beauty,  however, 
actualises  itself,  both  in  the  types  of  individual  beings,  and 
in  events.  It  is  disclosed  in  their  characteristics  ;  and  in 
the  agreement  between  the  free  activity  of  any  single 
living"  being  and  the  universal  laws  of  nature  it  finds 
expression.  To  impress  us  as  beautiful.  Art  must  first 
please  the  senses  (a  physiological  condition)  ;  it  must 
secondly  conform  to  general  laws  (a  psychological  condition). 
In  other  parts  of  his  philosophy  Lotze  was  much  influenced 
by  Herbart,  but  in  his  cESthetic  he  took  a  line  of  his  own. 

Carl  .Schnasse  (1798- 187  5)  wrote  a  history  of  Art  in 
seven  volumes,  wliich  he  finished  in  1862.  In  the  Intro- 
duction to  this  History,  Schnasse  discusses  the  nature  of 
the  Beautiful.  He  holds  that  there  is  no  more  mystery  in 
Beauty  than  there  is  in  Religion  and  Morals  ;  but  that  per- 
fect Beauty  docs  not  exist  in  the  world  of  actual  appearance. 
There  is  an  approach  toward  it  in  Nature  ;  but  Art  gives 
us  what  Nature  does  not  and  cannot  give.  In  the  energy 
and  manipulative  freedom  of  the  Ego,  constructing  a 
harmony  whicli  is  not  found  in  Nature,  Beauty  is  disclosed. 
It   is    thus   the    creation   of   man.       The   human    phantasy, 


S4  TJic  Philosophy  of  tlie  Bcautifnl  chap. 

however,  if  left  to  itself,  would  not  conduct  us  to  Beauty.  Ijut 
rather  to  vagary.  \\'e  must  therefore  distinguish  art  from 
artifice  and  the  artificial.  We  do  not  find  the  Beautiful,  or 
pick  it  up,  as  it  were  :  we  construct  it  ;  but  then,  we  do  not 
elaborate  it  by  artifice.  We  discover  it  by  second  sight. 
AVcre  an  artist  deliberately  to  sit  down  and  set  himself  to 
construct  a  beautiful  thing,  he  would  fail.  The  artist  works 
spontaneously,  and  almost  unconsciously,  by  a  natural  im- 
pulse which  is  freely  creative. 

In  the  thirteenth  and  nineteenth  chapters  of  H.  L.  F.  von 
Helmholtz's  great  work,  Die  LcJux  von  der  Toiioiipfui- 
(haigeii,  ah  fijiysiologisclie  GruiuUage  fiir  die  TJieoric  der 
Musik  (1S63),  there  is  much  that  is  valua'ole  on  the  icstheiic 
relations  of  Music  ;  the  rest  of  the  work  being  devoted  to 
its  scientific  relations.  .-\t  the  close  of  his  book,  wiili 
characteristic  modesty  Ilelmholtz  says  that  while  he  could 
not  avoid  mixing  up  the  cxsthetic  vvith  the  physical  problem, 
it  vras  with  the  latter  alone  that  he  felt  at  home.  In  the 
former  he  was  too  much  of  an  amateur,  and  its  problems 
were  really  more  difficult.  Nevertheless  there  is  probably 
more  in  Helmholtz's  volume  bearing'  directly  on  the 
resthetic  of  music  than  in  any  other  German  work,  with  the 
single  exception  of  Wagner's  Bectlio^'eti. 

Ilelmholtz  saw  that  in  discussing  the  principles  of  music 
from  the  physical  side,  we  are  simply  investigating  the  laws 
of  phenomenal  sequence.  It  is  quite  difierent  in  tlie 
aesthetic  of  music,  when  we  ask  what  music  expresses  and 
discloses.  The  following"  is  the  proposition  with  wlfirh  the 
third  part  of  his  treatise  begins  : — '•  The  system  of  scales, 
etc.,  does  not  rest  solely  upon  unalterable  natural  laws,  but 
is  at  least  partly  also  tlie  rc-ult  of  a  sthetical  principles 
which  have  already  changed,  and  will  still  further  change, 
wiih  the  progressive  development  of  humanity.''  It  does  not 
follow  from  this  that  the  deternfination  of  these  princij/ics 
is  arlfitrary.  The  nfies  of  Art  are  the  result  of  the  fi'ce 
effort  of  artists  to  shape  forms  of  Beauty  for  themselves.  Ijut 
they  all  conform  to  law,  e\'en  when  new  types  are  e^■ol\■ed. 

Compai'ing  the  development  of  Music  with  that  of  Archi- 
tecture, as  the  horizontal  line  of  I'oof,  the  circular  arch,  and 


VIII  The  PhilosopJiy  of  Germany  85 

the  pointed  arch  have  successively  evolved  themselves  ;  so, 
from  the  simple  melody  of  the  ancients,  through  the  "  poly- 
phonic "  music  of  the  middle  age,  we  reach  the  richer 
harmony  of  the  modern  world. 

In  his  fourteenth  chapter  Helmholtz  points  out  that  the 
motion  of  tone  surpasses  all  other  motions,  in  the  delicacy 
and  case  with  which  it  can  receive  and  imitate  the  most 
varied  kinds  of  expression.  Music  can  thus  represent 
states  of  mind  which  the  other  arts  can  only  indirectly 
touch.  We  have  no  means  of  expressing  what  Vischer 
calls  the  "  mechanics  of  mental  emotion "  so  exactly  or 
delicately  as  by  music  ;  although  different  listeners  may 
describe  the  impressions  produced  on  them  by  the  same 
music  in  different  ways.  The  construction  of  scales  is  not 
arbitrary,  although  it  is  the  product  of  artistic  invention. 
The  physiological  structure  of  the  ear  has  something  to  do 
with  the  result.  Thus  physiological  laws  are  the  building- 
stones  with  which  the  edifice  of  the  musical  system  is  set 
up.  But  just  as  people  of  diverse  taste  in  architecture  can 
erect  very  different  buildings  with  the  same  stones,  so  by 
means  of  the  same  physiological  apparatus  of  the  ear  very 
different  musical  structures  can  be  built.  In  working  out 
the  system  of  scales,  keys,  chords  (of  all  that  is  known  as 
thorough-ljass),  from  the  days  of  Terpander  and  Pythagoras, 
men  have  been  dealing  with  laws,  and  conforming  to  law  ; 
and  yet  it  has  all  been  the  result  of  artistic  invention.  The 
creation  of  beauty,  in  every  kind  of  musical  composition, 
is  invariably  wrought  out  in  obedience  to  laws  ;  but  these 
laws  are  not  consciously  present  in  the  mind  of  the  artist 
who  creates  the  result.  "Art  creates,"  says  Helmholtz, 
"as  imagination  pictures,  regularly  without  conscious  law, 
designedly  without  conscious  aim."  One  who  is  aesthetic- 
ally educated  recognises  the  Beautiful  instinctively  and 
directly,  without  consciously  referring  it  to  any  law.  But 
the  judgment  that  one  thus  passes  is  no  individual  judgment. 
It  is  universal  and  impersonal,  in  the  sense  that  the  indivi- 
dual passing  it  demands,  and  rightly  demands,  the  assent 
of  every  other  educated  nature.  There  is  room  for  indivi- 
dual and  sectional  peculiarities  of  taste,  but  the  limits  within 


86  The  PhilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

which  they  arc  confined  are  narrow  ones.  We  see  in 
each  individual  work  of  musical  Art  "the  picture  of  a 
similar  arrangement  of  the  universe,  governed  by  law  and 
reason  in  all  its  parts."' 

There  follows,  however,  an  important  addendum.  ••  It 
is  an  essential  condition  that  the  whole  extent  and  design 
of  a  work  of  Art  should  not  be  apprehended  consciously. 
It  is  precisely  from  that  part  of  it  which  escapes  our  con- 
scious apprehension  that  a  work  of  Art  exalts  and  delights 
us,  and  that  the  chief  effects  of  the  artistically  beautiful 
proceed  ;  not  from  the  part  we  are  able  fully  to  analyse.'' 

Gustav  Theodor  Fechner  (1834- 1887)  was  more  a 
physicist  than  a  metaphysician,  a  naturalist,  and  a  brilliant 
literary  essayist.  In  his  Etoiiente  dcr  PsycJio-pJiysik  he 
worked  out  a  philosophy  of  Nature  almost  on  the  principles 
of  Positivism.  He  starts  from  an  idealistic  root,  not  very 
different  from  the  Cartesian  self-consciousness  ;  but  through 
this  he  reaches  an  objective  Ding-an-sicJi,  which  gives  rise  to 
consciousness,  and  becomes  dualistic.  In  1871  he  wrote 
an  essay  on  yEsthetic,  which  excited  a  good  deal  of  atten- 
tion in  Germany.  It  was  limited  to  an  exposition  and  test 
of  Zeising's  aiirca  scctio.  In  his  Vorscliulc  dcr  Acstlictik 
(1S76)  he  treats  of  the  laws  or  principles  according  to 
which  our  sense-perception  of  objects  pleases  us,  and  leads 
us  to  call  the  objects  which  give  rise  to  it  beautiful.  His 
method  is  inductive  and  psychological,  in  contrast  to  the 
deductive  and  meta])]iysical  treatment  so  much,  in  vogue  in 
(lermany.  There  is  an  ob\'iously  close  link  of  connection 
between  liis  psycho-physics  and  his  esthetic  doctrine,  while 
the  latter  is  at  the  outset  based  upon  a  hedonistic  doctrir.e 
of  life.  First,  a  sensation  must  "cross  the  threshold"  of 
consciousness  ;  second,  several  sensations  must  combine  to 
support  each  other,  and  they  give  more  pleasure  in  union 
than  each  and  all  of  them  can  gixe  separately  ;  third,  there 
must  be  "  n.ianif  )ldncss '' ;  fourth,  "reality"  or  '-truth''; 
fifth,  there  must  be  "  clearness  "'  in  the  object  perceived  ; 
and  sixth,  the  principle  of  "association"'  must  come  in  to 
intensify  the  feeling  of  the  beautiful.  We  ha\e  thus  six 
principles,    which   may   be   regarded   as    Fechncrs   laws   of 


VIII  TIic  PliilosopJiy  of  Gerinany  87 

aesthetic.  The  first  amounts  to  this,  that  aesthetic  feeling, 
hke  all  sensation,  must  have  a  certain  intensity  or  quantity 
before  we  are  conscious  of  it,  must  come  up  to  that  "  thresh- 
old." But  if  itself  originally  "  below  the  threshold,"  it  may, 
by  combining  with  other  pleasurable  feelings,  produced  br- 
other stimuli,  get  above  it.  This  is  his  second  principle  ; 
and  the  two  are  indeed  one.  They  involve  each  other,  and 
neither  of  them  is  a  discovery  beyond  the  commonplace. 
The  third  is  the  old  principle  of  the  one  in  the  manifold  ; 
and  in  this  familiar  ground  Fechner  tries  to  determine  the 
extent  to  which  each  element  may  exist  with  a  mininumi  of 
the  other.  His  fourth  and  fifth  principles  are  elementary 
ones,  scarcely  deserving  of  the  rank  he  gives  them  ;  and 
in  his  last  he  adopts  the  principle  of  association  as  a  solvent 
of  the  problems  of  Beauty  almost  as  fully  as  Alison  had 
done.  His  discussion,  however,  of  the  "  associations- 
princip,"'  in  his  ninth  chapter,  is  extremely  aljle,  somc- 
v/hat  novel,  and  varied.  He  afterwards  deals  with  tlie 
relations  of  Poetry  and  Painting,  the  subject  of  Taste,  its 
phases,  and  the  laws  which  go\"ern  it.  .Se\  oral  art-problems 
are  then  discussed  by  him  in  the  light  of  the  principles  he 
has  laid  down,  e.g.  the  relations  of  Art  to  Nature,  and  of 
Beauty  to  Art,  the  relation  of  form  to  matter  in  a  work  of 
Art,  and  the  rival  tendencies  of  the  idealists  and  realists. 
Both  of  the  latter  are  recognised  as  good.  Fidelity  to 
Nature  (its  imitation)  and  departure  from  it  (its  idealisation) 
are  each  necessary  ;  but,  on  the  whole,  Fechner  more  than 
inclines  to  the  Aristotelian  imitation  and  realism.  Fie  also 
discusses  other  principles,  which  he  considers  important  in 
aesthetic,  viz.  those  of  contrast,  of  sequence,  and  of  recon- 
ciliation. 

]Jic  Entsfcliniig  dcr  nciieroi  Acstlicfik,  by  Heinrich  \'on 
Stein  (18S6).  This  sketch  of  modern  /Esthetic  starts  with 
those  writers  whom  its  author  regards  as  the  French  classi- 
cists of  the  seventeenth  century,  especially  Boileau ;  and, 
after  dealing  with  them,  passes  to  what  he  calls  the  "English 
classicism"  of  Shaftesbury,  returns  to  Diderot,  Rousse;'.u, 
the  Swiss  and  Italian  writers,  and  thence  to  Baumgartcn 
and    Winckelmann.      The    evolution    of  modern    European 


SS  TJic  PJiilosnpJiy  of  the  BtaHtifnl  chap. 

i.hou;^h:  on  the  subject  of  Aesthetik  has  thus  been,  accord- 
inL,^  to  von  Stein,  from  a  realistic  starting-point  through  the 
imitative  naturahsm  of  Diderot,  to  the  romantic  naturaHsm 
of  Rousseau,  and  thence  to  the  classic  idealism  of  Winckel- 
mann  and  others. 

Julius  I>ergmann.  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  Univer- 
sity of  Marburg,  published  in  1SS7  Uebcr  das  ScJid)ic.  It  is 
(as  the  author  says)  an  analytic  and  a  critico- historical 
work,  in  the  course  of  which  he  discusses  Kant,  Hcrbart, 
and  others.  The  determination  of  the  objective  nature  of 
licauty  he  considers  a  quite  hopeless  task.  Tiie  subjectivity 
of  Beauty  he  regards  as  a  conclusion  demonstrated  by 
science,  but  lie  considers  Herbart's  doctrine  quite  consistent 
with  this.  It  is  imp(j5sible  to  say  what  Beauty  is  in  itself; 
but  we  may  arrive  at  strictly  scientific  conclusions  as  to 
what  pleases  the  individual,  and  therefore  as  to  what  is 
beautiful  to  him. 

Acstiu'tii:.  by  J.  Jungmann,  Professor  of  Philosopliy  and 
Theology  in  the  University  at  Innsbruck  (who  died  in  1885), 
deals  both  with  the  fundamental  ideas  of  Aesthetik.  and  witii 
the  several  Arts  in  detail.  His  doctrine  is  a  development 
of  the  Aristotelic-Thomistic  view,  and  in  the  first  half  of 
his  first  voltime  (,5,;  i.-iii.)  he  discusses  the  essential  char- 
acteristics of  ]]eauty.  The  following  is  a  summary  of  his 
tctiching  : — (i)  Beauty  ;is  such  is  a  suprasensible  quality  of 
things  (p.  23).  It  is  apprehended  by  the  rational  faculty. 
and  although  it  is  cfjmmon  to  corporeal  and  incorporeal 
things,  it  is  more  perfect  in  the  latter,  and  has  its  ])ropcr 
sphere  in  the  ethical  life  of  beings  endowed  with  knowletige 
and  freedom.  (2)  Beauty  can  generate  plea-ure  in  us  by 
our  merely  contemplating  it.  In  this  it  diii'crs  from  the 
good,  which  is  the  object  of  de-ire.  (3)  Beauty  is  the 
fotmdation  (T  lo\-e.  It  is  '■  the  iriner  goodness  of  things  in 
so  far  as  the\-  give  plea-ure  to  the  rational  spirit."  '•  Beauty 
fp.  150)  is  the  actual  agreemetU  or  harmony  of  things 
witli  the  ratior.al  mind,  in  so  far  as  they  gi\"e  it  pleastux-.'' 
It  is  tlierefii'e  a  relative  attribute  of  things,  not  an  aljsolute 
one.  \:Va\  yet  it  i-  not  ptirely  r-u'cective.  Jutigmann  deals 
next  with    th.e    sublime,  the   ludicrous,  and  witli    tlse    -abject 


\'iii  The  PIiilosGpJiy  of  Gcruiany  89 

of  grace,  etc.,  and  gives  a  criticism  of  hostile  views.  In 
his  second  vokime  he  deals  with  the  Fine  Arts,  both 
generally  (pp.  3-173)  and  in  detail,  which  he  takes  up 
thus — Architecture  (pp.  173-213),  the  Drama  (pp.  223- 
254),  Sculpture  and  Painting  (pp.  254-3S0),  Oratory  (pp. 
3S0-402),  Poetry  (pp.  402-486),  Music  (pp.  484-566),  with 
a  iinal  section  on  Taste. 

8.    TJie  Lit craf lire  of  Denmark 

There  is  only  one  writer  of  importance  on  ^Esthetic  in 
the  literature  of  Denmark.  He  may  be  placed  at  the  close 
of  the  German  list. 

Hans  Christian  Oersted  (1777-1851),  Professor  of 
Physics  in  the  University  of  Copenhagen  from  1806 
onwards,  and  the  discoverer  of  electro-magnetism,  was  as 
much  interested  in  the  imaginative  as  in  the  scientific 
aspects  of  Nature.  While  yet  a  student  at  Copenhagen,  he 
obtained  the  University  gold  medal  on  "  the  limits  of  prose 
and  poetry."  His  chief  fame  is  as  a  physicist,  but  his 
essays  and  addresses  to  various  societies,  with  his  speeches 
and  papers  on  the  philosophy  of  Nature,  were  collected 
into  a  \olume,  and  tra.nslated  from  German  into  English  in 
1852  by  L.  and  J.  B.  Horner.  These  papers  deal  with  the 
relations  of  science  and  poetry,  science  and  religion,  the 
spiritual  and  the  material,  and  of  the  philosophy  of  Beauty. 

There  are  three  sections  in  Oersted's  book  in  which 
Beauty  is  discussed — (i)  two  dialogues,  on  the  fundamental 
principles  of  Beauty,  and  on  the  physical  effects  of  Tones  ; 
(2)  two  chapters  on  the  Natural  Philosophy  of  the  Beauti- 
ful ;  and  (3)  a  section  on  the  unbeautiful  in  Nature,  in  its 
relation  to  the  harmony  of  Beauty  in  the  whole. 

The  outcome  of  the  first  of  these  dialogues  is  that  the 
pleasure  we  derive  from  Beauty  depends  both  on  reason 
and  on  the  senses.  INIusical  tones,  for  example,  contain  a 
hidden  reason  within  them.  Symmetrical  figures,  which 
delight  us,  do  so  because  of  the  reason  that  is  in  the 
s}-inmetry.  They  are  conformable  to  rule,  i.e.  to  reason. 
The    circle   is   a  perfect  figure,  because   it   unites   so   many 


90  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful       cii.  vm 

characteristics  in  its  unity.  It  is  not  a  mere  abstract  con- 
ception. It  is  an  entity  that  is  in  itself  beautiful,  because 
of  its  essential  idea.  We  find  in  the  circle  symmetry,  com- 
pletion, wholeness,  unity  in  variety.  The  external  ima;^''e 
reaches  us  through  the  senses,  and  delights  us,  without  our 
being  conscious  of  the  ideas  which  it  contains,  and  which 
lie  within  it.  In  the  whole  realm  of  inorganic  Nature  we 
find  geometrical  forms  which  are  beautiful  ;  and,  when  we 
pass  to  organic  Nature,  the  lines  and  angles  of  crystalline 
Ijeauty  are  exchanged  for  the  curves  and  sinuosities  of  life 
and  organisation.  As  symmetry  lies  hid  in  crystals  and 
organisms,  reason  lies  Ind  in  tones.  It  lies  there,  on  a 
firm  foundation  within  our  nature,  not  in  sense  only  but  in 
reason. 

This  is  the  outcome  of  the  dialogue,  originally  printed 
in  the  Tra?isactio]is  of  the  .Scandinavian  Society  in  1808. 
Twenty-five  years  later,  in  1833,  Oersted  wrote  a  second 
dialogue,  on  "The  Pliysical  Effects  of  Tones."'  The  two 
chapters  on  the  Natural  Philosophy  of  the  Ilcautiful  were 
written  later  still.  In  them  he  discusses  the  laws  of  sound 
and  of  colour,  in  minute  detail.  We  find  that  Nature  pro- 
duces the  same  forms  as  are  created  by  human  thought, 
and  that  what  ai'e  thouglits  within  us  arc  also  laws  of 
Nature  without  us.  We  thus  discover  that  the  laws  of 
Nature  are  the  laws  of  Reason,  and  that  all  Nature  rc\cais 
the  eternal  li\-ing  Reason.  "  Soul  and  Nature  are  one, 
seen  from  two  diftcrent  sides."' 

Harold  Iloffding,  at  present  professor  at  the  University 
of  Co])cnhagcn,  has  published  Oi(fIiiics  of  PsycJioIogw  in  tlie 
6th  section  of  which  he  discusses  the  subject  of  aesthetic 
feeling.  In  the  main  he  follows  Schiller  and  Fcchner.  He 
thinks  the  asthetic  instincts  had  their  origin  in  the  tendencies 
which  lead  to  the  preservation  of  the  indi\idual  and  the  race. 
Art  arose  out  of  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  the  love  of 
;irt  preceded  an  appreciation  of  the  beauty  of  Nature. 
.\rt  is  nearer  man  than  Nature  is.  We  owe  the  modern 
fueling  for  Nature  chietly  to  Rousseau.  In  a  later  section, 
Hoi'fding"s  remarks  on  the  Sublime,  which  are  partly  based 
on  those  of  Kant,  are  noteworthv. 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    FRANXE 

I.  Descartes 

No  better  evidence  of  the  close  inter-relation  of  all  specu- 
lative problems  can  be  found  than  is  to  be  seen  in  the 
beginnings  of  Philosophy  in  France.  Descartes  —  the 
founder  of  modern  Philosophy — wrote  nothing  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  Beautiful,  but  the  influence  of  Cartesianism  is 
visible  in  the  earliest  efforts  of  French  Art,  and  its  root- 
principle  is  still  more  apparent  in  the  literature  of  ^Esthetics, 
as  soon  as  it  took  definite  shape  in  France. 

The  earliest  P'rench  writers  on  the  Beautiful  drew  their 
inspiration  from  St.  Augustine,  but  the  ideal  tendency — 
the  intellectual  parentage  of  which  may  always  be  traced 
back  to  Plato — had  a  metaphysical  embodiment  in  Des- 
cartes ;  and  so  soon  as  idealism  began  to  ripen  and  bear 
fruit  in  France,  its  influence  was  seen  both  in  art-tlieory  and 
art-production.  In  the  seventeenth  century,  French  art 
was  more  ideal  and  constructive,  than  real  and  imitative  ; 
and  it  is  noteworthy  that  while  Pere  Andre  looked  to  St. 
Augustine  as  his  guide,  he  really  embodied  and  wrought 
out  the  teaching  of  Plato. 

Descartes  was  a  voluminous  correspondent:  Ii6  of  his 
letters  were  published  in  1683,  but  only  three  of  them  refer 
to  Literature  as  distinct  from  Philosophy.  In  the  first  of 
these  Descartes  praises  his  friend  Balzac  for  certain  qualities 
which  he  thought  characterised  his  work.  The  first  of  them 
is  purity   of  diction.      This,   says   Descartes,    is   to  literary 


92  The  PliilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

style,  what  health  is  to  the  body.  "  Ouand  on  la  possede, 
on  n'y  pense  plus."  This  purity  of  diction  is  a  sign  of  unity 
between  thought  and  style — the  style  being  the  body,  and 
the  thought  being  the  soul.  A  perfect  style  resembles  a 
geometrical  figure,  of  which  the  beauty  lies  in  symmetry. 
A  mingling  of  contraries  is  monstrous.  Inequality,  irregu- 
larity, and  complexity  in  literary  work  are  to  be  condemned  ; 
and  those  in  whose  writings  they  occur  are — (i)  those 
wlio  have  too  many  words  and  too  few  ideas,  felicitous 
language  but  ignoble  thought  ;  (2)  those  who  have  lofty  or 
sublime  thought,  but  who  express  it  in  an  obscure  manner, 
or  who  have  too  much  thought  and  too  little  experience  : 
(3)  those  who  have  abundance  of  words,  yet  who  clothe 
their  thoughts  badly  ;  (4)  those  who  indulge  in  bons  mots, 
jeux  d'esprit,  equivoques,  poetic  fiction,  sophistry,  or  super- 
sul^tilty.  Descartes  believed  that  his  correspondent  Balzac 
avoided  these  four  faults. 

In  his  second  letter  Descartes  vindicates  the  function 
of  imagination.  He  wrote  to  Balzac  that  "sleep  led  him 
to  the  woods,  gardens,  and  enchanted  palaces,  where  he 
enjoyed  all  the  pleasure  imagined  in  fables."  Baillet,  in 
his  Vic  de  M.  Descartes,  tells  us  that  he  believed  in  dreams, 
analysing  and  interpreting  them  with  a  semi-scientific  and 
half-superstitious  curiosity. 

In  the  third  letter  Descartes's  feeling  towards  Nature 
comes  out — picturesque  Nature,  the  country  loved  of  artists 
and  poets.  He  urged  Balzac  to  come  to  Amsterdam,  be- 
cause it  would  be  quite  as  jjleasant  to  see  the  products  of 
Nature  arriving  from  distant  countries,  in  the  form  of  mer- 
chandise, as  to  watch  them  growing  in  the  fields.  He 
would  almost  have  agreed  with  Samuel  Johnson,  that  it  was 
better  to  walk  down  Cheapside  than  to  take  a  stroll  in  the 
green  fields  of  Surrey.  In  this  we  see  a  tendency  which 
was  developed  in  the  next  generation,  and  was  dominant  in 
I\al3elais  and  ]\Iontaigne.  There  was  no  appreciation  of 
Nature  for  its  own  sake  in  Descartes,  and  very  little  of  it 
even  in  the  French  literature  of  the  seventeenth  century. 
It  was  hunirm  nature  alone  that  was  interesting.  Never- 
theless   Cartcsianism    sought    to    unite   the   best   things   in 


IX  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  93 

ancient  literature  with  the  inheritances  of  cathoHcism,  a 
certain  freedom  of  spirit  in  investigation  with  a  deference 
to  authority. 

It  is  in  Boileau  that  we  see  the  Hterary  reflection  of  the 
philosophy  of  Descartes.  Beauty  was  supposed  to  lie  in 
reasonableness,  good  sense,  literary  proportion,  there  being 
no  room  allowed  for  fresh  imaginative  departures.  It  was 
expressed  in  the  formula  "  rien  n'est  beau  que  le  vrai."  As 
Descartes  sought  for  the  True  in  a  universal  principle  valid 
for  all  intelligence,  Iloileau  sought  for  the  Beautiful  in  a 
universal  element,  vouched  for  by  an  intellectual  criterion. 
To  the  test  of  the  "  clare  et  distincte  "'  in  Descartes  corre- 
sponds the  "  clarte  "  or  luminousness  of  Boileau.  And 
just  as  Pascal  differed  somewhat  from  Descartes  in  his 
test,  admitting  within  the  range  of  his  vision  things  that 
are  not  perceived  "clare  et  distincte''":  so  Corneille  and 
others,  in  Poetry  and  Art,  to  a  certain  extent  broke  away 
from  classic  rules,  the  intellectual  canons  and  unities  of  the 
past.  Cartesianism  was,  after  all,  a  realistic  movement  as 
compared  with  the  schools  to  which  it  gave  rise.  Its  insist- 
ence on  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  was 
somewhat  alien  to  high  art  ;  but  its  motto,  "  rien  n'est  beau 
que  le  vrai,"  might  really  be  taken  as  equivalent  to  "  rien 
n'est  beau,  s'il  n'est  pas  vrai."'  Thus  interpreted,  the  dictum 
of  Boileau  is  not  opposed  to  idealism,  it  is  only  its  sober 
realistic  base  ;  and  adopting  it,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  he 
should  prefer  the  Homeric  simplicity  and  the  Horatian 
directness  to  the  mystic  fancies  and  the  vague  idealisations 
of  other  writers. 

It  was  perhaps  due  to  the  fact  that  Descartes  was  a 
trained  mathematician,  and  that  he  had  tried,  in  elaborating 
his  "  method,'''  to  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  the  geometricians, 
that  he  wished  to  bring  the  department  of  aesthetics  (so 
far  as  he  recognised  it)  under  the  control  of  metaphysical 
or  even  mathematical  formulae,  and  make  it  an  "  exact 
science." 

It  will  be  seen  that  some  of  the  points  which  are  most 
prominent  in  Pere  Andre's  theory  of  Beauty  find  their 
intellectual   parentage   in    Descartes  :  and  we  may  perhaps 


94  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

e\en  trace  the  saying  of  Buffon,  "  le  style  c'est  riiomme,''  to 
the  Cartesian  doctrine  that  truth  is  independent  of  the 
individual,  not  invented  by  him,  and  that  the  function  of 
each  is  the  right  ordering  of  his  own  thought.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  the  ideal  realism  of  Descartes  coloured  the 
literature  of  Fnince  in  the  period  of  its  greatest  glory  in 
the  seventeenth  century,  and  that  its  decadence  was  due  to 
its  abandonment — in  a-sthetic  (as  in  metaphysic  and  ethic) — 
of  the  principles  which  guided  its  first  essays.  Excessi\e 
subjectivity  and  imitation,  instead  of  objectivity  and  idealisa- 
tion, gave  rise,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  to  mannerisms, 
to  tricks  of  cleverness,  to  artifice  instead  of  art,  to  mimicry 
and  dilettantism  instead  of  simplicity,  nature,  and  truth. 


2.  Crousa::  to  Bufficr 

It  was  not  till  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century 
that  an  attempt  was  made  in  France  to  discuss  the  question 
of  the  Beautiful  philosophically  ;  but  inrluences  were  at  work 
in  the  seventeenth  century  preparing  the  way  fur  it. 

The  Port-Royalists  were  occupied  with  (Jther  ]3roblems, 
but  a  phrase  of  Pierre  Xicole's  (1625-95),  "  Pulchritudinis 
fnntem  in  veritate  esse,''  may  be  noted  as  having  perliajjs 
indirectly  gi\'en  rise  to  IJoileau's  dictum,  '■  rien  n'cst  lieau 
que  le  vrai.''  The  indirect  work  of  Boilcau  (1636-171  i) — 
who  was  dictator  of  letters  to  France  for  man\'  years,  and  a 
belter  critic  than  an  original  v\-riter — should  a'l-o  Ije  noied. 
It  was  a  sort  of  literary  seed-sowing,  of  v.hich  the  har\x-.--t 
was  aftcrward.-j  reajied  in  otb.er  than  liter.ar}'  tield-.  Sul)- 
sequeiuly  the  woi'k  of  such  men  as  Rousseau  —  who  wi'oie 
nothing  directly  on  Beauty,  but  v.hose  name  is  specially  iden- 
tified with  a  return  to  Xalure.  ;md  wXv)  ir.ti'oduccd  a  new  wa\' 
of  looking  on  many  jiroblcms  — nnnt  be  taken  into  account 
in  any  estimate  of  the  philosophical  tendencies  of  Frante. 

W'liile  P'rench  literatiu'e  haa  not  been  so  construc;i\e  as 
that  of  (Germany,  either  in  the  department  of  .Fsihctics.  or 
in  that  of  intrllectual  or  Moral  Phi!osoi)h\".  it  has  the  mei;t 
(if  ''reater  clearness.      If  ncjt  in  literai'\"  criticism  generalh', 


IX  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  95 

in  art-criticism  at  any  rate,  the  French  writers,  until  recently, 
moved  on  a  hiyher  level  of  insight  than  the  Germans. 
With  the  exception  of  Winckelmann's  Ilisfoiy  of  Ancient 
Ari,  Schiller's  Letters,  and  Hegel's  ylesthetik,  Germany  has 
produced  nothing  so  admirable  in  this  direction  as  much 
that  has  proceeded  from  its  political  rival. 

The.  literature  of  France,  however,  includes  that  of 
Switzerland,  and  the  earliest  contribution  to  ^Esthetics  in 
the  French  language  was  by  a  Swiss,  who  held  a  philo- 
sophical chair,  first  in  his  own  country,  and  afterwards  in 
Holland.  Passing  over  the  Lettrcs  sur  le  bon  Gout,  by  the 
Abbe  ]5ellcgarde  (1708),  and  the  Discoiirs  sur  le  bon  Gout, 
by  J.  F.  du  Tremblay  (171  3),  the  first  book  of  any  value 
\\-as  the  Traite  du  Beau,  by  J.  P.  de  Crousaz  (1663- 1748), 
first  Professor  of  Philosophy  and  of  Mathematics  in  the 
Academy  of  Lausanne,  and  afterwards  at  Groningen.  It 
was  published  at  Amsterdam  in  17 12.  Crousaz  was  also 
the  author  of  a  djyie,  which  a])pearcd  at  Amsterdam  in  the 
same  year.  Tliis  little  treatise  has  thus  a  historical  im- 
portance in  excess  of  its  speculative  nierits. 

Crousaz  held  that  Beauty  is  not  known  by  us  as  absolute, 
but  that  the  word  expresses  the  relation  in  which  the  objects 
we  call  beautiful  stand  to  our  intellect  and  to  our  feelings. 
The  v.'ord  belongs,  in  this  respect,  to  the  same  class  as  the 
word  "Truth'"  or  "Honesty."  Every  one  who  rises  above 
mere  custom,  when  he  says  a  thing  is  beautiful  means  that 
he  perceives  something  which  he  approves,  and  which  gives 
him  pleasure.  (He  distinguishes  oljjects  which  please  the 
mind,  from  those  which  please  the  heart.)  It  is  not  neces- 
sary, however,  that  in  order  to  be  beautiful  an  object  must 
gi\'e  pleasure.  We  may  recognise  beauty  in  that  which  gives 
pain.  The  characteristics  of  Peauty,  according  to  Crousaz, 
are  variety,  unity,  regularity,  order,  and  proportion.  But  in  a 
subsequent  cha})ter  he  seems  to  lay  chief  stress  on  the  three- 
fold characteristic  of  unity  in  variety,  jDroportion,  and  fitness. 
An  object  is  beautiful  (i)  when  it  includes  within  it  diversities 
reduced  to  unity,  which  occupy  the  mind  without  fatiguing 
it  ;  (2)  when  it  has  proportion  well  sustained  ;  and  (3)  when 
it  is  well  fitted  to  its  place.     One  does  not  require,  however, 


96  The  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

to  postpone  his  judgment  as  to  the  beauty  of  an  object 
until  he  recognises  these  three  things  as  present,  because 
IJeauty  forces  itself  upon  us  spontaneously.  It  triumphs 
over  us,  and  our  heart  responds  to  it  without  the  aid  of 
reason.  The  question  then  is,  has  it  a  basis  in  the  nature 
of  things,  or  is  its  basis  caprice  ?  To  determine  this  we 
must  go  to  the  root  of  human  nature,  and  to  the  radical 
principle  of  the  universe,  which  is  harmony.  The  harmony 
between  }*Ian  and  Nature,  however,  is  not  perfect.  There 
is  a  chaotic  element  in  human  nature,  and  evils  of  all  sorts 
exist  around  it  and  within.  Derangem.ents  of  body  and 
mind,  due  to  inheritance  and  to  education,  have  artificialised 
human  taste.  Nevertheless  an  object  in  which  many  diver- 
sities are  brought  together  and  united  in  harmony,  and  which 
is  well  proportioned  and  fitted  to  its  end,  is  beautiful.  This 
is  a  summary  of  the  teaching  of  Crousaz. 

The  Latin  poem  of  Dufresnoy,  ZJt'^ir/t'  GrapJiica,  deserves 
a  passing  notice.  When  Charles  Alphonse  du  Fresnoy 
(161  1-1658),  who  had  studied  Painting  and  the  conventional 
Art  of  Poetry  both  in  France  and  in  Italy,  returned  to  his 
native  country,  he  appeared  both  as  artist  and  verse-writer. 
Plis  poem  on  the  Art  of  Painting  is  chietly  interesting  from 
the  fact  that  it  was  translated  into  English  prose  by  Drydcn, 
who  prefixed  to  it  an  Introduction  of  his  ov,-n,  much  more 
interesting  than  the  book  itself,  in  which  he  traces  a 
parallel  between  poetry  and  painting.  It  was  also  trans- 
lated into  English  verse  by  W.  Mason.  So  far  as  ]ioctry 
goes,  Dufresnoy's  work  is  as  dull  as  ditch-water.  Even 
Fusseli  says  of  it  (Introduction  to  Lectures  on  Pain/ tag;  Part 
II.  p.  XV.)  :  "  P'rom  his  text  no  one  ever  rose  practically  wiser 
than  when  he  sat  down  to  the  study  of  it.''  Like  much  of 
the  conventional  sculptured  monuments  at  Westminster 
.\bbey,  it  has  only  a  historical  interest,  as  a  mirror  of  the 
taste  of  the  age  that  thought  it  worthy  of  repr(xluction  in 
two  I'Inglish  editions. 

Its  perusal  by  the  .Abbe'  Du  I3os,  member  and  "  per- 
pctu.al  secretary"'  of  the  French  Academy,  gave  rise  to  liis 
Ju'/ltWions  critiques  sur  la  Pocsie  et  ta  Pcinture  (17  1 9).  If 
Dufresnoy's  poem  was   cltietly  interesting  from  the  fact  that 


IX  TJie  Philosophy  of  Frmice  97 

Dryden  translated  it,  Dubos's  Reflexions  are  worthy  of 
note  mainly  because  Lessing  refers  to  them,  and  seems 
to  have  made  some  use  of  them  in  his  Laocooji.  In 
France,  however,  they  went  through  many  editions  ;  and 
the  fifth,  enlarged  by  the  author,  was  translated  into  Eng- 
lish by  Thomas  Nugent,  and  published  in  London  in  three 
volumes  in  1748.  When  Dubos  wrote,  the  term  "Fine 
Art  ''  was  not  in  current  use.  P^rom  a  reluctance  to  drag 
down  the  vocation  of  the  poet  and  the  painter  to  that  of  a 
technical  workman,  Poetry  was  regarded  as  a  branch  of 
Literature  far  above  "Art.'"  Dubos's  discussion  gave  rise 
to  the  term  "  les  Beaux-Arts,"  and  indeed  nationalised  it. 
In  the  T7'aite  de  la  Peintiire,  by  Daudre  Bardon  (1760),  the 
phrase  is  used  as  current  coin. 

To  trace  in  detail  the  history  of  the  ideas  as  to  Fine  Art 
entertained  in  France — as  to  what  it  should  include,  and 
what  it  should  exclude — would  be  an  interesting  chapter 
in  the  history  of  ^Esthetics.  Only  a  single  remark  can 
here  be  made.  In  the  seventeenth  century  certain  schools 
of  Painting"  and  of  Sculpture  were  instituted.  A  school  of 
Architecture  followed.  In  1793  these  were  united  in  one,  an 
Ecole  des  Beaux-Arts.  When,  subsecjuently,  an  Academic 
des  Beaux-Arts  was  estaljlished,  ]\Iusic  was  added.  Poetry 
was  left  out,  partly  because  it  could  not  be  taught,  and 
partly  from  an  idea  that  it  belonged  to  a  loftier  sphere.  In 
the  Dictionnaire  des  Sa'eficcs,  des  Lei /res,  ei  des  Ar/s,  the 
arts  of  Design  only  are  included  —  Painting,  Sculpture, 
Engraving,  Architecture,  Music,  and  Drawing.  (This  sub- 
ject, however,  belongs  to  the  history  of  the  Fine  Arts,  rather 
than  to  that  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Beautiful.) 

Towards  the  close  of  the  first  quarter  of  the  eighteenth 
century  we  find  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful  discussed  by 
the  Pere  Puffier  in  his  Traite  des  Verites  pre^niires,  1724, 
a  work  which  did  not,  at  the  time  of  its  appearance, 
receive  the  attention  it  deserved.  In  the  thirteenth 
chapter  of  the  first  part  of  this  Treatise,  he  proposes  to 
"  apply  the  rule  of  common-sense,  in  order  to  discover 
in  what  true  Beauty  consists.''  On  reading  this  sentence, 
we  may  imagine  we  are  going  to  tread,    in  the   company  of 

H 


98  TJie  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap, 

Pere  Bufficr,  those  steps  afterwards  made  so  familiar  to 
Scotsmen  by  Dr.  Thomas  Reid.  Ikit  it  is  not  so.  "What 
is  called  Beauty,"'  lie  writes,  "  seems  to  me  to  consist  in 
that  which  is  at  one  and  the  same  time  the  most  common 
and  the  most  rare  in  thinij's  of  the  same  species  ;  or,  to  put 
it  otherwise,  it  is  that  particular  form  the  most  common  of 
all  the  forms  that  arc  to  be  found  in  the  same  species  of 
things  ■"'■  (c'est  la  disposition  pai'ticuliere  la  plus  commune, 
parmi  les  autres  dispositions  particulieres  qui  se  rencontrent 
dans  une  meme  espece  des  choses.  'Jraitc  dcs  Vcrilcs 
preinih-es,  I.  ch.  xiii.  !:j  94).  After  giving  this  definition,  he 
sees  that  it  has  a  paradoxical  look  on  the  surface,  and 
that  it  requires  some  explanation.  He  theref(jre  selects  the 
human  face  as  an  illustration  of  his  principle  ;  and,  witli  the 
view  of  showing  how  Beauty  is  both  rare  and  common,  he 
remarks  that  out  of  the  almost  infinite  variety  of  particular 
forms  which  the  human  face  assumes,  one  only  is  ])crfectly 
bcautiful,  while  the  rest  fall  beneath  that  standard  of  per- 
fection ;  but  that  none  of  the  departures  from  this  perfect 
beauty  have  so  many  human  faces  formed  after  t/ieir  model 
as  are  formed  after  the  model  of  the  perfectly  beautiful.  In 
50  faces  there  may  be  only  one  amongc^t  them  that  is 
really  beautiful — this  makes  beauty  rare  ;  but  then  this 
one  beautiful  face  will  have  many  of  the  remaining  49 
formed  after  its  model  ;  while  no  single  one  of  tlu-  49 
will  have  many  of  the  remaining  48  fcjrmed  on  its  model. 
JJunier  thought  the  same  jjrinciple  is  seen,  even  more  clearly, 
when  we  examine  the  different  ]iarts  of  the  face  in  detail. 
Take  the  s.-sme  50  persons,  and  examine  their  foreheads, 
e\'es,  mouths,  or  any  feature.  \()u  may  find,  say,  10  \vell- 
]:)roportioned  ones,  formed  as  if  after  the  same  model.  Oi 
the  remaining  40,  not  more  than  one  or  two  will  seem  to  be 
formed  after  the  same  model,  but  all,  or  nearly  all,  after 
different  ones.  It  will  be  found,  I'mffier  thought,  that  the 
individual  parts  which  constitute  deformity  occur  rai'ely  in 
the  human  face,  and  that  the  ])arts  which  constitute  beauty 
are  much  more  common.  It  might  be  supposed  to  follow 
tVnm  this  that  all  beautiful  faces  must  resemble  each  other. 
This   (jf  course  is   not   the   case,   and   Buffier  remarks   that 


IX  TJic  Philosophy  of  France  99 

"  however  beautiful  a  face  may  be,  its  ])arts  arc  never  equally 
or  perfectly  beautiful."  If  they  were  so,  then  all  beautiful 
faces  luoi/hl  resemble  each  other. 

He  makes  two  additional  remarks  which  are  noteworthy 
— viz.  (i)  that  those  persons  whom  we  are  most  apt  to  mis- 
take, the  one  for  the  other,  are  those  who  approach  toward 
the  beautiful.  We  can  easily  distinguish  between  ugly 
faces,  or  at  least  much  more  easily  than  between  beautiful 
ones.  (2)  It  is  to  be  observed  that  painters  find  it  com- 
paratively easy  to  depict  ugly  faces  ;  it  is  more  difficult  for 
them  to  paint  the  handsome  or  the  young.  Those  that  are 
either  wrinkled  with  age,  or  have  assumed  some  characteristic 
departure  from  the  mean  of  beauty,  or  are  positively  ugly, 
are  much  more  easily  dealt  with  by  the  artist.  It  comes  to 
this,  that  relatively  perfect  forms  of  Beauty  (if  distinct  in 
type)  have  always  a  much  closer  resemblance  or  affinity 
with  each  other,  than  any  one  of  them  has  resemblance  or 
affinity  with  departures  from  the  Beautiful. 

In  further  endeavouring  to  prove  his  thesis  that  Beauty 
consists  in  that  which  is  most  common  amongst  individuals 
of  the  same  species,  Buffier  comments  on  the  doctrine 
that  Beauty  consists  in  "  proportion."  He  at  once  asks  for 
a  standard  of  proportion,  and  says  that  what  is  ugly  is  so, 
simply  because  it  is  a  departure  from  the  common  form — 
that  a  monster  is  monstrous  only  because  it  has  nothing  in 
common  with  that  form  from  which  it  is  an  aberration. 
He  thus  justifies  his  seeming"  paradox,  that  I5eauty  is  both 
the  most  common  and  the  most  rare  form  of  those  things 
which  meet  the  eye,  and  to  which  we  are  accustomed 
in  experience. 

It  is  a  curious  thing  that,  after  stating  a  doctrine  which 
really  implies  an  essential  principle  of  Beauty,  Ikiffier  should 
sink,  at  the  close  of  this  chapter,  to  so  low  an  intellectual 
level  as  to  admit  the  arbitrariness  of  the  Beautiful,  and  its 
relativity.  Not  only  in  reference  to  beauty  of  colour  and 
of  figure,  but  in  reference  to  the  standard  of  every  kind  of 
Beauty,  he  falls  back  upon  the  bare  suffrage  of  the  masses, 
mere  count  of  heads.  His  theory  had  no  siDCcuIative  root. 
It  was  not  based  (as  Plato's  was)  on  the  essential  and  the 


TOO  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

absolute,  but  it  recognised  a  kind  of  typical  form,  a  sort  of 
Aristotelic  mean  Ijctween  extremes.  Iseauty  consisted  not 
in  anything  that  individuals  become,  but  in  the  type  after 
which  they  aim,  and  to  which  they  approximate  :  and 
although  each  one  fails  to  reach  it,  the  points  in  wliich 
each  most  nearly  approaches  to  the  type  are  its  most 
beautiful  points.  I  think  it  curious  that  Ikifner  did  not  see 
the  affinity  of  his  own  theory  with  that  of  Plato,  with  which 
at  starting  it  had  really  more  in  common  than  with  the 
Aristotelian  doctrine.  If  the  variations  and  departures  from 
the  medial  line  of  Beauty  all  resemble  ii  more  than  they 
resemble  each  other,  they  surely  do  homage  to  it,  as  at  once 
more  universal  than  themselves,  and  as  ideal  in  contrast 
with  their  actuality. 

In  1736,  ^l.  Cartand  de  la  \'ilete  puljlished  an  Essdi 
kfsforique  ct  pliilosophiqiie,  sur  le  Gonf,  but  it  has  no 
greater  significance  than  Rollings  Refexioas  ge/iefciles  si/r  le 
Go/if,  published  about  the  same  time.  Rollin  was  Principal 
of  the  University  of  Paris,  and  wrote  on  History  and  Belles- 
Lettres,  but  he  was  not  a  philosopher.  He  defined  Taste 
as  a  ''kind  of  natural  reason  brought  to  perfection  by 
study.'"'  It  is  innate  in  all,  but  only  in  some  are  its  seeds 
e\'er  brought  to  perfection. 

Several  works  of  interest  to  the  student  of  art  (though 
merely  as  links  in  the  evolving  chain  of  criticism)  were 
written  by  French  travellers  in  Italy  during  the  first  half  ot 
the  eighteenth  century,  <.'._;'".  in  1739-40.  The  Prc.-^idcnt  de 
Prosses  sent  home  to  his  friends  a  series  of  Let/res  Uunilieres 
on  Italian  life.  They  are  full  of  j^rejudice.  Wliat  could 
be  more  dejilorable  than  the  f)llowing  judgment  passed 
on  St.  Mark's,  \'enice  : — "  C''est  un  vilain  monument,  s'il 
en  fut  jamais,  massif,  sombre,  et  gothique,  du  plus  mcchant 
gout^'!  {\.%  174)- 

3.  Aiulre  io  Diderot 

In  I  74  I,  Pere  Antlrc  wrote  an  JCssni  sur  te  />'eiru.  which 
was  in  some  respects  an  advance  on  the  discussion  of 
Crousaz  and  Buftler.      Andre's   is   not   a   profound  analysis, 


IX  T]ic  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  loi 

but  it  drew  its  inspiration  from  the  idealism  of  Male- 
branche,  reverting  to  that  of  Plato,  through  the  connecting 
link  of  St.  Augustine.  He  finds  Beauty  in  Nature,  in  Art, 
in  Mind  and  [Morals  ;  but  he  asks  what  Beauty  is  in  itself 
Is  it  absolute  or  relative  ?  Is  it  fixed  so  as  to  please 
barbarian  and  civilised  alike,  and  to  be  independent  of 
individual  fluctuating  taste  ?  He  does  not  need  to  ask 
what  things  are  beautiful  ;  the  great  question  is,  what  is 
Beauty  ?  In  answer  he  classifies  the  kinds  or  types  of 
Beauty  thus  : — (i)  There  is  an  essential  and  divine  Beauty. 
(2)  There  is  a  natural  Beauty,  quite  distinct  from  this, 
which  exists  in  the  world,  and  is  independent  of  human 
taste  or  opinion  about  it.  It  is  seen  both  in  colour  and  in 
form,  both  in  external  things  and  in  man.  (3)  There  is  a 
Beauty  that  is  an  arbitrary  and  artificial  product,  due  to 
association,  custom,  and  the  creation  of  individual  or 
national  taste.  The  recognition  of  these  three  orders — 
the  essential,  the  natural,  and  the  artificial — is  supposed  to 
go  to  the  root  of  the  difficulty  as  to  a  standard  of  taste. 
The  variations  in  judgment  and  feeling  which  exist  in 
reference  to  it  apply  only  to  the  third  of  the  three  kinds  of 
Beauty.  Pere  Andre  subdivides  the  kinds  of  Beauty  in  his 
three  classes,  without  adding  much  that  is  of  value.  The 
third  class  (artificial  Beauty)  he  trifurcates  thus — (i)  the 
beauty  of  Taste,  (2)  the  beauty  of  Genius,  (3)  the  beauty 
of  Caprice  ;  and  the  two  first,  he  maintains,  are  founded  on 
a  sentiment  of  natural  Beauty, 

Pere  Andre  influenced  Victor  Cousin  a  good  deal,  who 
edited  his  works,  with  copious  notes,  in  1843. 

Fi\-e  years  after  the  publication  of  the  Essai  du  Bcaii 
the  Abbe  Batteux  (i 7 13-1 780)  issued  a  volume  which  he 
called  Les  Beaux-Arts  redidts  a  lai  7neme  ^rtna'pe  (1746). 
This  was  followed  in  1765  by  a  Coiirs  de  Belles-Lettres. 
In  these  works  Batteux  tried  to  reduce  all  the  arts  to  one 
principle,  and  then  to  classify  them.  For  principle  he  falls 
back  on  the  imitation  of  Nature,  and  in  his  classification  he 
tries  to  bring  the  Arts  within  the  categories  of  space  and 
time,  those  belonging  to  each  category  being  able  to  unite 
and  produce  complex  ettects.      Thus  he  thinks   that   Archi- 


102  TJie  PkilosopJiy  of  the  Bcmitifid  chap. 

lecture,  Sculpture,  and  Painting- — all  appealing-  to  the  sense 
of  sight,  and  being  illustrated  in  the  held  of  space — may 
combine  together  to  form  a  complex  whole  ;  while  music 
and  poetry  may  similarly  combine  in  time.  His  division  of 
the  Arts  is  altogether  arbitrary. 

In  1759  the  Jissai sur  k  Ikaii  of  Pcre  Andre  was  edited 
at  Amsterdan-i,  with  a  Discoiiys  prcliniinaire  et  dcs  Rr- 
flcxiotis  sur  Ic  Gouf^  by  J.  II.  B.  Formey.  It  is  a  vindica- 
tion of  a  power  in  man  to  rise  alcove  the  inipressions 
of  sense,  and  reach  universal  and  axiomatic  ideas.  He 
explains  the  diversity  which  exists  both  in  matters  of  taste 
and  of  conduct,  as  due  to  climate,  education,  and  pre- 
judice, but  affirms  that  this  does  not  weaken  the  force  of 
universal  ideas,  which  are  demonstrable  as  principles.  He 
eulogises  Andre's  Essai,  criticises  Crousaz's  distinction  of 
absolute  and  relative  Beauty,  and  combats  the  position  of 
the  Encyclopedists.  He  then  gives  it  as  his  own  opinion 
that  Beauty  consists  in  the  perception  of  7'o.pports: — "La 
perception  des  rapports  est  done  le  fondenient  du  Beau  ''  : 
and  continues  —  "  il  semble  que  nous  considcrons  alors  les 
etres  non  seulement  en  eux-memes,  mais  encore  relativement 
aux  lieux  qu'ils  occupent  dans  la  Nature,  dans  le  Tout.'' 

The  experiential  rather  than  the  ideal  philosophy  was. 
hovA-ever.  at  this  time  in  the  ascendant  in  France.  In 
17  59)  D'Alembcrt  read  to  the  French  Academy  some 
Reflexions  sur  fus'igc  et  sur  Tdhus  de  la  P/u'IosopIu'e  d<ni< 
les  niatieres  de  ^^cftt.  It  \\-as  a  string  of  rhetorical  conin-ion- 
places.  He  did  not  atnrm  the  complete  arbitrariness  of  taste. 
There  were  certain  kinds  of  Beauty  which  appealed  to  all  : 
others  which  only  a])pcaled  to  the  connoi.-.-cur  ;  but  ta-te 
was  founded  on  fixed  ])rinciples  within  our>eIves.  We  can- 
not attain  to  any  first  principles  regarding  it,  but  we  can 
reach,  and  may  do  \ery  well  with,  certain  seeoiidary  ones. 
That  v,-as  the  outcome  fif  D'Alcmbiert'-  "reflections.'' 

Taste,  he  afhrmed,  is  widespread  though  not  univer-a'.. 
There  are  beauties  so  sublime  and  striking  that  all  minds  feel 
theni  c'lually.  in  all  centuries  and  in  .all  countries.  But  besides 
thi-  kind  of  beauty  there  is  a  species  of  a  second  order,  ^\-hich 
requires  even  more  sagacity  to  discern  and  more  delicacy  to 


IX  TJic  Philosophy  of  Fra7ice  103 

feel.  This  beauty  is  found  most  in  nations  where  social 
intercourse  has  perfected  the  arts,  and  it  is  this  beauty  that  is 
properly  the  object  of  Taste.  D'Alembert  defines  Taste  then 
as  "  le  talent  de  demeler  dans  les  ouvrages  de  Tart  ce  qui 
doit  plaire  aux  ames  sensibles,  et  ce  cjui  doit  les  blesser."' 
Taste  is  not  arbitrary,  but  is  founded  on  fixed  principles. 
The  source  of  our  pleasure  or  our  ennui  lies  only  and  solely 
in  ourselves  ;  and  in  ourselves  we  find  the  invariable  rules  of 
taste,  which  serve  as  a  touchstone  to  test  all  productions  of 
art  submitted  to  us.  Pursuing  our  investigation  in  a  philo- 
sophical spirit,  however,  we  find  a  limit  which  we  cannot 
pass.  To  first  principles  we  cannot  ascend  ;  these  arc  for 
ever  hidden  behind  a  cloud.  To  seek  to  understand  the 
metaphysical  cause  of  our  pleasure  would  be  a  Ciuest  as 
hopeless  as  to  seek  to  explain  the  action  of  oljjects  on  our 
senses.  But,  as  the  origm  of  our  knowledge  can  be  reduced 
to  a  small  number  of  sensations,  so  the  source  of  our  pleasure 
in  matters  of  taste  can  be  traced  to  the  way  in  which  we  feel. 

In  the  same  year  as  Batteux's  Coiirs  de  Bellcs-Letires 
appeared  (i  76 5), Voltaire's  Philosophical  Dictionary  was  pub- 
lished. It  contained  a  brief  article  on  the  Beautiful,  stating 
the  ordinary  conventional  arguments  against  a  standard  of 
taste,  founded  simply  on  the  diverse  verdicts  of  individuals 
and  races.  It  has  no  philosophical  value.  The  curious 
thing,  however,  is  that  Voltaire  also  contributed  the  article 
"  Gout  "  to  the  French  E7icy  dope  die  on  Dictio)i7unre  Raisotine 
des  Scicfices,  des  Arts  et  des  Metiers  of  Diderot  and 
D'Alembert  (1751-1772);  and  in  it  he  admits  a  standard, 
which  in  his  own  Philosophical  Dictionary  he  denies. 

He  says  that  by  a  metaphor  drawn  from  the  physical 
world  Taste  is  the  sense  by  which  we  discern  beauty  and  its 
opposite  in  all  the  arts  ;  and  this  metaiDhoric  taste  follows 
the  same  laws  as  physical  taste  does.  Like  that  of  the 
tongue  and  palate,  it  even  anticipates  reflection,  is  sensitive 
to  what  is  good,  and  rejects  the  l^ad  with  indignation.  It 
is  often,  however,  uncertain  and  roving.  It  is  not  sufticient 
for  Taste  to  see  and  to  know  the  beauty  of  a  work,  it 
must  feel  it,  be  touched  by  it,  distinguish  its  "nuances.'' 
Depraved  taste  in   art  selects  revolting   subjects,  or  prefers 


I04  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Bcmitiftd  chap. 

the  burlesque  to  the  nol^le,  the  affected  to  the  natural 
and  simi:)le,  and  is  a  malady  of  the  spirit.  As  with  the 
individual,  so,  little  by  little,  taste  forms  in  nations,  as  the 
spirit  of  the  great  artists  is  apprehended.  The  saying 
that  one  cannot  dispute  about  matters  of  taste  applies 
only  on  the  physical  side.  It  is  not  so  in  Art.  There 
is  a  good  taste  that  discerns,  and  a  bad  taste  that  ignores. 
■■  11  y  a  aussi  des  ames  froides  et  des  esprits  faux,  qu'on 
ne  pent  ni  c'chaufier  ni  redresser  ;  c'est  avec  eu\  ([u'il 
ne  faut  point  disputer  parce  qu'ils  n'"en  ont  aurun."'  Ta-te, 
however,  may  be  lost  to  a  nation.  This  most  frequently 
occurs  after  a  period  of  perfection.  Artists,  fearing  to 
imitate,  go  too  far  afield,  and  lose  the  beauty  of  Xaiure 
that  their  predecessors  seized.  There  are  whole  countries 
which  a  genuine  taste  has  never  entered.  It  is  also  seen 
that  where  some  of  the  Arts  are  wanting,  the  rest  can  rarely 
flourish,  because  all  adhere,  and  depend  the  one  upon  the 
other.      This  is  the  substance  of  the  teaching  of  \'oltaire. 

During  the  greater  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  both 
French  criticism  and  French  Art  were  altogether  conven- 
tional. Much  of  the  former  appeared  in  the  Notes  of  travel 
in  Italy,  which  were  taken  down  by  the  artists  in  the  course 
of  their  wanderings,  but  which  \vere  written  without  any 
insight.  This  conventionality  is  well  put  by  .Mr.  Morley  a 
writer  certainly  not  biassed  against  the  dominant  note  of 
the  century — in  his  Diderot : — 

'■  Of  course  the  artists  wciil  to  Kome,  but  they  chaiiL^'eil  sky  and 
not  spirit.  The  pu|)il.s  of  the  Academy  came  back  wiih  tlieir  port- 
folios filled  with  sketches,  in  wliicii  we  see  nothing  of  tlie  '  true 
motlier  of  dea'l  empires,"  nothing  (jf  tlie  vast  ruin^,  and  tlie  great 
sombre  desolate  Campagna,  but  only  Rome  turned  into  a  decora- 
tion for  the  scenes  of  a  theatre,  or  the  panels  of  a  IjOU'loir."  ^ 

The  mention  of  Diderot's  name  brings  us  to  one  who 
had  ])erhaps  the  most  powerful  brain  amongst  the  French 
Flncycliipcdists.  Dideroi  wrote  the  enc_\'clopedia  article  on 
the    Beautiful.      Though    his   ihcoiy  ^\■as   a  \'ery  incomjjlete 


'    DiJeiot,  vol.   ii. 


P- 


IX  TJit  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  105 

one,  his  criticisms  were  admirably  incisive.  His  papers  on 
the  successive  SaIo7is,  though  desultory  and  unsystematic — 
and  they  could  not  help  being  so — were  scientifically  far  in 
advance  of  their  time  ;  now  and  then  they  rose  to  a  rank 
which  makes  them  even  models  of  art-criticism.  Diderot 
was  much  more  successful  as  an  art-critic  than  as  a  specu- 
lative philosopher.  His  essay  on  Painting  was  written  in 
1765,  though  not  published  till  1796.  Goethe,  writing  to 
Schiller,  called  it  "  a  magnificent  work,"  and  he  translated 
part  of  it.  In  intellectual  philosophy  he  was  a  necessi- 
tarian ;  and,  discarding  the  ideal,  his  one  recipe  for  good 
art  was  simply  "go  back  to  Nature"  —  the  fXL[ii](Ti^  of 
Aristotle.  He  could  not  understand  the  Platonic  idealisa- 
tion, but  would  cure  the  conventionality  and  mannerisms 
of  bad  Art  by  faithful  imitation,  by  copying  the  real.  And 
what  we  would  not  expect  in  this  connection,  he  con- 
demned the  practice  of  painting  from  models  as  artificial. 
He  saw  that  the  stiff  attitudinising  model,  the  posing 
figure,  was  not  a  piece  of  living,  breathing,  changing 
Nature,  and  condemned  it  accordingly.  But  Diderot 
forgot  (i)  that  the  most  perfect  products  of  Art  cannot 
possibly  be  reproductions  of  movement,  but  only  of  that 
which  once  moved,  and  which  has  therefore  the  latent 
capabilities  of  movement  ;  (2)  that  the  study  of  moving" 
objects,  as  they  are  seen  in  Nature,  and  not  as  they  would 
be  isolated  for  the  purpose  of  copying,  would  only  result 
in  blurred  effects,  confusion  of  detail,  with  no  harmony 
either  of  form  or  of  colour  ;  (3)  that  Art  cannot  imitate 
Nature  exactly,  simply  because  Nature  is  always  changing. 
We  may  fi.x  some  one  single  shape  or  group  of  shapes, 
some  one  assemblage  of  colours  or  groups  of  colours  ;  but, 
in  all  high  Art,  these  are  meant  to  suggest  much  more  than 
they  can  express  or  record. 

In  his  essay  on  the  licautiful  in  the  J-lncyclopedie 
Diderot  searches  for  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the 
Beautiful,  and  in  the  course  of  it  he  deals  with  Hutcheson's 
theory.  His  solution  that  Beauty  lies  "in  relation''  is  very 
inadequate.  "  Beau  est  un  terme  que  nous  appliquons  k 
une  infinite  d'etres   .    .    .   dans  tous  ces  etres  une  C[ualite  dont 


io6  TJit   PJiilosopJiy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

le  terme  beau  soit  le  signe.''  ^  It  is  too  abstract,  bare,  and 
therefore  too  sterile  a  conception.  The  relations  whicli  mai<e 
certain  objects  beautiful,  and  others  not — and  wliich  ma]<e 
the  same  object  beautiful  and  ugly  at  difterent  times — have 
still  to  be  examined.  Diderot  is  more  successful  in  his 
attempt  to  map  out  the  sections  and  sub-sections  of  An. 
than  he  is  in  his  theory  of  Beauty.  Wlien  we  raise  the 
Cjuestion,  How  do  the  poet,  painter,  sculptor,  and  musician 
co-operate  ?  and  how  do  they  differ,  in  dealing  with  their 
common  element.  Beauty  ?  in  this  scientinc  quest  we  may 
tind  Diderot  suggestive,  if  not  directly  helpful. 

Another  thing  may  be  noted.  He  was  more  indebted 
than  he  knew  to  the  philosophy  which  he  discarded.  Here 
is  one  idealistic  hint  which,  had.  he  f  illowed  it  out.  might 
have  led  him  a  certain  distance  towards  the  theory  opposite 
to  that  which  he  espoused,  or  at  least  out  of  the  ruts  of  his 
own  literalism.  '■  True  taste,'"  he  said,  '•  fastens  on  one 
or  two  characteristics,  and  leaves  the  rest  to  the  imagination. 
...  If  an  artist  shows  us  eveiything.  and  leaxes  lis  nothing 
to  dn,  he  leaves  us  weary  and  impatient.'-'  So  much  for 
Diderot. 

4.   Mo)ticsqu:cu  to  Cousin 

A  fragment  on  "Taste,''  by  Montesquieu  (i  6S9-1  7  5  ;). 
the  author  of  L Esprit  d-:s  Lois,  was  discovered  iimongsi 
his  papers  after  his  death,  and  inserted  in  the  French. 
Encyclopedic  by  Diderot.  He  held  that  tlic  arguments  ol 
Plato  are  no  longer  tenable,  founded  as  they  are  on  a  false 
philosophy.  These  arguments  treat  of  the  good,  beautiful. 
perfect,  v.ise,  as  pos:ti\'e  things.  ThiC  sources  of  the 
beautiful  are  in  ourselves,  and  in  seeking  the  reason  of 
th<;ni  we  seek  the  souroes  of  plca-ure.  Poetry,  Painting, 
S  ulpture,  Mu-i'-,  Architecture,  all  give  pleasure  ;  let  us 
discover  why.  how.  and  when.  This  will  aid  us  to  forni 
Ta-:e,  v.hicli  is  nothing  but  the  power  of  discerning  with 
delicacy   (nnesse),    and    with    promiJiiuule,    the    amount    oi 

^  S.-.-  n's--)  b.is  Lc'tr,'  sur  Ics  SjurJ;  et  M:i-::5:  — "  Le  ijoiit  en 
c^Or. -■.'■/.  cor.-;-to  dar.5  la  perception  des  rar-pi  irts." 


IX  TJic  Philosophy  of  France  107 

pleasure  they  can  give  to  mankind.  The  soul,  inde- 
pendently of  the  pleasures  that  come  through  the  senses, 
has  those  which  are  proper  to  it.  It  is  immaterial  to  con- 
sider whether  our  soul  has  these  pleasures  as  a  substance 
united  with  a  body,  or  as  separate  from  the  body  ;  the  soul 
has  them  always,  and  these  are  the  objects  of  Taste.  The 
manner  of  our  seeing  is  entirely  arbitrary  ;  we  might  have 
been  made  differently,  in  which  case  we  should  have  felt 
diftcrently.  It  follows  that  were  we  different,  art  would 
have  been  different.  After  referring  to  the  love  both  of 
order  and  variety,  he  pauses  to  criticise  Gothic  buildings, 
the  ornamentation  of  which  he  thinks  too  varied.  "  Gothic 
buildings  are  an  enigma,  confusing  the  eye,  and  em- 
barrassing the  mind."  He  compares  them  with  the  Greek, 
of  which  he  praises  the  simplicity — few  diversions,  and  those 
dignified  and  grand.  He  then  lays  down  the  law  that  what- 
ever we  see  at  one  moment  should  have  symmetry  ;  what 
we  see  in  succession,  variety.  "  Les  choses  que  nous 
voyons  successivement  doivent  avoir  de  la  variete  ;  car 
notre  ame  n'a  aucune  difificulte  a  les  voir  ;  celles  au  con- 
traire  que  nous  apercevons  d'un  coup  d'ocil  doivent  avoir 
de  la  symctrie."  He  then  emphasises  the  necessity  of 
contrast — (all  things  fatigue  us  in  the  long-run,  even  great 
pleasures) — of  sensibility,  delicacy;  and  so  comes  to  the 
"  je  ne  sais  quoi."  This,  he  says,  is  founded  on  a  feeling  of 
surprise.  "A  source  of  great  beauty  is  when  a  theory  in- 
spires us  at  first  with  a  slight  feeling  of  surprise  ;  this  feeling- 
is  sustained  and  augmented  ;  it  is  finally  followed  by 
admiration."  jSIany  painters  seize  our  imagination  at  once, 
with  an  extraordinary  expression,  bizarre  attitude,  or  gor- 
geous colour.  In  the  case  of  others,  as  Raphael,  the  beauty 
intensifies  after  a  time.  Similarly,  the  exact  proportion  of 
St.  Peter's  at  Rome  is  such  that  at  first  we  do  not  appre- 
hend its  greatness.  Were  it  less  wide,  we  should  feel  its 
length  ;  were  it  shorter,  we  should  perceive  its  breadth. 
But,  after  a  while,  the  more  one  gazes,  the  more  its  great- 
ness seems  to  grow. 

Many  of  the   shorter  articles  in   the  E?icyclopcdu  were 
written  by  Jean   Francois   Alarmontel  (i  723-1 799),   drama- 


irS 


TJu-  Fhil^scpliy  of  tJ:c  Beaut:  f:d 


CriAP. 


ti?:.  inerr.ber  of  the  Frer.rh  AcadeiriV  and  its  secretary, 
edit  re  of  the  .'/;V-.-v'v.  Hist  'rio-rapher  of  Frattce.  etc.  :  a:td 
i:t  those  «'hich  deait  \vi:h  the  principies  oi  hterary  art — 
he  hitttseif  pubiished  a  ^vork.  E';:k;k:s  d-:  Z;'.'^:'>t?.'v;v 
I  i"S"') — he  foiio-.ved  in  the  footsteps  of  his   chief      He  voas 

precedents  ot   the   Frettch  i."'rt:todoxy  ot  t'ne  ei^itteen.th.  '."en.- 

•.v;:h  La  Harpe^nd  ah  "his  cohah^-'atettrs.  -.vas  a  very   ciear 

A'ho    cothd    see    other    horizons    a    ver\-    dthi    critic.      ■•  Les 

-3.   ricnesse.   et  ^  ;r,te-.:_'ence    — a   statettter.t   v.'iv.cn   Toptter 


There    '.vas   no    prof)tntd    discttssion    oi    the    sthyect    oi 

dirrrttht    to   hnd.      The    experience-phiiosophy.    then    domi- 
nant in  Europe,  discredited   the   beantifui.  both  by  st:bordi- 


in  the  nineteent;:  centnr\'.      St;fnce   it   to   say  titat  tire  .rreat 

rem  "'S 'nn: ca.    re'vT.'a..    nt    Liertttan.v — tne   snectnatn.'e   rc'^'-'e- 

bcch  cm  Frenth  phiics  ^pity  and  French  arstiteti:. 

In  the  year  iSci  the  Institute  oi  France  '  ::"ered  a  prize 

EmvricT3avi  i   (i-;;-:::;..      The   fnii   titie   of  his  memoir 
—  the  price  f:'r  v.-hi;ii  was   avmrded   in  ic'oi.  and   the  bo^m 

ou    ■■::}::::>■:    -itr  :::::   c:t;s::'K  p' '::;:;  /,;>■    '/):'::::{:  .^  /- 
c;^c.'.Vc  (vm  ■::■:'  .Vc  :  iuj:s  a-:  '.i  'rcmv;'.  /i 


K.i:  .m  Fy-:> 


IX  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  109 

de  la  Scidpture  ojitique.  et  quelles  sera:t:nt  les  awye?!;  ay 
attaimlre?  Hib  thesis  was  a  defence  of  the  Ari=to:eIiar, 
dogma  that  the  imitation  of  Nature,  the  careful  study  of 
fact,  of  real  beauty  existing  in  Greece,  brought  the  art  of 
the  age  of  Pericles  to  its  rare  perfection. 

A  contemporary  of  his.  A.  C.  Quatremcre  de  Quincey, 
(1755-1849;.  took  the  opposite,  or  the  Platonic  view.  viz. 
that  the  ancient  artists  did  not  copy  Nature,  but  an  ideal  of 
perfection,  which  the  actual  world  did  not  supply.  He  was 
perpetual  secretary  of  the  Academic  Royale  des  Beaux-Arts, 
architect,  sculptor,  and  mem.ber  of  the  P~rench  Institute, 
was  a  voluminous  writer  on  art.  chiefly  in  the  form  of  papers 
read  to  the  Academie,  and  published  under  the  title  Discoitrs. 
The  follov.-ing  is  a  ryum-:  of  one  of  these  essays,  '•  De  Tujii- 
fersalit-J  die  Beau,  et  de  ha  }?:a/nere  de  I cnte?2drej'  bound  in. 
a  volume  oi  Discours  pycf:o?K-Js  a  I Institut : — Certain  truths 
are  invariable  and  universal.  .Such  are  the  ideas  of  the 
true  and  the  good,  of  which  Beauty  is  one  of  the  tangible 
forms.  But  taste  and  opinions  on  the  beautiful  ditier  in 
dinerent  nations  and  times.  Plow  then  can  it  be  universal  ': 
Either  there  is  a  standard  of  Beauty  that  can  be  recog- 
nised as  such,  and  therefore  it  is  absurd  to  extend  it  to  all 
works  alike  ;  or  there  is  not  such  a  standard,  and  no  one 
has  the  right  to  praise  or  blame  anything.  The  test,  hov.-- 
ever.  is  to  be  found  in  the  knowledge  or  the  ignorance  of 
the  individual,  or  the  nation.  Even  the  True  and  the 
Good  are  not  recogmised  as  such  by  all  ;  so  with  the  Beauti- 
ful. It  is  a  false  argument  that  because  a  number  of  people 
do  not  admit  the  truth  of  an  experience  or  a  calculation, 
therefore  it  is  not  true.  Moral  truths  are  obscured  by 
ignorance,  and  brutal  passion  :  yet  are  they  none  the  less 
universal,  or  have  the  inherent  pov.-er  of  becoming  so.  The 
least  analysis  shov.-s  that  the  Beautiful  is  comp'tised  of  a 
principle  of  unity  allied  to  variety,  a  principle  of  order  and 
harmony,  truth  and  utility — qualities  which  can  be  appre- 
ciated in  theon.-.  and  applied  in  practice  only  by  the  union 
of  reason,  intelligence,  imagination,  and  feeling  :  faculties 
existing  in  all  men.  but  v.-hich  are  in  the  g'reater  number 
inert.      In    ^■egetable    life,   do    not   all    agree    that  a  v.-ell- 


no  The  PhilosopJiy  of  tJic  Bcmitifnl  chap. 

developed  tree  is  more  beautiful  than  a  stunted  one  ?  So 
witli  regard  to  certain  races  of  men,  forms  of  bodies,  etc. 

The  universality  of  the  Beautiful  then  is  to  be  under- 
stood, not  in  a  material  or  arithmetical  sense,  but  in  a 
moral  and  intellectual  one.  We  call  human  reason,  not 
what  one  particular  individual  thinks,  but  the  opinion  of 
the  aggregate  intelligence.  Undeveloped  faculties  cannot 
distinguish  between  the  good  and  the  bad,  the  true  and 
the  false,  nor  can  they  appreiiend  the  idea  of  the  Beautiful 
or  discern  its  principles.  We  hnd  that  people,  arrived  at 
the  same  degree  of  civilisation,  are  in  accord  in  their 
opinions,  sentiments,  and  judgments  on  the  ]]eautiful,  its 
idea  and  principle.  Thus  it  is  universal,  not  because  it  is 
seen  and  known  of  all,  but  because  those  who  have  eyes 
to  see,  see  it  ;  not  because  it  exists  in  all  works,  but  because 
wherever  it  exists,  and  we  recognise  it,  it  has  the  pov.er  (jf 
pleasing  all  cultivated  minds,  who  are  able  to  understand  tlie 
laws  of  nature.  Xot  that  it  accords  with  the  taste  of  each 
particular  man,  but  because  it  accords  with  the  nature  of 
man  in  general.  If  instead  of  this  we  uphold  the  com- 
plaisant doctrine,  that  that  which  pleases,  at  any  time  and 
place,  is  beautiful  I  one  sees  that  each  artist  may  form 
rules  for  himself  One  would  lind  artists  re\'nl\-ing  in 
endless  circles  of  variation,  embracing"  sometimes  the  evil 
and  sometimes  the  good,  abjuring  truths  once  apprehended, 
and  returning  to  errors  once  rejected  by  themselves. 

Illsewhere,  Quatremcre  de  Quincey  puts  the  root-]3rin- 
ciple  of  idealism  thus  :  "  In  e\xry  Art,  that  v.hicli  comes 
within  the  range  of  the  understanding,  sentiment,  and  L^uriius 
does  not  really  exist  anywhere.  It  has  neither  suljsiance 
nor  place.  It  is  -ul_iiect  to  none  of  the  senses,  and  hf 
who  has  found  it  cannot  tell  \\here  h.e  has  seen  its  model.'' 

Perhaps  the  most  noteworthy  fact  to  ])e  mentioned  at 
this  stage,  as  beaiing  on  the  future  cotu'se  of  opinion  in 
France,  is  the  avidity  with  which  the  younger  race  of 
Frenchmen,  at  the  beginnin.g  of  the  nineteentlt  century,  roatl 
the  works  of  the  ( ierman  nicta])ln-sicians.  and  iml)ibed  the 
best  ]")arts  of  their  tc-aching.  Out  of  sheer  dcs])air  at  tlie 
philosophical  '"slough  of  despond,''  or  the   pit  of  nescience 


IX  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  1 1 1 

into  which  their  countrymen  had  been  swept  by  the  wave 
of  the  "  enhghtenment,"  they  turned  to  the  hterature  of 
other  lands  ;  and  by  the  help  of  the  works  of  German  and 
of  Scottish  philosophers,  they  essayed  a  new  reading  of  the 
facts  of  external  Nature  and  of  the  human  consciousness. 
It  is  certain  that  most  of  the  young  French  students  of 
Philosophy  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  looked  for 
help,  not  to  their  own  Encyclopedists — the  clever  scientific 
thinkers  of  the  brilliant  era  of  \'oltaire — but  to  the  meta- 
physicians of  Germany.  It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  very 
many  of  them  wrote  essays  or  papers  on  the  subject  of  the 
Beautiful.  Leveque  tells  us  ^  that,  in  the  half-century  from 
1810  to  1864,  thirty  of  the  docteurs  es  lettres  in  France 
selected  the  cjucstion  of  /Esthetic  as  the  subject  of  their 
graduation  thesis.  This  was  due  not  merely  to  the  interest 
which  Cousin  and  Jouffroy  had  stirred  up,  but  also  to  a  study 
of  Kant  and  Schelling,  of  Winckelmann  and  Schiller. 

It  is  somewhat  curious  that  in  the  voluminous  work  of 
Comtc— the  Bacon  of  France — we  have  almost  no  discussion 
of  this  subject.  In  the  fifth  volume  of  the  PJiilosophie 
Pos!f!Te,  pp.  47-49  and  pp.  104- 161,  and  in  the  sixth 
volume,  p.  158,  some  indirect  discussion  of  it  will  be  found. 
Comte  thought  that  the  personification  of  Nature  in  the  early 
polytheism  was  favourable  to  Art  ;  while  the  monotheistic 
conception  of  the  universe  was  at  first  unfavourable  to  it. 

In  18 1 3,  Victor  Cousin,  then  a  pupil  of  Royer-Collard 
at  the  Sorbonne,  caught  the  spirit  of  the  anti-sensationalist 
doctrine  which  that  pioneer  had  the  courage  to  unfold.  In 
181  5,  as  his  successor  in  the  Chair  of  Philosophy,  Cousin 
led  the  van  of  the  new  idealistic  movement  in  France.  As 
soon  as  it  took  definite  shape,  that  movement  was  carica- 
tured, and  its  advocates  were  lampooned  as  eclectics.  Its 
noblest  moral  feature,  and  its  most  characteristic  outcome, 
were  made  its  intellectual  pivot  by  its  opponents,  and  as 
such  ridiculed.  It  was  an  easy  but  a  foolish  task.  It  is 
true  that  in  Cousin  a  single  philosophical  thought  is 
sometimes  hammered  on  the  anvil  so  long,  that  it  is  beaten 
too  thin  and  fine  ;  and  now  and  then  (though  not  so  often 
^  /.(7  ScicTice  du  Beau  (preface,  p.  ix. ). 


112  TJu:  PhilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

as  his  detractors  allei,'-e)  the  thought  is  lost  in  rhetoric  ;  but 
the  sterhng  merits  of  the  philosophical  revival,  in  which  he 
bore  a  distinguished  part,  will  be  increasingly  appreciated 
as  the  history  of  opinion  on  this  subject  is  better  known. 

In  his  first  course  of  Lectures  at  the  .Sorbonne — from 
1815  to  1820 — Cousin  contented  himself  with  showing  that 
the  Beautiful  could  not  be  the  merely  agreeable  or  pleasant. 
either  in  a  lower  or  a  more  refined  sense  ;  and  that  the 
dicta  of  the  masses  could  determine  nothing  as  to  what 
Beauty  intrinsically  is.  When  he  passed,  ho\\"e\'er,  from 
the  mere  criticism  of  inadequate  and  partial  theories,  to 
announce  another  of  his  own,  he  fell  back  on  the  old  and 
equally  one-sided  doctrine  that  Beauty  consists  in  unity  and 
variety.  The  unsatisfactory  vagueness  of  this  old  August- 
inian  doctrine  is  apparent.  It  is  cjuite  true  that  variety 
with  no  unity  is  not  only  distracting,  but  unintelligible, 
just  as  unity  without  variety  is  not  only  monotonous,  but 
unmeaning.  But  the  mere  statement  that  these  two  thing-s, 
unity  and  variety,  are  equally  important  elements  in  Beauty, 
solves  nothing.  \Ve  see  unity  and  variety  in  almost  every- 
thing, but  what  the  better  are  we  for  the  sight  of  them,  so 
far  as  a  tlieory  of  le-thetic  is  concerned  ? 

Cousin's  is  a  very  partial  key  to  the  mystery  of  the 
problem.  He  is  much  less  successful  in  philosophical 
construction,  than  in  the  literary  criticism  of  inadequate 
theories.  With  incisive  fjrce  he  shows  the  inadequacy  of  the 
Aristotelian  doctrine  that  Art  lies  in  the  imitation  of  Nature  : 
but  he  falls  back  somewhat  helplessly  on  the  solution  of 
St.  Augustine  in  the  De  Apto  et  PitlcJiro,  and  his  reduction 
of  all  physical  and  intellectual  to  moral  beauty  is  ^x-ry  one- 
sided. It  is  surely  not  even  in  keeping  with  the  funda- 
mental rule  of  the  Eclectic  that  physical  Beauty  is  attractive 
only  because  it  is  a  mirror  of  the  spiritual  that  underlies  it. 
Cousin's  was  a  useful  protest  against  curi'ent  theories  that 
faced  the  other  way — and  to  glorify  Art  as  one  of  the  means 
that  (as  Browning  puts  it)  "bring  the  invisible  full  into 
play.''  is  always  serviceable — but  it  was  really  little  more 
than  a  re\'i\al  of  the  Xeoplatonic  doctrine. 

In  1S16,  M.  Gui/.ot  (17S7-1S74)  wrote   an  Essai  sur  Ics 


!x  TJic  PliilosopJty  of  France  113 

liiidtcs  qui  separenf,  ct  Ics  Hens  qui  iinissott  Ics  beaux  Arts. 
K.efcrence  to  this  essay  will  be  made,  in  a  subsequent 
volume,  in  the  section  which  deals  with  Sculpture.  It 
contains  no  profound  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  Beautiful, 
and  a  good  deal  of  that  vain  repetition  of  truisms  in  a  lucid 
style,  of  which  many  French  writers  are  masters.  Never- 
theless there  is  wisdom  in  many  of  Guizot's  incidental 
remarks,  e.g.  sculpture,  by  reason  of  the  material  in  which 
it  works,  can  only  deal  with  states  of  mind  or  of  bod)',  both 
of  which  states  must  be  beautiful  ;  whereas  painting,  with 
t'ae  help  it  receives  from  colour,  and  the  rapidity  with  which 
it  can  embody  an  inspiration,  may  represent  emotion  and 
action,  whetlier  simple  or  complicated,  without  any  sacrifice 
of  beauty. 

5.  Lanicnnais  to  Joiiffroy 

A  work  of  great,  though  subsidiary,  value,  as  bearing 
on  /Esthetics,  was  first  published  in  Paris  in  the  year  1835, 
\iz.  The  P)-inciples  of  Ha7inony  and  Contrast  in  Colours.,  ajjd 
ilieir  application  to  the  Arts,  by  INI.  E.  Chevreul.  This 
was  the  result,  as  its  author  tells  us,  of  researches  on  the 
simultaneous  contrast  of  colours,  pursued  for  many  years,  and 
especially  since  1828.  He  professes  to  have  demonstrated 
the  law  of  colours,  by  experiment,  a  posteriori.  It  is  a  standard 
treatise  on  the  subject  of  colour,  but  it  falls  rather  within 
the  literature  of  Fine  Art  than  the  history  of  v^sthetics. 

The  Esqiiisse  d'lnie  Philosophic  of  F.  R.  de  Lamennais 
ri782-i854)  was  published  in  1841.  In  this  book  (so  far 
as  there  is  any  philosophy  in  it)  mysticism  excludes  both 
reason  and  experience.  It  is  of  no  philosophical  signifi- 
cance, hui  it  contains  some  interesting  reflections  on  the 
historical  progress  of  the  Arts.  Lamennais  was  of  an  erratic 
and  somewhat  eccentric  temperament.  He  began  as  a 
Hl^cral  catholic,  and  ended  as  an  almost  agnostic  democrat. 
His  literary  work  was  vague  and  incomplete,  unsystematic 
to  the  last  degree,  though  with  occasional  insight,  and 
aljounding  in  detached  felicities  of  phrase. 

Just  as  Cousin  drank  inspiration  from  Royer-Collard,  a 
I 


114  Tlie  PJdlosophy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap, 

young'  auditor  of  Cousin's  lectures  caught  the  spirit  of  his 
icleahsin  and  developed  it  further.  Emile  Sai^set  ^  gives 
us  an  interesting  acc(junt  of  this  youth  from  the  Jura 
mountains,  with  "  mikl  and  melancholy  face'" — ]5'iet  as 
well  as  thinker — listening"  to  the  teacliing  of  Cousin.  He 
was  one  of  those  who  toolv  for  the  suljject  of  his  Doctor's 
thesis  ••  the  emotion  of  the  iJeautiful.''  This  youth,  Theodore 
Jouft'roy(i  796-!  842),  succeeded  Cousin  in  the  Chair  of  I'hilo- 
sophy  at  the  Sorbonne.  but  was  dismissed  from  it  in  1822 
(the  school  being''  suppressed).  He  then  gathered  round 
him  about  a  score  of  friends  in  a  private  house,  where  he 
lectured  to  them.  "  This  little  cham1:)er  (jf  the  Kue  du  Four,'' 
says  .Saisset,  '•  has  a  place  in  history.'"  One  of  the  audience. 
SainteTleu\'e.  gives  a  brilliant  picture  of  the  v.-eekly  lectures. '-' 
To  a  small  but  appreciati\'e  audience  Joun'roy  delivered  f  irty 
lectures,  v.'hich.  howe\'er.  he  did  not  \\'i'it('  out.  Notes  of 
them  were  taken  b\-  ]\L  de  Lorme.  These  were  revi-ed  by 
louffroy,  and  after  his  deaths  they  were  edited  \)\  M.  Damiron. 
This  Coiirs  d' EstJicii ;ue  (1843)  is  an  admirable  work, 
not  facile,  with  no  surface  platitude,  or  showy  epigram, 
(v.'hich  is  tlie  occasional  bane  of  P'rench  philosophy).  Ij-.'.t 
with  real  merit  of  a  sf)lid  kind,  perhaps  v.ith  just  a  tride 
too  niuch  contldence  that  it  is  invariably  carrying  us  alorig 
the  right  lines.  One  great  micrit  in  the  work  is  the  dis- 
tinction dra\\"n  betA\'een  the  science  and  the  philosophs'  of 
•he  ISeautiful.  Joiu'tVoy  Ijegins  v.'ith  the  science,  i.e.  v.idi 
the  discussion  of  the  psychological  qu.e,-tion  of  Ileauty  as  a 
fact  or  ])henoinenfin  in  the  mind  of  man  and  in  Xatu.re.  in. 
order  t!':at  he  nia\-  the  more  successfully  pa.-s  thence  to  the 
])hilosophical  or  niet;ipliysical  problem  of  the  essence  of 
Jieauty.  Wd-ion  the  (lu-e.-tion  was  rai-ed,  What  is  it  that 
makes  an  (jbiect  beautiful  ?  the  metaphysical  method  of 
dealing'  v.'ith  it  was  to  luring  together  a  number  of  things. 
each  separately  l^eautiful.  and  to  try  to  take  froin  iiiti;: 
their  cnnimnn  characlei'i-tic.  If  this  could  l^e  withdrawn 
(remo\'edi  Ijy  riualysis),  it   \\'as   thought   that   in  and  by  the 

'    I:!  !.:-  /.' .-1  !?:•:  c!  I.:  \':c.  suiii  a  un  cxamai  crit!  j:ic  u'l  I  E::iu:i  jui 
/,-■'■  ■  ■:'  ■■  1;.;).   98-10O'. 

-    1:.  :.;^  I\-rf>\zits  I.itttr  lircs  'vol.  i.  p.  320). 


IX  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  France  115 

separation  we  might  lincl  the  ultimate  principle,  the  inner 
secret,  or  spccuhitive  kernel  of  Beauty.  A  much  surer 
method  of  procedure  is  to  start  psychologically.  Jouffroy 
thought  we  should  begin  by  asking  what  it  is  in  each 
separate  thing  tliat  leads  us  to  call  it  beautiful  ;  and  in 
what  relation  does  each  separately  beautiful  thing  stand  to 
us  who  percei\e  and  know  it  ?  First  of  all  he  notes  the 
elementary  fact  that  all  objects  that  are  regarded  by  us  as 
beautiful,  or  that  awaken  the  emotion  of  beauty,  give 
pleasure.  Therefore,  he  says,  we  may  start  by  assuming 
that  the  emotion  of  pleasure  is  inseparable  from  our  recog- 
nition of  beauty.  That  fact,  however,  will  not  prove  that  the 
beautiful  and  the  agreeable  are  one.  A  psychological  fact  of 
some  importance  is  signalised  at  this  stage  of  the  discussion. 
It  is  that  in  proj^ortion  as  objects,  recognised  as  beautiful, 
resemble  man,  or  in  so  far  as  they  mirror  our  humanity,  they 
are  to  that  extent  deemed  more  beautiful  by  us.  It  is  the 
grace  of  the  lil\-,  the  tenderness  of  the  colour  of  the  rose,  the 
peace  of  the  sky  at  sunset,  that  are  the  source  of  their  charm; 
but  grace,  tenderness,  and  peace  are  human  characteristics. 
Jouffroy  next  shows  fully  and  very  clearly  the  difierence 
between  the  beautiful  and  the  useful.  Much  that  is  beau- 
tiful is  not  useful,  and  much  that  is  useful  is  not  beautiful. 
Further,  in  realising  the  beauty  of  any  object,  we  ignore  its 
utility  for  the  time  being  ;  and  vice  7'ersa,  in  apjjreciating 
its  utility,  we  miss  its  beauty.  Another  psychological  fact 
of  importance  mentioned  by  Jouftroy  is  that,  \\'henever  \\e 
experience  an  emotion  of  the  beautiful,  we  desire  nearness, 
or  contact  with  the  object  ;  but  that,  as  soon  as  we  possess 
it,  part  of  its  charm  begins  to  fade.  The  craving  for 
possession,  howe\'er,  is  no  part  of  tlie  original  feeling  we 
have  for  any  object  that  we  recognise  as  beautiful.  If  our 
admiration  is  genuine,  it  is  disinterested.  It  is  respectful, 
even  reverential.  It  is  otherwise  when  we  desire  any 
object  for  its  use.  In  JoutlVoy's  Cours  iV Esllictique  there 
is  an  ampler  criticism  than  in  Cousin's  Du  Vna',  dii  Beau,  et 
dii  Bien  of  the  inadequate  theories  that  find  the  origin  of 
Beauty  in  unity  and  variety,  in  utility  or  novelty,  in 
organised  experience  (or  custom),  and  in  association. 


ii6  The  Pliilo<:opJiy  of  tJie  Bcaiitifiil  chav. 

In  passing'  from  the  psychology  to  the  metaijhysics  of 
the  question,  and  trying  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  essence 
of  Beauty,  he  first  deals  critically  with  other  defective 
theories,  such  as  those  which  find  its  essence  in  order, 
proportion,  perfection,  harmony,  adjustment,  arrangement. 
What  do  all  these  theories  mean  ?  Simply  that  certain 
iihenoniena  are  related  to  <~ine  another,  as  means  to  ends. 
IVat  all  phenomena  arc  thus  adjusted  or  correlated,  and  the 
fict  of  their  adjustment  and  correlation  has  nothing  to  do 
cither  with  the  beauty  or  the  ugliness  of  the  plienoniena 
that  are  correlated.  What  makes  each  correlated  tiling 
beautiful  has  yet  to  be  fouiid.  Is  it  not,  he  goes  on  to 
say — and  licrc  we  reach  the  speciality  of  liis  tlicory — is 
it  not  that  each  jihenomenon  speaks  to  us,  as  by  symbol  or 
allegory,  that  it  shadows  f^irth  what  it  does  not  fully  dis 
close,  and  what  it  cannot  reveal  entirely  ?  In  proportion  as 
the  visible  hints  to  us  of  the  invisible,  the  corporeal  of  the 
incorporeal,  it  is  suffused  or  covered  o\'er  with  the  raiment 
of  the  beautiful  ;  and  we  now  reach  his  definition  of  Beauty, 
'•  the  expression  of  the  Invi.-ible  by  the  natural  signs  vdiich 
nianifest  it"  :  the  ^-isible  world  is  the  "garment  v.-e  see  it  by." 

In  this  doctrine  JouftVoy  gives  us  a  synthesis  of  the 
realistic  and  idealistic  theories.  Starting  from  the  visible 
and  material,  it  transcends  them,  and  at  the  same  time 
keeps  close  to  nature  in  the  \cry  act  of  transcending  it. 
It  keeps  close  to  it  because  it  recognises  tliat  if  we  lose 
our  hold  of  the  actual  in  the  process  of  idealisation,  we 
will  probably  jiass  in.to  a  region  of  haze  or  mer;'  clou.dland. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  ne\X'r  tran>cend  the  actual,  we 
become  i:)ro3aic  literalists,  the  mere  slaves  of  fact. 

Refci'ence  should  here  be  made  to  the  French  tnmsla- 
tions  and  comnicntaries  on  Kant's  Kritik  acr  l'?ic!7s/:ni','. 
In  1796,  six  years  aftcn^  it  ap])eared  at  Kdnigsberg,  there 
was  published  at  Paris  Cn'f.'t/i/c  dii  Ji/L^'nncnf  {o^'scr:'(i/!0!!s 
sio-  Ic  soifhiiciit  di'.  beau  ft  du  siiolhuc'),  ti"an>lated  In- 
I'aycr  Imhoft".  In  1823  a  second  translation  by  M.  Kcratry 
was  ])i-erededi  by  a  long  inti'odurtory  connnentary.  I'-X'.)):c): 
f/iilosopJuijuc  di's  lOasia'  'rat:,  '/is  siir  Ic  srnfi/hwiif  dii  sUidijKC  ct 
du  beau  i!c  Kaid.     In  the  same  year  M.  Wcyland  published 


IX  The  PJiilosopliy  of  France  117 

another  trrinslation  under  the  title  Essai  siir  Ic  sentiment  dit 
[>:au  ct  du  sublinie  ;  and  in  1S46  Professor  Jules  Barni  pub- 
lished Critique  du  Ju^'eincnt,  suivie  d'un  Essai  sur  le  Beau, 
with  a  brief  introduction. 

6.  Szjiss  zuritcrs  J    Topffer  to  Cherbulicz 

At  this  stage  in  the  evolution  of  French  yEsthetic  four 
Swiss  writers  should  be  referred  to.  They  are  all  interest- 
ing in  diticrent  ways — Topffer,  Pictet,  Amiel,  and  \'inet. 

Rodolphe  Topfter,  a  philosophic  litterateur,  was  born  in 
Geneva  in  1790,  and  died  there  in  1846.  Plis  work  on 
/Esthetic  was  published  posthumously  in  184S,  with  a  short 
biographical  notice.  Topfter  was  a  sentimental  thinker, 
and  somewhat  fantastic,  deficient  in  logical  precision  ;  but 
his  book  is  full  of  insight  and  suggestiveness.  It  is  called 
Rcjiexions  et  Menus -Propos  d'un  Peintre  Genevois  —  ou 
Essai  sur  le  Beau  dans  les  arts.  Topfter  wages  war  against 
the  doctrine  that  imitation  of  nature  is  the  artist's  sole 
mission.  If  imitation  were  the  end  of  art,  then  the  highest 
end  art  could  attain  would  be  the  "  trompe  Tajil."  This 
logical  deduction,  v.hich  carries  absurdity  with  it,  shows 
the  falsity  of  the  principle.  The  slightest  sketch  of  a  clever 
painter  may  possess  more  artistic  merit  than  any  "trompe 
I'ceil."  A  Claude  Lorrain  is  worth  all  the  dioramas  and 
panoramas  in  the  world.  The  true  artist  must  trcmsform, 
not  imitate.  From  this  Topfter  proceeds  to  lay  down  certain 
laws  of  Art.  He  passes  from  design,  colour,  etc.,  and  asks 
to  what  all  these  must  tend  ?  what  must  be  the  aini  of  the 
artist  ?      "  Ce  but,'"  he  replies,  "  c'est  le  beau.'' 

"The  Beauty  of  Art  proceeds  absolutely  and  solely  from 
human  thought,  freed  from  every  fetter,  save  that  of  mani- 
festing itself  by  the  representation  of  natural  objects  " 
(Book  vi.  chap.  ^d).  He  then  discusses  the  theistic  side 
of  Beauty,  as  St.  Augustine,  Pere  Andre,  and  others  had 
done.  Beauty  proceeds  from  our  thought,  but  it  is  im- 
planted in  us  by  the  Infinite,  in  whom  all  Beauty  resides. 
Further,  he  says,  God  is  beauty,  and  ideas  of  beauty  in  us 
are   divine   attributes    there.      Topffer  held  that   beauty   in 


ii8  TJie  Philosophy  of  tJie  Bcaiitlf III  chap. 

art  was  wholly  different  from  beauty  in  nature,  being  inde- 
pendent and  superior.  The  beauty  we  conceive  is  absolute 
beauty.  This  being  admitted,  Art  has  two  things  it  must 
do.  It  must  conceive  the  Ijcautiful,  and  embody  it.  To 
conceive  it,  one  must  be  endowed  with  the  faculty  for 
it,  must  clear  the  mind  of  prejudice,  give  free  play  to 
thought,  and  resti'ain  the  critical  instinct.  'J'hen,  from 
the  union  of  the  creative  genius  which  conceives,  with  the 
talent  which  executes,  art  will  arise  in  its  most  perfect  form. 
Topffcr  at  the  same  time  affirms  that  the  hand  of  man 
will  never  raise  the  veil  from  behind  which  the  "generating 
principle  "  of  the  Ueautiful  radiates  ;  and  in  reference  to  this, 
mystery  is  better  than  knowledge,  and  search  more  fruitful 
than  possession.  lie  affirms  that  the  Beautiful — which  is 
the  splendour  of  the  True — is  the  absolute  essence  of  God. 

Adolphc  Pictet,  born  in  Geneva  in  1799,  was  a  soldier 
as  well  as  a  litterateur.  He  devoted  himself  chictly  to  the 
study  of  language  and  of  art. 

In  his  Dii  Bcaif,  da?is  la  Nature,  P  Art  ct  la  Poesie  (i  856) 
he  takes  exception  to  the  term  ;csthetics  as  limited  in 
meaning''^  preferring  the  phrase  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful. 
What  alone  interests  us,  he  says,  is  to  know  what  is  beauti- 
ful in  itself,  and  what  are  the  laws  of  its  develo])ment  in 
Art  and  Nature.  Without  concerning  himself  with  delini- 
tions  or  philoso])hical  authorities,  Pictet  tries  to  read  tlie 
book  of  Nature  which  lies  open,  and  that  other  book. 
Humanity,  of  which  we  are  both  authors  and  readers;  the 
great  diffci'cnce  between  these  t\\'o  books  Ijcing  that 
whereas  one  —  Nature--has  remained  unchanged  from  tlu; 
beginning  of 'I'iuic,  tlie  other-  1  lumanil)-  -  has  added,  from 
century  to  century,  new  ideas  and  new  expressions.  The 
one  presents  itself  as  an  invariable  manifestation  of  invari- 
able principles  ;  the  other  as  the  "  re\"elation  reflechie,'"' 
"  comme  la  libre  creation  d'un  pouvoir  ([ui  se  sent,  ciui  se 
posst'de,  et  t|ui  se  develo])pe  ])ar  le  ])rogres."  These  two 
])0()!<s  caimol  be  considered  indcpenilenth'  of  each  other. 
Still,  llunianity  is  the  more  recent  document;  and  there- 
fore we  nnist  first  read  the  Ijook  of  Nature,  and  then  in 
our    search    for    the    beautiful    we    nuist    find    our    ])()int    of 


IX  TJlc  PhilosopJiy  of  France  119 

departure  in  its  simplest  and  most  elementary  form. 
Pictet  considers  both  the  subjective  and  objective  theories 
of  ]5eauty  as  defective,  but  he  would  unite  them  from  a 
higher  point  of  view,  rather  than  sacrifice  the  one  to  the 
other.  He  dismisses  the  doctrine  of  utility.  On  that 
theory  the  interior  parts  of  all  organised  structures  would 
be  as  beautiful  as  the  exterior  ;  and  to  prove  how  little  the 
idea  of  Beauty  is  allied  to  that  of  utility,  causalit}',  and 
'' convenance,''"  or  the  relation  of  means  to  ends,  he  says 
that  our  cesthetic  sense  is  shocked  by  some  organisms  which, 
from  a  utilitarian  point  of  view,  are  nevertheless  admirable. 
Beauty,  then,  before  all  things  '-vent  paraitre,  se  montrer, 
briller,  eire  vu ''' ;   it  is  essentially  phenomenon. 

Pictet  contests  the  notion  that  the  beauty  of  animals 
serves  any  purpose  to  the  animal  world.  //  is,  he  says, 
for  man  iliat  ilicir  beauty  exists.  For  man  alone  beauty 
manifests  itself  in  external  nature.  His  recognition  of  it.  is 
allied  to  a  power  of  reproducing  it,  and  thus  a  world  arises, 
of  which  l^eauty  is  the  unique  element.      This  world  is  A7-t. 

But  how  does  the  idea  manifest  itself  in  the  phenomena 
of  natural  beauty?  If  it  lies  in  the  manifestation  of  the 
idea  in  some  perceptible  form,  "  il  faut  ensuite  que  cette 
forme  n'exprime  absolumcnt  autre  chose  que  la  simple 
presence  de  I'idce,  sans  aucun  accessoire  de  causalite  finale." 
Complete  fusion  between  the  idea  and  the  form  is  required, 
or  the  highest  beauty  is  not  attained.  When  the  harmony 
is  incomplete,  we  have  lesser  degrees  of  beauty.  Plants, 
for  example,  do  not  fulfil  the  highest  idea  of  beauty, 
nor  do  the  lower  animals  ;  but  when  the  soul  shows  itself 
through  a  form,  and  renders  that  form  in  some  sort  trans 
parent,  then  it  is  that  the  idea  is  triumphant,  and  beauty 
appears  in  its  glory.  Thus  Beauty  is  a  manifestation,  "  im- 
mediate et  libre,"  of  the  divine  idea,  revealing  itself  in 
"  formes  sensil:iles."'  Its  source  is  above  Nature.  It  belongs 
essentially  to  the  ideal  world  ;  and,  if  Nature  contains  it,  she 
does  wot  possess  it.  It  has  no  direct  relation  to  the  material 
world.  It  is  to  man  that  it  appeals,  its  true  mission  being 
to  rouse  our  asthetic  faculties,  and  thus  Ijecome  the  founda- 
tion of  a  new  world  of  ideal  creation.     Beautv,  in  itself  is  a 


I20  Tlic  Pinlosophy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

primordial  idea,  of  which  natural  beauty  is  a  partial  reflection. 
To  demand  a  reason  for  the  existence  of  that  idea  is  to  seek 
a  condition  for  that  which  is  unconditioned  and  absolute. 

The  primary  condition  of  our  discernment  of  the  Beautiful 
is  a  perception  of  the  object  endov,"ed  with  beauty.  Si;^ht 
and  hearing  alone  put  us  in  "rapport'"  with  the  beautiful. 
These  are  our  most  intellectual  senses.  The  impression 
of  the  beautiful  throuL;'h  them  is  accompanied  with  p]e;isurc. 
not  because  our  senses  are  satishcd,  but  because  our  inward 
being-  is  penetrated.  A  characteristic  of  all  asthetic  fecliuLr 
is  that  it  remains  free  of  personal  intere-t  in  every  foi'm. 
The  beautiful  pleases  us,  not  because  it  appeals  to  our  sen- 
suous nature,  nor  because  it  is  useful  or  moral,  nor  everi 
because  it  is  true,  but  simply  because  it  is  in  itself  bcai'Jfui. 
It  is  at  last  delined  as  the  immediate  intuitive  revelation 
of  an  invisible  principle,  and  Pictet  concludes  by  laying 
stress  on  the  universality  of  the  idea.  "  Emanating,''  he  says, 
"as  a  pure  ray  from  the  supreme  Intelligence,  this  idea 
reveals  itself  in  Xature  ;  thence  reflected  by  Art,  It  shines 
under  a  thousand  different  forms  in  the  heart  of  hunianity." 

Henri -Frederic  Amiel  (1821-18S1)  caught  inspiratior, 
as  a  youth  from  the  lectures  of  M.  Pictet  at  Geneva  in 
1S40,  and  two  years  later,  after  spending  a  year  in  Italy 
and  Sicily,  he  made  his  first  contribution  to  literature  bv 
sending"  three  articles  on  ]\I.  Rio's  book,  L'Art  Chretien,  to 
the  Bibliothequc  Uiiifcyselle  de  Ge>ieve.  After  sexxral  years 
of  study  in  Germany,  he  was  appointed  in  1S49  Professor 
of  .Esthetics  in  Gene\a,  which  four  years  later  he  exchanged 
for  the  chair  of  ^Mental  and  Moral  Philosophy.  Amiel  was 
an  idealist  and  a  mystic  of  the  Alexandrian  type.  "  There  is 
no  repose  except  in  the  absolute,  the  infinite,  and  the  divine.'' 
"  What  I  desire  is  the  sum  of  all  desires,  what  I  seek  to  know- 
is  the  sum  of  all  kinds  of  knowledge."'  The  real  disgusted 
and  even  tcrrilled  hin-i,  but  he  could  not  find  the  ideal. 
Hence  the  sad  undertones  of  his  foioiial  Intime.  in  which 
w-e  lia\-c  ;i  ])roIonged  introsiiccti\-e  anah'sis  of  the  inner  life. 

There  arc  some  passages  in  the  Jour/uil  hitiiiie  v.hirh 
arc  pro])a'oly  more  relevant  to  the  subject  of  IScauty  th.an 
all   his   lectures   on   /P^stheiics,  r.;-.    December   26,    1S52  — 


IX  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  121 

"  Look  twice,  if  you  want  a  just  conception  ;  look  once,  if 
wliat  you  want  is  a  sense  of  beauty."  April  3,  1865 — '-To 
the  materialist  philosopher  the  beautiful  is  a  mere  accident, 
and  therefore  rare.  To  the  spiritualist  philosopher  the 
beautiful  is  the  rule,  the  law,  the  universal  foundation  of 
tiiiuffs,  to  which  every  form  returns,  as  soon  as  the  force  of 
accident  is  withdrawn.  \Miy  are  we  ugly  ?  Because  we  are 
evil,  morose,  and  unhappy.  Heroism,  ecstasy,  love,  en- 
thusiasm, wear  a  halo  round  the  brow,  for  they  are  a  setting 
iVee  of  the  soul,  which  through  them  gains  force  to  make 
its  envelope  transparent,  and  shine  through  upon  all  around 
it.  Beauty  is  thus  a  phenomenon  belonging  to  the  spiritual- 
isation  of  matter.  It  is  a  momentary  transfiguration  of  the 
privileged  object,  to  remind  us  of  the  ideal.  To  study  it  is  to 
I'latonise  almost  inevitably.  As  a  powerful  electric  current 
can  render  metals  luminous,  and  reveal  their  essence  by 
the  colour  of  their  flame,  so  intense  life  and  supreme  joy 
can  make  the  most  simple  mortal  dazzlingdy  beautiful.  .  .  . 
The  ideal  is,  after  all,  truer  than  the  real  ;  for  the  ideal  is  the 
eternal  element  in  perishable  things,  it  is  their  type,  their 
sum,  their  raison  d'etre,  and  the  most  exact  and  the  most 
condensed  expression  of  them."  April  9,  186S — ••  1  have 
Ijeen  spending  three  hours  over  Lotze"s  GeschicJite  der 
Aesthetik  in  Deiitscldaiid.  It  begins  attracti\'ely,  but  the 
attraction  wanes,  and  by  the  end  I  was  very  tired  of  it. 
Why  ?  Because  the  noise  of  a  mill-wheel  sends  one  to 
sleep,  and  these  pages  without  paragraphs,  these  inter- 
minable chapters  and  their  incessant  dialectical  clatter, 
affect  me  as  though  I  were  listening  to  a  windmill.  I  end 
by  yawning,  like  any  simple  non-philosophical  mortal,  in 
the  face  of  all  this  heaviness  and  pedantry.  .  .  .  Do  these 
pedantic  books  leave  a  single  image  or  formula,  a  single 
view  or  striking  fact  behind  them  in  the  memory,  when  one 
puts  them  down  ?  Xo  ;  nothing  but  confusion  and  fatigue. 
Oh  for  clearness,  terseness,  brevity.  .  -  .  The  Germans 
gather  fuel  for  the  pile  ;   it  is  the  French  who  kindle  it." 

A  somewhat  popular  Swiss  Vvriter,  Alexandre  Vinet  ( i  797- 
I  847),  has  some  suggestive  remarks  on  the  feeling  for  Nature 
being  peculiar  to  certain  epochs.      .\\\  age  that  is  artificially 


122  The  Philosophy  of  t/ic  Beautiful  chap. 

civilised  turns  from  itself  to  Xature,  but  it  is  "only  the 
social  man  v.ho  is  in  a  condition  to  feel  Xature.  .  .  .  The 
more  v/e  have  cultivated  social  intercourse,  and  suftered 
from  it,  the  more  rich  and  profound  Xature  becomes.  .  .  . 
All  its  parts  are  mysteriou-iy  allied  to  our  inner  being. 
This  unity  and  universal  harmony  is  instinctively  revealed 
to  all  minds."  He  adds  that  "at  a  certain  depth  the  good 
and  th.e  beautiful  are  one.''  \'inet's  remarks  on  Poetry  and 
Philosophy  are  excellent.  "  Once  arrived  in  the  region  ol 
science,  oppres-ed  beneath  the  whole  burden  of  acquired 
knowledge,  but  having  always  the  same  need  of  air  ar.d 
space,  the  human  mind  seeks  brjth  in  another  region,  that 
of  metaphysical  speculation.  If  poetry  \\"as  the  philosoph.y 
of  early  ages,  pldlo-nphy  is  perhaps  the  poetry  of  our  era  : 
it  is  a  new  method  of  recovering  liberty."  ' 

The  earliest  v/ork  of  C.  Y.  Cherbuliez,  novelist,  and  after- 
wards one  of  the  \vriter5  in  the  Rcz'uc  lics  Deux  Mouics.  v/as 
A  firopos  d'un  c/icz'al,  Causcries  atJu'iiioDies  (Gene\"e,  i  S6o}. 
It  is  an  animated  discussion,  in  the  form  of  a  tale,  on  one  of 
the  metopes  of  the  Parthenon,  in  which  an  attempt  is  made 
to  discover  where  the  unique  power  and  beauty  of  this 
work  of  Phidias  lies.  The  horse,  carved  in  marljle,  seems 
endowed  with  life  ;  and  every  one  who  sees  it  adniires  it  rather 
as  a  v.'ork  of  nature  than  of  art.  Hov/  then  lias  the  artist 
robbed  Xature  of  her  inmost  secrets,  and  been  able  to 
produce  an  illusion  which  affects  even  the  coldest  and  most 
critical?  The  various  individuals  —  the  doctor,  the  abbe', 
and  the  chevalier — advance  diff-rent  thenrivs. 

The  first  theory  is  that  I'hiclias  selected  points  of  beauty 
.from  the  race  of  horses,  which  he  united  to  firm  a  whole, 
more  beautiful  than  any  one  horse  that  ever  existed.  The 
second  theory  —  the  abbe's  —  is  that  Phidias,  the  divine 
sculptor,  knew  by  intuition  th.at  in  art,  as  in  nature,  all 
parts  must  be  connected.  'I'he  In.finite  is  the  supreme 
logician,  atid  tire  artist  u.-ed  this  logic  as  Prometheus  stole 
tire  fi-um  heaven.  Xothing  can  be  beautiful  that  is  n.ot 
indi\-idual  :   the  form  of  a  tlnng   is  its  limit.      Through  its 

'  < 'f.  /;■  :  rit  J  AltX'inJrc  ViU'-t,  Pc>!:l'-:s  ci  K\'_,:txions,  ttc,  jar  J.  F. 
Asiic,   i36i'. 


IX  The  Philosophy  of  f  ranee  123 

limits  it  must  manifest  itself;  its  soul  must  penetrate 
through  its  body.  In  this  Phidian  sculptured  horse  there 
is  something  human,  and  more  than  human  ;  and  in  the 
contemplation  of  it,  some  of  that  force  and  beauty  is 
communicated  to  us.  Insignificant  as  we  are,  we  are  bound 
to  admire  and  to  say,  "  Tu  es  la  force  cjui  se  connait  et  se 
posscde,  tu  es  la  beaute  qui  jouit  d'elles  mcmcs,  tu  cs  ce 
qu'il  y  a  de  meilleur  et  de  jalus  precieux  dans  I'humanite." 

This  is  disputed  by  the  chevalier,  who  proposes  to  demon- 
strate that,  the  beautiful  steed  is  a  natural  phenomenon. 


7.  Lcveqiie  to  Tliore 

The  next  important  work,  and  one  of  the  most  significant 
in  the  history  of  French  esthetique,  is  Levcque's  La  Science 
du  Beau,  published  in  1862.  Its  original  form  was  that  of  a 
prize  essay  on  the  subject,  prcscril^ed  by  the  French  Academy 
of  Moral  and  Political  Sciences.  It  was  afterwards  expanded 
into  a  treatise  in  two  volunies,  extending  to  1000  pages. 

The  ground  -  plan  of  the  book  was  prearranged  for 
Levcque  by  the  terms  laid  down  for  competition  ;  and 
both  the  essay  and  the  treatise  are  admirably  arranged. 
The  eftect  of  the  appreciation  of  the  beautiful  on  human 
nature,  not  only  on  the  intellect  and  feelings,  but  also  on  the 
practical  tendencies  of  the  race,  is  first  discussed.  The 
essential  nature  of  Beauty  is  next  considered  ;  whether  it  is 
an  ultimate  fact  in  the  universe,  and  if  so,  what  it  is  in 
itself.  Then  the  outcome  of  Beauty  in  Nature,  both 
organic  and  inorganic,  is  dealt  with  ;  and  lastly  the  appli- 
cation of  Beauty  in  the  various  Arts  is  examined.  The 
historical  excursus  —  dealing  with  previous  theory  from 
Plato  to  Hegel — is  excellent,  although  the  a.utlior  at  times 
applies  his  a.  friori  views  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
history,  which  detracts  from  his  impartiality. 

Leveque  caught  the  spirit  of  Schelling  and  Hegel,  as 
well  as  of  Goethe  and  Schiller,  and  of  his  own  master 
Jouffroy.  This  is  seen  in  his  recognition  of  Beauty  as  the 
expression  or  manifestation  of  something  invisible  behind 


124  The  J^JiilosopJiy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

Nature,  —  a  force,  or  spirit,  thus  adumbrated  to  us. 
Whether  in  the  reahn  of  the  organic  or  of  the  inorganic,  ah 
outward  Beauty  is  the  expression  of  an  immaterial  ]:)rinciple 
behind  it.  Take  some  of  its  manifestations.  The  hnv  of 
gravitation,  for  example,  is  the  disclosure  of  an  immaterial 
force  in  the  material  world.  If  we  select  a  vital  product  of 
Nature,  such  as  a  flower,  all  its  phases — colour,  grace  of 
form,  unity  in  variety — manifest  to  us  the  workings  of  an 
unseen  power  which  is  making  for  order.  In  every  realm. 
it  is  the  same.  We  discern  in  Beauty  the  outcome  of  an 
ordered  energy,  which — consciously  or  unconsciously,  or 
both  together — is  working  towards  completion. 

In  the  fourth  section  of  the  Treatise  there  are  many 
happy  bits  of  criticism.  He  acutely  shows  how  the  beaut)- 
of  Architecture,  for  examjjle,  is  the  ex[)res3ion  of  latent 
ideas.  Its  primary  aim  v.-as  not  use,  or  convenience,  or  fit- 
ness for  anything.  It  was  meant  to  express  thought.  Take  a 
church,  or  a  temple,  a  palace,  a  chateau,  a  villa,  a  theatre,  a 
cloister,  a  bridge,  or  a  tomb, — they  all  express,  and  were 
meant  to  express,  something  beyond  the  material  structure 
that  is  raised.  Levcque  is  a  consistent  intellectualist  through- 
out.     In  his  classification  of  the  Arts  he  follows  Ilegel. 

When  we  reach  the  work  of  M.  Taine,  who  was  Professor 
of  ^Esthetics  and  of  the  History  of  Art  in  the  I-Zcole  des 
Beaux-Arts  in  Paris,  we  find  an  interpretation  of  the  lieauti- 
ful  in  marked  contrast  to  that  of  Levcque.  Taine  has  added 
to  our  ever-accumulating  criticism  a  somewhat  remarkable 
work  on  the  literature  of  hhigland  ;  and  both  in  that  worl-:. 
and  in  his  icsthetic,  he  has  applied  the  method  and  the  prin- 
ci])les  of  Comte  to  his  study  of  the  suliject.  The  lecture-, 
(jn  aesthetics,  v,-hich  form  his  little  book  on  the  Philosophy 
of  Art,  were  delivered  to  the  students  in  the  winter  of 
I  864.  It  is  his  aim  to  explain  the  evolution  of  art  by  social, 
racial,  and  climatic  causes;  his  sole  purpose  "being  to 
mark  the  characteristics,  and  to  seek  the  causes  '" — that  is 
to  say.  the  phenomenal  antecedents — of  this  or  that  particu- 
lai-  a>pect  which  tlie  I'eauliful  has  for  a  time  assumed. 
His  work  is  not  only  a  meagre  and  surface  one,  but  it 
contains  a  misreading  of  history.      When  he  is  not  stating 


IX  TJic  Philosophy  of  France  125 

commonplaces,  he  is  off  the  Hne  of  philosophic  construction. 
It  is  sm-ely  no  L^reat  discovery  for  a  savant  to  make,  that  a 
work  of  Art  is  not  an  isolated  product  ;  and  to  affirm  that 
we  must  study  what  gave  rise  to  it — the  intellectual  and 
social  conditions  of  its  age — before  we  can  understand  it,  is 
to  state  a  proposition  which  nobody  can  deny.  Every  one 
knows  that  the  artist  is  one  of  a  group  gi'eater  than  himself, 
and  that  all  artists  are  in  part  created  by  their  time. 

]\I.  Taine  writes  "as  one  having  authority";  but  his 
walk,  his  intellectual  gait,  is  just  a  trifle  too  majestic. 
His  essays  are  all  in  the  grand  manner,  and  they  often  end 
in  platitude.  But  he  begins  his  discussion  —  as  every 
evolutionist  is  scientifically  bound  to  begin — with  the  pro- 
mise of  great  catholicity.  He  avows  his  sympathy  with 
e\xry  form  of  Art,  and  with  every  school,  as  each  and  all 
'phases  of  human  activity  ;  and  therefore  the  more  numer- 
ous they  are,  the  richer  the  tribute  they  ofter  to  us,  nay,  the 
more  contradictory  they  are,  the  fuller  the  witness  they 
l^ear  to  the  wealth  of  human  nature.  But  this  delightful 
;esthetic  preamble  ends  in  a  mere  catalogue  of  theories,  a 
series  of  dead  phenomenal  facts  strung  on  a  thread  of  a 
positivist  chronicle.  Taine  says  :  "/Esthetic  science  is  like 
Botany,  in  which  the  orange,  the  laurel,  the  pine,  and  the 
birch  are  of  equal  interest.  It  is  a  kind  of  iDotanical 
method  applied,  not  to  plants,  but  to  the  works  of  man." 
(jood  ;  but  we  want  the  miscellaneous  assortment  of  facts,  not 
merely  inventoried  for  us,  and  even  scientifically  catalogued, 
but  also  iftfej'p/rfcd,  and  this  AI.  Taine  does  not  attempt. 
Walt-Whitman-like,  he  contents  himself  with  a  mere  list,  of 
which  it  may  with  truth  be  said  that  there  is  no  reason  why 
it  should  begin  at  any  particular  place,  or  end  at  any  other, 
or  \\hy,  having  once  begun,  it  should  not  go  on  for  ever. 

Taine  falls  back,  of  necessity,  on  Imitation  as  the  object 
of  Art,  though  the  imitation  is  not  to  be  "  exact."  We 
must  closely  imitate  some  things,  but  not  everything  in 
Nature.  The  Artist  has  to  select,  and  to  reproduce,  the 
relationships  of  parts,  each  to  each  ;  and  he  has  to  reproduce 
objects,  so  as  to  re-embody  their  essential  characteristics. 
But  in  making  the  concession  that  "it   is  the  object   of  all 


126  The  Philosophy  of  tlie  Beautiful  chap. 

Art  to  manifest  some  essential  character,  and''  —  with 
that  end  in  \ie\v — '-to  make  use  of  a  group  of  associated 
parts,  the  relationship  of  which  the  artist  combines  and 
modifies''  (I^t.  I.  ch.  vi.),  Taine  really  abandons  his  original 
theory.  '-The  end  of  a  work  of  Art,''  he  elsewhere  says. 
"  is  to  manifest  some  uliimate  characteristic,  and  therefore 
some  idea,  niore  clearly  than  real  objects  do.''  .So  far  well 
liut  in  conceding  this  principle  of  idealism,  it  is  to  be  note! 
that  Taine  entirely  ignores  feeling,  as  a  cause  co-operating 
with  thought,  in  the  jn'oduction  of  a  work  of  Art.  He  recog- 
nises intellectual  causes  only;  while  his  positivist  metliod*'!' 
reading  HisKn-y  allows  liim  to  take  ncjte  only  of  antecedents 
and  sequents.  He  therefore  chronicles  the  wai'ifjtis  elenients 
that  co-operated  in  tlie  age  of  Pericles  to  make  (Ireek  art  srt 
brilliant,  and  those  at  the  modern  renaissance  which  made  the 
Fhjrentine  school  so  great  ;  but  as  to  the  creative  force,  the 
vital  formative  power  lying'  latent  in  these  two  periods,  and 
efilorescing  in  them, — tlie  power  which  rises  toward  the  ideal, 
and  approximately  touches  it, — of  that  he  knows  nothing. 

Perhaps  the  best  recent  study  of  P^nglish  .-p'sthetics 
by  a  I'""rench  writer  is  J.  ]\Iilsand's  critical  examination  of 
Ruskin  —  LcstJi'tiqiic  anfuiise^  I'tudc  sur  M.  fului  Ruskui. 
par  J.  Milsand  (1S64).  it  is  for  the  most  part  drawn  from 
two  articles  which  he  had  previously  contriljuted,  in  iS6c 
and  I  861,  to  the  Rt7'uc  dcs  Deux  Mo/nics.  ]\I.  Milsand  cow- 
siders  Ruskin's  theories  and  a]ipreciations  typical!}'  J-hiL^lish. 
They  reiiect  at  once  the  excellences  and  the  defects  of  the 
natiimal  character.  Sprin;_;ing  from  ProtCr^tant  tradiiio:;. 
religion,  conx'iction,  and  intense  lo\'e  of  nature,  they  preterit 
a  remarkable  mixture  of  imagination  and  realisni.  a  uninn 
in  which  much  sentinient  predoniinates  o\'er  cdear  iritelli- 
gence.  Ru.skin's  ideas  are  as  remote  as  the  anti]:)odes  from 
French  thought.  At  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
France  broki;  \\'ith  tradition — a  re\'oltuion  sliarcd  by  al! 
]-2uro['je.  ]*LnL;iand  alone  resented  this  uphea\'al  and  con- 
tented her.-elf  with  gradual  reform.  True,  certain  spirits  in 
]:LngIaiidi  took  tirm.^  in  the  cause  of  rex'olution.  ]'hi,L;lan(l 
works  by  eNolution.  ]''rance  by  revolution.  Phigland  was 
slow  to  perceive  that   the   new  >pirit   of  the   a^e  was  a  life. 


IX  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  127 

and  a  creative  force  ;  and  it  was  long  before  she  trans- 
formed this  force  into  a  doctrine.  England  remains  true  to 
her  Protestant  traditions.  English  aesthetics  arc  an  exami- 
nation of  the  conscience,  a  moral  practice.  Tlie  most 
impassioned  expounder  of  this  artistic  movement  is  Ruskin. 
A  great  painter  in  words,  a  jjoet  in  descriptive  power  and 
enthusiasm,  his  thoughts  arc  often  hallucinations,  even 
contradictions.  He  confounds  the  beautiful  and  the  real. 
i)y  his  antipathy  to  the  subjective  theory,  he  makes  Beauty 
consist  of  a  pure  idea ;  every  kind  of  Beauty  is  but  a 
reflexion  of  the  Divine  Perfection.  Launched  into  this 
Platonism,  his  imagination  becomes  intoxicated.  What 
Ruskin  has  done  is  to  present  us  with  the  ethics  of  Art. 
Now  the  French  make  knowledge  the  principle  of  good,  and 
ignorance  the  principle  of  evil,  because  they  have  lost  the 
instinct  of  unity.  They  have  tried  to  find  by  sheer  clever- 
ness the  knack  of  putting  into  artistic  Avork  a  dignity,  an 
emotion,  and  beauty  that  is  not  in  them.  Ruskin  has  taught 
us  that  the  secret  either  of  triumpli  or  of  defeat  lies  in  tJie 
moral  being,  in  the  good  or  the  evil  that  lives  in  the  depth 
of  the  heart  ;  and  he  has  put  his  finger  on  the  true  principle 
of  all  genius  and  power.  "  Be  ?»Iussulman,  Ijc  Christian," 
he  says,  "  but  believe  in  something  outside  of  yourself'' 

Tlieophile  Thore  (i  807-1 869),  a  distinguished  French 
pulilicist  and  critic,  has  written  many  articles  on  Beauty 
and  the  Arts,  in  the  Artiste,  the  Siccte,  and  the  Constitu- 
tionrcl.  He  was  the  editor  of  IJArt  Modcnic,  and  wrote 
critical  notices  of  the  French  Salons  from  1844  to  1847. 
He  wrote  also  under  the  noni-de-pluric  of  W.  Biirger.^  In 
the  Salo/i  of  1847  he  wrote  :  "  Nature  is  the  supreme  artist, 
who,  in  her  universal  gallery,  offers  to  a  favoured  few  the 
principles  of  all  proportion  ;  the  oljject  is  to  develop  some 
sort  of  individuality,  a  second  creation,  with  its  own  distinct 
and  original  signification.  Btit  Art  is  the  human  interpreta- 
tion of  Nature.  The  more  the  artist  has  transformed 
external   reality,  the   more  of  himself  he   has   put   into   his 

■'  Salons  de  T.  T/ion^,  1844,  1845,  1846,  1847,  1848,  avcc  ti?ic 
friface  par  IV.  Burger  (1868).  SaLms  de  IV.  DUrrr,  1861  a  t868, 
ir.ee  mie pri!face par  T.  Tliori  (2  vols.  1870). 


128  TJic  PJiilosophy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chak 

work,  tlie  ncai'er  has  he  approached  to  the  ideaL''  A  work 
written  by  M.  Thore  in  1857,  Xoii7'cUcs  Teiulnnccs  dc  I'Art, 
contains  a  review  of  the  progress  of  the  Arts  from  the  days 
of  Phidias  onwards.  He  complained  that  most  of  it  had 
been  too  symbohc,  till  we  come  down  to  the  Dtitch  school  in 
the  sixteenth  century,  and  to  the  French  in  the  seventeenth  ; 
and  he  held  that  the  worship  of  the  past,  of  classic  models 
precedents  and  attainments,  was  fatal  to  the  rise  of  new  Art. 
It  is  only  when  it  breaks  through  the  fetters  of  the  past, 
and  defies  precedent,  that  Art  is  truly  great.  Why,  he  asks, 
should  we  not,  or  at  least  should  the  future  not,  excel  Raphael 
and  Angelo,  as  they  excelled  the  Greeks  ?  It  Ciin  be  done,  if 
we  give  up  the  imitation  of  classic  types,  and  create  afresh. 

In  his  Gfivmiiairc  dc.-:  A?-fs  dii  Dcssin  (1867),  Charles 
Blanc,  member  of  the  French  Institute,  discusses  Archi- 
tecture, Sculpture,  and  Painting,  as  well  as  engraving  of 
ail  sorts.  (In  an  earlier  work — which  he  undertook  in 
1849.  ;dong  with  M.  Arsene  Houssaye  and  M.  Thuophile 
'kautier — he  sketched  the  Hisfoifc  dcs  pcintrcs  de  ionics  Ics 
ccolcs.  It  begins  with  a  discussion  on  the  sublime  and  the 
beautiful.)  In  the  earliest  ages  Nature  may  have  presented 
the  spectacle  of  the  sublime,  but  not  of  the  beautiful.  The 
sublime  may  be  found  in  chaos,  or  in  the  horrible  ;  but 
beauty  rec[u;res  order,  proportion,  and  harmony.  The 
beautiful  is  always  human  ;  but  the  sublime  partakes  of  the 
divine  and  opens  before  us  a  vista  to  the  Infinite.  As  we 
have  an  innate  feeling  of  the  just,  we  bring  with  us  into 
tlie  world  an  intuition  of  the  beautiful,  which  is  the  ideal. 
To  learn  this  is  simply,  as  Plato  teaches,  to  recollect  it. 
■•  Apprendre — c'est  se  ressouvenir."' 

All  the  germs  of  beauty  are  in  Xatr.re,  but  it  is  the 
mind  of  man  alone  that  can  disengage  them.  That  Xaturv 
is  beautiful,  man  knows  ;  but  Nature  herself  does  not  !  Thus 
Peauty  exists  only  in  the  mind  of  man  ;  and  the  arti.-t  ^\■h(l 
under:-t,ands  the  beautiful  is  greater  than  Nature  which  shows 
it.  The  artist  jiui'ines  reality  from  the  accidents  thai  drs- 
fi-ure  il,  and  from  ilie  alio)  that  deba-^es  it.  He  ;v-finds  the 
idc'i,  which  his  art  intci-prets.  idealises,  and  transfigures. 
This  is   the   mission    of  the   artist — not  only   to  give   enjoy- 


IX  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  129 

ment  or  ornament  to  life,  but  to  reawake  in  us  the  ideal, 
to  reveal  to  us  the  Beauty  inherent  in  things,  to  discover 
the  imperishable  essence  ;  and  the  ideas  which  Nature 
presents  under  an  obscure  or  perplexed  form.  Art  makes 
plain.  Beauty  in  Nature  is  liable  to  destruction  ;  Art  raises 
itself  above  time  and  death.  Take,  for  instance,  the  Niobe. 
A  living  woman  passes  her  life  in  becoming  beautiful  and 
in  losing  beauty  ;  she  has  not  one  moment  of  perfect 
beauty,  but  the  artist  comes,  and  he  renders  an  invisible 
beauty  visible.  He  passes  over  all  that  is  not  essential  in 
time,  and  makes  the  essence  hve  for  ever. 

Speaking  of  the  sublime  in  architecture,  Blanc  says  it 
has  three  essentials — greatness  of  dimension,  simplicity  of 
surface,  and  continuity  of  line.  The  sacrifice  of  one  of  these 
three  dimensions  of  space,  however,  is  sometimes  an  element 
of  grandeur.  St.  Peter's  at  Rome,  for  example,  disappoints 
us,  because  there  is  a  too  perfect  concordance  of  the  three 
dimensions.  Its  height,  its  width,  and  its  depth  neutralise 
each  other.  Some  small  buildings  (especially  some  Gothic 
ones)  impress  one  more  than  this  vast  cathedral,  because, 
with  less  material,  they  appeal  more  to  the  mind.  They 
deceive  the  eye,  for  the  good  of  the  soul. 

Art  in  Sculpture,  he  says,  consists  in  raising  an  individual 
truth  to  the  height  of  the  type,  and  the  type  itself  to  beauty  ; 
seeking  in  real  life  for  the  features  of  the  ideal.  To  idealise 
a  lion,  for  instance,  the  sculptor  would  take  whatever  points 
were  common  to  all  lions,  and  were  characteristic  of  the  lion- 
nature,  such  as  majesty,  force,  ferocity.  He  defines  Painting 
as  the  art  of  expressing  the  conceptions  of  the  soul  through 
the  realities  of  nature  ;  representing  on  a  single  surface, 
unity,  form,  and  colour.  He  goes  minutely  into  the  means  of 
doing  this,  treating  of  the  laws  of  colour,  etc.,  with  elaborate 
descriptions  and  illustrations  of  many  world-famous  pictures. 

In  a  work  entitled  L'optique  et  les  Arts,  in  the  Bibliotheque 
de  Philosophie  Co7itemp07'aine  (i  869),  the  author,  M.  Auguste 
Laugel,  emphasises  the  principle  of  order  and  harmonious 
proportions,  not  in  opposition  to  the  views  of  Thore,  but  as 
a  supplement.  He  says:  "The  Beautiful  cannot  have  its 
origin  in  tumult,  in  the  echo  of  a  set  of  sounds  in  which  no 

K 


130  The  Pliilosophy  of  tJtc  Beautiful  chap. 

measure  or  harmony  can  ho.  discerned  ;  nor  can  it  be  found, 
amongst  the  plastic  arts,  in  a  miscellaneous  medley  of 
colours  and  of  lines.  The  ideas  which  the  arts  express 
must  be  made  intelligible  through  forms  and  figures,  light 
and  shade,  etc.  ...  If  there  is  no  common  measure,  if 
contrasts  are  not  managed  with  skill,  if  the  small  and  the 
large,  if  light  and  shade,  if  the  simple  and  the  rich  jostle 
with  each  other,  and  are  intermingled  without  judgment, 
and  without  rule,  all  pleasure  is  lost,  because  the  idea  and 
the  thought  which  underlie  the  material  envelope  do  not 
exist." 

8.    Veron,  Coster,   Vnttet,  etc. 

In  1878,  Eugene  Vcron,  publicist  and  journalist  in 
Paris,  who  edited  the  journal  L^A?-t,  published  UEstJu'tique. 
It  was  the  fourth  volume  of  the  BibliotJieque  dcs  Sciences 
Coutci/ipormnes.  He  had  previously  published  La  Mytlwlogie 
dans  I'Art  (1878),  and  has  since  written  Histoire  natiircUe 
dcs  Relioio>is  (1884)  and  La  Morale  (18S4). 

The  aim  of  his  work  will  be  seen  from  the  following 
sentence : — • 

"Art  is  nothing  but  a  natural  result  of  man's  organisation, 
wliich  is  of  sucli  a  nature  tliat  lie  derives  particular  jileasure  from 
certain  combinations  of  forms,  lines,  colours,  movements,  sounds, 
rhythms,  and  images  ;  but  these  combinations  only  give  him  plea- 
sure when  they  express  the  sentiments  of  tlic  soul,  struggling  willi 
the  accidents  of  life,  and  in  presence  of  natural  scenes." 

True  Art  is  not  imitation,  or  slavish  devotion  to  the  pre- 
cedents of  the  past,  nor  is  it  a  realistic  imitation  of  nature. 

"  Man  puis  sometliing  of  his  own  nature  into  everything  lie 
does.  ...  Tie  always  adds  something  not  actually  before  his  eyes 
which  comes  from  witliin  Inmself,  his  own  jiersonal  emotions  and 
impressions.  .  .  .  Of  tlie  tlu'ee  forms  of  Art — the  conventional, 
the  realistic,  and  the  jiersonal,  tlie  last  alone  deserves  the  name. 
.  .  .  The  essential  constituent  of  Art  is  the  personality  of  the 
artist.    .    .    .    The  source  of  all  poetry  is  the  soul  of  the  poet." 

With   the   exception   of  some  foolish   sneers  at   a  priori 


IX  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  Frcxnce  131 

theorists  —  and  at  Philosophy  and  ;Metaphysics  generally, 
e.g.  his  assertion  that  Plato's  idealism  is  "  refuted  by  its 
mere  recital " ! — there  is  mtich  that  is  excellent  in  this 
book,  In  a  chapter  on  the  origin  and  grouping  of  the  Arts, 
he  shows  that  Art  is  a  spontaneous  and  necessary  outcome 
of  human  activity  ;  and  he  arranges  the  several  arts,  as 
those  which  appeal  respectively  to  the  eye  and  to  the 
ear — Poetry,  ?vlusic,  and  Dancing  appealing  to  the  sense  of 
hearing  ;  while  Sculpture,  Painting,  and  Architecture  appeal 
to  the  sense  of  sight.  He  shows  that  the  primitive  Art  of 
prehistoric  times,  as  seen  in  drawings  on  the  walls  of  cave- 
dwellings,  was  not  merely  imitative.  Nevertheless  all  art  is 
essentially  subjective,  or  the  expression  of  man's  personality. 
.-Esthetic  pleasure  differs  from  the  pleasures  of  sense,  which 
are  self-centred  and  self-confined.  Art  extracts  admiration 
from  us,  because  the  personality  of  the  artist  shines  through 
it.      All  "aesthetic  pleasure  is  essentially  admiration.''" 

After  the  analysis  of  Taste  and  Genius,  W'ron  raises  the 
question.  What  is  Art  ?  the  art  that  is  born  with  man, 
and  is  found  in  nearly  all  his  thoughts  and  acts,  which  is 
natural  and  necessary  to  hinr,  and  which  rules  the  formation 
of  all  his  ideas  ?  In  answering  the  question,  he  first 
glances  at  the  historic  growth  and  development  of  the 
several  Arts.  In  the  oldest  Vedic  hymns  we  find  the 
natural,  the  spontaneous,  the  unsophisticated  outpourings 
of  emotion  before  the  forms  of  Xature.  They  are  con- 
strued as  living-  beings,  hostile  or  friendly  to  man.  To 
this  succeeded  self-conscious  art,  in  which  the  personality 
of  the  artist,  a  subjecti\e  element,  dominates  over  the 
objectivity  of  earlier  art.  Art  became  analytic,  after  its 
early  crude  synthesis.  He  deals  similarly  with  the  other 
arts  —  music,  sculpture,  painting,  and  architecture.  He 
affirms  that,  far  from  being  its  late  blossom,  or  only  the 
fruit  of  civilisation,  art  is  rather  its  germ.  It  arose  in  the 
search  for,  and  in  the  eftbrt  to  reach,  the  best  of  things. 
Art,  in  general,  is  the  manifestation  of  emotion,  which  is 
externally  construed  or  interpreted  by  form,  colour,  sound, 
etc.  ;  and  the  special  merit  of  any  work  of  Art  is  its 
power  of  manifesting  and  of  interpreting  emotion. 


132  The  PJiilosophy  of  the  Beaiitifid  chap. 

In  his  definition  of  yEsthetics,  \'eron  is  far  less  successful, 
his  anti-metaphysical  bias  incapacitating  him  for  the  task. 
Beauty  as  an  entity,  is  dismissed  at  once  into  the  limbo  of 
the  unintelligible.  Because  art  can  deal  with  the  horrible 
and  the  repulsive,  as  well  as  with  the  beautiful,  the  realisa- 
tion of  Beauty  is  not  the  aim  of  art.  Beauty  cannot  be 
the  result  of  perfection  because,  he  says.  Art  can  make 
us  enjoy  the  sight  of  objects  which  would  naturally  repel 
us  !  Veron  rejects  the  imitative  theory,  as  taught  by 
Aristotle,  Boileau,  and  Pascal.  On  that  theory.  Photo- 
graphy would  be  the  most  perfect  art,  and  if  we  could 
photograph  colour,  it  would  supersede  landscape  painting. 
Realistic  portraiture  may  be  all  in  all  to  the  historian,  Ijut 
the  Artist  desires  the  reproduction  of  life  and  movement. 
The  frescoes  in  the  Sistine  Chapel  are  not  realistic.  The 
beautiful  in  Art  is  always  due  to  the  intervention  of  the 
genius  of  the  artist,  who  throws  his  own  individuality  into 
his  work,  when  stirred  by  emotion.  He  creates  the  beauti- 
ful ;  and  the  object  and  aim  of  the  science  of  a'Sthetics  is 
the  study  of  this  outcome  of  artistic  genius. 

Art  is  either  decorative  or  expressive.  The  two  run 
together  ;  because  all  decorative  art  may  be  also  expressive, 
and  expressive  art  may  be  decorative.  Xevertheless  the  two 
are  broadly  contrasted.  Decorative  Art  is  addressed  to  the 
eye  and  the  ear.  and  it  achieves  its  result  by  certain  arrange- 
ments of  lines,  forms,  colours,  sounds,  rhythms,  movements, 
light  and  shade,  without  any  intervening  idea  or  sentiment. 
It  arises  out  of  the  desire  for  beauty,  and  in  beauty  it  rests. 
It  is  found  not  only  in  architecture,  sculpture,  and  jiuinting, 
but  also  in  music,  poetry,  rhetoric,  and  the  dance.  Express- 
iz'c  Art.  on  the  other  hand,  discloses  ideas  and  ser.timents. 
It  is  the  manifestation  of  thought  and  feeling",  by  forms  and 
attitudes,  by  colours,  sounds,  and  the  rhythm  of  language. 
Decorative  art  deals  with  and  reflects  the  beautiful. 
Expressive  art  deals  with  character,  purpose,  tendency. 
The  fornier  suited  the  ancient  world,  attaining  perfection 
amongst  the  Greeks  ;  but  it  does  not  suffice  for  the 
modern  world.  We  now  need  that  kind  of  Art  which 
expresses  character,  which  goes   beneath   appearances,  and 


IX  TJie  Philosophy  of  France  133 

discloses  to  us  the  personality  of  the  artist,  showing  the 
range  of  his  faculty  and  the  extent  of  his  insight. 

In  the  chapter  on  Style  the  aphorism  of  Buffon,  "  Le 
style  c'est  I'homme,"  is  endorsed,  so  far  as  it  is  the  style 
of  each,  or  his  characteristic  way  of  looking  on  Nature,  and 
reproducing  it,  that  differentiates  him  from  other  men.  It 
is  the  "reflection  of  the  artist's  personality."  Thore,  in  his 
Salon  of  1863,  agrees  with  the  teaching  of  V^ron  on  this 
subject  : — "  In  works  which  instruct  us,  the  authors  in  a 
way  substitute  themselves  for  nature."  It  is  always  the 
individuality  of  the  artist  that  produces  Art.  That  is  the 
key  to  V^ron's  book.  Then,  and  then  only,  have  we  (as 
Thore  put  it)  "I'art  pour  I'homme." 

But  the  pendulum  sways  incessantly  to  and  fro  between 
the  opposite  poles  of  philosophic  thought.  The  idealistic 
flood  succeeds  the  materialistic  ebb  with  the  constancy  of  the 
tides  and  the  seasons.  In  1 880,  two  years  after  Veron's  book 
appeared,  a  Belgian  writer,  Guillaume  Herbert  de  Coster, 
issued  one,  which  he  called  Elements  de  V Estlietique gencrale ; 
and  three  years  later,  P.  Vallet  published  his  L!Idec  du 
Bean,  dans  la  philosophie  de  Saint  Thomas  d' Aqui7i. 

According  to  M.  de  Coster,  the  science  of  ^Esthetics  must 
not  be  confounded  with  the  history  of  Art,  nor  even  with 
the  power  of  discriminating  between  the  art  of  different 
masters,  races,  or  epochs.  It  is  easy  to  see,  for  instance, 
the  difference  between  a  Greek  and  a  Gothic  statue.  Each 
is  equally  beautiful,  if  the  aim  of  the  artist  be  remembered  ; 
the  ideal  of  the  Greek  being  the  perfection  of  the  body, 
that  of  the  Gothic  the  perfection  of  spirit.  But  to  recognise 
this  even  is  not  the  science  of  yfLSthetics.  "  Pour  nous, 
I'esthetique  est  et  ne  peut  etre  que  la  philosophic  de  I'art." 
Art  does  not  consist  in  reproducing  or  exactly  imitating 
Nature.  It  must  grasp  and  embody  the  ideal.  "  Le  premier 
but  de  I'art  est  done  I'expression  de  la  pensee  par  la  forme 
ou  la  manifestation  de  I'ideal."  The  artist  must  first  con- 
ceive his  ideal  ;  then  he  must  find  in  nature  an  object 
that  corresponds  to  his  ideal,  or  even  surpasses  it.  "  L'iddal 
artistique  comprend  done  deux  elements  divers ;  I'ideal  de 
la  pensee  et  celui  de  la  forme."      The  power  of  the  imagin- 


134  Tlic  Pliilosopli)  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

ation  here  asserts  itself,  to  determine  and  complete  the 
ideal  thought,  and  to  give  i:  expressive  form.  Imagination 
is  thus  an  intermediary  between  the  ideal,  the  feeling,  and 
the  form.  The  true  artist,  even  v/hen  his  work  is  iinir3hed 
in  all  its  beauty,  is  nor  satislied.  '-Son  ideal  etait  encore  plus 
beau.'"'  Neither  thought  nor  expression  must  be  sacrinced 
the  one  to  the  other. ^ 

Ideas  of  the  beautiful,  the  good,  and  the  true  are  innate 
in  us.  '■  II  faut  de  nouveau  absolument  admettre  que  ces 
meme  ide'es  existent  identiquement  en  nous  et  dans  tons  les 
hommes  ■'  (p.  151).  ''Ces  idces  supcrieures  a  notre  esprit 
qu'elles  eclairent.  independantes  de  nous  et  de  toute  chose 
cre'ee,  universelles  et  absolues.  s'identitrent  a\'ec  Dieu,  qui 
est  le  beau,  le  vrai.  le  bien  intuiis  ''  (p.  152).  The  idea  of 
Beauty  includes  unity  of  essence,  variety  of  constitutive 
elements,  and  order  which  gives  unity  to  variety  and  mani- 
festation of  life. 

De  Coster  has  a  curious  theory  as  to  the  difference  be- 
tween Beauty  and  .Sublimity.  The  sublime  is  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  the  beautiful.  Beauty  is  a  quality  in  the  object, 
while  the  sublime  manifests  itself  in  our  thought.  What  theri 
is  the  sublime  r  '•  Lorsque  I'homme  est  devant  un  de  = 
grands  pht'nomcnes  de  la  nature,  devant  un  acte  d'heroisme. 
de  devoir  accompli,  de  sacrihce  ou  d'abnt'gation,  devatit  une 
haute  conception  de  I'intelligence,  il  se  produit  dans  son 
ame  une  emotion  puissante  ciui  la  transporte  dans  le  mo:ide 
superieur  de  la  penst'e,  qui  eveille  a  la  fois  une  f  aile  d'idecs 
opposc'cs,  dont  I'une  disjiarait  devant  I'autre  inhniment  dilYc'r- 
ente  ou  plus  grande.  pcur  ele\x-r  I'esprit.  a  tra\-ers  tons  ces 
contraires.  ju-ou'a  I'intlni  absfilu  lui-mcme.  iJieu  "  (p.  i''>3). 
'■  Le  sublime  est  done  une  ardente  aspiration  de  la  pensec  et 

'  "  L'honime  percoit  licleril  ;  "I'ani-te  le  determine  car;  un  obg;-. 
coiTrii  par  linteiligeiice,  saisi  par  le  ?-jn::nient.  Get  oljet  doit  recc'>"o:r 
u:;e  forme  qu'il  faut  rea:i-er  a  I'e.xterieiir.  L'imagination  aidee  ce  la 
memoire  fourriit  la  f'.rme  ;  le  spoilt  la  choi.~it  ;  le  faire  la  ri-a'ise  n-a 
moyen  d.u  proc-Jde,  er.  imr^rimant  a  tous  les  elements  de  la  j'vr:?—:-  et 
de  la  for.me  tin  cacliut  par-ment  personnu'..  Mais  dar:i  t-'V-Vj-  ]•;•; 
rip/'rations  d.e  l\--pr:t  et  d.u  corp?.  n''-cr;;aire.;  depuis  la  cunce;-iti'^n  de 
I'idijal  jr.sfju'a  "a  r'-'a!isati'_.n  comiiiete  de  l'a:uvre,  toutcs  les  facr.ltes 
opijrent  L-n-emMe.  ^^'aid'-i-.t.  s-j  souti'-nnent,  au  ram'ieau  de  la  i^icr..e 
et  de  la  rai-^n   '  i /-..'■:»:  >:■:.   i'-"'-  p^rt:e,  p.   !.;'■'. 


IX  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  France  135 

du  sentiment  vers  Tinfini."  In  the  beautiful  there  are  many 
shades  of  difference  —  agreeable,  pretty,  eloquent,  grand, 
majestic,  delicate,  suave,  sweet ;  in  the  sublime  there  are 
no  "nuances."  The  sublime  takes  us  to  the  heights.  "  Le 
sublime  est  une  sur-elevation  de  notre  ame  transportee 
d"une  ardente  aspiration  vers  I'infini'"'  (p.  173).  "  Le  senti- 
ment du  sublime  n'est  done  ni  expansif,  ni  calme  ;  c'est  une 
vive  agitation,  une  sorte  de  vertige  de  I'ame  devant  I'abime 
du  neant  de  toute  chose  en  face  de  Dieu  "  (p.  173). 

While  there  is  but  one  idea  of  the  beautiful,  there  are 
divers  kinds  of  beauty.  They  all  conform  to  the  general  idea, 
but  they  are  distinct  the  one  from  the  other.  The  beauty  of 
the  Greek  statues  is  due  to  the  realisation  of  the  ideal  by  the 
artist,  not,  as  some  pretend,  to  the  study  of  beautiful  models. 
To  its  realisation  the  study  of  models  contributed,  but  it  was 
in  virtue  of  their  ideas,  and  their  intelligence  in  embodying 
tliem,  that  these  artists  were  able  to  draw  from  imperfect 
Nature  that  which  she  never  oftered,  viz.  absolute  perfection 
of  form.  Two  orders  of  beauty  result  from  this  realisation 
of  the  ideal  —  "la  beaute  spirituelle  appartenant  a  I'ctre 
pensant,  et  la  Ijeaute  sensible,  propre  aux  ctres  corporels.'' 

In  the  third  part  of  his  book,  De  Coster  discusses  the  sub- 
ject of  the  Beautiful  in  Art,  and  affirms  that  in  Art,  beauty 
of  form  is  of  paramount  importance.  Without  this  the  idea 
itself  will  have  lost  its  value.  But  he  goes  on  to  distinguish 
l^etween  a  lower  and  a  higher  kind  of  truth  in  Art,  material 
truth,  and  "  une  verite  superieure  a  celle  cjue  I'on  trouve 
dans  la  realite."  If  we  only  imitate  the  real,  we  do  not 
reproduce  the  whole  of  the  truth. 

In  18S3,  a  year  or  two  after  Coster's  book  appeared,  the 
.•\bbe  P.  Vallet,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  Seminaire 
d'lvry,  and  author  of  several  speculative  works,  Praclectiones 
PJiilosopliiae,  a  History  of  Philosophy,  and  a  work  on 
Kantism  and  Positivism,  published  L'Lftc  du  Bean,  danx  la 
pliilosopJue  de  Sai)it  Tlioiiias  d' Aqui?i.  \'allet  selects  the 
few  sentences  of  Aquinas  on  Beauty,  all  of  which  he  con- 
siders golden  ones  ;  and,  while  interpreting  them,  he  dis- 
cusses the  whole  subject  of  the  Beautiful  in  the  light  of 
subsequent  theory. 


136  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

In  his  preface  he  says  that  although  Aquinas  has  not 
developed  his  doctrine  of  the  Beautiful  in  the  same  profound 
way  as  that  in  which  he  has  dealt  with  Logic,  Metaphysics, 
and  Ethics,  each  word  that  he  has  let  fall  on  the  subject 
contains  the  germ  of  a  theory,  and  opens  up  immense  horizons 
of  thought.  ^Esthetic  ought  to  deal  with  three  questions — 
(i)  the  nature  of  Beauty  in  itself,  independent  of  the  subject 
who  perceives  it ;  (2)  the  faculties  in  us  to  which  it  addresses 
itself,  and  the  subjective  eftect  it  produces  ;  and  (3)  the 
chief  manifestations  of  the  Beautiful.  In  discussing  the  first 
problem — the  principles  of  Beauty,  and  what  it  is  in  itself — 
Vallet  at  once  quotes  his  master,  Aquinas — "  Resplendentia 
formae  super  partes  materiae  proportionatas  vel  super 
diversas  vires,  vel  actiones "  {Opusc.  de  Pulchro)  ;  which 
he  paraphrases  thus.  The  good  and  the  true  do  not 
need  the  intermediary  of  the  senses  in  the  same  way  that 
the  Beautiful  does.  The  highest  beauty,  however,  includes 
the  idea  of  the  true  and  good  ;  but  its  characteristic  is 
splcfidour.  Human  beauty  does  not  consist  in  that  of  the 
body  only,  or  in  that  of  the  soul  alone  ;  but  in  the  intimate 
union  of  both.  Art  must  not  imitate  nature  exactly,  but 
also  interpret  and  transfigure.  After  discussing-  the  forms 
of  art  with  copious  illustration,  Wallet  concludes  that  the 
highest  expression  of  beauty  has  been  evolved  by  the 
Christian  religion.  "  \'oila  bien  le  corps  illumine  de  toutes 
les  splendeurs  de  Tame,  la  chair  transfiguree  par  I'esprit, 
en  un  mot  I'ideal  de  la  beaute  morale  re'alise  et  vivant." 

"  Le  beau,  c'est  I'eclat  communique  par  la  forme  aux 
diverses  parties  de  la  mati^re,  ou  bien  a  plusieurs  principes, 
a  plusieurs  actions,  harmonieusement  unis  en  un  meme 
tout."  If  one  weighs  each  word  of  this  definition,  one 
finds  that  five  elements  constitute  the  beautiful — "la  varicte, 
rintegrite,  la  proportion,  I'unite,  et  la  splendeur  ou  I't'clat;' 

He  proposes  first  to  establish  the  objective  reality  of  tlie 
beautiful,  and  then  to  show,  with  what  precision  he  can,  "  la 
nature,  le  role  et  la  place  ''  of  each  of  the  principles  that 
enter  into  its  composition.  In  discussing  its  objectivity  he 
cjuotes  Kant's  view  that  Beauty  is  nothing  in  itself  inde- 
pendent of  the  relation  which   it   bears  to  the    subject   who 


IX  The  Philosophy  of  France  137 

perceives  it.  There  is  therefore  no  science  of  the  Beautiful. 
He  quotes  Schiller  and  Hutcheson  as  agreeing  with  Kant. 
Strange  words,  says  Vallet — we  believe  that,  in  a  lovely  rose, 
a  flowing  symphony,  an  elegant  discourse,  an  act  of  sublime 
devotion,  there  exists  some  secret  virtue  that  allures  us  and 
elevates  us,  and  that  these  things  would  still  preserve  their 
beauty,  even  did  we  not  rejoice  in  them.  He  admits,  how- 
ever, that  the  subjective  element  may  be  greater  in  the 
sphere  of  the  beautiful,  than  in  that  of  the  true  and  the 
good.  To  perceive,  and  above  all  to  taste  the  beautiful, 
there  must  be  the  concurrent  action  of  several  faculties — 
sense,  imagination,  and  reason. 

He  next  analyses  the  five  elements  of  beauty.  (i) 
Variety  is  necessary,  because  unity  alone  would  weary  us. 
He  gives  an  instance  from  literature.  A  great  master  such 
as  Shakespeare  will  introduce  comedy  into  tragedy  whereby 
tragedy  becomes  more  tragic.  (2)  Completeness,  whole- 
ness, or  integrity  is  indispensable  ;  and  he  mentions  two 
kinds  of  it,  the  one  original,  and  the  other  acquired.  (3) 
So  is  Proportion.  Whatever  adds  to  the  order  and  harmony 
of  anything  perfects  its  7-aison  d^etre.  (4)  Unity  must  be 
found  underneath  variety,  as  that  which  animates  the  whole. 
But  everything  must  not  be  sacrificed  to  this  unity.  If  the 
unity  is  absolute.  Beauty  is  destroyed.  It  must  be  possible 
to  disentangle  the  principal  idea  from  the  innumerable 
details  which  surround  it,  but  it  must  not  be  presented  naked 
and  solitary;  we  must  still  retain  " I'integrite,  la  mesure, 
I'harmonie,  le  mouvement,  la  vie''  (p.  79).  In  addition, 
there  is  (5)  perhaps  the  most  difficult,  but  certainly  the 
most  important  element  in  beauty,  viz.  the  e'claf,  communi- 
cated by  the  form  to  the  material  substance.  What  is  this  ? 
In  a  word  it  is  the  essence  of  the  thing  itself  "  L'id(5e  d'un 
etre  n'est  pas  autre  chose  que  le  type  ou  I'ideal  de  cet  etre, 
ideal  qu'il  ne  realisera  jamais  entierement,  mais  dont  il 
doit  s'approcher  le  plus  possible,  afin  d'acquerir  la  plus 
grande  somme  de  beaute  possible"  (p.  82).  "  Le  caractere 
propre,  la  note  distinctive,  ou  la  difference  specifique  du 
beau,  c'est  la  sploidciir  de  la  forme  "  (p.  93). 

In  the  second  section  of  his  book  Vallet  discusses  sub- 


138  TJic  PJiihsopliy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

jecti\'c  Beauty,  beauty  in  the  mind  of  nian.  In  this  we  quit 
the  sphere  of  pure  beiiig  (essence)  for  the  more  accessible 
region  of  phenomena.  ISeauty  exists  independent  of  us, 
and  of  every  subject.  It  would  be  the  same,  it  would  pre- 
serve its  characteristic  features  and  its  lustre,  even  should 
there  be  no  spectator  capable  of  apprehending"  it.  But.  as 
a  fact,  the  spectator  exists,  longing  to  see  and  to  rejoice  in 
the  sight.  This  spectator  is  maji.  Beauty  is  first  appre- 
hended by  the  senses  ;  but  intelligence,  following  after,  dis- 
covers a  beauty  still  more  profound.  We  do  not  credit 
the  senses  with  a  knowledge  of  ideal  beauty.  Init  they  are 
the  door  by  which  ideal  beauty  can  enten  The  voice  of 
Xature  and  of  man,  music,  poetry,  light,  colour,  etc..  pene- 
trate to  the  soul  through  the  eye  and  the  ear  ;  and  there 
must  be  '■  concours  des  sens  et  de  la  raison  dans  la  percep- 
tion de  la  beaute  sensible,''  and  again  '•  I'intelligence.  pour 
concevoir  le  beau,  a  besoin  d'une  image  sensible." 

In  1SS2,  E.  Krantz  wrote  ^\\  Essai  siir  V Estiidtiijitc  ih' 
Descartes.  The  aim  of  this  book  is  to  show  that  the 
classical  literature  of  France  in  the  seventeenth  century  was 
the  ;L'Sthetic  outcome  or  expression  of  Cartesian  doctrine  : 
and  that,  although  Descartes  said  nothing  of  the  Beautiful,  he 
nevertheless  impressed  on  the  intellectual  spu'it  of  his  time 
a  certain  type  of  beauty  that  was  original  and  authoritative  : 
and  further,  that  the  indirect  influence  of  the  founder  of 
French  philosophy  was  really  more  fertile  of  result  than  that 
of  the  direct  teachers  of  -Esthetic  who  succeeded  him.  and 
who  formulated  theories  of  art  which  ^^■ere  never  consecrated 
by  success.  It  is  an  extremely  able  treatise,  though  some- 
what diffuse  in  its  details. 

9.  Guyn.n.  etc. 

A  remarkably  brilliant  and  suggestive  writer,  Jean  Marie 
Ciuyau  ( I  854-1  888),  whose  recent  death  was  a  great  loss  to 
the  philosophical  literature  of  France,  was  appointed  in  hi- 
tv.critieth  year  lecturer  on  Philosophy  in  the  Lycee  Con- 
(lorrct  at  Paris.  In  18S4  he  published  a  somewhat 
remarkable   work    on    the    Beautiful,    which    he    called    Les 


IX  TJie  Philosophy  of  France  139 

Proble flies  dc  P Estlictiqiie  Contcviporaiiie.  It  is  to  a  large 
extent  a  reply  to  Schiller's  doctrine  of  the  spicl-trcib,  as 
developed  by  Mr.  Spencer.  He  contends  that  Beauty  has 
Its  source  in  what  is  both  natural  and  essential  in  the 
development  of  the  function  of  living  beings.  His  book  is 
a  protest  (perhaps  at  times  too  emphatic)  against  the 
materialistic  and  evolutionary  solution  of  the  problem.  A 
very  sympathetic  and  interesting  account  of  Guyau  was 
written  in  1889  by  his  step-father,  M.  Alfred  Fouillee,  La 
Morale^  VArt  et  la  Religion  d'apres  ill.  Guyau.  The 
following  is  an  outline  of  Guyau's  teaching  on  eesthetics. 

He  regards  the  notion  of  the  evolutionists  that  beauty 
can  be  explained  by  the  mechanical  laws  of  motion,  and  is 
due  to  them,  as  superficial.  Some  motor  must  be  recog- 
nised, as  well  as  the  movement  which  results  ;  and  to  find 
an  adeciuate  explanation  of  this  we  must  rise  to  the  sphere 
of  the  will  and  the  emotions.  The  beautiful  may  be 
defined  cither  as  a  perception,  or  an  action,  that  stimulates 
our  life,  whether  through  the  senses,  the  intellect,  or  the  will, 
at  one  and  the  same  time,  and  produces  pleasure  by  the 
rapid  consciousness  of  such  stimulation.  According  to  Mr. 
Spencer  and  his  school,  the  idea  of  beauty  excludes  (i)  that 
which  is  necessary  to  life,  (2)  that  which  is  useful  to  life, 
and  (3)  that  which  is  an  object  of  desire  and  possession. 
But,  according  to  ]\I.  Guyau,  beauty  restoring  to  us  the  full 
consciousness  of  life  cannot  exclude  that  which  is  necessary 
to  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  first  manifestation  of  aesthetic 
feeling  is  need  satisfied,  life  regaining  its  equilibrium,  and 
the  consequent  renewal  (renaissance)  of  inward  harmony. 
Again,  instead  of  excluding  the  idea  of  utility,  beauty 
presupposes  the  idea  of  a  will  spontaneously  adjusting 
means  to  ends,  an  activity  that  seeks  to  attain  its  end  with 
tlie  least  expenditure  of  force.  Yet  again.  Beauty,  instead 
of  being  something  exterior  to  the  thing  in  which  we  see  it, 
as  a  sort  of  parasitic  plant,  is  the  very  blossoming  of  the 
being  in  which  it  is  seen,  the  very  flower  of  life. 

In  a  subsequent  chapter  (Book  II.  ch.  I.)  on  the  antag- 
onism between  the  scientific  spirit  and  the  imagination, 
Guyau    discusses    the    question    whether    the    progress    of 


140  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

science  and  the  development  of  the  scientific  spirit  will  end 
in  destroying  the  faculty  essential  to  the  artist,  viz.  the 
imagination.  He  refers  to  the  opinion  of  such  writers  as 
Schelling  and  Wagner  that  there  can  be  no  poetry  without 
mystery,  or  even  superstition,  as  he  thinks  Goethe  held. 
As  mist  enhances  the  beauty  of  a  landscape — and  if  the 
mist  be  removed,  the  beauty  vanishes — so  it  is  with  Poetry 
and  Nature.  Not  so,  says  Guyau.  The  opposition  between 
poetry  and  science  is  more  apparent  than  real.  "  La 
poesie  aura  toujours  sa  raison  d'etre  h.  cote  de  la  science." 
The  savant  may  desire  to  abstract  his  own  personality  from 
the  objects  of  his  research,  but  the  human  heart  is  part 
mistress  of  the  world.  A  necessary  harmony  therefore 
exists  between  man  and  the  things  of  the  world.  The  poet 
takes  cognisance  of  the  harmony.  It  is  no  more  possible 
to  take  our  heart  from  the  world  than  it  is  possible  to 
drive  out  the  world  from  our  heart.  All  the  theories  of 
astronomy  cannot  prevent  the  sight  of  the  infinite  heavens 
from  filling  us  with  a  vague  restlessness,  a  desire  that  is  not 
satisfied  by  knowledge.  There  is  always  an  eternal  sug- 
gestion, consequently  an  eternal  poetry.  The  higher  we  rise, 
and  enlarge  our  view,  we  lose  some  of  the  poetry  of  detail  ; 
small  things  vanish  from  our  sight,  but  what  breadth  there 
is  around  us  !  Still  girdled  by  shadows,  we  enlarge  our 
horizons,  and  the  need  grows  within  us  to  see  farther,  and 
to  know  more.  But  beyond  us  there  is  ever  a  mystery  which 
science  cannot  destroy,  a  mystery  that  will  remain  as  the 
theme  of  poetry.  "  C'cst  le  mystere  metaphysicjue."  This 
mystery  rests,  not  on  known  laws,  but  on  the  unknowable. 

Guyau  has  also  written  a  volume  on  the  ethics  of 
Epicurus,  and  one  on  English  contemporary  ethics.  At 
his  death  he  left  three  other  books  behind  him  for  pos- 
thumous publication,  one  of  which  he  called  IJArt  an 
poi)it  de  vue  sociologiqiic.  In  an  earlier  work — which  he 
called  U l7-rclio;ion  dc  PAvc/iir — he  expounded  the  socio- 
logical idea  which  he  thought  underlay  religion.  In  the 
later  he  desired  to  prove  that  the  same  idea  is  to  be 
found  at  tlic  root  of  Art  ;  and  that  through  it  Art  is  alHcd 
to    religion,    metapliysics,    and   morals.       The    recognition 


IX  The  Philosophy  of  Fratice  141 

of  this  social  idea  as  a  fundamental  truth  is,  according  to 
Guyau,  the  keynote  of  the  nineteenth  century.  It  is  not 
enough  that  thought,  action,  and  will  converge  toward  one 
end,  in  what  he  calls  "la  synergic  sociale."  To  this  must 
be  added  "  la  sympathie  sociale,"  to  produce  which  is  the 
function  of  Art.  Art  has  to  raise  the  individual  from  his 
own  life  to  the  life  universal,  not  only  by  a  participation  in 
the  same  ideas  and  beliefs,  but  also  by  community  of  feel- 
ing and  sentiment.  All  hearts  should  vibrate  to  the  same 
music.  To  think  alike  is  much  ;  but  to  enable  us  to  feel 
alike  is  the  miracle  w^hich  Art  accomplishes. 

Art  must  realise  two  conditions.  The  sensations  and 
sentiments  it  awakens  must  have  a  character  both  of 
intensity  and  of  expansiveness.  Consequently  they  must  be 
social,  "  La  solidarite  sociale  est  le  principe  de  I'emotion 
esthetique  la  plus  haute  et  la  plus  complexe."  Great  art 
exercises  its  power  over  a  great  area.  By  its  simplicity 
and  sincerity  it  can  move  all  intelligent  beings  ;  by  its 
depth  it  can  stir  the  elect.  The  great  artist,  filled  himself 
with  extraordinary  intensity  of  life,  can  only  satisfy  himself 
by  creating  a  new  world  of  living  beings  ;  and  in  the  life- 
likeness  of  the  artist's  work  we  find  the  force  that  makes  it 
sympathetic.  Life,  if  it  is  even  that  of  an  inferior  being, 
interests  us  from  the  sole  fact  that  it  is  life  ;  even  the  anti- 
pathetic may  become  to  a  certain  extent  sympathetic  in 
becoming  a  reality  that  seems  to  say  to  us,  "  Je  suis  ce  c]ue  je 
suis,  et,  telle  que  je  suis,  telle  j'apparais  "  (p.  67).  Replying 
to  Victor  Hugo,  who  had  said  that  emotion  is  always  new, 
Guyau  asserted  that  emotion  is  not  new,  but  that  it  has  an 
eternal  spring  ;  its  freshness  is  like  that  of  the  morning, 
like  the  dawn.  "  Life,"  says  Guyau,  "  morality,  science, 
art,  religion, — there  is,  as  I  believe,  an  absolute  unity 
between  these  things.  Great  and  serious  art  is  that  which 
maintains  and  manifests  this  unity." 

Such  is  a  bare  outline  of  the  philosophic  thought  of  a 
very  suggestive  writer  on  aesthetics. 

La  Criiique  Scioitifiqiie,  by  E.  Hennequin,  appeared  in 
1888,  and  is  an  extreme  application  of  the  principles  of 
M.   Taine  to  criticism.      Throughout  his  literary  analysis 


142  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful      chat.  \x 

the  author  is  in  search  of  ajsthetic,  psychological,  and  socio- 
logical data,  and  he  regards  his  method  as  purely  scientific, 
since  causes  are  sought  l:)ehind  facts,  and  laws  traced  be- 
neath phenomena.  Works  of  Art  are  "  les  indices  de  Tame 
des  artistes  et  de  I'ame  des  peuples."  After  explaining  his 
method  he  applies  it  to  \'ictor  Hugo,  finding  in  him  a 
synthesis  of  the  aesthetic,  psychologic,  and  sociological 
tendencies  of  the  nineteenth  century.  One-third  of  the 
volume  deals  with  aesthetics,  the  remainder  with  the 
psychological  and  sociological  aspects  of  Literature. 

In  iSSg,  Charles  Be'nard,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  a 
Lycee,  etc.,  of  Paris,  who  about  a  quarter  of  a  century 
earlier  translated  Hegel's  Acsthctik  into  French,  ])ublished 
L' Estlu'tique  d'Aristote,  et  de  scs  Siiccesseurs.  He  thinks 
that  Aristotle  was  the  wisest  writer  on  ^Esthetic  amongst 
the  Greeks.  Although  Plato  had  a  deeper  vision  as  to 
the  nature  of  Beauty,  Aristotle  had  a  wider  grasp  of 
its  relations,  and  consequently  of  its  place  amongst  the 
sciences.  }^I.  Benard's  book  contains  much  information  as 
to  the  history  of  Esthetics  in  the  Aristotelian  and  post- 
Aristotelian  schools,  down  to  the  Neoplatonists. 

Lc  Rcalisme  ct  te  Xaturalisiiie,  by  David  Sau\"agart 
fiSgo),  is  an  original  work  of  merit  ;  and  there  are  many 
articles  of  great  interest  on  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful  in 
the  French  Revue  P/utosopInquc,  which  was  started  in  1876, 
and  has  done  much  the  same  service  to  Philosophy  in  France, 
as  MvidhTiS  done  in  England,  and  \h.t  founial  of  Specula- 
tive PJiitosophy  in  America.  Amongst  them  the  following 
may  be  noted  : — Descours  di  Tournoy  (Giuseppe)  Det  Vera, 
del  Belto.  c  del  Bene  ;  La  Physiologie  dii  Beau,  a  re\iew  of 
S.  A.  Byck's  (of  Leipzig)  Die  Physiolo-^ie  des  Schbnoi  ; 
La  Science,  et  la  Beaute,  a  criticism  of  luigene  W'ron's 
LL EstJictiquc,  by  G.  Seailles  ;  Lx  problhne  du  L^cau,  by 
B.  Carneri.  The  last  arose  out  of  a  German  translation, 
by  J.  Kirkmann,  of  a  condensation  of  part  of  Comtc's 
Lours  de  philosophie  positive,  by  >L  Jules  Rig. 


CHAPTER    X 

THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF    ITALY 
I .  Leon  Battista  A  lbc7-ti  to  J.  P.  Be  I  lor  i 

The  course  of  philosophic  thought  on  the  subject  of  the 
Beautiful  has  been  more  mixed  up  with  the  progress  of  the 
Arts  in  Italy,  than  in  any  other  European  country.  Through- 
out the  modern  period  beginning  with  the  Cinquecento 
Renaissance  the  artistic  has  been  the  dominant  Italian  im- 
pulse ;  Philosophy  and  Science  have  been  quite  secondary. 
There  were  reflections,  and  casual  discussions,  on  the  theory 
of  the  Arts  ;  but  there  was  no  philosophic  speculation  on 
the  subject  of  Beauty  till  the  present  century. 

The  earliest  Italian  writers  on  the  subject  did  not  use 
the  term  "estetica."'  As  we  have  already  seen,  the  word  was 
introduced  into  Europe  with  a  new  meaning,  when  Baum- 
garten  naturalised  it  in  Germany  ;  but  in  describing  the 
methods  and  aims  of  Painting,  Sculpture,  and  Architecture, 
many  writers  discussed  the  principles  of  Art.  For  example, 
Leon  Battista  Alberti's  (i4oo?-i485)  tracts,  l)e  piciura  and 
De  re  ccdificatoria,  were  written  in  1435.  They  were  the 
first,  and  are  perhaps  the  most  important  writings  of  the 
earh"  Italian  renaissance.  Although  they  do  not  cast  much 
light  on  art-theory,  they  have  gone  through  many  editions, 
and  have  been  translated  into  Italian,  English,  French,  and 
German.  Alberti's  tracts  are  to  be  found  in  Eitelberger  von 
Edelburg's  QiieUc7iscJiriften,yo\.  xi.  (Wien,  1877).  In  vol.  ix. 
of  the  same  series  is  Francesco  Bocchi's  tract,  of  1571,  on 
the  St.  George  of  Donatello  ;  an  extremely  interesting  work 


144  TJic  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

on  Art-theor>',  considering  its  date.  In  Leonardo  da  Vinci's 
(145 2-1 5  1 9)  Trattato  delta  Pittura  there  is  a  discussion — 
especially  interesting  as  his — on  beauty  of  Form  and  beauty 
of  Colour,  also  as  to  what  gradation  or  shade  in  a  colour  is 
most  beautiful.  Unfortunately,  however,  his  treatise  con- 
tains nothing-  as  to  the  principles  of  Beauty  itself  An 
interesting  version  of  Da  Vinci's  book  has  been  given  in 
German,  by  H.  Ludwig,  from  a  late  MS.  copy  of  the 
Trattato,  now  in  the  Vatican.  It  was  published  in  the 
Vienna  (luctloischriften  by  \ovl  Edelburg  in  1S77. 

In  his  Traitc  du  Bemc  (ch.  vii.  p.  190)  Crousaz  refers  to 
Augustin  Niphus,  who  wrote  a  work  under  the  same  title. 
He  was  born  at  Jopoli  about  1453,  and  died  at  Jena  in 
1538,  and  seems  to  have  been  Professor  of  Philosophy  at 
Naples,  Pamia,  and  Rome,  also  at  Pisa  and  Bologna.  He 
wrote  a  work  on  Auguries.  In  his  book  on  Beauty  he 
distinguished  three  different  types  and  consequent  tastes 
for  it — (i)  Intellectual  Beauty,  (2)  Sensational  Beauty,  and 

(3)  an  intermediate  type  between  the  intellectual  and 
sensational. 

In  the  GrcEco-Roman  chapter  reference  has  already 
been  made  to  Vitruvius  (see  p.  40).  Leon  Battista  Alberti 
looked  to  him  as  his  master  ;  and  so,  though  less  explicitly, 
did  Peruzzi  and  Palladio.  But  perhaps  the  most  important 
link  between  the  Dc  Architccfuj-a  of  \*itruvius  and  the  modern 
books  of  I\Ir.  Hay  (who  reverted  to  him  explicitly)  is  the 
Harinoniccs  Mundi  of  the  astronomer  Kepler.  This  book 
(which  was  dedicated  to  James  I.  of  England)  was  published 
in  I  619,  and  is  divided  into  five  chapters,  entitled  respect- 
ively— (i)  Geometricus,  (2)Architectonicus,  (3)  Harmonious, 

(4)  Metaphysicus,  and  (5)  Astronomicus  and  Metaphysicus. 
In  it  the  principle  of  symmetry  or  proportion  is  recog^nised 
as  running  through  all  things,  and  resulting  in  "the  music 
of  the  spheres."'  The  relations  of  musical  and  figure  liar- 
mony  are  discussed,  and  this  is  a  strict  development  of  the 
principle  of  A'itruvius,  by  whom  the  principles  of  music 
were  applied  to  architecture. 

The  work  of  an  Italian  writer,  J.  P.  Bellori  (1616-1691). 
must  not  be  overlooked  at  this  stage.     Bellori  was  a  Roman 


X  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  Italy  145 

antiquary,  an  authority  on  coins,  inscriptions  on  ancient 
monuments,  icones,  etc.,  who  wrote  a  book  Le  vite  di 
Pittori,  Scidtori,  ed  Architetit  modcrjii  (1672).  In  it  he 
deals  with  the  Hves  and  works  of  such  men  as  the  Carracci, 
Michael  Angelo,  Rubens,  Vandyke,  etc.  ;  but  in  a  preface 
he  discourses  on  "  the  Idea  in  Painting,  Sculpture,  and 
Architecture,  etc."  Bellori  was  a  modern  Platonist,  an 
extreme  idealist,  with  crotchets  of  his  own.  He  held 
that  Nature  always  strove  after  perfect  or  ideal  Beauty, 
but  never  realised  it,  because  of  the  imperfection  of  the 
material  through  which  it  worked ;  and  that  therefore 
all  the  highest  artists  formed  an  ideal  of  their  own.  He 
glorifies  this  idea  in  language  which,  if  too  rhetorical,  is  in 
substance  Platonic.  "  The  idea,  which  we  may  call  the 
goddess  of  Painting  and  of  Sculpture,  descends  upon  the 
marble  and  the  canvas,  and  becomes  the  original  of  these 
arts.  Being  measured  by  the  compass  of  the  intellect,  it 
is  itself  the  measure  of  the  performing  hand  ;  and,  being 
assimilated  by  the  imagination,  it  infuses  life  into  the  image." 
He  affirms  that  in  Nature  no  individual  thing  is  perfect,  and 
therefore  that  the  true  artist  frames  a  Beauty  which  we  cannot 
find  in  any  single  object.  Nature  is  thus  "  inferior  to  Art." 
The  higher  artist  does  not  paint  men  as  they  are,  but  as 
they  ought  to  be.  He  "  advances  Art  above  Nature  itself' 
Bellori  quotes  Phidias,  Apollonius  Tyaneus,  Leon  Battista 
Alberti,  Da  \"inci,  and  Raphael,  as  all  on  his  side.  He 
cites  Raphael's  letter  to  Castiglione  about  his  Galatea  : 
"To  paint  the  fair,  it  is  not  necessary  that  I  see  many  fair 
ones  ;  but,  because  there  is  so  great  a  scarcity  of  beautiful 
women,  I  am  bound  to  make  use  of  an  idea  which  I  have 
formed  to  myself  of  my  own  fancy."  Similarly,  Guido  Reni 
— writing  to  M.  Massano,  steward  of  Pope  Urban  VIII., 
when  sending  him  his  picture  of  St.  ]\Iichael  for  the  church 
of  the  Capuchins  at  Rome — said  :  "  Not  being  able  to  mount 
so  high  as  to  behold  my  Archangel,  I  was  forced  to  make 
an  introspection  of  my  own  mind,  and  that  idea  of  Beauty, 
which  I  have  formed  in  my  own  imagination."  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  Bellori  recognised  the  various  types  of  Beauty, 
and  their  compatibility  with  one  standard  of  the  Beautiful. 

L 


146  The  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  ciiAr. 


2.   RosDiini  to  Mainiani 

Italy  was  but  slightly  influenced  by  the  stream  of  modern 
thought  which,  originating  with  Bacon  and  Descartes,  so 
powerfully  aftected  England,  Germany,  France,  and  Hol- 
land. It  was  natural  that  mediaeval  tradition  should  rule 
the  centre  of  Catholicism,  much  longer  than  it  controlled 
the  rest  of  Europe.  Galileo  represented  a  scientinc  move- 
ment, and  \'ico  a  philosophical  one.  The  latter  shed  a  new 
light  on  the  hrst  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  in  Italy; 
but,  like  Erigena  in  his  age,  he  stood  alone.  The  French 
"enlightenment"  passed  over  the  Italian  soil  without  taking 
root,  although  for  some  years  it  dazzled  the  imagination  of 
a  few.  Condillac  had  spent  ten  years  in  Italy  while  tutor 
to  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Parma,  and  did  something  to  give 
it  temporary  favour,  Even  in  the  earlier  decades  of  the 
nineteenth  century  a  doctrine  of  experience — a  moditication 
of  Locke's,  somewhat  resembling  that  of  Reid,  and  what 
used  to  be  known  as  the  .Scotch  school — was  taught  by 
Pasquale  Galuppi  (i  770-1  S46)  in  his  Sai^gio  Filosofco  and 
Sulla  Ct'itica  dclla  Coiioscenza  (1819).  .Starting  from  a 
psychological  basis,  he  was  a  realist,  but  yet  a  spiritualist. 
He  did  not  deal,  however,  with  the  yjroblems  of  the  Beauti- 
ful, and  the  four  Italian  writers  on  the  subject  in  the  earlier 
years  of  the  present  century — M.  Deltico,  in  his  Xiiove 
Ricrrche  siil  11:11^  (iSiS),  Talia  in  his  Fri)icUii  di  Esiciica 
(1S27J,  G.  \"enanzio  in  his  Call'.fUia  (1S30),  G.  Longhi 
in  his  Call'i-j^rapliia  (1830),  and  Ermcs  A'isconti  in  his 
Siti^gi  sul  Bcllo  (1S35) — all  give  an  empirical  solution  of 
the  problem.  None  of  them  \\ere  authors  of  any  import- 
ance, and  they  did  not  really  intluence  their  time. 

The  chief  philosophers  of  modern  Italy  have  been  Ros- 
mini,  Gioberti.  and  Mamiani,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  they 
were  not  merely  recluse  speculative  thinkers,  but  were  men 
of  affairs  as  well,  intensely  interested  in  the  progress  of 
th(-ir  country,  and  in  sympathy  with  the  political  aspirations 
of  the  Italian  race  ;  v.hile  they  saw  in  the  devel(ij)ment  of 
Philoaopjhy    one    of  the    most    important   elements    in    the 


K  TJic  Philosophy  of  Italy  147 

national  life.  They  did  not,  however,  break  with  the  Church. 
Their  chief  studies  were  at  patristic  and  mediteval  sources, 
but  to  the  philosophical  theology  of  scholasticism  they  added 
some  ideas  that  were  more  ancient,  and  others  that  were 
more  modern. 

The  nineteenth-century  philosophy  of  Italy  dates  from 
Antonio  Rosmini-Serbati  of  Rovereto  (1797-1855)  and 
begins  about  1830.  It  was  fundamentally  an  attempt  to 
bring  the  Platonic  view  of  the  universe,  as  transmitted 
through  the  later  mediaeval  Idealism,  into  harmony  with 
the  modem  philosophy  of  Europe.  Rosmini  was  a  Kantian, 
but  the  ideal  indeterminate  existence,  the  Dmg-an-sich,  was  to 
him  a  divine  element  which  mediated  between  our  minds  and 
particular  determined  phenomenal  objects.  He  brought  into 
his  philosophy  a  ciuasi-Malebranchian  doctrine  of  seeing  all 
things  in  God.  He  wrote  no  treatise  on  the  Beautiful,  but 
his  detached  speculations  on  the  subject  were  collected  and 
published  in  two  volumes  in  1870  {Letteratura  e  Arti  Belle), 
and  his  theory  on  the  subject  is  worked  out  in  his  Teosofia 
(1859),  Book  III.  §  4,  ch.  X.  To  him  /Esthetics  was  a 
subsection  of  a  wider  science  of  the  Beautiful,  and  was 
the  doctrine  of  the  Beautiful  as  seen  in  the  sensible  world. 
Beauty  is  an  objective  fact,  the  attribute  of  an  object  beyond 
us,  as  Truth  is  beyond  us  ;  while  Goodness  is  rather  con- 
trasted with  it,  as  an  attribute  within  us — an  attribute,  not  of 
the  object  but  of  the  subject.  The  beautiful  is  also  con- 
trasted with  the  true  in  this  respect  that  it  implies  four 
elements  in  addition,  viz.  "unity,  multiplicity,  totality,"  and 
(what  Rosmini  most  illogically  introduces  along  with  them) 
"  mental  approval,"  or  the  subjective  delight  experienced 
by  us  in  recognising  the  other  three  elements.  It  is  the 
objective  element  of  Beauty  that  determines  its  approval  or 
recognition  by  us.  Rosmini  held  that  what  is  beautiful  to 
us  subjectively  is  created  by  the  action  upon  us  of  what  is 
objectively  beautiful  ;  and  we  realise  Beauty  chiefly  in  the 
objective  world  of  sense,  because  we  are  ourselves  both 
body  and  spirit.  It  is  in  the  world  of  the  real  that  we 
discern  it  ;  but  we  at  the  same  time  aspire  after  the  ideal, 
after  what  transcends  the  actual.     In  doing  so,  a  new  feeling 


148  The  PliilosopJiy  of  tlie  Bcaiitifiil  chap. 

is  evoked,  and  a  new  aspect  of  the  universe  is  discerned. 
We  recognise  the  sublime ;  and.  instead  of  the  tranquil 
pleasure  which  the  beautiful  yields,  we  have  the  enthusiasm 
which  the  sublime  evokes. 

A  fev.-  years  after  l\0:,mini  published  his  book  on  the 
Origin  of  Ideas,  the  influence  of  the  idealistic  movement 
which  he  championed  Vv'as  seen  in  two  minor  books  on  the 
I]eautiful,  viz.  (j.  Zuccakrs  Pri}:c!p:i  di  EstLiica  (1S35) 
and  P.  Lichtentaks  ii'.vA //V,?  (1836;.  These  writers  find  tlie 
essence  of  the  Beautiful,  not  in  anything  conventional, 
accidental,  or  associated,  but  in  a  reality  within  the  ideal 
sphere  ;  the  real  being  known  adequately  only  through  the 
ideal. 

A'incenzo  Gioberti  (1S01-1852)  is  the  second  in  tk.e 
triumvirate  of  the  modern  philosophers  of  Italy.  He  is  the 
typical  ontologist  of  Italian  phiic'sophy.  He  wrote  his 
principal  works  when  in  exile,  and  \\'hen  he  was  under  the 
influence  both  of  Hegel  and  of  Schelling  amongst  the 
Germans.  (Some  have  thought  of  him  as  a  sort  of  Italian 
.Schelling',  but  this  is  an  exaggerati'in.)  He  was  an  ontolo- 
gist pure  and  simple.  He  abjured  equally  the  ])sycho]ogical 
method  of  Descartes,  the  individualistic  apjjeal  to  self- 
consciousness,  and  the  abstract  ideaiiiy  of  Rosmini.  He 
held  that  we  cannot  reach  the  realm  of  real  existence, 
either  through  the  contin;jent  facts  of  consciousue-s  fas 
Dcscartes  attempted),  or  throu.gh  the  idealistic  assumptions 
with  which  Rosmini  started,  but  that  we  must  begin  v.ith 
the  object  as  comprehending  \\-ithin  it  all  existence.  The 
radical  proposition  of  (iioberti's  plrilu.-.ophy  was  therefore 
1-1)13  o'cat  cxistciitias  (Being  creates  e:\i--tences)  :  and  there- 
fore Science,  instead  of  being,  a.s  Bacon  and  Descartes  and 
all  their  successors  had  maintained,  a  process  of  inductive 
study  by  experiment  a  posicrioyi .  is  a  sort  of  a  ^jriori  readmg 
of  the  facts  (T  the  universe,  given  ontologically  in  our  know- 
ledge of  the  Absolute. 

In  I  84 1,  (Jioberti  wrote  an  article  on  tlie  Beautiful  for  an 
Italian  encyclopa.  dia,  whiidi  \\"as  in  the  same  year  publi-:hed 
!)y  itself  as  Tyaitato  del  Iklln.  In  th.is  v.-r.rk  lie  proclaims 
himself  a  disciple  of  Plato,  and  lie  fuilov.-s  Plato  in  the  way 


X  TJie  Philosophy  of  Italy  149 

in  which  he  discusses  the  subject  (seeking  in  the  Beautiful 
and  the  Good  types  of  the  moral  and  the  political),  as  well 
as  in  the  conclusions  he  reaches.  He  examines  the  radical 
idea  of  the  Beautiful,  and  seeks  its  origin.  He  discusses  the 
function  of  the  imagination,  and  distinguishes  the  Beautiful 
from  the  Sublime,  the  Sublime  being  merely  the  superior 
principle  of  Beauty.  He  traces  its  manifestations  in  the 
sphere  of  Nature  and  of  Art,  and  takes  a  rapid  review  of 
the  history  of  the  doctrine  of  Beauty. 

Gioberti  makes  ontology,  not  psychology,  the  basis  of  his 
doctrine  of  Beauty.  Thinking  that  the  modern  psycho- 
logical movement  had  injured  philosophy,  he  reverted  to 
the  Greek  and  the  mediaeval  ontology.  The  starting-point 
of  his  method  and  the  first  principle  of  his  system  was,  as 
already  mentioned,  not  the  Cogito  ergo  sum  of  Descartes, 
but  his  own  E?is  crcat  existoitias.  He  thought  he  could 
thus  unite  the  real  and  the  ideal,  and  deduce  all  the  sciences 
from  his  primary  maxim,  the  three  terms  of  which  were  the 
roots  of  all  knowledge.  The  "ens"  gave  him  Ontology 
and  Theology  ;  the  "  creat "  yielded  him  Logic,  Ethics, 
Esthetics,  and  Mathematics;  and  the  "  existentias"  sup- 
plied him  with  Psychology,  Cosmology,  and  the  Physical 
Sciences.      It  is  a  wholly  chimerical  scheme. 

To  Gioberti,  Beauty  is  neither  the  agreeable  nor  the 
useful.  It  is  not  a  purely  subjective  phenomenon,  de- 
pendent on  the  idiosyncrasy  of  individuals.  It  is  an  object- 
ive, though  an  ideal,  reality,  and  is  in  its  essence  absolute. 
In  Nature  we  must  distinguish  form  from  matter.  In  Art 
it  is  even  more  necessary  to  distinguish  that  which  belongs 
to  imagination  from  that  which  depends  on  reason,  as  the 
one  furnishes  us  with  a  sensible,  and  the  other  with  an 
intellectual  element.  In  the  products  of  Art,  Beauty  shows 
itself  most  clearly  when  an  ideal  type  dominates  over  the 
sensible  element.  But  the  radical  idea  of  Beauty  is  to  be 
found  in  the  idea  of  Being  considered  in  itself,  in  its  unity,  and 
in  its  manifestations  eii  rapport  with  existence.  To  know 
both  the  principle  and  the  development  of  Beauty,  and  the 
highest  rules  of  aesthetics,  we  must  seek  them  in  the  universal 
laws  of  ontology.      There  is  uninterrupted  continuity  in  the 


150  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

chain  of  existence,  from  the  impenetrable  essence  of  unity 
to  the  last  ramifications  of  multiplicity.  The  elementary 
ideas  of  resthetic  are  contained  in  the  postulates  of  ontolo.yy. 
These  ideas  are  those  of  the  sublime,  the  beautiful,  and  the 
marvellous. 

"The  idea  of  creation,"  says  Gioberti,  "furnishes  us 
with  the  three  simultaneous  conceptions  of  Time,  Space, 
and  Force,  which,  together  or  sejiarate,  form  the  dificrent 
species  of  the  sublime.  The  sublime  is  creation,  so  far  as 
it  is  represented  to  the  imagination  ;  as  creation  is  the 
sublime,  in  so  far  as  it  is  realised  by  God  and  percci\'ed 
by  the  reason.  That  premised,  it  will  not  be  ditncult  to 
find  the  relation  of  the  sublime  to  the  beautiful.  Wliat  is 
creation  if  not  the  realisation  of  the  intelligible  types  of 
things  in  finite  substance  ;  and  what  docs  the  creative  act 
do,  if  not  to  adjust  matter  in  its  stibstantiality,  and  form 
according  to  its  ideal  ?  Beauty  is  the  union  of  form  and 
matter.  ...  It  is  derived  from  the  creative  force  in  which 
the  sublime  principally  resides.''  In  the  second  place, 
intelligiljle  types,  in  so  far  as  they  are  realised  in  finite 
substances,  exist  in  time  and  space  :  whence  it  follows  that 
these  two  forms  of  the  Universe  (which  constitute  another 
aspect  of  the  sublime)  are  also  the  scat  of  IJcauty.  Thus 
creative  force  produces  beauty,  space  and  time  contain  it. 
Towards  Beauty  the  one  has  a  relation  of  causality,  the 
other  a  relation  of  containedness,  whence  the  formula. 
"The  sublime  creates  and  contains  the  I]L-autiful,''  which  is 
equivalent  to  this  other,  "  The  sublime  dynamic  creates  the 
l)eautiful,  the  sublime  mathcmatic  contains  it.''  But,  as  the 
creati\-e  force  is  only  the  all-powerful  activity  of  Being, 
and  since  Time  and  .Space  are  its  coiiditions  and  effects,  it 
follows  that  the  formulas  of  ;csthetics  can  spread  thcmsch'es 
out  as  formulas  of  ontology  thus  :  "  Being,  l)y  means  of  the 
dynamic  su])lime  creates  tlie  lieautiful.  and  Ijy  means  of 
the  mathcmatic  suljlime  contains  it.''  Such  is  the  relation 
between  ;esthetics  and  ontology,  as  to  the  ideas  of  tliC 
beautiful  and  su])lime. 

Similarly  with  tlic  relation  of  the  l)eautiful  to  the  wi-wOcr- 
ful.      The  wonderful  is  of  two  kinds,  the  mvslerious  aiid  tr.e 


X  The  Philosophy  of  Italy  151 

supernatural.  The  latter  is  the  unknown,  which,  mingling 
itself  with  the  known  under  a  sensible  form,  allies  itself 
with  the  beautiful  and  the  sublime,  and  adds  to  its  own 
eclaf.  Entering  the  realm  of  the  imagination,  it  brings  in 
a  floating  indefinable  something,  which  expresses  itself  in 
the  ideal  world  of  art  and  poetry.  jNIysterj'  is  necessar}'  to 
beauty,  because  the  Beautiful  is  inseparable  from  the  objects 
which  transcend  experience,  and  which  open  up,  beyond 
the  real  world,  an  infinite  perspective  to  the  mind.  Mystery 
is  also  found  in  science,  where  the  light  of  truth  burns 
with  keener  brilliance  by  contrast  with  the  shadows  which 
attend  it. 

The  supernatural  in  aesthetics  is  not  less  important.  It 
is  not  the  extraordinary,  it  is  rather  the  superior  condition, 
which,  within  the  world  or  beyond  it,  begins,  continues,  and 
transforms  the  order  of  things.  .  .  .  The  incomprehensible, 
in  passing  from  the  domain  of  reason  to  that  of  imagination, 
and  clothing  itself  with  the  raiment  of  appearance,  gives 
rise  to  the  notion  of  the  mysterious.  It  follows  that  every 
partial  disclosure  of  the  incomprehensible  essence  must  be 
mysterious,  and  must  possess  beauty.  The  indeterminate 
determines  itself  in  forms,  colours,  sounds,  motions,  words, 
which  are  to  us  points  of  light  on  a  field  of  darkness. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  summary  of  his  views, 
that  alihough  the  root-principle  of  Giobcrti's  philosophy  of 
Aesthetik  may  be  quite  erroneous,  there  is  a  great  deal 
of  suggestive  tliinking  in  his  discussion  of  the  subject. 

The  third  in  the  modern  Italian  triumvirate.  Count 
Terenzio  !\Iamiani  —  perhaps  tlie  most  rcmarkaljlc  of  the 
tliree — has  not  specially  discussed  the  Beautiful  ;  but  it  is 
worthy  of  note  that,  although  Mamiani  began  his  philoso- 
phical career  by  defending  the  experience  doctrine,  while  an 
exile  in  France  in  1834,  he  worked  himself  gradually  clear 
of  it,  into  an  idealism  that  is  both  catholic  and  cosmopolitan. 
He  was  a  poet  as  well  as  a  philosopher,  and  his  mind  has 
received  vivid  impress  from  his  art  studies,  and  from  the 
movement  of  which  Alneri  is  perhaps  the  chief  representa- 
tive, ^ilamiani  is  a  Platonist,  but  he  has  tried  to  unite 
Platonism  with  the  Aristotelian   doctrine,  in  his   recognition 


152  The  Piiilosop'iy  of  t lie  Beautiful       chap,  x 

of  the  Absolute  as  within  the  relative,  and  is  thus  able  to 
endorse  the  ontological  position  of  St.  .-Inselm.  It  is  easy 
to  see  that  his  doctrine  of  the  Beautif.il  was  a  Platonic 
one  ;  and  his  name  is  introduced  into  this  historic  essay 
chieny  because  one  of  his  disciples — Luigi  Ferri,  of  Naples 
— has  \\Titten  an  Essai  su7-  VJiistoire  de  la  philosophie  en 
li'ilic  au  ilLv-neui'iL'tne  sieele  (1S69).  in  which  a  g"ood  deal 
of  information  v/ill  be  found  as  to  the  evolution  of  the  philo- 
sophical thought  of  Italy  on  this  and  kindred  problems. 

Two  Italian  works  issued  in  1SS2  need  onh"  be  men- 
tioned. The  first  is  Sul  Beilo^  by  Sac.  Salvatore  di  Pietro, 
published  at  Palerm.o.  It  treats  (i)  of  natural  Beauty, 
(2)  of  moral  Beauty,  and  (3)  of  artificial  Beauty.  7  lie 
second  is  a  note  Sul  Bcllo,  by  G.  S.  Ferrari,  published  at 
\'erona  and  also  at  Padua. 


CHAPTER    XI 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    HOLLAND 

i'"RANZ  HE^LSTERHUIS  (1720-1790),  the  earliest  Dutch 
|jhilosopher  who  discussed  the  subject  of  the  Beautiful, 
was,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  follower  of  Baumgarten.  The 
aim  of  his  whole  philosophy  was  to  mediate  between  the 
intellectual  and  the  emotive  in  Human  Nature,  and  to 
reconcile  them;  and  his  "internal  sense''  was  the  recon- 
ciler. He  held  that  through  the  testhetic  sense  we  attain 
to  a  real  knowledge  of  things,  but  that,  in  comparison  with 
the  clear  knowledge  which  science  yields,  it  is  dim  and 
confused  information  (verworrene  \"orslcilungen).  The 
mind  desires  the  fullest  possible  knowledge  of  all  things, 
I)ut  it  is  fettered  by  sense,  and  by  the  interrupted  action  of 
the  several  senses.  As  all  its  knowledge  comes  primarily 
ihrough  sense,  the  mind  tries  to  overcome  the  barrier,  and 
to  reach  the  largest  number  of  ideas  open  to  it  in  the 
shortest  possible  time.  This  it  reaches  most  of  all  by  means 
of  Beauty,  which  may  therefore  be  defined  as  "  that  element 
in  an  oljject  which  affords  the  largest  number  of  ideas  in 
the  shortest  time."  But  the  senses  can  act  simultaneously, 
and  it  certainly  is  not  necessary  to  the  idea  of  Beauty  that 
many  separate  ideas  should  coalesce.  Their  union  may 
e:ihance  the  beauty  of  an  object,  but  it  does  not  create  it. 
A  single  idea  may  give  rise  to  the  feeling  of  iJeauty,  and  con- 
stitute it  ;  while  rapidity  of  perception  has  really  nothing-  to 
do  with  it.  To  affirm  that  the  more  numerous  the  elements 
in  a  beautiful  object  are,  the  greater  is  its  beauty,  is  manifestly 
not  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  Beauty  in  itself. 


154  The  PltilosopJiy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

In  177S,  Hieronymus  van  Alphen  (i  746-1 S03)  freely 
translated  from  the  German  of  F.  J.  Riedel,  and  issued  in 
two  volumes,  with  additions,  notes,  and  an  introduction  for 
the  use  of  Dutch  readers,  a  TJicoric  vati  Sclwonc  Kinisfc?i 
en  WeteiiscJiappci:.  lie  was  a  statesman  and  a  poet,  and 
published  several  volumes  of  verse.  Wan  Alphen  classified 
human  desires  as  follows — (i)  those  that  strive  aftei  the 
possession  of  an  object  :  (2)  those  that  are  satisfied  with 
the  pleasure  occasioned  by  the  perception  or  si;4"ht  of  ari 
object.  The  former  strive  after  Goodness,  the  latter  after 
the  Beautiful.  Thercfire  we  call  all  that  can  i)lease  our 
senses  (inward  and  outward),  our  imagination  and  passions, 
without  any  prospect  of  self-interest,  even  if  we  do  not 
possess  it,  beautiful.  We  call  that  ugly  which  displeases, 
even  though  there  be  no  likelihood  of  its  coming  into  our 
possession.  He  affirmed  (i)  that  Beauty  is  no  natural  and 
inseparable  equality  of  the   things   wb.ich   we   call   beautiful  ; 

(2)  that  Beauty  is  not  inherent  in  the  objects  themselves, 
like  Perfection,  without  regard  to  a  percipient  being' ;   and 

(3)  that  pjcauty  is  of  a  relative  nature,  and  the  relation   in 
which  it  stands  to  us  is  that  it  pleases  us. 

The  obiect  which  is  to  please,  must  be  sensuous  ;  it 
must  not  show,  in  relation  to  the  whole,  any  obvious  im- 
perfection. It  must  also  occupy  us  sufficiently,  and  cau--e 
our  attention  to  be  concentrated  upon  it  ;  while  it  must  not 
be  represented  too  plainly  and  in  detail.  Beauty  is  sensuous 
unity  in  sensuous  variety. 

The  impressions  of  the  lower  senses,  Taste,  Smell,  etc., 
are  only  pleasant  :  but  through  -Siglit  and  Hearing,  in  their 
simplest  forms  (colour  and  tone),  the  elements  of  beauty  arc 
brought  in,  and  are  j:)ronounced  l^cauiiful.  The  tnrmer 
lack  Ijcauty,  Ijecau^e  they  are  de^^titute  both  of  jicrfect 
measure  and  of  ]ii-cci-ion.  which,  together  with  a  pleasant 
impression  of  the  senses,  produce  Ijcaut}'.  Side  by  side 
with  the  beauty  f)f  which  the  elements  are  Coloiu'  and 
Tone,  we  have  the  beauty  of  Form  and  Motion. 

We  nnist  disiingu.i-b.,  howc:\'er,  Ijetween  real  ISeauly  m 
Nature,  and  oiu'  ideal  of  the  highest  possible  BjcaiUy. 
Nature  not  only  produces  ]]eauty,  it  also  yields  Perfection  ; 


XI  TJlc  PJiilosopJiy  of  Holland  155 

and  these  two  are  often  opposed  to  each  other.  When 
they  are  so,  Beauty  must  give  way  to  Perfection.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  the  beauties  of  Nature  do  not  reach  the 
ideal,  of  which  they  are,  nevertheless,  the  foundation  ;  and 
for  this  reason,  too,  they  are  often  surpassed  by  the  pro- 
ductions of  Art.  Our  artists  take  Beauty  as  their  sole  aim, 
and  when  they  follow  Nature  they  are  able  to  give  us 
beauty  ;  but  when  Nature  (at  the  cost  of  beauty)  gives  us 
Perfection,  the  Fine  Arts  must  produce  works  which  surpass 
the  beauties  of  Nature,  and  approach  the  ideal  of  the  highest 
possible  beauty. 

Immediately  after  the  publication  of  this  book,  W.  E.  de 
Perponcher  wrote  some  letters  to  Van  Alphen  in  criticism 
of  his  theory  of  Beauty,  and  to  these  Wan  Alphen  replied. 
It  was  the  Aristotelian  and  Platonist  controversy  renewed 
on  a  small  scale.  Perponcher  was  a  follower  of  Charles 
Batteux  (see  p.  10 1),  who  held  that  all  good  art  is  mimetic. 
He  affirmed  that  the  copying  or  free  imitation  of  the  beauties 
of  Nature  lay  at  the  root  of  all  the  Fine  Arts. 

In  reply.  Van  Alphen  maintained  that  this  cannot  be 
taken  as  our  general  and  first  principle,  because  we  cannot 
deduce  from  it  the  rules  and  precepts  for  all  artists  in 
every  branch  of  .A-rt.  He  thought  Batteux  right  in  many 
of  his  views  ;  but  he  was  also  of  opinion  that  the  beauties 
of  Nature  (la  belle  nature)  were  too  vague,  too  indistinct 
to  be  a  foundation  for  aesthetic  reasoning.  Even  when  this 
idea  is  taken  in  the  sense  generally  given  to  it,  and  stretched 
to  the  utmost,  it  is  still  too  limited  for  Poetry. 

De  Perponcher  maintained  that  in  taking  Batteux's 
generalisation  as  the  first  principle  of  Art,  we  do  not 
exclude  all  original  invention  or  original  feeling.  Even 
the  poet,  who  gives  us  his  own  thoughts  and  feelings,  is 
follov.'ing  or  co]:)ying  Nature,  since  he  must  continually 
compare  his  own  thoughts  and  feelings  with  those  of 
oth.er  men.  All  Art-products  have  their  root  in  a  close 
sti'.dy  of  Nature,  and  nothing  has  been  produced  which 
may  not  be  found  there.  \'an  Alphen,  on  the  contrary,  is 
of  opinion  that  when  a  poet  expresses  his  own  emotions 
in  verge,  there   is  no   copying  or  following   of  Nature,  but 


156  Tlic  PliilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful         chap. 

Nature  itself  is  at  work.  De  Perponcher  objects  to  the 
theory  that  an  artist  must  search  for  beauty  without  regard 
to  Perfection.  In  that  case,  he  argues,  a  wrong  and  per- 
nicious taste  will  develop  itself  without  check.  Van  Alphen 
answers  that  this  is  true,  but  says  that  we  cannot  blame 
the  artist  for  it,  although  as  a  citizen  it  may  not  be  abvays 
desirable  for  him  to  make  use  of  the  freedom  which  he 
ui'idoubtedly  possesses  as  an  artist. 

The  work  of  an  anonymous  writer  in  17SS,  Dc  Gecst  der 
XedcrhiiidscJie  dicJitcrs  Diet  Verhandeliiig  over  Jiet  Bcval'tij^e 
liet  fiaive  eu  de  rouiaficen  (The  Spirit  of  the  Dutch  poets, 
with  a  Treatise  about  the  Graceful,  the  Naive,  and  the 
Romantic),  is  of  slight  value.  ]\Iore  important  is  the 
following,  written  in  1802  by  J.  F.  van  Beeck  Calkoen 
(1772-1S11),  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Leiden  1S00-1S05, 
and  in  Utrecht  1S05-1811,  Eiiryatus  over  Jiet  SeJioone. 
His  conclusions  on  the  subject  of  the  P.eautiful  are  as 
follows  : — (i)  What  is  perceived  by  the  senses  is  beautiful, 
if  its  parts  are  arranged  ;ind  combined  after  an  intellectual 
order  or  law.  (2)  When  we  feel  that  anything  is  beautiful, 
that  feeling  is  awakened  by  our  discernment  of  the  relatioii 
bet'.vecn  the  intellectual  and  the  material.  Intellectual 
unity  is  always  the  foundation  of  the  beautiful.  From  this 
he  infers,  among  other  things,  that  in  Architecture,  Sculpture, 
and  Painting,  Beauty  lies  in  a  mathematical  order,  by  which 
the  relation  and  position  of  lines  and  planes  are  fixed.  The 
artist  perceives  this  equation  of  lines  and  phuies  at  once  by 
sight,  feeling",  and  inspiration  through  a  mathematical  tact. 

In  1S27,  Humbert  de  Super\-i!le  wrote  at  Leiden  an 
essay  on  I,es  S/ynes  hjecuditioniiels  de  lyirt.  Though  the 
work  is  writien  in  French,  the  autlior,  a  Dutchman,  was 
Director  of  the  Museum  of  Plaster  Casts  in  Leiden.  It  is  a 
somewhat  remarkaljlc  book  ;  and  in  it  he  demonstrates  that 
line-.,  placed  in  a  certain  direction  on  both  sides  of  an  axis, 
give  the  same  definite  cesthetical  imiircssion  to  every  one, 
quite  apart  from  their  mathematical  character.  Taking 
the  lunnan  face  as  the  liasis  of  his  demonstration,  he  shows 
that  the  lir.es  of  the  di!Yercr,t  organs  may  ha^■e  three  distinct 
])o.dtions    with    respect   to   tlie    axis  —  one    converging,   the 


XI  The  PJiilosophy  of  Holland  157 

second  horizontal,  and  the  third  expanding.  The  first  will 
always  give  the  impression  of  a  weeping,  the  second  of  an 
unexpressive,  and  the  third  of  a  laughing  face.  These  three 
directions  of  the  lines  of  the  face  are  seen  in  the  three 
typical  heads  of  Venus,  Pallas,  and  Juno,  indicating  respect- 
ively voluptuousness,  wisdom,  and  egoism.  We  may  deduce 
from  these  three  schemata  of  lines,  which  respectively 
indicate  (i)  passion,  agitation,  inconstancy;  (2)  order, 
equilibrium,  dignity,  durability  ;  (3)  reflection,  depth  of 
thought,  solemnity,  sublimity.  To  these  lines  correspond 
the  colours  red  (seen  in  blood  and  fire,  and  symbolic  of 
movement),  white  (symbolic  of  peace),  and  black  (symbolic 
of  silence,  sorrow,  death),  making  part  of  the  same  "signes 
inconditionnels.'"' 

He  thinks  that  these  principles  hold  good  in  the  animal 
and  vegetable  kingdoms  as  well,  and  are  borne  witness  to 
in  the  Kslhetic  impressions  of  beauty  we  receive  from  the 
forms  and  outlines  both  of  animals  and  trees.  In  Art 
these  same  lines  produce  impressions  everywhere  analogous 
to  the  lines  of  the  three  types  of  face  already  referred  to. 
Thus  a  Doric  tem.ple,  wiih  its  horizontal  lines,  has  for  us  a 
totally  difterent  character  from  a  Gothic  cathedral,  with  its 
pointed  lines.  The  first  is  an  image  of  equilibrium,  and 
calmness,  or  greatness  of  soul  ;  the  second  is  the  symbol  of 
tlie  religious  spirit,  casting  its  looks  and  thoughts  upwards. 
The  Gothic  and  the  Grecian  architectural  lines  show  us  two 
of  the  "signes  inconditionnels."  In  the  Chinese  buildings, 
with  their  upturned  curves,  we  find  the  third,  showing  the 
absence  alike  of  digmity,  stability,  and  rest. 

De  Socratische  School,  by  Ph.  \V.  van  Hensde,  Professor 
of  Philosophy  at  Utrecht,  was  published  in  1834.  He 
takes  the  theory  of  Plato  as  his  basis,  and  says  that  the 
Socratic  method  of  philosophical  study  is  the  one  which 
should  be  adopted  and  followed  in  the  nineteenth  century 
He  comes  to  the  following  conclusions  : — The  love  of 
}5eauty  springs  in  reality  from  want.  If  man  found  entire 
satisfaction  in  himself,  he  would  not  strive  after  Beauty,  or 
even  Goodness.  Feeling  the  need  of  Beauty,  and  loving 
it  ardently,   he  tries   to  create   things  as  like  his   ideal   of 


158  TJic  PJiilosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

it  as  possible.  The  love  of  the  Beautiful  is  the  origin  of 
the  Arts,  as  the  love  of  Truth  is  the  origin  of  Science.  This 
love  gives  scope  to  all  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  which  in 
their  turn  give  birth  to  the  sciences.  The  Arts  and  their 
productions  come  from  the  same  root,  viz.  a  sense  of 
harmony  and  measure,  of  taste  and  imagination.  The  end 
of  Art  with  the  Tireeks  was  the  stimulus  of  the  religitjus 
sense  ;  their  study  and  culture  were  designed  for  the  moral 
and  religious  education  of  man.  So  it  ought  to  be  with 
us.  The  Arts  should  not  be  cultivated  solely  for  use  or 
pleasure.  Their  highest  aim  is  to  produce  the  highest 
moral  beauty,  which  is  the  only  true  beauty.  The  lieauti- 
ful  exists  in  all  ideals,  and  it  is  this  that  charms  us  most  in 
the  masterpieces  of  art.  The  highest,  or  moral  beauty, 
however,  does  not  exist  in  all  ideals,  although  certainly 
all  artists  should  look  to  it  as  their  highest  aim.  Nothing 
is  beautiful  that  is  not  true  ;  and  as  truth  is  the  aim  of 
science,  we  here  nnd  the  relation  which  makes  of  Art  and 
Science  one  great  harmonious  whole. 

Professor  C.  W.  Opzoomer,  the  successor  of  P.  \V.  van 
Hensde  in  the  Chair  of  Philosophy  at  Utrecht,  is  the  author 
of  Ilet  IVezcn  dcr  KeiDiis.  Opzoomer  gives  a  somewhat 
elaborate  classification  of  knowledge,  the  tirst  section  of 
which  he  calls  Psychical  Anthropology  or  Psychology,  and 
he  subdivides  it  thus — (i)  Logic;  (2)  ,-Esthctics,  taken  in 
its  most  general  sense  as  the  knowledge  of  man  as  a  sentient 
being,  of  which  the  doctrine  of  the  Beautiful  is  a  part  ;  (3) 
Pathology.  It  would  be  impossible  for  us  to  estimate  Beauty 
or  to  enjoy  Art  if  we  had  no  inborn  sense  or  feeling  of 
Beauty.  The  objects  which  we  observe  by  our  senses, 
the  operations  of  which  we  learn  to  know,  we  do  not 
judge  merely  from  the  view-point  of  sensuous  feeling,  but 
also  from  that  of  our  feeling  of  Beauty.  We  do  not  merely 
ask  whether  the  ol^iects  are  agreeable  and  useful  to  us,  we 
al^o  ask  whether  they  are  beautiful.  It  is  not  unusual  that 
what  our  sensuous  nature  considers  desirable,  and  even 
necessary,  awakens  at  the  same  time  our  aversion,  as  being 
ugly  ;  wPicreas  what  atTccts  us  painfully  and  what  v/e 
strenuously    oppo-^e,   often    claims    our    admiration.      If  we 


XI  The  Philosophy  of  Holland  159 

had  no  innate  feeling  of  beauty,  we  would  never  be 
able  to  understand  its  definitions  as  given  by  others,  and 
the  nature  of  Beauty  would  remain  for  ever  hidden  from  us. 
But  having  this  feeling,  and  being  led  by  it  to  reject  some 
things  as  ugly,  and  to  praise  others  as  beautiful,  it  is  possible 
for  us  to  discover  by  strict  analysis  the  characteristics  which 
give  beauty  to  objects.  If  we  doubt  our  own  judgment,  the 
verdict  of  the  Ages  will  serve  us  as  a  touchstone. 

By  continued  analysis  and  comparison  we  find  the 
nature  of  the  Beautiful.  It  is  not  symmetry,  but  rather  the 
harmony  of  the  whole  of  an  object  with  its  different  parts, 
so  that  all  the  parts  help  to  produce  the  impression  which 
results.  There  must  also  be  harmony  between  the  form  of 
a  work  of  Beauty  and  the  thought  to  which  it  gives  ex- 
pression. But  harmony  alone  is  not  enough.  A  beautiful 
form  is  much,  but  its  contents,  the  thoughts  within  it,  must 
not  be  neglected  ;  and  the  artist  and  his  work  will  take  a 
higher  place  according  to  the  height  to  which  the  artist's 
mind  has  reached.  His  ideas,  however,  must  be  artistic^ 
that  is  to  say,  they  must  be  ideas  fit  to  bear  the  sensuous 
forms  of  Art.  This  is  true  even  of  the  most  spiritual  of  arts, 
viz.  Poetry.  Not  all  thoughts  or  ideas  are  artistic.  The  aim 
of  the  artist  is  to  create  Beauty.  It  has  been  said  that  his 
aim  must  be  to  follow,  and  to  copy  Nature  ;  but  by  so  doing 
the  Ideal,  which  is  the  inmost  soul  of  Art,  vanishes.  It  is 
untrue  that  Art  must  be  made  subservient  to  morality  or 
religion.  Art  and  Beauty  are  sure  to  help  Virtue,  but  only 
as  her  free  allies,  not  as  her  slaves.  Our  innate  sense  of 
Beauty  may  be  considered  as  the  connecting  link  between 
the  imperfect  world  and  the  perfect,  because  it  shows  us 
divine  beauty  in  actual  things,  and  teaches  us  to  form 
ideals,  and  artistic  creations,  which  not  only  copy  Nature 
but  surpass  it. 

Popidaire  Aesthetisdie  Beschouiuingeti  over  de  Symnietrie 
of  de  Bevallige  Proportieti  (Popular  ^sthetical  Remarks 
about  Symmetry  or  the  Graceful  Proportions),  by  H.  G. 
A.  L.  Fock  (1875).  The  author  thinks  that  in  its  original 
sense,  as  used  by  the  Greeks,  Symmetry  indicated  not  our 
modern  idea  of  it,  but  a  graceful,  pleasing   proportion  of 


i6o  The  PliilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  ch.-.  p. 

the  different  parts  of  an  object  ;  this  pleasing  effect  being 
only  obtained  \vhcn  the  proportion  could  be  expressed  by 
small  numbers.  Thus,  if  a  line  of  130  possible  sections 
be  divided  into  parts  of  30,  40,  and  60,  it  is  divided 
symmctyically  ;  its  proportions  being  expressed  in  the 
numbers  3,  4,  and  6.  If  the  same  supposed  line  were 
divided  into  parts  of  22,  79,  and  29  respectively,  there 
would  be  no  svmiucfry,  because  the  proportion  can  only  be 
given  in  the  larger  numbers.  He  is  of  opinion  that  the 
lost  theory  of  Polycleitus,  which  he  explained  by  a  model 
figure,  and  by  which  he  taught  what  the  respective  lengths 
of  the  ditterent  parts  of  the  human  body  must  be  in  order 
to  give  a  graceful  v/cll-formed  whole,  was  based  upivn  this 
symmetry  of  proportion.  He  then  proceeds  to  explain 
how  ihis  same  symmetry  is  found  in  the  dimensions  of  the 
I'yramids,  the  Greek  Temples,  the  Gothic  Cathedrals,  in 
ceramic  objects,  gold  and  silver  work,  etc.,  in  short,  in 
all  true  works  of  art,  in  endless  ^"aric■L\'  ;  also  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  human  body,  and  that  of  different  animals. 
He  believes  this  Symmetry,  in  its  new  meaning,  to  be  a 
condemnation  of  Zei-^:ng's  o.urca  StCtio  (see  p.  68). 

The  most  elaborate  work  of  recent  years  in  Dutch 
.Esthetics  is  the  XcdniaiidscJic  AcsfJicft/:,  by  J.  van  \'loten 
(iSSi),  the  ediior  of  -Spinoza's  works.  His  work  bc^.,ii'is 
with  a  general  analysis  of  the  human  faculties,  from  sen^-^a- 
tion  to  thou^^ht  and  will.  In  reference  to  Ileauty  he  sa\'s 
all  beauty  is  Itfe  in  a  harmonious  form,  life  sliov.ing  i[.~elf 
in  time  and  space.  Therefore  all  art  must  be  true  to  life. 
Everything  that  buys  its  origin.aliiy  at  tlie  expense  of  truth 
— that  is  to  -ay,  universal  human  truth,  as  well  as  truth 
to  Nature — is  um-iatural,  and  repugnant  to  our  taste.  The 
principal  rules  to  which  all  works  of  art  must  conform 
are  method,  unity  in  diversity,  symmetry,  ;ind  proportion. 
i)i\'ersity  an.d  motion  must  be  there,  if  our  e\'e  would  not 
be  fatigued  by  too  much  sameness  ;  but  this  diversity  mu-t 
be  C(jntro!Icd  by  order,  wliich  combines  differences  in  op.e 
hai'monious  whole.  S)-mnietry  is  ar.dther  \-ery  important 
rule.  An  ob-ect  is  symmetrical  when  tlic  parts  on  each 
side  of  the   diameter  are    equal,  which,  liowever,  does   not 


XI  TJie  PJiilosop]iy  of  HoUmid  1 6 1 

hinder  the  greatest  variety  of  form.  Symmetry  is  obvious 
at  once  to  the  eye  ;  proportion,  though  based  upon  the  same 
desire  for  unity  and  measure,  has  a  more  hidden  influence, 
and  shows  itself  only  in  its  general  eftect.  Adolf  Zeising's 
well-known  aiirea  scctio  is  the  law  that  lies  at  the  root  of 
the  study  of  Proportion.  This  law  is  not  only  applicable  to 
the  human  body,  but  also  to  the  mineral,  vegetable,  and 
animal  kingdoms.  Both  balance  and  counterbalance  must 
be  found  in  the  productions  of  art.  Of  no  less  importance 
than  this  harmony  between  the  whole  and  its  parts  is  the 
harmony  between  the  thought,  which  the  artist  wants  to 
express,  and  the  form  with  which  it  is  clothed — that  between 
the  soul  of  the  work  and  its  image.  Beauty  can  only  be 
attained  by  avoiding  conflict. 

The  Universe  is  beautiful  because  it  is  the  perfect  image 
of  eternally  renewed  life  ;  it  is  a  harmonious  whole,  full  of 
and  inspired  by  the  highest  spirit  of  life.  Thoroughly  to 
understand  and  appreciate  its  beauty,  we  must  exercise  our 
faculties  in  the  contemplation  of  its  separate  parts.  Our 
admiration  continually  increases  when  we  discover  how 
the  simplest  gerin  is  gradually  developed  into  the  most 
complicated  structure.  The  charm  of  a  landscape,  taken 
as  a  whole,  lies  in  the  impression  which  we  receive  from 
the  happy  combination  and  harmonious  relation  of  the 
natural  objects,  organic  and  inorganic,  of  which  it  is  com- 
posed. It  is  a  powerful  help  in  aesthetic  education  to 
excite  and  develop  an  appreciation  of  the  different  aspects 
which  Nature  assumes  in  different  countries. 

Van  Vloten  next  discusses  the  phenomena  of  Motion, 
Sound,  and  Light,  which  have  had  most  to  do  with  our 
recognition  of  the  Beautiful,  the  nature  of  Art  as  not 
merely  imitative,  the  relation  of  /Esthetics  to  Ethics  ;  and 
then  proceeds  to  a  consideration  of  the  six  separate  Arts  in 
detail,  the  classification  of  which,  he  says,  dates  from  the 
Middle  Ages.  His  analytic  power  is  seen  at  its  best  in 
these  concluding  sections  of  his  book. 

In  1889,  J.  P.  X.  Land,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the 
University  of  Leiden,  published  an  Inleidiiig  tot  de  IVijsbc- 
gecrtc  (An  Introduction  to  Philosophy).      In  it  he  discusses 

M 


1 62  The  PJiilosophy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

the  subject  of  Beauty  aud  Art.  In  trying  to  give  a  defini- 
tion of  the  Beautiful  from  which  the  definition  of  Art  must 
be  deduced,  we  have  first  to  ask  whether  ]]eauty  is  a  thing 
sharply  defined  (fike  a  circle  or  a  straight  line),  or  whether 
it  indicates  many  qualities  of  objects,  more  or  less  related, 
which  perhaps  have  nothing  in  common,  but  only  this,  that 
they  procure  for  man  (in  many  diftercnt  wa}s)  an  unselfish 
enjoyment. 

It  is  extremely  difiicult  to  give  a  general  answer  to  the 
question,  What  is  beautiful,  either  in  Art  or  in  Nature  ?  To 
give  a  normal  judgment,  one  ought  to  study  man  in  his 
development  throughout  the  ages,  and  try  to  find  out  what 
has  been  considered  the  most  beautiful  for  a  long  time,  and 
in  a  large  circle. 

If  Beauty  be  one  separate  quality,  r.i,''.  harmony,  it  is 
nevertheless  united  and  interwoven  with  so  many  other 
pleasing  qualities,  that  to  treat  of  it  separately  makes  it  not 
much  more  than  a  lifeless  mathematical  conception.  If  one 
intends  to  study  all  pleasing  qualities  in  their  mutual 
relationships,  one  has  a  science  which  can  never  get  on 
without  the  help  of  experience,  and  for  which  systematic 
unity  is  only  an  itleal. 

Much  has  been  said  on  the  question.  Whether  the  Form 
of  a  work  of  Art  constitutes  its  beauty,  or  the  Thought  which 
it  is  meant  to  express  ?  If  Harmony  in  representation  be 
the  principal  aim  of  the  artist,  Beauty  may  undoubtedly 
be  achie\'cd  h\  well -chosen  colours  and  lines,  by  light, 
shadow,  etc.,  although  the  object  represented  be  perhaps 
of  little  interest.  But  a  work  of  Art,  in  which  harmony  of 
form  is  associated  with  an  object  which  awakens  our 
interest,  and  stimulates  our  attention,  will  fascinate  us  more 
lastingly.  True  and  high  art  must  be  distinguished  from 
its  lower  forms,  which  may  sometimes  please  us,  in  the 
inequalities  of  our  intellectual  life,  and  which  (as  such)  may 
perhaps  be  temporarily  beneficial. 

Apart  from  th.e  philosophical  questions  which  arise 
everywhere  in  the  study  of  .-Vrt,  and  its  many  forms,  we 
nuist  consider  what  its  cultivation  adds  to  the  harmonious 
development  of  m;'.:i  ;   also  what  linfits  must  be  observed,  if 


XI  TJlc  PhilosopJiy  of  Holland  163 

we  would  not  injure  other  important  interests.  It  cannot 
be  denied  that  the  cuhivation  of  Art — or  the  manners  and 
ways  of  Life,  which  attend  it — often  promotes  a  super- 
excitation  of  the  passions,  and  a  slackening  of  the  sense  of 
duty,  and  personal  dignity.  For  this  reason  Art  has 
sometimes  drawn  upon  itself  wholesale  condemnation.  If  it 
be  said  that  every  one  who  is  unwilling  to  concede  unlimited 
freedom  to  Art  and  Artists,  is  a  narrow-minded  moralist, 
this  will  not  solve  the  problem  for  us  ;  especially  when  the 
question  may  be  put  whether  the  cultivation  of  Art  is 
sufficient  to  satisfy  our  desire  for  the  Beautiful.  Should  it 
not  be  our  highest  aim  to  get  to  the  primal  or  original  beauty, 
if  only  because  we  can  meet  with  it  oftener  than  we  can  see 
works  of  Art,  which  only  give  us,  from  time  to  time,  an 
ennobled  edition  of  a  fragment,  or  an  extract  of  the  world 
as  we  see  it  ?  Ought  we  not,  for  example,  to  consider 
more  the  beauty  of  our  speech,  than  that  of  music  ?  the 
beauty  of  the  life  we  lead,  more  than  that  of  an  epic  poem 
or  a  drama  ?  and  the  beauty  of  living  men  (beautiful  in  soul 
and  body)  above  that  of  statues  ?  Otherwise,  may  not  our 
worship  of  the  idea  deteriorate  into  an  adoration  of  the 
imperfect  and  the  perishable,  excellent  though  they  be  ? 
This  was  a  question  which  Plato  asked  himself,  and  man 
will  have  to  return  to  it  many  times. 


CHAPTER    XTI 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    PRITAIN 

r.  Bacon  to  HutcJicson 

The  first  writer  on  the  subject  of  IJeauty  in  our  English 
literature  is  not,  as  we  might  have  expected,  the  father  of 
]]ritish  jjhilosophy,  Lord  Bacon.  His  remarks  on  Beauty  in 
the  D^  yliiginottis  are  very  fragmentary,  and  ha^•e  no  ]ihilo- 
sophical  importance.  Perhaps  the  most  notable  saying  of 
Bacon's  on  the  subject  is  this  (in  his  forty-third  Essay)  : — 
"  Tha.t  is  the  best  ])art  of  ]3eauty,  which  a  picture  cannot 
express  ;  no,  nor  the  first  sight  of  the  eye.  Tiiere  is  no 
excellent  beauty  that  hath  not  some  strangeness  in  the 
proportion." 

A  translation  of  Dufrcsnoy's  poem,  Dc  Arlc  G}-<{pJ::ca, 
by  Dr^clen,  appeared  in  1695,  with  a  preface  C(Mitaining, 
with  other  thir.gs,  a  parallel  bi'tween  poetry  and  ]iainting. 
Dryden  tries  to  unf  )ld  the  characteristic  fciturcs  in  which 
all  good  Painting  and  I'oelry  excels,  viz.  In\'cnt;on,  Design, 
and  colouring  or  exprcs:5ion.  He  falls  l)ack,  ho\ve\'er,  on 
the  Aristotelian  imitation  of  Nature.  "To  imitate  Nature 
well  is  the  perfection  of  Art."  "  'j'liat  picture  and  that  poem 
\s'!fich  conies  nearest  the  resembl;ince  of  Nature  is  the  best  ; 
but  it  follows  not  th;it  what  ])lca:^es  most  in  either  kind  is 
theref  )re  good,  but  what  ought  to  jileasc." 

There  was,  however,  no  r(.>al  discussion  of  the  subject  of 
the  Ilcautiful  amongst  hlnglish  \\-riters  till  the  begimiing  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  The  li.->t  opens  with  the  name  of 
the  first  Lord  .Shaftesbury,  the  author  of  the  Cliardctcrisiics. 


CHAP.  XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britaui  165 

He  -^vas  the  first  philosopher  in  England  to  discuss  the 
question  of  the  Beautiful  with  any  insight,  or  with  an  ade- 
quate sense  of  its  importance.  His  Moralists^  a  PJiilosopJiical 
Rhapsody — originally  published  in  1709,  and  afterwards  in- 
corporated in  the  Cka?-acte)istics — with  all  its  diffusencss  and 
lack  of  precision,  has  passages  in  the  spirit  of  Plato.  As  a 
reproduction  of  the  Platonic  dialogue,  it  is  an  utter  failure  ; 
but  it  recalls  the  mental  attitude  and  the  general  drift  of 
the  teaching  of  the  Academy,  which  is  still  further  developed 
in  the  Miscellanies,  published  in  17 14.  The  following 
extract  from  the  Rhapsody  will  show  how  far  Shaftesbury 
grasped  the  teaching  of  Plato  : — 

"  Whatever  in  Nature  is  beautiful  is  only  the  faint 
shadow  of  the  First  Beauty "  (pt.  iii.  sec.  2).  "  Beauty 
and  Good  are  one  and  the  same."  "  I  now  am  obliged  to 
go  far  in  the  pursuit  of  Beauty,  which  lies  very  absconded 
and  deep.  I  have  dwelt,  it  seems,  all  this  while  upon  the 
surface,  and  enjoyed  only  a  kind  of  slight  superficial 
beauties,  having  never  gone  in  search  of  ISeauty  itself,  but 
of  what  I  fancied  such."  And  then  the  dialogue  proceeds 
(pt.  iii.  sec.  2) — "'Whatever  passions  you  may  have  for 
other  Beauties,  I  know,  good  Philocles,  you  are  no  such 
admirer  of  wealth  of  any  kind  as  to  allow  much  beauty  to 
it,  especially  in  a  rude  heap  or  mass.  But  in  medals, 
coins,  imbost  work,  statues,  etc.,  you  can  discover  beauty, 
and  admire  it.'  'True,'  said  I ;  '  but  not  for  the  metals'  sake.' 
'  'Tis  not  then  the  metal  or  matter  which  is  beautiful  with 
you?'  '  Xo.'  'But  the  Art?'  'Certainly.'  '  The  Art  then 
is  the  Beauty.'  '  Right.'  '  And  the  Art  is  that  which 
beautifies.'  '  The  same.'  '  So  that  the  beautifying-,  not 
the  beautified,  is  the  really  beautiful.'  '  It  seems  so.' 
'  For  that  which  is  beautified  is  beautiful  only  by  the 
accessories  of  something  beautifying,  and  by  the  recess  or 
withdrawing  of  the  same  it  ceases  to  be  beautiful  ? '  '  Be  it 
so.'  '  In  respect  of  Bodies  then.  Beauty  comes  and  goes?' 
'  So  we  sec.'  '  Nor  is  the  body  itself  any  cause  of  its 
coming  or  staying.'  '  Never.'  '  So  there  is  no  principle  of 
Beauty  in  body.'  '  None  at  all'  '  For  the  body  can  no 
way  be  the  cause  of  Beauty  to  itself?'      '  No  way.'      '  Nor 


i66  The  PJnlosopJty  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

govern,  nor  regulate  itself? '  '  Nor  yet  this.'  '  Xor  mean, 
nor  intend  itself .f"  'Not  this  neither.'  'Must  not  there- 
fore that  which  means  and  intends  for  it,  which  regulates 
and  orders  it,  be  the  principle  of  Beauty  in  it  ? '  'Of 
necessity.'  'And  what  must  that  be  ?'  '■  Mt7id,  I  suppose; 
for  what  can  it  be  else?'  '  Here  then,'  said  he,  'is  all  I 
could  have  explained  to  you  before :  that  the  Beautiful, 
the  Fair,  the  Comely,  were  never  in  the  matter,  but  in  the 
art  and  design  ;  never  in  the  body  itself,  but  in  the  form, 
or  forming  Power.' " 

He  then  goes  on  to  "  establish  three  degrees  or  orders  of 
Beauty.  First,  the  dead  forms,  which  are  formed  by  nature 
and  by  man,  but  which  have  no  forming"  power,  no  action 
or  intelligence  ;  secondly,  the  forms  which  form,  i.e.  which 
have  intelligence,  action,  and  operation."  Here  we  have 
double  beauty.  We  have  both  form,  the  effect  of  mind, 
and  the  mind  itself  In  this  second  kind  or  type  we  have 
living  form,  vital  Beauty.  But  in  the  Beauty  which  fashions 
or  produces  Beauty  (artist-like)  we  rise  to  a  third  order. 
Architecture  and  music  resolve  themselves  into  this  last, 
which  is  the  order  of  the  parent  or  creative  Beauty.  So 
much  for  the  PJiilosopliical  Rhapsody  of  1709. 

In  the  MisccUancoi{s  Reflections  of  17 14,  Shaftesbury 
reverted  to  his  former  teaching  on  the  subject,  and  laid 
down  a  proposition,  in  which  the  three  provinces  of  the 
True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good  are  mapped  out  almost 
as  clearly  as  by  Cousin.  "That  what  is  beautiful  is  har- 
monious and  projiortionable,  what  is  harmonious  and  pro- 
portionable is  true,  and  what  is  at  once  both  beautiful  and 
true  is  of  consc(]uencc  agrccaljje  and  good."  In  a  note  he 
recurs  to  his  scale  of  pjcauty  ;  the  first  in  the  inanimate,  the 
second  in  the  animate,  and  the  third  in  the  sphere  of  the 
mixed.  Inanimate  beauty  is  in  regular  figures,  symmetrical 
architecture,  harmonious  sounds  ;  the  animate  is  in  living 
things,  in  character,  in  societies,  communities,  and  common- 
wealths. In  the  third  the  two  forms  are  joined  (as  in  man, 
l)0(ly  and  soul  are  united),  and  wc  ha\c  the  lieauty  of  family 
life,  cemented  by  friendship,  and  of  national  life  with 
patriotic  feeling  as  the  tic. 


XII  The  PJdlosophy  of  Britain  167 

Shaftesbury  vindicates  the  originality  of  natural  beauty. 
He  speaks  of  it  as  existing  independently  "  in  figure,  colour, 
motion,  sound  "  ;  and,  selecting  the  first,  he  asks  why  an 
infant  is  at  once  pleased  with  a  sphere  or  globe  in  preference 
to  irregular  shapes.  He  answers  that  there  is  "a  natural 
beauty  which  the  eye  perceives  as  soon  as  the  object  is 
presented  to  it."  "No  sooner  does  the  eye  open  to  see  a 
figure,  or  the  ear  to  hear  sounds,  than  straightway  Beauty 
results,  and  grace  and  harmony  are  acknowledged.  No 
sooner  are  actions  viewed,  and  affections  discerned,  than 
straight  our  inward  eye  distinguishes  the  fair,  the  shapely, 
the  admirable." 

In  his  ethical  teaching  Shaftesbury  threw  emphasis  on 
sentiment  rather  than  reason.  He  would  have  human  con- 
duct guided  by  natural  normal  impulse,  or  feeling,  rather 
than  by  the  control  of  a  law  from  without,  or  a  rational 
principle  from  within.  So  far  as  he  applied  his  doctrine  of 
Beauty,  which  he  had  derived,  both  directly  and  indirectly, 
from  the  Greeks — as  he  was  a  classical  scholar,  and  was  in 
sympathy  with  the  spirit  of  antiquity  —  to  the  sphere  of 
conduct,  an  action  was  to  be  condemned,  if  it  was  inhar- 
monious. A  selfish  act  was  an  ugly  one.  It  violated  the 
canons  of  good  taste,  whereas  an  action  that  was  normal, 
and  that  regarded  the  welfare  of  others  as  well  as  of  one- 
self, was  always  beautiful. 

From  2 1st  June  to  3d  July  171 2,  Joseph  Addison 
discussed  the  "  Pleasures  of  the  Imagination,"  in  a  scries  of 
ten  papers  in  the  Spectator  (Nos.  411  to  421).  Addison's 
essays  are  bright  and  sparkling,  but  his  philosophy  is 
botli  slender  and  nebulous.  He  affirms  that  "  though  there 
is  not  perhaps  any  real  Beauty  or  Deformity  more  in  one 
piece  of  matter  than  in  another,  we  find  by  experience  that 
there  are  several  modifications  of  matter  "  [why  did  he  not 
say  '  objects  '  Y\  "  which  the  mind,  without  any  previous  con- 
sideration, pronounces  at  first  sight  beautiful  or  deformed." 
He  then  refers  to  a  second  kind  of  Beauty,  which  "  raises  in 
us  a  secret  delight  for  the  places  or  objects  in  which  we 
discover  it.  This  consists  either  in  the  gaiety  or  variety 
of  colours,  or  in  the  symmetry  and  proportion  of  parts,  in  the 


i68  Tlie  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

arrangement  and  disposition  of  bodies,  or  in  a  just  mixture 
and  concurrence  of  all  together.''  All  this  is  vague  enough. 
It  was  almost  inevitable,  however,  that  the  subject  should 
be  discussed  in  this  rhetorical  fashion  in  England  before  it 
was  handled  with  analytic  rigour  in  the  schools. 

The  English  em]D;ricists,  as  a  rule,  true  to  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  their  system,  have  dealt  with  the  out- 
ward features  of  the  Beautiful,  and  tabulated  some  of  its 
characteristics  with  skill,  but  they  have  seldom  risen  above 
or  got  behind  these  external  features.  }.Iany  of  them  have 
explicitly  avowed  that  we  cannot  reach  any  ultimate  principle. 
What  the  best  of  them  saw  was  a  sort  of  uniformiity  in  the 
order  of  Nature,  but  not  a  unity  underlying  the  diversity  of 
its  forms. 

In  1725 — seventeen  years  after  .Shaftesbury's  Moralisis 
appeared — Francis  Hutcheson,  Professor  of  Philosophy  at 
(Glasgow  University  (1694-1747),  published  a  book  which  he 
called  an  E/ujuiry  into  tlic  Oriyi/iat  of  our  ideas  of  B caul y 
luui  Virtue.  This  book  was  professedly  an  explanation  and 
defence  of  the  teaching  of  Shaftesbury,  against  the  sub- 
sequent attack  of  ?vlandeville,  the  author  of  Tiic  Fabte  of 
tiic  Bees. 

In  his  preface  Hutcheson  says  that  his  chief  solicitude 
is  to  prove  *•  that  there  is  some  sense  of  Beauty  ?:aturat  to 
viajii'  But  v.hile  his  starting-point  is  thus  realistic  or 
matter  of  fact,  it  is  also  idealistic,  as  he  afhrms  that  Beauty 
is  an  idea  in  us  ;  and  he  wants  to  find  out  what  occasions 
it,  what  (juality  in  olrc^ts  excites  it.  He  concludes  that  it 
is  by  "an  internal  sense''  th.at  we  perceive  Beauty,  or 
'•receive  its  impressions"  ;  and  he  justifies  his  use  of  the 
term  "sense,''  because  our  pleasure  does  not  arise  "from 
any  knowledge  of  the  princijiles.  causes,  or  usefr.lness  of  tlie 
fjbject.''  We  recognise  a  Beauty  in  olajects  before  we  are 
aware  of  any  advantage  to  be  derived  from  them. 

Hutcheson  divided  the  kinds  or  types  of  Beauty  into  the 
.■\bsoIute  and  tlie  Belative.  Ab-^olute  Ileauty,  liowe\er,  is 
niit  l>eauty  in  an  object  out  of  all  relation  to  th.e  mind  that 
pc-rrcives  it;  for,  without  mind  to  penx-ive  it,  no  oi^ject 
could  Ijc  beautiful.      Absolute  Beautv  is  beruuv  in  an  o;)iect 


XII  TliC  PJiilosopliy  of  Britain  169 

without  relation  to  anything  beyond  it,  anything  of  which  it  is 
an  imitation.  Relative  Beauty  is  beauty  in  objects  which  are 
resemblances  of  other  things.  The  ideas  of  absolute  beauty 
are  raised  in  us  by  the  perception  of  uniformity  amid 
variety  ;  the  variety  increasing  the  beauty,  and  the  uni- 
formity heightening  it  also.  This  is  the  foundation  of  the 
beauty  we  perceive  in  Nature  generally  ;  and  in  the  in- 
dividual things  in  Nature  that  we  call  beautiful  (especially 
in  living  things)  the  proportion  of  the  parts  to  one  another 
is  an  additional  source  of  their  beauty.  The  beauty  of 
theorems  is  due  to  the  amount  of  variety  niingling  with 
uniformity  in  them,  and  when  many  corollaries  are  deducible 
from  them.  The  same  is  true  of  beauty  in  the  great  laws 
of  Nature,  such  as  the  law  of  gravitation.  Then  as  to 
Relative  Beauty,  it  springs  from  the  imitation  of  what  is 
originally  beautiful.  To  this  the  beauty  of  metaphors, 
symbols,  and  allegories  is  due.  But  Hutcheson  affirms  that 
to  obtain  this  secondary  or  relative  beauty,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  there  should  be  any  beauty  in  the  original.  "An 
exact  imitation  shall  still  be  beautiful  though  the  original 
were  entirely  devoid  of  it." 

The  sixth  section  of  Hutcheson's  treatise  is  devoted  to 
the  "originality  of  the  source  of  Beauty  among  men.'' 
Deformity  is  only  the  absence  of  beauty  where  it  was 
naturally  to  be  expected.  A  rude  heap  of  stones  is  not 
ugly ;  but  rude  and  irregular  architecture  is.  The  effect  of 
association  in  deflecting  our  judgments,  and  artificially 
changing  things  that  are  naturally  very  different,  is  fully  ad- 
mitted by  him  ;  and  he  thinks  that  it  is  due  to  the  influence 
of  association  that  many  persons  do  not  admire  what  is 
really  beautiful,  and  do  admire  what  is  not  beautiful.  Still, 
he  says,  "  there  is  a  natural  power  of  perception,  or  a  sense 
of  the  beauty  of  objects,  antecedent  to  all  custom,  education, 
or  example."'  Custom  simply  makes  us  perceive  things, 
or  perform  actions,  more  easily  than  we  did  at  first  ;  but, 
had  we  no  natural  sense  of  Beauty,  custom  could  never 
have  made  us  perceive  any  beauty  in  them.  In  other  words, 
it  enlarges  our  capacity,  and  quickens  our  powers,  but  it 
creates  nothing. 


I  JO  TJie  Philosophy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

The  net  result  of  Hutcheson's  speculations  on  the  Beauti- 
ful is  not  great.  All  honour  to  him,  however,  in  that 
prosaic  eighteenth  century,  for  the  work  which  he  did  as  a 
pioneer.  Probably  Tcre  Andre  had  something  to  do  in 
sug'^gesting  the  subject  to  Hutcheson  ;  and  it  is  worthy  of 
note  that,  with  the  exception  of  Andre,  British  writers 
jDreceded  those  of  Germany  and  France,  if  not  in  an  appre- 
ciation of  the  Beautiful,  at  least  in  recognising  the  fact  that 
the  subject  could  be  scientincally  dealt  with,  and  that  it 
demanded  philosophical  treatment.  The  Enquiry  z>!io  tlw 
Original  of  our  ideas  of  Beauty  and  Virtu;  is  the  prototype 
of  all  subsecjuent  discussions  in  Europe  on  the  True,  the 
Beautiful,  and  the  Good.  Kant  seems  to  have  read  the 
book  (it  was  translated  into  German)  ;  Jacobi  also  was 
familiar  with  it ;  and  Hutcheson  is  almost  the  only  English 
writer  on  the  subject  ^^■ho  is  referred  to  by  the  German 
historians. 

2.  Berkeley  to  Hogarth 

In  the  third  dialogue  of  A/eifln'on,  or  tlie  Minute 
rhilosop/ia;  written  by  George  Berkeley,  the  Bisliop  of 
Cloyne  (1684-1753),  and  published  at  Dublin  in  1732, 
there  is  a  discussion  on  }>Ioral  Beauty.  "  Doubtless,''  saici 
Euphranor,  '■  there  is  a  Beauty  of  the  mind,  a  charm  in 
\':rtue,  a  symmciry  and  proportion  in  the  moral  world."' 
This  moral  ]]eauty  was  known  to  the  ancients  by  the  name 
Ilonestum,  or  to  Ko.Xtjv.  Euphranor  gives  the  meai-.ing  of 
it  as  he  understands  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  th.cn  asks 
Alciphron  for  his  denniiion  of  the  beauty  of  virtue,  since  he 
does  not  agree  with  I'lato  and  ,-\ri.>totle.  '•  !\Ioral  Beaut}",'' 
he  rcj)l:ed,  "is  of  so  familiar  and  abstracted  a  nature,  some- 
thing so  subtle,  tine,  and  fu;.^\'u:ious,  that  it  v>-ill  not  bear 
being  handled  or  in.-nectcd,  lil^e  e\'ery  gross  and  comn:nn 
(jbiect."'  •■  It  is  rather  to  Ijc  felt  tlian  understood — a 
certain  Je  ne  s'ai  quoi" — moral  beauty  being  percci\'ed  by 
the  moral  sense,  as  colours  are  by  the  eye.  Eupln-anrir 
rejoins  that  inward  feeling  is  a  \cx\  uncertain  guide  in 
mora!-;,  and  that  reason  sh.ould  rather  come  in,  and  h^alance 


XII  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  Br  it  am  171 

pleasures  one  against  another.  Alciphron  replies  that  he 
contemns  the  man  who  "  must  haA'e  a  reason  for  being 
virtuous."  The  abstract  Beauty  of  virtue  should  itself  allure, 
and  virtue  be  "loved  for  virtue's  sake."  Euphranor  then 
asks  Alciphron  "  if  all  mankind  are  agreed  in  the  notion 
of  a  beauteous  face.'"'  He  replies  that  "  all  minds  have  the 
ideas  of  order,  harmony,  and  proportion."  P^uphranor 
presses  him,  however,  for  a  definition  of  Beauty  "in  the 
objects  of  sense."  Alciphron  rcphes,  "  Every  one  knows 
that  Beauty  is  that  which  pleases ''  ;  but,  as  odoui's  and 
tastes  are  not  beautiful,  but  pleasant  only,  it  must  be 
further  defined  as  consisting  "in  a  certain  symmetry  or 
proportion  pleasing  to  the  eye."  He  is  asked  if  it  is  the 
same  in  all  things.  He  replies  that  it  is  different  in  chfferent 
things.  It  therefore  consists  in  proportions  and  relations, 
which  proportions  and  relations  must  be  so  adjusted  that 
the  whole  is  perfect  of  its  kind  ;  and  a  thing-  is  perfect  in 
its  kind  when  it  answers  the  end  for  which  it  was  made. 
This  being  the  work  of  reason,  not  of  sense,  Beauty  "  is  in 
objects,  not  of  the  eye,  but  of  the  mind,"  and  Beauty  is 
discerned  only  by  the  mind.  Euphranor  then  refers  to 
architectural  proportion,  and  to  the  beauties  of  draping 
amongst  the  ancients,  which  he  compares  with  the  artificial 
ugliness  of  some  Gothic  dresses  ;  and  concludes  that 
]5eauty,  both  of  architecture  and  of  dress,  "depends  on 
their  subserving"  to  certain  ends  and  uses."  This  gives  us 
the  distinction  between  the  Greek  and  the  Gothic  Archi- 
tecture— the  Greek  being  founded  on  reason,  necessity,  and 
use  ;  the  Gothic  being  fantastic.  Euphranor  further  pleads 
that  the  fact  that  a  thing  gave  pileasure  2000  years  ag'o, 
and  2000  miles  away,  and  that  it  does  so  now  and  here,  is 
proof  that  there  is  in  it  "  some  real  principle  of  Beauty," 
and  that  we  may  therefore  conclude  that  the  order,  pro- 
])ortion,  and  symmetry  of  objects,  which  tend  to  some  use 
or  end,  are  integral  elements  in  their  beauty.  The  dis- 
cussion then  proceeds  to  moral  beauty,  and  Berkeley 
argues  that  the  beauty  of  the  moral  system  "  supposeth  a 
Providence."' 

In   comparing   the   discussion   of  Beauty   in  AlcipJiro?i 


172  TJie  P]iilosopJiy  of  iJie  Beautiful  chap. 

with  that  of  Shaftesbury  in  his  Rhapsody^  and  e\-cn  with 
that  of  Hutcheson  in  his  Eiiqinry,  it  wiU  be  seen  tliat  our 
English  ideahsm  has  assumed  a  new  and  a  more  finished 
form.  Its  affinity  with  the  teaching  of  Plato  is  more 
marked,  and  its  idealism  gives  character  to  the  style  no 
less  than  to  the  doctrine  of  Berkeley. 

In  1744  a  Treatise  concctiiiiig  Art^  and  another  on 
Music,  Painting,  aful  Poetry,  were  written  by  James  Harris 
(1709-1780)  ;  better  known  as  the  author  of  Hermes  (175  i) 
and  I'hitotogieat  Ar7-angeincnts  (^ijy^).  It  is  in  the  form 
of  a  dialogue,  and  a  \-ery  cumbrous  dialogue  it  is.  Art  is 
defined  as  a  cause  set  in  operation  by  man  to  produce  an 
effect  which  he  only  can  produce  (not  a  very  luminous 
definition).  But  the  object  on  which  this  cause  operates 
in  not  the  abstract  course  of  Nature,  but  the  "transient, 
particular,  contingent "  Nature.  Art  is  "  an  energy  "' 
whose  dominion  is  of  the  widest  kind.  Fire,  air,  water, 
earth,  and  the  mind  of  man,  are  all  amenable  to  it ;  and  it 
always  operates  "for  the  sake  of  some  good,  relative  to 
human  life,  and  attainable  by  man  "  (p.  44). 

Towards  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  Joseph 
Spence,  Professor  of  Poetry  in  the  University  of  Oxford, 
wrote  two  works  which  deal  with  the  subject  of  Beauty. 
The  first  was  Polymctis,  or  an  E/K/uiry  concerning  tJie 
Agreement  between  the  works  of  the  Roman  Poets,  and  t/ic 
Re7?iaij!s  of  the  Ancient  Artists,  being  an  attempt  to  itlus- 
trate  tJiem  mutually  fro))i  each  other  (1747).  This  work 
is  criticised  by  Lcssing  in  his  Laocoon,  who  points  out  that 
Spence  did  not  distinguish  tiie  province  of  Art  with  accuracy, 
making  the  range  and  power  of  the  sculptor  equal  to  that  of 
the  poet.  One  of  the  special  ainis  of  the  Laocoon  was  to 
distinguish  these  jM-ovinccs.  He  held  that  all  repulsive 
subjects  must  be  removed  from  plastic  Art,  while  Poetry 
might  deal  with  them. 

Spcncc's  second  work  was  Crito ;  or  a  Dialogue  on 
locality,  printed  in  the  first  volume  of  Dodsley's  Fugitive 
/V;\vj-  (London  1752),  and  afterwards  at  Dublin  in  1762. 
This  Dialogue  was  written  under  the  pseudonym  of  Sir 
Harry    licaiiinont.      "  I    should    as   soon   think,''   wrote    tli3 


XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britain  173 

author,  "  of  dissecting  a  rainbow,  as  of  forming  grave  and 
punctual  notions  of  Beauty.  Who,  for  Heaven's  sake,  can 
reduce  to  rules  what  is  so  Cjuick  and  so  variable  as  to  be 
shifting  its  appearance  every  moment  ? "  (p.  9).  And  yet 
he  proceeds  to  lay  down  some  excellent,  if  not  "  grave  and 
punctual  notions.''  '"Everything  belonging  to  Beauty  falls 
under  these  four  heads — Colour,  Form,  Expression,  Grace  ; 
the  two  former  of  which  are  the  body,  the  two  latter  the 
soul  of  Beauty"  (p.  11).  (i)  The  delight  of  Colour  is 
due  to  its  "natural  liveliness,"  the  charm,  when  colours 
"  are  properly  blended,"  of  the  idea  of  health  which  they 
convey,  and  of  variety,  when  many  different  kinds  of  colour 
are  intermixed.  (2)  In  Form  we  have  symmetry,  harmony, 
proportion.  But  (3)  in  Expression  the  ideas  and  changes 
of  the  mind  are  made  visible  by  look  and  gesture,  as  they 
also  are  (4)  by  Grace  ;  and  if  the  chief  seat  of  expression 
is  the  eye,  that  of  grace,  he  fancies,  is  the  mouth.  The 
discussion  is  not  a  profound  one  ;  but  the  dialogue  was 
adopted  almost  wholesale  in  an  article  on  Beauty  in  \A'ilkes' 
Encyclopedia  Londitiensis,  and  also  in  Barro\\'es'  Modern 
Encyclopedia. 

The  principle  of  an  independent  standard  of  the  Beautiful, 
announced  by  Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson,  had  leavened  a 
few  minds  in  Britain,  and  borne  fruit  in  various  ways  ;  and 
it  is  interesting  that  the  next  expression  of  opinion  on  the 
subject  came  from  one  of  the  artist-minds  of  England. 
William  Hogarth  is  better  known  as  a  painter  and  engraver, 
than  as  a  literary  man  or  a  philosopher.  Nevertheless  he 
published,  in  1753,  a  somewhat  important  book,  v.hich  he 
called  The  Analysis  of  Beauty,  "  written  '"  (he  added  on  the 
title-page)  "with  a  view  of  fixing  the  fluctuating  ideas  of 
Taste."'  Eight  years  before,  he  had  made  a  frontispiece  for 
one  of  his  engraved  works,  in  the  form  of  a  painter's  palette, 
on  which  he  drew  a  serpentine  line,  like  the  letter  S  ;  and 
under  it  he  placed  the  words,  "  the  Line  of  Beauty."  It  was 
a  sphinx- riddle  to  his  contemporaries.  The  Analysis  of 
1753,  however,  explained  it.  Like  the  work  of  1745,  it  had 
a  frontispiece  ;  this  time  it  was  a  prismatic  cube,  within 
which  a  serpentine  line  was  drawn  from  the  apex  to  the  base, 


174  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

with  the  word  "  \'ariety  "  printed  below.  In  his  preface, 
Hogarth  raises  the  question,  why  the  great  artists  of  the 
past  had  not  given  us  a  theory  of  the  Beautiful  ;  and  he 
answers  that  it  was  because  they  had  been  so  busy  with  their 
craft,  and  with  copying  Beauty,  that  they  had  found  no  time 
for  its  analysis,  so  that  -fc  7ie  scai  quoi  had  become  a  fashion- 
able phrase  for  grace.''  He  proceeds  to  defend  his  own 
Line  of  Beauty.  Rubens  had  made  use  of  a  large  flowing 
line,  Raphael  of  the  serpentine  line,  particularly  in  his 
draperies,  as  did  Peter  of  Cortona,  and  Correggio.  Albert 
Diirer  and  Vandyke  did  not  ;  and  this  explains  why  there 
was  more  of  beauty  in  the  works  of  the  former  than  in  those 
of  the  latter. 

In  his  Introduction,  Hogarth  e.xplains  that  his  aim  is  to 
show  what  the  principles  in  Nature  are,  by  which  we  call 
certain  objects  beautiful,  and  others  ugly.  These  principles 
are  "  fitness,  variety,  uniformity,  simplicity,  intricacy,  and 
quantity,  all  which  co-operate  in  the  production  of  Beauty, 
mutually  correcting,  and  occasionally  restraining  each  other.'' 
There  is  (i)  the  fitness  of  the  parts  to  the  design  for 
which  each  thing  is  formed,  as  in  the  case  of  the  eye  formed 
for  seeing.  There  is  (2)  variety  in  such  things  as  shape 
and  colour.  All  the  senses  rejoice  in  variety,  and  dislike 
uniformity.  But  the  variety  may  be  either  in  the  way  of 
increase  or  diminution,  and  the  results  in  either  case  be 
beautiful.  (3)  There  is  uniformity,  regularity,  and  sym- 
metry, which,  says  he,  "please  only  as  they  seem  to  give 
the  idea  of  fitness.''  (4)  Simplicity  and  distinctness. 
"  Simplicity  v/ithout  variety  is  wholly  insipid,"  but  with 
variety  it  pleases  the  eye  "  by  giving  it  the  power  of  enjoy- 
ing with  ease."  (5)  Intricacy.  The  eye  enjoys  "winding 
walks  and  serpentine  rivers,  and  all  sorts  of  objects  whose 
forms  are  composed  of  waving  and  serpentine  lines."  "  Intri- 
cacy of  form,"  he  says,  "  is  that  peculiarity  in  the  lines  that 
leads  the  eye  a  wanton  kind  of  chase  "  ;  and  he  adds  thai 
"  grace  more  intimately  resides  in  this  than  in  the  other  five, 
except  '  variety,'  which  indeed  includes  this  and  all  the 
others.''  (6)  Quantity.  Great  objects,  because  of  their 
greatness,  excite  our  admiration,   especially  if  simplicity  is 


XII  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  Britain  175 

allied  to  quantity.  "  It  is  quantity  that  adds  greatness  to 
grace."  These  six  principles  Hogarth  applies  to  Lines  and 
Figures,  to  Colours,  and  to  Actions.  In  every  kind  of 
composition  he  afifirms  that  the  art  of  composing  well  is  the 
art  of  varying  well  ;  and  he  says  that  St.  Paul's  Cathedral 
is  one  of  the  noblest  instances  of  the  application  of  every 
principle  he  has  mentioned.  In  this  monumental  work  of 
Wren  we  find  "  variety  without  confusion,  simplicity  with- 
out nakedness,  richness  without  tawdriness,  distinctness 
without  hardness,  and  quantity  without  excess." 

The  line  of  Beauty  or  Grace,  according  to  Hogarth,  is 
the  serpentine  line,  its  excellence  being  due  to  its  curves 
giving  play  to  the  imagination,  as  well  as  delighting  the 
eye.  He  illustrates  this  at  great  length,  and  tries  to  show 
that  almost  all  ornamentation,  from  the  very  beginning  of 
Art,  consisted  in  the  double  curve.  But  his  analysis  of  the 
beauty  of  colour  is  perhaps  more  interesting.  Here  it  is 
variety — the  utmost  possible  variety — that  is  the  source  of 
the  charm.  It  is,  he  says,  "  the  not  knowing  Nature's 
artful  and  intricate  method  of  uniting  colours  for  the  pro- 
duction of  the  finer  tint  of  flesh,  that  hath  made  colour- 
ing, in  the  art  of  painting,  a  mystery  in  all  ages."  He 
thinks  Correggio  stands  almost  alone  in  this  excellence, 
that  Guido  was  always  at  a  loss  about  it,  and  that  Poussin 
seems  scarcely  ever  to  have  had  a  glimpse  of  it. 


3.  Burke  to  Sir  Josliua  Key  not ds 

In  1756,  three  years  after  Hogarth's  Analysis  appeared, 
Edmund  Burke  published  his  Essay  on  tlie  Subtinie  and 
Bcaiitifut.  Burke's  theory  harked  back  from  the  idealistic 
to  almost  the  lowest  empirical  level.  He  identified  the 
Beautiful  with  the  pleasant.  But  his  discussion  has  this 
interest  and  merit,  that  it  dealt  with  some  of  the  physiological 
aspects  of  the  question.  The  elements  of  Beauty,  accord- 
ing to  Burke,  are — (i)  smallness  of  size,  (2)  smoothness  of 
surface,  (3)  variety  of  outline  in  curves,  (4)  delicacy,  sug- 
gesting fragility,  (5)  brightness,  and  softness  of  colour.      He 


I -J  6  TJic  Pliilosopliy  of  tJie  Beautiful  cww. 

emphasised  smoothness  of  surface  and  softness  of  outhne 
till  he  made  it  almost  all- dominant,  and  in  consequence 
gave  his  theory  a  one  -  sided  character.  Those  objects 
appear  beautiful  which  have  the  power  of  relaxing  our 
nerves,  and  producing  in  us  a  sort  of  languor  and  repose. 
Pie  could  see  no  beauty  in  angles,  or  sharp  points  of  any 
kind  ;  and  so,  in  his  eulogy  of  smoothness,  he  mistook  one 
of  the  conditions  of  beauty  for  its  constitutive  essence. 
Burke's  v/as  a  thoroughly  partisan  theory.  His  way  of 
comparing  the  Beautiful  with  the  Sublime  has  more  interest 
than  his  separate  discussion  of  either  of  them.  '•  Sublime 
objects,''  he  says  (pt.  iii.  p.  27),  "are  vast  in  their  dimensions 
■ — beautiful  ones  comparatively  small  :  beauty  should  be 
smooth  and  polished  —  the  great  rugged  and  negligent  : 
beauty  should  show  the  right  line,  yet  deviate  from  it 
insensibly — the  grea.t  in  many  cases  loves  the  right  line, 
and  when  it  deviates  makes  a  strong  deviation  :  beauty 
should  not  be  obscure  —  the  great  ought  to  be  dark  and 
gloomy  :  beauty  should  be  light  and  delicate — the  great 
ought  to  be  solid,  and  e\'en  massive.'' 

The  year  after  Burke's  essay  appeared  (in  1757),  David 
Hume  issued  his  Foiur  Dissertations^  the  last  of  v.hich  was 
"  Of  the  Standard  of  Taste."  It  was  afterwards  included 
in  his  Essiivs  :  Moral,  Political,  and  Literary,  where  it  forms 
the  twenty-third  essay.  It  is,  in  many  respects,  remarka'ole; 
mainly  because  in  it  the  chief  agnostic  of  the  eighteenth 
century  takes  up  a  position  which  is  out  of  keeping  witli 
tlie  rest  of  his  philosophy,  and  which,  had  it  been  carricti 
out  consistently,  would  have  led  to  a  vital  modification 
of  the  doctrine  of  experience,  if  not  so  far  as  the  opposite 
philosophy  of  idealism.  On  this  point  Hume  has  been 
greatly  misunderstood.  His  clear  and  penetrating  intellect 
is  seen  to  much  a.dwantage  in  his  essay  on  Taste.  He 
begins  by  saying  th.at  it  is  natural  for  us  to  desire  a 
standard  of  Taste,  and  he  rcfcr^  to  '•  a  species  of  Bhilosopliy 
wliich  cuts  off  all  hope  of  success  in  such  an  attempt,'' — a 
philosophy  \\"hicli  sa}"s — 

•'  Beauty  is  no  qu.ality  in  things  themselves.  It  ex;s'.s 
merely    in    the    min  1   wliich    contemplates   them,  and   each 


xi:  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  Britain  177 

mind  perceives  a  diftcrcnt  beaut}'.  One  person  may  even 
j^erceive  deformity  where  another  is  sensible  of  beauty,  and 
every  individual  ought  to  acquiesce  in  his  own  sentiments, 
without  pretending  to  regulate  those  of  others.  To  seek 
the  real  Beauty  or  the  real  deformity  is  as  fruitless  an 
enquiry  as  to  pretend  to  ascertain  the  real  sweet  or  the  real 
bitter''  ;  and  so  the  old  maxim  de  gustibiis,  etc.,  should  be 
extended  to  "  mental  as  well  as  bodily  taste." 

]Many  persons  have  supposed  that  in  this  paragraph  Hume 
was  Cjuoting  his  own  opinion  ;  whereas  he  goes  on  imme- 
diately to  state — and  the  whole  purpose  of  his  essay  is  to 
defend — what  he  calls  "a  species  of  common  sense,  which 
opposes  it,  or  at  least  seems  to  modify  and  restrain  it."  The 
very  burden  of  the  essay  is  a  vindication  of  the  general  and 
permanent  principles  of  criticism,  as  against  the  tluctuating 
verdicts  of  individual  minds.  He  recalls  to  us  the  fact 
that  "  the  same  Homer  who  pleased  at  Athens  and  Rome 
is  still  admired  at  Paris  and  London,"  and  he  connects  this 
with  what  he  calls  "  certain  qualities  in  the  original  struc- 
ture of  the  internal  fabric  [i.e.  the  mind  of  man]  which 
are  calculated  to  please,  and  others  to  displease."  This 
is  really  a  concession,  and  a  very  important  concession,  on 
the  part  of  perhaps  the  strongest  European  brain  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  to  the  very  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  which 
it  elsewhere  repudiated.  "Some  objects,"  Hume  says,  "by 
the  structure  of  the  mind  are  naturally  calculated  to  gi\'c 
pleasure."  "  Though  it  be  certain,"  he  adds,  "that  I^cauty 
and  Deformity,  more  than  sweet  and  bitter,  are  not  cjualities 
in  objects,  but  belong  entirely  to  sentiment,  it  i>ii/st  be 
allcnued  tiiat  t/icfe  are  certain  qiiaiities  in  objects  wiiic/i  are 
fitted  by  Nature  to  produce  tiiose  particular  feelings.'^  This 
is  every  way  a  most  significant  admission. 

The  essay  deals  further  with  the  things  \vhich  :end  to 
make  Taste  delicate  and  accurate,  its  rapid  and  acute  per- 
ception of  minute  things,  its  training  by  long  practice,  its 
freedom  from  prejudice,  the  revision  of  its  judgments,  and 
the  comparison  of  varied  excellences.  Hume  affirms  that 
the  difficulty  of  finding  a  standard  of  Taste,  even  in  parti- 
culars, is  not  so  great  as  is  represented.      The  principles  of 

N 


1 78  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  tlie  Beautiful  chap. 

Taste  are  "uniform  in  Human  Nature.''  They  are  ••  uni- 
versa.l,  and  nearly,  if  not  entirely,  the  same  in  all  men  "  ; 
rtnd  he  expressly  contrasts  the  difficulty  of  finding  a 
standard  of  the  True  by  which  to  judge  the  systems  of 
Philosophy,  witli  the  ease  with  which  a  trained  taste  can 
judge  a  work  of  Art. 

These  explicit  statements  by  Hume  should  have  saved 
him  from  the  indiscriminate  and  ignorant  charge  of  denying 
an  objective  standard.  It  would  have  been  a  much  wiser 
criticism  to  have  suggested  that  the  admission  he  made  of 
the  existence  of  a  universal  and  uniform  standard  of  Taste 
might  be  extended  from  the  realm  of  the  Ik'autiful  to  that 
of  the  True  and  the  Good  ;  that  the  variety  in  the  verdicts 
ot  men  in  the  latter  sphere  is  not  greater  than  in  the 
former  ;  and  that  the  admission  of  a  standard  in  the  one 
case  suggests,  and  almost  logically  involves,  its  admission  in 
the  other.  In  reference  to  the  deeper  question  of  the 
origin  of  the  standard  Hume  is  of  course  silent. 

In  the  same  year  in  which  this  essay  of  Hume's 
appeared,  D'Alembert  read  to  the  French  Academy  his 
'•  Reflections  on  the  use  and  abuse  of  Philosophy  in  matters 
of  Taste,'"  and  Richard  Price — the  extreme  intellcctualist 
amongst  the  eighteenth-century  moralists  of  England  — 
issued  his  Rciiczc  of  iJic  Prhicipal  (2i<€siiojis  of  Mu>-ids. 
In  the  second  chapter  of  Price's  "review''  there  is  a  dis- 
cussion '"of  the  ideas  of  the  Beauty  and  Deformity  of 
actions.''"  Price's  po>;t!on  was  a  curious  one.  He  ron- 
sider^'d  that  the  action,  both  of  the  understanding  and  of 
the  heart,  came  into  ])lay  in  cleternrining  the  moral  cjuality 
of  a.ctions,  and  that  by  the  former  we  judge  of  them  as 
right  or  wrong,  by  the  latter  as  beautiful  or  base  :  the  one 
faculty  (intellect)  deciding  as  to  the  diKtiutv  (the  right), 
.ind  the  other  faculty  (feeling)  deciding  as  to  the  i:nX''>v 
(the  beauty).  He  agreed  v.'ith  Hutcheson  that  unit'ormity 
and  wariety  was  the  source  of  the  P)Caut\"  of  Nature  :  Ijut  if 
we  go  on  to  ask  v/hy  this  characteristic  of  Nature  pi;  ascs 
us,  he  did  not  think  we  require  to  bring  in  tlie  hypotl'.esrs 
i)f  an  internal  sense  to  explain  it.  because  the  objcts  as 
sink   have    this    quality  in   them.      If  there   be    uniformity 


XII  The  PJiilosopliy  of  Britain  179 

•within  the  variety  in  every  natural  object,  the  object  is 
more  easily  measured,  and  its  bea.uty  taken  in  by  us  ; 
while  it  is  the  order  and  symmetry  of  objects  that  give 
them  strength  and  stability.  The  uniformity  is  as  necessary 
to  the  variety,  as  the  variety  is  to  the  uniformity  ;  and  Price 
held  that  natural  Beauty  was  a  quality  absolutely  inherent 
in  objects,  that  it  existed  in  them  whether  any  mind  per- 
ceived it  or  not. 

A  chapter  in  the  TJieory  of  Moral  Se^itiiiients  of  Adam 
Smith,  published  tv/o  years  after  these  discussions  by  Hume 
and  Price  (1759),  must  not  be  overlooked  by  the  student 
of  the  history  of  cCsthetic  doctrine  in  Britain.  It  is  the 
first  chapter  of  the  fifth  part  of  the  book,  and  is  entitled 
'•  Of  the  influence  of  custom  and  fashion  upon  our  notions 
of  Beauty  and  Deformity."  Smith  gives  a  much  wider 
scope  to  their  influence  on  our  judgments  of  Beauty,  both 
in  Nature  and  in  Art,  than  Hume  did.  He  states  the 
theory  of  Pere  Buflier,^  but  he  is  unjust  in  his  inference 
that,  according-  to  it,  the  whole  charm  of  the  Beautiful 
arises  from  the  habits  which  custom  imposes  on  the 
imagination.  Adam  Smith  no  more  admits  that  Beauty 
can  be  explained  by  custom  than  Buffier,  or  Price,  or 
Hume  had  done.  He  held  that  the  fitness  of  objects  for 
their  intended  end,  their  utility,  was  the  source  of  the 
Beauty,  independently  of  custom.  This  was  perhaps  a 
natural  conclusion  for  the  father  of  modern  Political 
Economy  to  come  to.  The  utilitarian  rule  was  that  by 
vrhich  he  tested  most  things.  But  he  also  held  that  certain 
colours  were  intrinsically  beautiful,  that  smoothness  was 
naturally  more  agreeable  than  roughness,  and  variety  than 
uniformity. 

In  the  same  year  as  that  in  which  Smith's  book  appeared 
(1759),  Dr.  Alexander  Gerard  of  Aberdeen  published  his 
Essay  on  Taste,  an  acute  work  of  no  speculative  ^'alue. 
He  held  that  Beauty  is  of  many  kinds.  The  first  is  that 
of  Figure,  and  is  found  in  objects  which  have  uniformity, 
variety,  and  proportion.  "  Uniformity,  when  unmixed,''  will 
"pail  upon  the  sense."  -A'ariety  is  necessary  to  enliven 
'  See  p.  93. 


I  So  The  P/iilosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

it'';  but  "were  the  variety  boundless,  the  mind  would  be 
fatigued.''  A  certain  degree  of  uniformity  must  therefore 
be  blended  with  the  variety  of  objects.  These  two  qualities, 
by  moderating  one  another,  increase  the  pleasure  resulting 
from  each.  To  this  "  proportion "'  must  be  added,  or  a 
"general  aptitude  of  the  structure  to  the  end  proposed." 
In  marked  inconsistency  with  this  Gerard  sets  down 
"utility,  or  the  fitness  of  things  for  answering  their  ends.'' 
as  "another  species  of  ]5eauty.''  "The  beauty  of  colour'' 
he  finds  "entirely  distinct  from  both  the  former,''  and  "in 
most  instances  resolvable  into  association."  "  In  all  cases 
Beauty  is  at  least  in  part  resolvable  into  association.'' 

We  now  reach  the  work  of  another  English  artist.  Sir 
Joshua  Reynolds,  who  discussed  the  subject  of  Beauty  with 
more  rhetoric,  but  with  less  insight,  than  Hogarth  had  done. 
In  the  same  }-ear  as  Smith's  Moral  Senfijucnfs  apjjeared 
(1759),  Reynolds  wrote  a  paper  in  the  Idler  (No.  82)  on 
IScauty  :  and  in  subsec^uent  years,  in  three  discourses  which 
he  delivered  to  the  students  of  the  Royal  Academx" 
(1769  to  1790)  he  re-discussed  the  subject  under  man\' 
aspects.  Adopting  the  theory  of  Bufiler  that  every  vital 
species,  animal  or  vegetable,  had  a  "  tixed  or  determinate 
form,  towards  which  Nature  is  continually  inclining,"  and 
that  there  is  therefore  a  goal  of  Beauty  as  the  end  of 
Nature's  etTort,  he  went  on.  not  to  develo]i  this  doctrine 
logically,  but  to  append  to  it  illogically  the  statement — which, 
is  a  bare  unreasoned  assertion  on  his  part — that  \\  e  admire 
Beauty  "for  no  other  reason  than  that  we  are  u^cd  to  it"! 
He  added  :  "  I  have  no  doubt  that  if  we  were  more  used  to 
deformity  than  Beauty,  deformity  would  then  lose  the  idea 
now  annexed  to  it,  and  take  that  of  Beauty,  and  that  if  th.e 
whole  world  should  agree  that  yes  and  ?!0  should  change 
their  meaning,  >vj'  would  then  deny,  and  no  would  afnrm  ": 
^V-  3  59)-  Such  a  position  scarce]}'  requires  any  comment. 
Reynolds  had  drunk  dee])ly  at  the  well  of  the  mt l7:lai'u/y. 
the  l-'rench  "enlightenment.'' 

Sir  Joshua  did  much  more  for  England  by  his  Art  than 
by  his  D!scoi/>-SlS  upon  it.  He  has  charmed  posterity 
by  his   portraits,  and   by  his  bkill  as   a  colourist,  but   he  has 


XII  The  PJiilosophy  of  Britain  i8i 

contributed  nothing  to  a  theory  of  the  Beautiful.  It  is 
curious  to  note,  ho\ve\-er,  that  in  liis  third  Discourse  he 
contradicts  the  principle  which  he  had  laid  down  in  his 
essay  in  the  Idler.  In  that  address,  delivered  in  1770 
^eleven  years  after  the  r\Iagazine  article  appeared),  he 
wrote  : — 

livery  object  wliich  pleases  must  give  pleasure  upon  some  certain 
principles.  ...  In  every  particular  species  (of  being)  there  are 
various  central  forms  which  are  separate  and  distinct  from  each 
other,  and  yet  are  undeniably  lieautiful.  .  .  .  As  there  is  one 
general  form,  which  belongs  to  the  human  kind  at  large,  so  in 
each  class  there  is  a  common  idea,  or  central  form,  which  is  the 
abstract  of  the  various  individual  forms  belonging  to  that  class.  .  .  . 
Perfect  Beauty,  in  my  opinion,  must  combine  all  the  characters 
vdiicli  are  beautiful  in  that  species.  It  cannot  consist  in  any  one, 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  rest.  Xo  one  therefore  must  be  predominant, 
tliat  no  one  may  be  deficient. 

He  goes  on  to  speak  of  the  education  of  the  artist 
necessitating  a  knowledge  of  the  difterence  between  '-the 
genuine  habits  of  Nature  as  distinguished  from  those  of 
fashion,"  and  in  this  connection  refers  to  the  saying  attri- 
buted to  Zeuxis,  1)1  aeterniiatcm  phii^o. 

In  another  Discourse — the  seventh,  delivered  in  1776 — 
Reynolds  discusses  the  cjuestion  of  the  reality  of  a  standard 
of  Taste,  and  he  defends  it.  He  says  that  caprice  and 
casualty  would  govern  the  Arts  if  there  were  no  settled 
principles  in  them,  and  he  actually  affirms  that  Beauty  and 
Nature  '-are  but  different  names  for  expressing  the  same 
thing.''  --The  works  of  Nature,  if  we  compare  one  species 
with  another,  are  all  equally  beautiful  ;  and  in  creatures  of 
the  same  species.  Beauty  is  the  medium  or  centre  of  all  its 
various  forms."  Again  :  ••  The  most  general  form  of  Nature 
is  the  most  beautiful. ■'  This,  if  carried  out  logically, 
would  be  very  much  the  same  as  aftirming  that  Beauty  is 
the  perfect  mean  between  all  extremes.  In  the  eighth 
Discourse  (17S0)  he  deals  with  '-the  Principles  of  Art," 
to  show  that  they  have  their  foundation  in  mind.  In  the 
tenth  he  objects  to  iuiitntioji  as  the  end  of  Art — a  subject 
resumed  in  the  thirteenth  (in  17S6). 


1 82  The  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

In  Sir  Joshua's  notes  to  Mason's  translation  of  Dufres- 
noy's  Dj  ^bie  Grapliica,  he  alludes  to  the  same  subject,  c.^l;. 
'•We  can  no  more  form  any  idea  of  Beauty  superior  to 
Nature  than  we  can  form  an  idea  of  a  sixth  sense,  or  any 
other  excellence,  out  of  the  limits  of  the  human  mind. 
Nothing  can  be  so  unphilosophical  as  a  supposition  that 
we  can  form  any  idea  of  Beauty  or  excellence  out  of  or 
beyond  Nature,  which  is,  and  must  be,  the  fountain-liead 
from  whence  all  our  ideas  must  be  derived.'' 


4.  Lord  Kaiaics  to  TJwdw.s  Rcid 

In  1762,  Henry  Home  (Lord  Kaimesj  published  hi- 
EIcDicnts  of  Criticisr,:.  Kaimes  was  an  accomplished  .Scot- 
tish lawyer,  and  a  man  of  wide  culture  ;  but  notwithstand- 
ing the  praise  of  Dugald  Stewart  (which  was  largely  the 
exaggeration  of  friendship),  he  did  not  do  much  to  advance 
the  subject  he  discussed.  He  limited  the  objects  which  are 
beautiful  to  those  which  appeal  to  our  sense  of  sight. 
What  appeals  to  us  through  the  ear  may  be  agreeable,  bu; 
it  is  not  beautiful.  It  is  only  by  a  figure  of  speech  tha: 
sounds,  thoughts,  theorems,  i)X  e\'cnts  can  be  said  to  be  beau- 
tiful. The  objects  of  sight  are  m,ore  simple  than  tl^ose  of  ar.y 
other  sen-e  ;  and  their  beauty  is  eitb.er  intrinsic  or  relat:\c. 
Intrinsic  Beauty  is  in  an  oljject.  as  one  of  sense,  and  \- 
ultimate.  Relative  Beauty  is  in  an  oljject.  as  a  meaiis  t'/ 
an  end,  a  purpose.  When  the  Beauty  of  an  etTcct  is  trans- 
ferred to  its  cause,  then  an  object,  in  itself  void  of  intrinsic 
beauty,  appears  beautiful  from  its  utility.  Lord  Kaimes 
analyses  the  beauty  both  of  colour  and  of  ilgure.  The  latter 
arises,  he  thinks,  from  regularity,  unifirmity.  proportion. 
order,  and  simplicity.  Many  of  his  remarks  on  the  superior 
beauty  of  the  square  to  the  triangle,  etc..  are  foundationless  : 
and  b.e  asks  at  the  clo-e  of  his  chapter  op.  this  subject 
whether  Be;iuty  is  a  jM-imary  or  only  a  secondary  cjuality 
(jf  objects.  (V)lour  being  admittedly  a  secor.dary  (jual;;}'. 
exi^tir.g  only  in  the  mind  of  the  spectator,  the  beaut}-  of 
colour  mu.it  also  be  suliiectiv'c.      The   bcautv  of  form  is  tlie 


XII  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  Br  it  am  183 

same,  '-for  an  object  is  said  to  be  beautiful  for  no  otlier 
reason  but  that  it  appears  so  to  a  spectator."  It  is  not. 
and  "cannot  be  an  inherent  property,'"  either  in  "the  per- 
cipient, or  in  the  object  perceived." 

In  his  analysis  of  Grandeur  and  Sublimity,  Kaimes  simply 
brought  in  the  element  of  size,  or  mass.  If  the  Cjualities 
that  go  to  make  an  object  beautiful  are  present  in  cjuantity,  or 
if  the  object  be  vast,  and  other  qualities  be  superadded,  the 
emotions,  first  of  grandeur,  and  then  of  sublimity,  are  evoked. 

In  William  Shenstone's  Essays  o?i  Men,  Manners,  and 
Tilings  (1764)  there  is  an  "Essay  on  Taste." 

The  object  of  Taste  is  corporal  beauty.  All  beauty  is 
either  absolute,  relative,  or  a  compound  of  both.  Every- 
thing derives  its  pretension  to  beauty  on  account  of  its 
colour,  smoothness,  variety,  uniformity,  partial  resemblance 
to  something  else,  perfection,  or  suitableness  to  the  end 
proposed,  some  connection  of  ideas,  or  a  mixture  of  all 
these.  Habit  has  an  influence  over  taste  to  which  we  can 
afiix  no  bounds.  The  most  perfect  health  is  the  most  per- 
fect l^eauty.  An  obvious  connection  may  be  traced  between 
physical  and  moral  beauty.  These  are  samples  of  the 
commonplaces  of  Shenstone.  He  affirms  that  our  ideas  of 
beauty  depend  greatly  upon  habit,  and  yet  admits  that  there 
is  a  beauty  in  some  forms  which  is  independent  of  their  use. 

In  I  768,  Abraham  Tucker  published  his  Light  of  Nature 
pursued,  under  the  pseudonym  of  Edward  Search.  In  the 
tv/enty-second  chapter  of  the  first  volume,  entitled  "  Plea- 
sure.'' he  discusses  the  subject  of  lleauty,  adopting  the  then 
dominant  empirical  view.  "Nothing  is  beautiful  in  itself: 
those  things  bid  fairest  for  the  title  that  are  adapted  to 
please  the  generality  of  mankind  ■'"  (j:^  4).  "  Our  sense  of 
Beauty  was  not  born  with  us,  but  grows  by  time,  and  may 
be  moulded  into  almost  any  shape  by  custom,  convention, 
or  accident.'"  "There  seem  to  be  four  principal  sources 
from  whence  the  efficiency  of  Beauty  derives  :  composition, 
succession,  translation,  and  expression"  (.^  5).  The  first 
and  last  of  these  are  evident  enough.  By  the  second 
Tucker  refers  to  variety,  not  mere  novelty,  but  such  a 
change  as   prevents   monotony.      By  the  third  he  refers  to 


184  T lie  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

the  power  of  association,  in  transferring  what  belongs  to 
an  effect  to  its  cause,  or  in  investing  objects  with  charms 
not  originally  theirs.  He  explicitly  combats  the  Platonic 
doctrine  of  an  absohite  and  essential  Beauty  existing  in 
objects  independent  of  the  subject. 

A  Scotch  artist  and  writer,  John  Donaldson  (1751-1801), 
issued  a  small  book  in  1780  which  he  called  Tiic  Elements 
of  Beauty ;  at  so  ?-efeetio!is  on  the  tianuony  oj  tlie  Se)isibitity 
aiui  Reason.  He  considered  it  ••'  the  common  error  of  most 
of  our  modern  \\riters  on  Beauty"'"  that  they  have  supposed 
all  beautiful  things  "'  subject  to  one  fixed  principle,  relative 
to  sense.'"  ■•Taste,"'  he  says,  "  pre\'ents  judgment,  and 
is  more  beholden  to  sentiment  than  to  experience.  There 
is,  however,  a  perfect  agreement  between  right  reason  and 
true  taste.  They  are  reciprocal  tests  of  each  other's  validity  ' 
(p.  6).  "  Qualities  of  objects,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  Beauty, 
are  either  such  as  most  clearly  excite  perception  or  life 
in  the  senses,  or  an  expression  of  tife  or  sensibility  "'  (p.  9). 
He  discusses  light,  sound,  motion,  assimilation,  contrast, 
personihcation,  character  and  expression,  and  gracefulness. 
Although  not  a  contribution  to  philosophical  theory,  the 
book  contains  some  ha])py  statements,  e.g.  ''We  cannot 
judge  of  anything  but  by  relation,  and  it  is  in  the  eliauges 
of  things  that  we  perceive  them"'  (p.  21).  "What  pleases 
one  sense  comes  as  it  were  recommended  to  the  re^t  '" 
(p.  32).  '■  Imagination  in  all  its  conjunctions  acts  like  a 
skilful  mu>ician,  proceeding  by  the  rule  of  contrarie>  ' 
(p.  43).  •■  Everything  that  assails  the  senses  violently  is 
personiiled  :  and  life,  clad  in  the  armour  of  the  foe,  is 
turned  against  itself' 

James  IScattie,  the  somewhat  prosaic  occupant  of  the 
Chair  of  rhilo.->ophy  in  Aberdeen  from  1760  to  1787.  and 
author  of  the  Jissay  on  TrutJi.  also  wrote  a  scries  of 
I h'ssertat/ons,  Morat  a/nt  Critieat,  \\hich  appeared  in  1783. 
and  in  which  we  tind  an  anticipation  of  much  that  .Alist)!!  and 
others  subsecjuently  wrou,L^ht  out.  The  fu'st  of  his  ])i.-;serta- 
tinns  is  on  •■  .Memory  and  Imagination  "'  ;  and  in  the  fourth 
section  of  the  second  chapter  of  the  essay  on  Iniagination 
lie  discusses   the   oriLiin   of  our   ideas  of  Beautv  in    Colour, 


XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britain  185 

Figure,  Attitude,  and  Motion,  wiiich  he  partly  accounts 
for  from  the  influence  of  "  custom,  as  an  associating  prin- 
ciple." "  In  all  cases,  it  seems  possible  to  account  for 
them,-'  i.e.  our  ideas  of  Beauty,  "  upon  the  principle  of  asso- 
ciation, except  perhaps  in  that  single  one  of  colours  giving 
pleasure,  and  being  called  beautiful,  merely  because  they 
are  bright,  or  because  they  are  delicate''"  (p.  142). 

Beattie  seems  to  admit  that  Symmetry  is  in  itself  beau- 
:iful  ;  but  he  contends  that  Utility  is  essential  to  beautiful 
ihings  (p.  115).  He  endorses  Hogarth's  "line  of  beauty," 
but  brings  in  custom  and  association  to  explain  our  delight 
in  it.  The  beauty  of  gesture  or  movement  is  wholly  due 
to  what  it  suggests  ;  but  he  distinguishes  "  expression '"' 
from  "beauty,"  and  considers  that  many  very  expressive 
things  are  not  beautiful  ;  although  the  beauty  of  others, 
such  as  the  human  eye,  depends  upon  their  expression. 
Regularity  of  feature  is  beautiful,  because  it  "  betokens  an 
even  temper,  and  the  absence  of  those  passions  by  which  the 
features  are  made  irregular '"  (p.  136).  Beattie,  however, 
contends  for  a  standard  of  Beauty.  "Ikauty  cannot  be 
perceived  without  (the  requisite)  percipient  faculties" 
(p.  141).  He  discusses  the  subject  elsewhere  indirectly, 
in  his  "  Illustrations  of  Sublimity."  He  has  hardly  got  his 
due,  as  a  precursor  of  the  later  associationalists. 

The  idealistic  attitude  of  mind,  never  wholly  absent 
from  the  Celtic  race,  and  repressed  rather  by  foreign  influ- 
ence than  by  native  tendency  in  Scotland,  at  length  found 
expression  in  the  philosophical  teaching  of  her  Universities. 

In  1785,  Dr.  Thomas  Reid — the  typical  "common-sense" 
philosopher  of  Ilritain,  and  teacher  of  it  both  at  Aberdeen 
and  Glasgow  —  published  his  Essays  on  the  Ititcllectiinl 
Foiccrs,  in  one  section  of  which  he  discussed  the  Beautiiul. 
He  starts  by  assuming  the  existence  of  a  power  of  the  mind 
by  which  we  discern  and  relish  the  Beauty  of  Nature,  and 
begins  by  comparing  it  with  other  "  tastes."  He  finds  a 
judgment  as  to  the  beauty  of  ol^jects  implied  in  the  opera- 
tions of  this  power  or  faculty.  This  "'judgment  of  Ileauty  " 
is  accompanied  by  a  feeling  or  emotion,  a  "sense  of 
beautv."      In   his   analvsis  of  the   thintrs   in  Nature  "which 


1 86  The  PJiilosophy  of  tJie  Benutifiil  chap. 

please  a  good  taste,"  and  call  forth  this  judgment  and 
feeling,  Reid  followed  the  defective  classitication  of  Addi- 
son and  Akensidc,  viz.  novelty,  grandeur,  and  beauty, 
just  as  in  another  part  of  this  discussion  he  somewhat 
slavishly  followed  the  ground-plan  of  the  author  of  Crifo 
(see  p.  172).  He  seems,  however,  at  once  to  perceive  its  in- 
adequacy, because  he  goes  on  to  say  that  Novelty  "  i^  not 
properly  a  quality  of  the  thing  to  which  we  atiribute  it." 
but  is  "  a  relation  which  the  thing  has  to  the  knowledge  ut 
the  person.""  That  a  thing  which  is  new  interests  us, 
is  a  very  commonplace  observation.  Reid's  analysis  of 
"grandeur"  may  be  passed  over. 

It  is  in  his  fourth  chaptei",  "Of  Beauty,"  that  he  seems 
for  the  first  time  to  see  the  real  point  of  the  difticulty. 
when  he  remarks  (as  indeed  many  had  done  before  him) 
that  while  there  is  beauty  in  colour,  sountl,  form,  and 
motion,  in  truth,  action,  aftection,  and  character,  the  ques- 
tion is  "Is  there  any  quality  tJie  same  in  a/ 1,  which  we 
may  call  by  the  name  of  Beauty?"  He  can  lind  none. 
There  is  no  identity  or  even  similarity  in  the  beauty  of  a 
theorem  and  the  beauty  of  a  piece  of  music  ;  and  he  gives 
us  the  reason  why  we  call  such  diftcrent  things  by  a  com- 
mon name — (i)  that  they  both  produce  an  agreeable 
emotion,  and  (2)  that  this  is  conjoined  with  a  belief  that 
they  possess  some  inherent  excellence.  This  is  "a  secop.a 
ingredient  in  our  sense  of  Beauty."  When  objects  strike 
us  at  once  as  beautiful,  our  judgment  as  to  them  is  insiinct- 
i\e  :  others  are  only  deemed  beautiful  when  we  can  ration- 
ally explain  their  Beauty,  or  how  we  came  to  regard  them 
as  beautiful  ;  and  so.  Beauty  itself  may  be  distinguished  as 
original  and  deri\'ed.  The  one  shines  by  its  own  light,  the 
other  by  borrowed  or  reflected  light.  Thus,  we  transfer  the 
Ijeauty  of  the  sign  to  the  thing  signified,  of  the  cause  to  the 
effect,  of  the  end  to  the  means,  of  the  agent  to  the  instrument. 

Tr\'ing  next  to  determine  the  qualities  in  objects  to 
which  Beauty  may  be  rationally  ascribed,  he  finds  that  it 
i-i  in  c[ualities  of  mind  that  original  Beauty  is  to  be  found, 
and  that  in  the  objects  of  Nature  the  beauty  is  '•  dcri\ed 
from    some   relation   they   bear   to   mind."      He   tjuoles   the 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  187 

lines  of  Akenside  as  to  Mind,  and  mind  alone,  being  "  the 
living  fountain "  of  the  beautiful ;  and  adds  that  it  is  a 
beautiful  character  that  primarily  awakens  in  us  the  feeling 
and  the  judgment  of  Beauty,  while  "  every  object  of  sense 
is  beautified  by  borrowing  attire  from  the  attributes  of 
mind.'"'  Inanimate  matter  is  made  beautiful  by  the  possession 
of  c[ualities  that  resemble  mind.  [Music  is  most  expressive 
when  it  shadows  forth  human  sentiment,  emotion,  or  passion. 
An  external  object  is  most  beautiful  when  its  form  is  most 
fitted  for  the  end  it  is  destined  to  subserve,  and  that  kind 
of  fitness  is  a  mental  equality  ;  while  the  greatest  Beauty 
of  all  lies  in  expressio?:^  which  again  is  a  mental  C[uality. 

On  the  whole  there  is  in  Reid  a  curious  mixture  of 
shrewd  insight,  limited  by  the  horizon  of  Scottish  idiosyn- 
crasy, with  vague  platitude.  At  times  he  seems  the  very 
incarnation  of  commonplace,  and  again  there  are  width, 
penetration,  and  flashes  of  real  insight,  which  make  his 
discussion  a  valuable  one. 

5.  Alison  to  W.   TJioiiison 

While  the  intuitional  and  a  prio7-i  teaching  of  Reid  (and 
others)  held  its  own  in  the  north,  a  reaction  from  it  was 
also  inevitable.  The  influence  of  Hume  and  Smith  was 
intellectually  a  much  stronger  one  than  that  of  Reid  ;  and 
tlie  unconscious  presence  of  the  opposite  type  of  philosophis- 
ing, in  the  minds  of  many  who  were  unaware  of  it,  wrought 
out  results  opposed  to  the  admission  of  an  objective  standard 
cf  Beauty.  The  principle  of  Association  was  brought 
forward  (with  more  explicitness  and  more  apparent  success 
than  ever  before)  to  explain  the  formation  of  those  judg- 
ments that  seemed  innate  and  intuitive.  The  writer  who 
led  the  way  in  developing  this  empirical  psychology,  and 
applying  it  in  the  sphere  of  aesthetic,  was  Alison.  In  1790 
he  published  an  Essay  on  tlie  Xafure  and  Principles  of  Tasfc. 
A  second  edition  appeared  in  two  volumes  in  181 1,  when  it 
was  criticised  by  Jeffrey  in  the  Edinbiirgli  Rcvicii.'.  and  this 
review  article  Jeffrey  expanded  into  an  encyclopajdia  one 
for  the  sixth  edition  of  the  Britanriica.  in  the  year  1S24. 


iSS  TJic  PliilosopJiy  of  the  Beajitiful  chap. 

Alison's  aim  was  to  analyse  the  emotions  of  Sublimity 
and  Beauty,  with  the  view  of  showing  that  they  are  not  simple 
but  complex  emotions,  and  "involve  in  all  cases  (i)the 
production  of  some  simple  emotion,  or  the  exercise  of  some 
moral  aft'ection.  and  (2)  a  peculiar  exercise  of  the  imai^ina- 
tion  ;  and  that  the  peculiar  pleasure  of  the  ]5cautiful  or 
Sublime  is  only  felt  when  these  two  are  conjoined,  and  a 
complex  emotion  produced.''  Alison  denies  the  existence 
of  any  quality  in  objects  which  makes  them  beautiful.  Their 
beauty  is  entirely  due  to  the  innuence  of  the  principle  of 
association.  With  i^reat  wealth  of  illustration  he  traces  the 
working  of  this  principle,  in  local  associations,  historical  ones, 
etc.  He  applies  it  hrst  to  the  sublimity  and  beauty  of  the 
material  world,  to  sounds,  the  notes  of  animals,  the  tones  of 
the  human  voice,  and  to  music  ;  next  to  the  obiect  of  sight. 
colours  and  forms.  He  traces  the  inrluence  of  Design, 
fitness  and  utility,  on  the  beauty  of  forms,  especially  of  the 
human  form  and  countenance,  and  at  the  end  of  his  discussion 
he  says  :  '•  The  conclusion  in  which  I  wish  to  rest  is  that 
the  beauty  and  sublimity  which  is  felt  in  the  various  ap- 
pearances of  matter  are  nnally  to  be  ascri])cd  to  their 
expression  of  mind,  or  to  their  being  either  directly  or  in- 
directly the  signs  of  these  qualities  of  mind  which  are 
litted  by  the  constitution  of  our  nature  to  affect  us  ^ith 
pleasing  or  interesting  emotion"  fvol.  ii.  p.  423).  All  I'f 
this.  howe\"cr.  is  irrelewmt  to  the  prol^lem  in  debate. 

A  letter  from  Roljert  Burns  to  .Alison,  dated  l-lllisland, 
P'eb.  I  79 1;  maybe  referred  to  in  passing.  Alisrm  had  r-cnt 
Burns  a  copy  of  his  book.  In  acknowledging  it.  he  said  : 
'•  Except  Euclid's  Elements  of  Geometry,  I  never  read  a  book 
which  gave  me  such  a  quantum  of  information,  and  added 
so  much  to  my  stock  of  ideas,  as  your  Essays  on  tiie 
Priuciplcs  of  Taslc."'      The  letter  is  satiri'^•tl. 

As  it  was  a  sequel  to  Alison's.  Enrd  JetTrey's  Essay  on 
r>o  i!{fv  may  loe  referred  to  somewliat  out  of  its  chronological 
orrler.  It  was  ba>ed  upon,  and  it  almost  entirely  endorses, 
Ali-r)nV  theory,  in  o]:)position  to  the  existence  of  any  ir.- 
trin-ic  beauty  in  objects.  It  is  thus  tliat  JetTrey  denrics  his 
po^itjnn: — ■■Our   sense  of  beauty  dejjends   entirely  on   our 


XI!  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  189 

previous  experience  of  simpler  pleasures  or  emotions,  and 
consists  in  the  suggestion  of  agreeable  and  interesting  sensa- 
tions with  which  we  had  formerly  been  made  familiar,  by 
the  direct  agency  of  our  common  sensibilities  ;  and  that 
^■ast  \'ariety  of  objects  to  which  we  give  the  common  name 
of  beautiful  become  entitled  to  that  appellation  merely 
l)ecause  they  all  possess  the  power  of  recalling  or  reflecting 
those  sensations  of  which  they  have  been  the  accompani- 
ments, or  with  which  they  have  been  associated  in  our 
imagination  by  any  other  more  casual  bond  of  connection."' 
And  so  on,  and  so  on,  and  so  on.  Jeffrey's  theory  is  an 
irrelevancy  from  first  to  last,  even  more  than  Alison's. 

In  1792,  William  Gilpin,  Prebendary  of  Sarum,  and  \"icar 
of  Boldre  in  the  New  Forest,  wrote  Tlircc  Essays  oji 
FictKresquc  Beai/tv,  etc.  He  thought  that  disputes  about 
Beauty  might  be  lessened  ''if  a  distinction  were  established 
between  such  objects  as  are  beautiful,  and  such  as  are 
picturesque  ;  between  those  which  please  the  eye  in  their 
natural  state,  and  those  which  please  from  some  quality 
capable  of  being  illustrated  in  painting."  His  chief  inquiry 
was  as  to  '-that  cjuality  in  objects  which  marks  them  as 
j)icturesque."  Beautiful  objects  are  usually,  though  not 
always,  smooth  ;  picturesque  objects  are  the  reverse,  they 
arc  rough  or  rugged.  Thus  while  a  temple  newly  built 
may  be  beautiful,  as  a  ruin  it  is  picturesque.  So  with  garden 
ground,  and  so  with  the  human  face  and  figure  ;  when 
smooth  they  are  beautiful,  when  rough  and  rugged  they  are 
picturesque.  In  rough  and  rugged  objects  we  have  the 
variety  and  contrasts  which  are  wanting  in  smooth  ones  ; 
we  have  also  greater  light  and  shade,  less  uniformity,  and 
more  varied  colouring.  He  j^roceeds  to  ask  why  the 
quality  of  roughness  should  make  an  essential  diflerence 
between  the  objects  in  Nature  that  are  picturesque,  and 
those  of  Art.  He  finds  no  solution,  and  gives  up  the 
inquiry  into  first  principles  in  art,  as  in  metaphysics  and 
ethics,  as  an  impossible  one. 

In  1794,  Uvedale  Price  issued  an  Essay  o?t  the  Pictur- 
esque, as  compared  zvith  the  SuIjUjiic  and  the  Beautiful,  which 
passed  through  several  editions.      It  was  followed  in  1795 


190  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

by  a  supplement  on  the  aj^nlication  of  the  Principles  of 
Landscape  Painting  to  Landscape  Gardening,  in  reply  to 
Mr.  H.  Repton  :  and  in  iSoi  by  a  Dialo;^UL\  on  the 
distinct  characters  of  the  Picturesque  and  the  Beautiful,  in 
answer  to  Payne  Kni;^dit.  These  works  of  Sir  Uvedale 
Price  were  re-edited,  in  1S42,  with  an  introductory  essay  on 
the  ori;:,nn  of  Taste,  by  .Sir  Thomas  Dick  Lauder. 

Uvedale  Price  dehnes  the  picturesque  as  ''everything  that 
can  be  represented  with  good  ettect  in  painting"  (ch.  iii. ). 
He  thinks  the  dennition  of  Gilpin  "at  once  too  vague  and 
too  conrined."'  He  held  that  the  picturesque  had  a  char- 
acter ■•  separate  and  distinct  from  the  beautiful  and  the 
sublime,"'  and  '-independent  of  the  art  of  painting.''  He 
ob'ects  to  the  combination  of  the  two  words  in  the  phrase 
■•picturesque  beauty''  as  tending  to  mislead,  because  the 
picturesque  "not  only  ditiers  from  the  beautiful,''  -'but 
arises  from  qualities  the  most  diametrically  opposite."'  He 
follows  Gilpin  ^  in  believing  that  "  roughness,  and  sudden 
variation,  with  irregularity,  are  the  most  efricient  causes  of 
the  picturesque.'"  '•  Time  converts  a  beautiful  object  into  a 
picturesque  one."'  Picturesqueness  holds  a  station  between 
beauty  and  sublimity"'  (ch.  iv.),  "and,  on  that  account,  is 
more  frequently  and  m'>re  happily  blcr.ded  with  them  Ijoih 
than  they  are  with  each  other.  It  is,  however,  perfectly 
distinct  from  either.''" 

Price  says  of  Beauty  and  Picturesqueness  that  tliC}'  are 
••founded  on  opposite  qualities  ;  the  one  on  smoothness,  the 
other  on  roughness  :  the  one  on  gradual,  the  other  on  sudden 
variation:  the  one  on  ideas  of  youth  and  fre-hness,  the  other 
on  those  of  age  and  even  of  decay  '"  (ch.  iv.).  The  Beautiful 
is  symmetrical,  but  "symmetry  is  adverse  to  the  picturesque."' 
The  picturesque  is  equally  distinct  from  the  sublime. 
Greatness  of  dimension  is  a  cause  of  the  sublime;  it  h;is  r.o 
con:^.ection  with  the  picturesque.  The  intricacy  and  \-ariety 
v/hi'di  chai'acterise  the  latter  can  be  found  equally  in  tr.e 
grrL^-ide.-^t  and  tlie  gayest  scenery.  Innnity,  boundlessne-s 
is  onu  cause  of  the  sublime  :  but  it  is  on  deiinite  shape  ar.d 

■   .\!t:.^';:;h  ;ic  t-!!?  i;;  i:.-t  a  "rea:  part  of  Lis  Look  was  written  befcre 


XII  Tlic  Philosophy  of  Britain  191 

boundaries  that  picturesqueness  depends.  Uniformity  is 
often  the  cause  of  subhmity,  the  picturesque  requires  variety ; 
and  while  the  sublime  is  austere,  the  picturesque  captiwates. 
But  "it  seldom  happens  that  the  two  qualities"  (the  beauti- 
ful and  the  picturesque)  "  are  perfectly  unmixed."  "  Nature 
has  blended  them"'  (ch.  v.).  "The  picturesque  fills  up  a 
\-acancy  between  the  sublime  and  the  beautiful"  (ch.  vi.). 
■*  Smoothness  is  the  groundwork  of  Beauty,  yet  roughness  is 
its  fringe  and  ornament,  and  that  which  preserves  it  from 
insipidity."  "  The  charm  of  smoothness  is  that  it  conveys 
the  idea  of  repose,  of  roughness  that  it  gives  that  of  anima- 
tion and  variety." 

Price  next  discusses  light  and  shade,  the  difference 
between  the  beautiful  and  the  picturesque  in  colour,  and  in 
his  ninth  chapter  deals  with  ugliness.  "  Deformity  is  to 
ugliness  what  picturesqueness  is  to  beauty."  Perhaps  the 
most  interesting  section  of  his  treatise  is  the  concluding 
chapters  in  which  he  discusses  the  principles  of  Landscape 
Gardening,  especially  his  treatment  of  the  subject  of  Trees 
as  ornanicnt,  whether  in  clump,  or  belt,  or  avenue,  and  the 
general  effects  of  water  on  landscape. 

In  a  printed  letter  addressed  to  Price  by  Mr.  H.  Repton 
in  July  1794,  his  theory  of  "deducing  landscape  gardening 
from  p.-iinling  "  was  vigorously  rejjlied  to.  Price  rejoined  in 
a  treatise,  called  A  Letter  to  H.  Repton,  Esq.,  in  which  the 
picturesque  in  landscape  gardening  is  discussed  in  detail, 
and  in  which  he  maintains  that  the  best  landscape  artists 
would  be  the  best  landscape  gardeners  were  they  to  de\ote 
themselves  to  it.  Price  also  wrote  three  essays,  on  Arti- 
ficial IVnter,  on  Decorations  7iear  the  House,  and  on 
A.rcliitecturc  and  Buildings  ;  and  in  1801  a  Dialogue 
on  th.e  distinct  cliaracters  of  tJie  Picturesque  and  Beautiful. 
This  was  written  in  answer  to  the  objections  of  Payne  Knight, 
given  in  a  note  to  the  second  edition  of  his  poem  TJie 
Landscape,  in  which  he  tried  to  show  that  Price's  distinction 
between  the  beauiiful  and  the  picturesque  was  imaginary. 
It  was  prefaced  by  an  Lntroductory  Essay  on  Beauty,  with 
"remarks  on  the  ideas  of  Sir  Joshua  Reynolds  and  ]\Ir.  Purke 
upon  that  subject."'     This  essay  contains   an  acute,  and  on 


192  The  Philosophy  of  the  Bcaittiful  chap. 

the  whole  a  sympathetic  estimate  of  the  theories  of  Sir 
Jo-hua  and  Burke  ;  while  differin;^'  from  them  on  several 
points.  Price  quotes  Sir  Joshua's  fifty-sixth  note  on  Du- 
fresnoy,  in  \vhich  he  says  :  '•  A  llowing  outline  is  recom- 
mended, because  Beauty — which  alone  is  Nature — cannot 
be  produced  without  it  ;  old  ai,^e  or  illness  produce  strai;:.(ht 
lines,  corpulency  round  lines,  but  in  a  state  of  health 
accompanyin^^r  growth,  the  outlines  are  waving,  flowing,  and 
serpentine  "  :  and  he  seems  to  admit  that  the  highest  beauty 
must  conform  to  rule,  the  rule  of  a  ••  central  form.''  and  the 
qualities  which  ■■  constitute  the  beautiful  are  in  all  directs 
chielly  found  to  e.xist  at  that  period  when  Nature  has  at- 
tained, but  not  passed,  a  state  of  perfect  completion." 
Price's  Dialogue  is  of  less  value  than  his  essays. 

In  connection  with  these  discussions  on  the  picturesque 
a  Letter  to  Mr.  Kepton  frotn  the  RigJit  Ho7ioiirable  IJl/liatr 
]Vyndliam  should  not  be  overlooked.  He  held,  in  opposition 
to  Price,  that  grounds  should  not  be  laid  out  with  a  \'iew  to 
their  appearance  in  a  picture,  but  solely  with  a  view  ••  to 
their  uses,  and  enjoyment  in  real  life  ;  and  their  conformity 
to  these  purpiises  constitutes  their  true  beauty.''  ?vlr.  Repton. 
in  his  Sketehes  and  Hi/its  on  Landscape  Garile/u'ng. 
endorses  this. 

A  work  on  the  Beautiful  that  is  little  known  was  pub- 
lished eight  years  after  Alison's,  viz.  in  179S.  by  William 
Thomson,  an  Irish  scholar  and  artist  (i  726-1  79S).  One  of 
Thomson's  pictures  attracted  the  attention  of  Reyncjlds.  but 
he  had  no  success  as  a  painter.  His  book  is  called  ^-In 
1-lnjuiry  into  tJie  elonent'iry  principles  of  Beauty,  in  tiie 
Works  of  Xature  a)ui  Art.  It  is  prefaced  In- an  •■Introduc- 
tory Discourse  on  Taste,''  in  which  the  various  faculties  are 
discu^-ed  seriatim  (perception,  memory,  imagination,  ta^te. 
iudgment),  v.ith  a  \-iew  to  determine  in  what  tlie  faculty  of 
ta?te  consists,  \\-hether  it  can  be  developed,  and  whether  it 
is  a  universal  faculty  inherent  in  all,  or  only  in  a  iaw.  T];e 
rest  of  the  book  is  a  discussion  on  "the  elemeiTtary  prin- 
ciples of  the  Beautiful.'"  Thomson  finds  that  it  is  the  re-uit 
of  ••  -ix  different  accidents  or  elementary  principles,  each  of 
which  is  a   distinct   beauty  in  itself  and  conseciuently  com- 


XII  The  PliilosopJiy  of  Britain  193 

iiiunicatcs  a  peculiar  Beauty  to  every  oljject  to  which  it  is 
joined.  All  Ijciiv^s,  inanimate  as  well  as  animate,  have  one 
or  more  of  these  six  beauties,  and  each  of  these  elementary 
principles  which  is  added  after  the  first  (which  none  are  or 
can  be  Vvithout)  increases  its  beauty  by  the  addition  of  such 
element.  It  follows  that  the  creature  or  element  which 
possesses  all  the  elementary  principles  is  most  or  perfectly 
beautiful ;  while  the  creature  or  object  which  possesses 
only  one  element  is  least  bea.utiful  ;  and  if  there  be  any 
creature  or  ol:)ject  v.hich  possesses  more  it  must  be  ugly, 
deformed,  or  monstrous  "  (pp.  loi,   102). 

The  six  elementary  principles  of  Eeauty  are — (i)  The 
beauty  of  proportion  or  fitness,  (2)  the  beauty  of  shape,  (3) 
the  beauty  of  lines,  (4)  the  beauty  of  colours,  (5)  the  beauty 
of  variety,  (6)  the  beauty  of  smoothness.  Thomson 
thought  that  the  creature  which  possessed  beauty  of 
■'  shape,"  in  addition  to  that  of  "  fitness,"  was,  on  that 
account,  a  stage  higher  in  the  scale  of  beauty  ;  that  those 
creatures  which,  in  addition,  had  the  "beauty  of  the  Sdike 
•  ine,"  had  beauty  in  the  third  degree  ;  further,  that  those 
v.'hich  liad  beauty  of  colour  were  in  the  fourth  degree  ;  and 
ihat  those  which,  over  and  above,  had  the  be.auty  of  variety 
and  of  smoothness,  had  beauty  of  the  fifth  and  sixth 
degree.  All  this  is  Cjuite  arbitrary.  No  creature  that  has 
proportion  is  without  beauty  of  shape,  line,  colour,  and 
variety.  Thomson  himself  admits  (p.  182)  that  "variety  is 
not  a  definite  clement  like  the  others,  but  an  occasional 
mode  or  accident,  by  which  the  Beauty  of  the  other  elements 
is  heightened  or  increased."  The  l^ook  had  neither  specu- 
lative nor  literary  merit  to  outlast  its  generation. 


6.  l-'.rasiims  Darr^'in  to  S.   T.  Cotcridge 

Erasmus  Darwin  (1731-1S02)  first  published  his  Zoo- 
noiiiia;  or  tJie  Laius  of  Or^'a/u'c  Life  in  1794-6.  In  the 
third  edition,  iSoi  (^  xvi.  6,  i)  there  is  a  slight  discussion 
on  Beauty.  His  explanation  of  its  origin  is  purely  physical. 
"  The  characteristic  of  Beauty  is  that  it  is  the  object  of  love; 

O 


194  TJie  PliUosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  ckap. 

and  though  many  other  objects  are  in  common  language 
called  beautiftil,  yet  they  are  only  called  so  metaphorically, 
and  ought  to  be  termed  agreeable.''  Neither  a  Greek 
temple  nor  a  Gothic  cathedral,  neither  music  nor  poetry, 
can  be  termed  beautiful,  except  metaphorically,  becau.--e 
■'  we  liave  no  wihh  to  embrace  or  salute  them  ''  1  "  Our 
perception  of  Beauty  consi-ts  in  our  recognition  by  the 
sense  of  vision  of  tliose  ol^iects,  llrst.  which  ha\'e  bcujre 
inspired  our  love  by  tlie  pleasure  they  have  afforded  to 
many  of  our  senses  (as  to  our  sense  of  warmth,  of  toucli, 
of  smeil,  of  taste,  hunger  and  th.irstj  ;  and,  secon'-ily,  v,-Li'-h 
bear  any  analogy  of  form  to  such  objects.''  And  so  he 
finds  that  the  infant's  experience  of  smootimess,  softness, 
and  warnuh  v.hen  it  receives  nourislnnent  leads  it  after- 
wards to  nnd  delight  in  oljjects  tb.nt  are  smooth,  soft.  ;ind 
v.-arm.  Erasmus  Darwin's  explanation  of  Beauty,  as  thus 
tracealile  to  a  material  source,  has  been  more  fully  v.Tought 
out  in  the  next  generation  by  his  son  Charles  and  others, 
and  by  them  presented  in  a  more  scientific  form  ;  but  the 
gr(;undwork  of  the  theory  is  tlie  same  in  Zoo/iomi/!  as  in 
'f/ic  Descent  (f  Man. 

Henry  Fuselli  (or  Fusselij,  a  Swiss  naturalised  in 
England,  friend  of  J.a\-ater  and  of  Reynolds,  became,  in 
1799,  Professor  of  Painting  and  Keeper  of  the  Royal 
Academy  in  Loiidon.  In  his  tv,'ent}'-tiiird  \car  he  trans- 
lated W'inckehnann's  Rcfcctiius  on  t'lc  J\;!nt:j:g  a>hl  Sciil/i- 
tiii-e  (f  tlic  Greeks  (which  was  pf.ljii^hed  in  1765).  He 
deii\'ered  a  course  of  lectures  on  in\'ention.  exprL-ssion, 
de.-ign,  CM':i/arin;r.  etc.,  to  the  jrapils  of  the  Academy  during 
the  tenure  of  his  office.  Tliey  were  puljli-hed  in  iSoi. 
In  his  seventh  lecture  he  sa\'-  :  ••  Ti'.e  notion  (jf  Rcaut\' 
arises  from  tb.e  ])i'ja~ure  v^e  feel  in  the  harmonious  co- 
0]jerati(!n  of  tb.e  couii")onent  parts  of  ;tn  (jbject  towards  one 
end  at  (;n<:e  ;  it  implies  their  iiiuni-i;;a.e  coexistence  in  the 
p.iass  tiicy  compnse  ;  and  as  that,  immediateh'  and  at  once, 
r;in  1)0  ciinve\-ed  to  the  r.iind  by  the  eye  alone.  I-"i.-^ure  is  the 
ie._;itip.'!a'.-c  vehicle  of  Re:.uty,  and  Der,ign  the  physical  element 
u'i  .Art  •'  (p.  4).  Fu~i.'!Ii's  ov,-n  art-work  was  wild  and  errat'':, 
but  hi-  art  criticism  jliows  insiglri  as  v.x-ll  as  knov,led.^'c. 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  195 

In  1805,  Richard  Payne  Knight — who  had  discussed  the 
suljject  in  pre\-ious  works  —  pubhished  An  Analytical 
Enquiry  into  the  Principles  of  Taste.  This  book  is  a 
product  of  the  empirical  school  ;  but  it  is  full  of  detached 
wisdom  and  insight.  The  author  maintained  that  under 
all  the  varieties  of  fashion  and  taste  there  was  a  real  and 
permanent  principle  of  lieauty,  a  "standard  of  excellence, 
which  every  generation  of  civilised  man  has  uniformly 
recognised  in  theory"  (p.  4).  Visible  ]5eauty  he  finds  in 
"  harmonious  but  yet  brilliant  and  contrasted  combinations 
of  light,  shade,  and  colour,  blended  but  not  confused,  and 
broken  but  not  cast  into  masses"  (Pt.  I.  ch.  v.  >^  16, 
p.  68).  His  analysis  of  the  picturesque  in  Art  is  excellent 
(Pt.  II.  ch.  ii.  >;;:;  15-27).  It  does  not  consist  in  reproducing 
"what  the  eye  sees,"  but  in  inassi>ig  oh]'cQ.\.'i,  so  as  to  give 
them  breadth  of  light  and  shade,  blending  them  lightly 
and  airily. 

An  Enquiry  into  tlie  state  of  the  A.rts  of  Design  in  Eng- 
land, etc.,  by  Prince  Iloare  (1S06),  need  only  be  mentioned 
as  a  connecting  link  of  a  conventional  character  in  a  some- 
what barren  discussion. 

In  1 8 06,  ten  essays  on  The  Anatomy  and  Philosophy  of 
Expression  as  connected  7i'itli  the  Tine  Arts,  by  Sir  Cliarles 
(then  i\Ir.)  PjcII,  were  published,  though  they  were  written 
some  time  pre\'iously.  They  contain  a  "theory  of  I]eauty, 
in  the  (human)  countenance."  ]Mr.  Bell  held  that  it  was  by 
losing  sight  of  Nature  that  the  right  principle  of  ]>cauty 
had  not  always  been  reached.  He  objected  to  the  notion 
that  the  artist's  principle  was  in  losing  sight  of  the  real  to 
find  the  ideal  ;  as  if,  by  avoiding  the  human,  we  could 
reach  the  Divine.  "With  what  divine  essence,"  he  asks, 
"is  the  comparison  to  l^e  made?"  The  artist  has  an 
abstract  idc;i  of  perfection  in  his  mind  ;  and  all  that  the 
ancient  sculptors  did  to  interpret  divinity  was  to  "avoid 
indi\  iduality,"  that  is  to  say,  individual  peculiarity.  He 
was  of  opinion  that  we  can  only  define  I^eauty  negatively, 
as  the  reverse  of  the  ugly.  As  .Mengs,  the  pupil  of 
Winckelmann  put  it,  "  Labellczza  e  rf)pposito  della  brutezza." 
He  held  that  Raphael  was  mistaken  in  supposing  that  as  no 


196  The  P/nlosof'hy  of  tlic  Beautiful  chap. 

real  model  gave  him  perfect  beauty,  he  could  fall  back  on 
the  ideal  within  his  own  mind.  No  painter  could  "  dis- 
engage himself  from  material  things,  and  rise  into  the  sphere 
of  intellectual  ideas."  And  yet,  with  some  inconsistency, 
liell  affirmed  that  ''the  painter  must  not  be  satisfied  to 
copy  and  represent  what  he  sees  ;  he  must  cultivate  the 
talent  of  imitation  merely  as  giving  scope  to  the  exertions 
of  his  genius.''  Mc  was  a  realist  in  Art-theory,  as  is  seen 
in  his  criticism  alike  of  Winckelmann,  Hogarth,  and  Sir 
Joshua  Reynolds;  but  his  account  of  "the  sources  of 
expression  "  in  the  liuman  countenance  is  acute  and  valu- 
able. "  Ex])ression  is  of  more  consecjucncc  tlian  sha]3e  ;  it 
will  light  u]i  features  otherwise  heavy  ;  it  will  make  us 
forget  all  but  the  cjuality  of  the  mind''  (Ess.ay  iv.  j;  5). 
He  h.eld  that  the  ancient  sculptors  went  beyond  mere  imita- 
tion. They  combined  excellences.  He  differs  from  other 
writers  on  Art  in  his  ex]:)lanation  of  the  work  of  the  ancients. 
He  says  :  ''  They  "  (other  writers)  "  call  the  '  ideal  head  ' 
that  which  docs  not  represent  individual  beauty,  but  collect- 
ive beauties,  a  selection  and  adaptation  of  Ijcautiful  parts 
taken  from  a  variety  of  individuals,  and  combined  in  one 
representation.  I  i)lace  the  superiority  of  the  antique  on 
higher  ground,  on  the  more  extended  study  of  nature,  of 
brutes  as  well  as  of  man "'  (Kssay  iv.  ^  5). 

In  iSio,  Dugald  Stewart — to  whom  we  are  indebted  for 
a  refined  and  scholarly  develojiment  of  the  philosophy  of 
Thomas  Reid — jiublislred  his  rjiiIosop]:icaI  l\ssays  ;  in  the 
second  part  of  which  we  have  '•  Essays  relative  to  matters 
of  Taste."  The  first  essay  in  this  second  p.'irt  is  Or.  tJic 
])Cautiful.  .Steuart  begins  by  saying  that  ]5eauty  always 
denotes  what  gi\"es  refined  pleasure  ;  and,  criticising  and 
rejecting  the  theory  of  Diderot,  that  it  consists  in  perfection 
of  relations,  he  falls  bacd-;  on  tlie  .Socr.atic  definition  in  the 
Mc))wrabilia,  and  reiterates  what  the  author  of  the  ^hia- 
hf.ual  J-'./iquify,^  and  what  I)'.-\lembert,  in  his  /.V/^c/rr/.f.w- 
!>:c/!/s  siir  Ics  J-'Jiinens  tie  l''Jiiiosopliii\  had  said  about  tlie 
meta]:)hysical  meaning  of  words.  He  decides  that  Ikviuty 
is  primarily  a})plicable  to  o1)jects  of  sight,  and  that  "  our 
'  See  p.  195. 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  197 

first  ideas"  of  it  are  "derived  from  colours"  (p.  204). 
"  From  the  admiration  of  Colour,  the  eye  gradually  advances 
to  that  of  Forms"  (p.  205);  and  thence  to  IMotion,  "a 
species  of  beauty  which  is  in  part  a  modification  of  that  of 
Form"  (p.  206),  giving  rise  to  Grace;  and  the  beauty  of 
graceful  motion  is  due  to  "  the  living  expression  which  it 
exhibits"  (p.  207).  Stewart  then  criticises  Burke's  theory 
of  the  causes  of  Beauty,  especially  the  doctrine  that 
"smoothness"  is  the  most  considerable  of  them.  It  may 
be,  and  is,  one  element  in  Beauty ;  but  the  rough,  the 
jagged,  and  the  angular  may  be  also  beautiful,  as  in 
crj'stals  and  in  mountain  scenery.  He  deals  also  with  the 
teaching  of  Uvedale  Price,  and  contends  that  "  asperity, 
sharp  angles,  and  irregularity  are  amongst  the  constituents 
of  Beauty."  In  an  eclectic  spirit  he  affirms  that  "the 
meaning  of  the  word  Beauty,  instead  of  being  restricted,  in 
conformity  to  any  particular  system  whatsoever,  should  con- 
tinue to  be  the  generic  word  for  expressing  every  quality 
which,  in  the  works  either  of  Nature  or  Art,  contributes 
to  render  them  agreeable  to  the  eye"  (p.  225). 

Continuing  the  discussion  in  chapters  somewhat  diffuse,  he 
maintains  that  "amongst  the  elements  which  enter  into  the 
composition  of  the  Beautiful,  some  are  intrinsically  pleasing, 
without  reference  to  anything  else  ;  others  please  only  in  a 
state  of  combination."  "  The  beauty  of  the  former  may  be 
said  to  be  absolute,  or  intrinsic  ;  that  of  the  latter  to  be 
only  relative"  (p.  228).  Things  relatively  beautiful  are  so 
only  in  their  proper  places.  It  is  thus  that  they  are 
picturesque.  Stewart  criticises  Price's  doctrine  of  the 
picturesque  (in  which  it  had  been  arbitrarily  separated  from 
the  Beautiful),  and  falls  back  upon  Gilpin's  view,  in  his 
Observations  on  Picturesque  Beauty,  that  things  are 
picturesque  when  they  are  so  combined,  or  grasped,  as  to 
be  fitted  for  purposes  of  the  painter.  He  objects,  on 
similar  grounds,  to  the  distinction  of  the  Sublime  from  the 
Beautiful,  as  if  it  belonged  to  a  totally  different  category. 
He  would  widen  out  the  general  category,  so  as  to  include 
within  it  the  simply  beautiful,  the  picturesque,  and  the 
sublime.        "  It    is     only     when     the    beautiful     and     the 


19S  The  PhilosopJiy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

picturesque  are  united  that  a  landscape  painting  produces 
its  highest  effect'"'  (p.  254).  }*Iany  of  the  details  in  a 
landscape  picture  have  no  intrinsic  beauty,  but  they  suggest 
what  is  not  dehneated.  As  Idiny  in  his  Ilistoria  Xiitiiralis 
says  of  Timnnthus,  the  painter  of  Ipliigenia,  "in  omriiljus 
ejus  opcribus,  inteUigitur  plus  super  quam  pingetur "'  (lib. 
35,  cap.  36). 

In  another  chapter  Stewart  gives  an  acu.te  criticism  of 
the  princi]:)Ie  of  Association,  as  applied  to  tlie  IJeautiful  Ijy 
Alison.  He  saw  clearly  that  Association  could  never 
account  for  the  origin  of  anything.  '■  If  ti:ere  was  anything 
originally  and  intrinsically  beautiful,  the  associating  prin- 
ciple would  have  no  materials  on  which  it  could  operate'' 
(p.  242).  It  was  evident  to  him  that  the  ofiice  of  associa- 
tion is  to  heighten  and  combine,  not  to  create.  That  it 
adds  a  charm  to  the  things  round  which  it  gathers,  every 
(jne  admits. 

Stewart  has  four  essays  '"relative  to  matters  of  Taste.'' 
The  first,  On  tJic  JJcuttf/I,  has  been  already  analysed. 
The  second  is  O^i  tJie  Siib'inic^  the  third  On  7]jsfc,  and  the 
fourth  On  tJic  Culture  of  Ilaluts  connected  icitJi  Taste.  In 
the  second  he  criticises  the  \':ews  of  Uvedale  Price.  A 
feeling  of  the  sublime  is  awakened,  not  by  motion  down- 
wards, according  to  the  law  of  gravitation,  but  by  motion 
upwards  ;  active  ]iov,-er,  like  the  ilight  of  the  eagle  soaring 
sunwarils,  ]:)roduces  it.  Similarly,  heroic  qualities  affect  us, 
as  tliose  v.hich  transcend  ordinary  experience.  lie  then 
;-efers  to  the  intluence  of  l-leligion  in  heightening  the 
sublime,  to  th,e  forces  of  the  ])h.ysical  universe,  and  to  thi; 
power  of  liuman  emotion.  The  second  essay  is  more 
•'ifiu-c  and  popular  tlian  the  first. 

In  1S14,  S.  T.  Coleridge  contributed  several  "  PZssays 
on  the  Fine  Arts"  to  I'elix  l'.u-!ey's  r>r!stil J,  ur>int}  In 
the  first  (^"i  these  es-ays  '■  (^n  the  i)rincii")!cs  of  criticism.'' 
lie  says  of  Association,  '-explaining  cverx'thing  it  oqdams 
riD-jiing,  and  above   all    !ea\'(js    itself  unexplained."      In    the 

••  'ji;''y  Nwro  rr;.;:: '^i--;!'-:!  in  1837,  ns  an  "nppeniix"  to  To-''p:i 
<"'.u:-"s  /■;.■;■.'■.■  R,-::c,ii.„s  clu.-Cv  /•v.'?.'/?;.;  to  ihc  late  S,:;v-'i''l  'rav:o>- 
Colcrt.:--: 


XII  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Britain  199 

second  essay  he  refers  to  the  vague  way  in  which  terms 
are  used.  Beauty  gives  pleasure,  but  so  does  food  ;  it 
might  be  better  to  speak  of  complacency  or  delight 
than  of  pleasure.  Sawage  races  ha\'e  no  word  for  Beauty, 
because  the  idea  is  dormant  ;  but  though  "  stifled  and 
latent  in  some,  and  perverted  and  demoralised  in  others," 
it  is  a  universal  principle  "  independent  of  local  and  tem- 
porary circumstances,  and  dependent  only  on  the  degree 
in  which  the  faculties  arc  developed."  In  the  third  essay 
he  defines  the  Beautiful,  reverting  to  I'lotinus.  In  its 
essentials  it  is  "  that  in  which  the  many,  still  seen  as 
many,  become  one."  He  gives  an  illustration  from  the 
frost  ferns  on  a  vrindow-pane.  So  far  is  the  Beautiful  from 
depending  on  association,  it  is  often  "  produced  by  the  mere 
removal  of  associations.''  Beauty  is  harmony,  and  exists 
only  in  composition  ;  it  results  from  a  pre  -  establislied 
harmony  between  Nature  and  Man  ;  and  it  exists  only  in 
oijjccts  appealing  to  thjC  eye  and  the  ear,  because  these  onh' 
can  be  divided  into  parts  ;  it  exists  pre-eminently  where  Life 
is  superadded  to  Fomi,  the  freedom  and  movement  of  life 
in  the  confining  form.  V,\  this  the  '■  forma  informans  "' 
reveals  itself  It  is  thus  that  we  find  a  general  principle  of 
Beauty,  and  v.liile  it  may  be  true  "  de  gustibus  non  est  dis- 
putandum,"  it  is  not  true  "  de  gustu."  Coleridge  therefore 
falls  back  on  Plotinus's  definition  to  d/jxpes  ov,  iv  —oXXols 
f;'jarra(o//.eroi'.  The  discernment  of  the  harmonious  relation 
of  the  parts  of  a  thing  each  to  each,  and  of  all  of  them  to 
the  whole,  at  once  and  intuitively  excites  in  us  a  feeling  of 
delight.  This  is  wholly  different  from  a  sense  of  what  is 
agreeable,  and  it  is  in  a  sense  intermediate  between  it  and 
a  perception  of  v/hat  is  good.  The  scent  of  the  rose  may 
make  it  more  agreeable  to  us,  but  it  does  not  add  to  its 
beauty.  The  usefulness  of  the  sheep-dog  to  a  shepherd, 
and  its  intelligence,  may  make  it  more  valualjle  to  him,  but 
these  things  do  not  increase  its  beauty.  The  Beauty  of  an 
object  depends  neither  upon  its  use,  nor  on  our  seeing''  in 
it  the  fitness  of  means  to  ends,  nor  on  proportion.  In  an 
oyster,  the  unshapely  shell  is  tlie  instrument  of  use;  the  pearl, 
in  vdiich  beauty  is  found,  is  produced  by  disease.      It  is  not 


2  00  The  PliilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  c hap. 

by  analysing  an  object  into  parts  that  its  beauty  is  seen. 
"  The  moment  \vc  look  at  it  in  divibion,  the  charm  ceases." 

The  "Essay  on  Beauty''  (1818) — a  fragment  of  two 
pages,  first  printed  in  Coleridge's  Remains,  vol.  i.  —  adds 
nothing  of  importance  to  the  Essays  of  18 14.  In  it  he 
refers  the  Beautiful  in  objects  to  two  elements — "  first,  the 
shapely,  foiDU'siis  ;  second,  the  lively,  the  free,  the  spon- 
taneous." 

In  181  7,  Coleridge  wrote  a  Dissertation  on  "Method,'' 
as  a  general  introduction  to  the  Encyclopedia  Mc/repoli/ana. 
It  has  no  great  value,  amongst  the  schemes  for  classify- 
ing the  sciences  ;  but  it  may  be  referred  to  in  a  passing 
sentence.  Between  the  sciences  (both  pure  and  mixed), 
and  the  scientific  arts,  lie  the  Fine  Arts,  which  are  governcii 
by  the  laws  of  taste.  The  Fine  Arts  are  "  sciences  a])plied 
to  the  purposes  of  pleasure  through  the  medium  of  the 
imagination.  They  are  poetry,  painting,  music,  sculpture, 
architecture."  In  reference  to  the  mixed  sciences,  and  some 
of  the  applied  sciences,  the  "mental  initiative  comes  from 
without."  In  the  Fine  Arts,  the  mental  initiative  must 
necessarily  proceed  from  within.  Their  authors  are  impelled 
by  a  mighty  in\\ard  power,  a  feeling  quad  ncqiceo  7nor:slraye, 
et  scniio  ta/ituin. 

7.  Daidd  lldhicie  to  Sir  'll'illiani  Haniilloji 

In  1 8 16,  Henry  H.  Milman  —  afterwards  the  dis- 
tinguished lustorian  of  Latin  Christianity—  obtained  tliC 
prize  for  an  h^nglisli  e.-sa\-  at  Oxford,  on  a  comparati\e 
estimate  of  Sculpture  and  Painting.  It  is  published  in  the 
third  \-oiui'ne  of  'I'Jic  Oxford  J-iny/ish  I'rirjc  Jissays  (1S30). 
He  refers  to  tlie  difficulty  of  framin.g  any  positive  theorx"  as 
U)  T;tste.  The  Fine  Arts,  while  they  advance  the  imagina- 
tion through  the  sense  of  si;_;ht,  and  strictly  imitative  in  their 
origin,  "Ijcconic  purely  idea!,  and  present  us  with  forms 
closely  ;id!icr;ng  to  their  ty]:)es  in  Nature,  but  Vvrought  to 
siipernatiu'al  gi'andeiu'  or  lx-atU\'."  It  is  this  address  to  the 
nnaginatinn  wliich  chietly  causes  the  emotions  ^'.'itliin  lis. 
Fainting    has   a   wider  sco{>e  than   sculptiu'c.      Idiere   is   in 


XII  TJic  Pliilosopliy  of  Britain  201 

man  an  innate  tendency  toward  the  ideal.  "  All  from 
Thersites  up  to  an  Achilles,  between  a  '  Hecate  and  a  Helen,' 
may  exist  in  nature,  and  why  not  something  more  lofty  than 
Achilles,  more  lovely  than  Helen  ?" 

The  dicta  of  a  Scottish  artist  of  some  repute,  David 
Wilkic,  on  the  subject  of  Beauty,  should  not  be  overlooked, 
for  the  following  reason.  Wilkie  began  his  artistic  life  as 
a  literalist,  and  imitator  of  Nature,  but  he  ended  as  an 
idealist,  at  least  to  some  extent.  In  the  year  1805,  at  the 
age  of  nineteen,  he  wrote  :  "  I  am  convinced  that  no  picture 
can  possess  real  merit,  unless  it  is  a  just  reiircsentation  of 
Nature.'"'^  In  the  year  1836,  at  the  age  of  fifty-one,  he 
wrote  :  "  If  Art  was  an  exact  representation  of  Nature,  it 
could  be  practised  with  absolute  certainty,  and  assurance  of 
success  ;  but  the  duty  of  Art  is  of  a  higher  kind.  .  .  .  Art 
is  only  Art  when  it  adds  mind  to  form."  - 

There  is  a  discourse  on  'Beauty'  in  John  Flaxman's 
Lectures  on  Sculpt h?x  (1829),  from  which  one  sentence  may 
be  quoted  : — "  That  Beauty  is  not  merely  an  imaginary 
quality,  but  a  real  essence,  may  be  inferred  from  the 
harmony  of  the  Universe." 

At  this  date,  too,  a  sentence  from  Constable  (1776- 
1837) — the  pioneer  of  Turner,  and  of  all  our  modern  land- 
scape Art — may  be  cjuoted  : — ■"  I  know  that  the  execution 
of  my  paintings  is  singular,  but  I  love  that  rule  of  Sterne's  : 
'  Never  mind  the  dogmas  of  the  schools  ;  go  straight  to 
the  heart,  if  you  ha\'e  it  in  you.'  People  may  say  what 
they  like  of  my  art.      I  say  that  it  is  my  own." 

In  1 81 7,  Sir  George  Stewart  Mackenzie  published  an 
Essay  on  some  subjects  connected  with  Taste.  He  begins 
by  desiring  a  more  accurate  definition  of  the  terms  Beautiful 
and  Sublime.  He  criticises  Dugald  Stewart's  notion  that 
the  term  I5eauty  was  originally  applied  to  colour,  and  then 
extended  to  other  things  agreeable  to  the  senses.  Though 
he  admits,  with  Stewart,  that  Beauty  is  nothing  sin  generis, 
he  recognises  "  an  internal  faculty  which  judges  and  deter- 

1  Life  of  Sir  David  Willcie,  by  Allan  Cunningl'am,  vol.  i.  p.  76  ; 
cf.  p.   158. 

-  //'/(/.  vol.  iii.  p.  I'^i. 


202  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  cha;\ 

mines  -which  perceptions  are  true  of  beauty,  and  wliich  of 
ug-liness '•  (p.  20).  He  thinks  tliat  IJeauty  does  not  reside 
in  the  oljjects  of  Nature  or  their  qualities,  but  in  the  effects 
they  produce  (p.  28).  Ilcauty  is  '-the  si^:;n  by  wliich  we 
express  the  consciousness  of  pleasurable  etYects  f(jl!o\ving 
the  perception  of  certain  cjualities  in  objects  ''  (p.  39). 
lie  thinks  that  in  all  discussions  of  the  emotions,  we  sh.ould 
keep  strictly  to  tlreir  "  genuine  effects.  Pleasure  and  Pain  '' 
(p.  40).  Then  fallows  a  criticism  of  the  association  theory 
as  applied  (i )  to  Form,  (2)  to  Colour,  and  (3)  to  Sound.  Th,e 
radical  defect  of  Alison's  the-iry  is  pointed  out  with  much 
acutcncss.  There  is  "  x-va^'/ZvV/^  /;/  our  minds  whi';h  lea'ls 
us  to  prefer  certain  forms,  etc..  to  otliers ''  (p.  161 ).  He 
accounts  for  varieties  of  taste  Ijv  variations  in  the  faculties 
and  th.cir  balance,  and  by  differences  and  defects  in  the 
brain  (p.  29S). 

An  essay  "On  Taste"  by  William  Hazlitt,  first  pub- 
lished in  18  ig,  was  included  in  the  volume  of  Sketches  ami 
iLSsaj's,  collected  by  his  son,  and  issued  in  1S39.  This 
essay  of  Hazlitt  is,  f  )r  th.e  most  part,  a  diluted  commentary 
on  the  old  (te _ifust/'>us  maxim,  although  he  admits  a  general 
ap])roach  to  canons  of  taste  amongst  the  educated.  Ta-,te 
should  not  be  opposed  to  genius,  for  genius  in  art  is  simply 
the  power  of  producing  the  Pcautiful.  and  men  of  genius 
should  l;e  the  best  judges  of  excellence.  ■'■  He  sees  most  of 
Nature  who  understands  its  language  best,  or  conr.ects  one 
thing  v^'ith  the  greatest  nurribcr  of  other  things.  Experience 
is  the  key  v»'hich  unfolds  a  thousand  in-i]:)erccptible  distiiic- 
tions.''  The  triumph  of  art  is  sl;own,  '''n'-t  in  making  the  eye 
a  microscope,  ])ut  in  making  it  the  ir.tcrprcter  and  organ 
of  all  that  can  touch  the  >oul.''  '•  Peauty  docs  not  consist 
in  a  medium,  l:iut  in  gi-a^'lation  an-d  harmor.y."  Pic  sav.-  tlic 
defect  of  the  association  theory  :  ••  If  there  is  a  pleasing  asso- 
ciation, there  must  be  first  somct!d::g  naturally  pleasing.'' 
'•  Picauty  consists  in  gradation  of  c>,;.;urs,  or  symmetry  of 
firm:  su1)!imity  arises  from  the  source  of  jiower,  and  is 
a:  led.  by  contrast.  T!u:  ludicrous  is  the  inc  ihercrit,  arising 
frum  weakness.''  ''  The  ideal  is  not  coriilned  to  creation,  bu.t 
takes  jjlace  in  imitation.      In\-e;;tion  is  only  feigning  accord.- 


XII  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  Britain  203 

ing  to  nature.  .  .  .  Rules  and  models  destroy  genius  and 
art  ;  and  the  excess  of  the  artificial  in  the  end  cures  itself. 
.  .  .  Nature  contains  an  infinite  variety  of  parts,  relations, 
and  significations  ;  and  different  artists  take  them,  and  all 
together  do  not  give  the  whole.  ...  It  is  ridiculous  to 
suppose  there  is  but  one  standard  or  one  style." 

William  Hazlitt  also  wrote  an  "  Essay  on  the  Fine 
Arts  "  for  the  sixth  edition  of  the  Encyclopccdia  Briiannica, 
which  was  republished  in  1836,  in  the  second  volume 
of  his  IJtc7'ary  Reinodns.  It  is  a  defence  of  the  imitative 
theory  of  art.  He  thinks  that  the  form  of  the  Greek  statues 
was  "as  completely  local  and  national  as  the  figures  on  a 
Chinese  screen."  Their  superior  symmetry  was  all  due 
(i)  to  "the  superior  symmetr}-  of  the  models  in  nature," 
and  (2)  to  the  "more  constant  opportunities  for  studying 
them,"  with  the  peculiar  susceptil:)ility  of  the  Greek  race  to 
what  is  beautiful  and  grand.  The  beauty  of  the  statues 
"existed  substantially  in  the  forms  from  which  they  were 
copied";  and  in  keeping  with  this  he  defines  the  ideal  as 
simply  the  preference  of  that  which  is  fine  in  Nature  to  that 
which  is  less  so.  He  maintains  that  the  figures  in  Raphael's 
cartoons,  and  his  groups  in  the  Vatican,  the  work  of  Da 
Vinci  and  Correggio,  and  every  great  master  in  Art,  are 
all  careful  copies  from  Nature.  His  essay  is  an  elaborate 
attempt  to  prove  this  thesis.  Success  in  Art  is  a  return  to 
Nature,  and  a  reaction  against  all  attempts  to  improve 
upon  it. 

It  is  easy  to  criticise  such  a  representation  of  the  ideal 
theory  in  Art,  as  Reynolds  has  laid  down  in  his  Discourse^ 
"giving  the  general  ideas,  and  avoiding  details."  But 
llazlitt  utterly  fails  to  understand  Sir  Joshua,  and  was  unable 
to  grasp  the  profound  truth  which  underlay  his  maxim  ; 
and  yet.  had  he  carried  out  the  principle  underlying  one  of 
his  own  sentences  towards  the  close  of  his  essay,  he  might 
Iiave  left  the  most  of  it  unwritten.  "  We  still  want  a 
Prometheus  (in  Art)  to  embody  the  inmost  refinements  of 
thought  to  the  outward  eye,  to  lay  bare  the  very  soul  of 
passion.  That  picture  is  of  comparatively  little  value, 
which  can  be  timislaicd  into  another  language  ;   .   .   .   for  it 


204  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  tJie  BcLX2ttiful  cha:-. 

is  the  excellence  of  every  Art  to  give  what  can  be  given  Ijy 
no  other  in  the  same  degree"  {Litc7-nry  Refnai?!s,  vol.  ii. 
pp.   177,  I  78). 

In  discussing  "the  immediate  emotions  "  in  his  Lectures 
on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Ilu/iia/i  Mind,  published  in  1S2S, 
Dr.  Thomas  Brown — who  held  the  Chair  of  Moral  Philo- 
sophy in  P'dinburgh  from  18 10  to  1820 — deals  with  ihe 
subject  of  Beauty  and  Sublimity  (Lectures  53-58).  It  is  an 
obscure  and  wordy  discussion.  His  first  remark  is  that 
Pleasure  is  "the  one  essential''  of  the  emotions  ;  and  his 
second  that  we  transfer  the  delight  we  feel,  and  embody  it 
in  the  object.  "  Beauty  is  simply  that  which  exciies  in  us 
a  delightful  feeling."  The  external  beauty  is  our  delight 
reflected  over  the  object,  and  diffused  into  it.  Me  quotes 
Akenside's  lines — 

Mind,  mind  alone,  bear  witness  Heaven  and  earth. 
The  living  fountain  in  itself  contains 
Of  beauteous  and  suldlme 

— and  spends  many  pages  in  trying  to  prove  that  the  whole 
charm  of  external  Nature  consists  in  its  rellecting  our  own 
feelings.  i\Iany  things  modify  our  emotion  of  Beauty.  It 
is  flexible  under  the  influence  of  fashion,  or  even  of  acci- 
dent and  passion.  He  thinks  this  is  true  brjth  of  the  beauty 
of  external  Nature,  and  of  .Moral  Beauty.  These  modifying 
tendencies  are  at  work  from  our  birth,  and  deflect  our 
judgments.  We  can  only  reach  a  probability,  and  not  a 
certainty  as  to  whether  there  is  such  a  thing'  as  original 
Beauty.  He  goes  on,  however,  to  refer  to  the  "natural 
language  of  emotion,"  which  is  "instinctively  underst'/yd,'' 
and  says  that  the  burden  of  profT  rests  with  those  who  deny 
an  original  Heauty  independent  of  association,  and  seems 
at  least  to  hint  that  an  original  standard  of  Ileauty  is  as  likely 
as  the  existence  of  an  original  standard  of  Truth.  Neverthe- 
less he  endorses  the  ar-.so(;i;ition  theory  almost  in  full  ;  and 
affirms  that  TiCauty  is  not  anything  "  which  exists  in  objects, 
indeijcndently  of  the  mind  that  perf:civcs  them,"'  and  tliat 
the  emotion  of  the  beautiful  is  "not  on(;  feeling  (jf  the  mind, 
but    many  feelings   that    have   a   certain    sinnlarity."      The 


XII  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  Britain  205 

Beautiful  is  "  a  mere  general  term  expressive  of  similarity 
in  various  pleasing  feelings." 

John  Wilson  (Christopher  North),  Brown's  successor  in 
the  Chair  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  Edinburgh  (i 820-1 853), 
in  the  main  followed  Alison  and  Jeftrey  in  their  association 
theory,  as  did  the  late  Professor  AlacD-ougall,  Wilson's  suc- 
cessor in  ofnce  from  1 8 5 3  to  1 868.  Wilson  wrote  an  article  in 
BlackwooiTs  Maga::ine  (January  1839),  in  which  he  speaks 
of  the  theory — "  that  all  beauty  and  sublimity  in  external 
Nature  are  but  the  reflections  of  mental  qualities" — as  "in 
a  great  measure  true  "  ;  but  the  real  attraction  of  th.e  theory 
to  Wilson  (as  to  all  poetic  minds)  lay  in  its  recognition  of 
"  analogies  between  the  object  of  the  external  world,  and  the 
attributes  of  our  moral  and  intellectual  being."  He  saw 
through  the  fiction  that  it  was  the  fj-occss  of  association  that 
made  objects  beautiful  to  us.  We  as  instantaneously 
perceive  Beauty,  as  we  perceive  the  object  itself.  But  it 
was  that  part  of  the  theory  of  association  which  discerned 
mental  cjualities  in  Nature  that  appealed  to  Wilson.  W'hile 
"  admitting  the  truth  of  the  principle  "  of  Alison,  he  sought 
to  "limit  the  application  of  it." 

A  short  section  in  James  Mill's  Analysis  of  tJic  Pheno- 
mena of  /he  Hiniian  il/ind  (1S2C)) — chap.  xxix.  §2 — deals 
with  the  "  objects  called  sublime  and  beautiful,  and  their 
contraries,  contemplated  as  causes  of  our  pleasures  and 
pains."  3.1ill  adopted  Alison's  view  almost  entirely,  and 
added  nothing  of  importance  to  it. 

A  course  of  Lectures  07i  rai/iting  was  deli\'ered  at  the 
Royal  Academy  of  Fine  Arts,  London,  in  1834,  by  Henry 
Howard,  R.A.,  Professor  of  Painting  to  the  Academy. 
They  were  published  in  1848.  They  deal  with  design, 
chiaroscuro,  colour,  composition,  etc.  In  the  lecture  on 
Design,  the  theory  of  the  Beautiful  is  dealt  with.  The 
author  applies  the  maxim  "  the  proper  study  of  mankind  is 
man  "  to  Art,  and  to  any  answer  we  may  give  to  the  question, 
"  Hovs'  to  look  on  Nature.'  The  Greeks  saw  that  we  must 
refine  upon  ordinary  Nature,  and  therefore  not  select  any 
specimen  for  portrayal,  but — from  what  he  calls  "a  wide 
and  collective  survey" — find  the  centre  or  generic  character 


2o6  The  PhilosopJiy  of  tlie  Beautiful  chap. 

of  all  the  species  we  meet  with.  The  Greeks  even  idealised 
tlieir  ideal  man,  to  find  the  divine  ;  and  they  brouylit  in  the 
ideuh  that  in  the  human  they  might  find  an  emblem  of  the 
divine.  All  Greek  sculptors  and  painters  of  eminence — 
Phidias,  Polycletus,  Praxiteles,  Zeuxis  —  present  in  their 
masterpieces  the  combined  result  of  many  actual  forms  (jf 
beauty,  blendin;,^  tlieir  separate  excellences  in  one.  The 
notion  that  nothin,L;  is  natural  but  tliat  which  is  '•  dravrn 
from  an  individual  type''  (p.  67),  is  condemned  as  a  "  vulyar 
error."  The  perfections  of  Art  are  "deviations  from 
Nature.''  So  far  art  must  be  corA-entional.  Artistic  style 
is  ''  Xature  rectified  by  her  own  permanent  standard,  and 
restored  to  her  ori-jinal  perfectinn '''  (p.  6S).  .Mr.  Howard 
does  not  enter  into  the  metapliy-ics  of  the  problem,  but. 
deali'.iy  with  the  beauty  of  for//!,  he  maintains  tliat  certain 
fcjrms  are  beautiful  intrinsically,  a|jart  from  association  ;  and, 
referring  to  the  theories  v.'hich  find  the  essence  of  Pcauty 
in  "fitness,  propriety,  harmony,  perfection,''  he  says  that 
they  all  virtually  '•  admit  prvporiio/i  to  be  an  essential 
clement  of  Keauty''  (p.  71).  which  he  thinks  a  "primary 
and  uni\'ersal  ■'  element  ('p.  72). 

The  contribution  of  .Sir  AVilliam  Hannlton  to  the 
philosophy  of  yEstlietic,  in  his  Lcciu/'cs  and  the  Xotes  to  his 
edition  of  Rcid,  is  fragmentary  ;  but  the  forty-sixth  or  last 
lecture  of  his  rnctaphy-:c;il  course  is  devuied  to  the  Peauriful 
and  the  Sublime.  llis  treatment  is  whdily  su')_iective. 
I!e  makes  no  attempt  to  determine  the  ob_;ecii\-e  cliaracter 
of  Peauty  itself,  .\fier  discussing  the  feelings,  and  sub- 
dividing thiCm — in  a  some-.\'h,at  artificial  manner — r.e  con- 
siders those  "  which  arise  irom  the  acts  of  tlie  Imaginaiion 
and  th.e  Understa:v;ing  in  Cdnjunrtion  ""  (p.  506).  These, 
lie  says,  are  "  jirin'.ipally  those  of  Peauty  ;uid  .Sublimity.'' 
He.  hjjwever,  distir.gui-h.es  aptly  (because  the  distiriCtion  is 
constacitly  forgmtcn)  between  the  fctlii-^s  of  Peauty  and 
the  J!iiii;//!L/!fs  of  Taste.  lie  afiirm--^  that  the  satisfaction 
whi'jh  we  feel  in  the  |)resence  of  the  Peautiful  or  the 
.Subiliine  "  ari-es  sule'y  frdm  the  con.-ideration  of  the 
ob'i.-ct,  and  altogether  aj^art  frcm  any  desire  of,  or  sati~- 
faction    in    its    pos-e-sinn "    (}).     507).        lie    refers    to    tr.e 


XII  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Britain  207 

distinction  between  Beauty  that  is  "  free  oi-  absolute,''  and 
Beauty  that  is  "  dependent  or  relative."  He  rejects  the 
distinction,  but  at  the  same  time  affirms  that  certain  objects 
"  please  us  directly,  and  of  themselves,  no  reference  being 
had  to  aught  beyond  the  form  which  they  exhibit " 
(p.  50S).  Others  which  please  us  indirectly,  and  for  a 
purpose,  arc  simply  useful  ;  although  the  same  object  may 
please  us  in  both  ways.  Relative  beauty  is  only  "a 
beautified  utility,  or  a  utilised  beauty"  (p.  509).  In  the 
case  of  Free  or  Absolute  Beauty,  both  the  imagination 
and  understanding  find  occupation,  and  an  object  is  beautiful 
to  us  in  proportion  as  these  two  energies  act  fully  and 
freely.  The  action  of  the  understanding,  however,  tends 
towards  unity.  It  binds  up  separate  parts  into  a  whole  ; 
and  as  difterent  minds  do  this  diftercntly — with  \'arying 
speed,  and  varying  success  —  we  can  easily  account  for 
difterences  in  tlie  apprehension  of  the  Beautiful.  The 
less  cultivated  mind  lingers  over  the  parts,  the  multifarious 
details  ;  the  more  educated  combines  these  in  unity.  So 
much  for  \.\\^  feeliiii:;  of  the  beautiful.  \  jtu/L^inent  of  Taste 
is  either  pure  or  mixed  ;  it  is  liure  when  it  is  based  on  the 
beautiful  solely,  it  is  mixed  when  it  takes  account  of  other 
things  which  stimulate  the  senses.  Thus,  Hamilton's  defini- 
tion of  the  beautiful  is,  "A  beautiful  thing  is  one  whose 
form  occupies  tlie  Imagination  and  B'nderstanding  in  a  free, 
and  full,  and  consecjucntly  an  agrecaljle  activity"  (p.  512). 
It  will  be  seen  that  it  is  defined,  not  from  what  it  is  in  itself, 
but  solely  from  its  effects. 

lie  proceeds  to  a  dcfiniti(jn  of  the  Sublime  in  the  same 
fashion.  "  The  beautiful  attracts  without  repelling  ;  whereas 
the  sublime  at  once  docs  both  :  the  beautiful  affords  us  a 
feeling  ot  unmingled  [flcasure,  in  the  full  and  unimpeded 
activity  of  our  cognitive  powers  ;  whereas  our  feeling  of 
sublimity  is  a  mingled  one  of  pleasure  and  pain — of  pleasure 
in  the  consciousness  of  the  strong  energy,  of  pain  in  ihe  con- 
sciousness that  this  enci'gy  is  in  vain.  But,  as  the  amount 
of  pleasure  in  the  sublime  is  greater  than  the  amount  of 
pain,  it  follows  that  the  free  energy  it  elicits  must  be  greater 
than  the  free  energy  it  repels.     For  Beauty,  magnitude  is  an 


3o8  T/ic  Pliilosof-Jiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

iiiipc-dimer.t  ;  sublimity,  on  the  contrary,  requires  magnitude 
as  its  condition.  That  we  are  at  once  attracted  and 
repelled  by  sublimity,  arises  from  the  circumstance  that 
the  object  which  we  call  sublime  is  proportioned  to  (jne  of 
our  faculties,  and  disproportioned  to  another"'  (j).  513). 
He  divides  the  sublime  into  three  classes — the  subhme  of 
Space,  of  Time,  and  of  Power.  The  Picturesque  star.ds 
opposite  both  to  the  Peautiful  and  the  .Sublime.  An  oL-'cct 
is  ugly  when  the  understanding  and  imagination,  working 
together,  cannot  take  it  up  into  a  u;:ity.  liut  with.out 
wholly  failing,  the  faculties  may  be  only  embarrassed,  em- 
barrassed by  the  amount  of  variety,  which  for  a  time  Ijafiles 
the  reduction  of  the  mass  to  detail,  to  unity.  Hamilton 
thinks  that  if  the  mind  '-expatiates  freely  and  easily  in 
'.'aricty,  without  attempting  painfully  to  reduce  it  to  unity'' 
(p.  567),  it  will  find  the  object  before  it  jjicturcsque.  A 
jiicturesque  object  is  "so  determinately  varied,  and  so 
a!)rupt  in  its  \'ariety,  it  presents  so  complete  a  negation  of 
all  rounded  contour,  and  so  regular  an  irre-,"ularity  of  broken 
lines  and  angles,  that  every  attempt  at  reducing  it  to  a 
liarmonious  whole  is  found  to  be  impossible"  (ip.  517). 

There  is  much  that  is  sugge=ti\"e  and  valuable  in 
Hamilton's  discussion,  but  as  a  branch  of  psycliology  it  is 
altogether  subjective.  Pie  docs  not  face  the  problem  of  th.e 
nature  of  objective  beauty. 

3.  M-VL^iy  to  Ccorg:  Ramsay 

V,\  far  tp.e  most  imj^ortant  Scottish  writf-r  on  the  philo- 
sophv  of  th.e  lieautiful  during  the  nineieenth  cer.ti:ry  has 
been  Dr.  l\r\'icar  of  MolYat.  In  the  ye;ir  1S37  PjC  issued 
a  work  Uii  tJic  ]>C'':!tif;I,  tJ:c  Vicluy.syic^  oj:J.  tlic  Sulli»u\ 
Nineteen  years  afterwards  he  jvabii^h.ed  a  series  of  Lectures 
addressed  to  the  Philosophical  In,~titution  of  ICdinburgh,  on 
the  same  sub;ci:t,  and  memorable  lectures  they  were. 
iJe'ivered  in  tlie  city  of  JenVex',  they  gave  the  coitp  ih'gra.'c 
t'>  the  association  doctrir:e,  -o  th.at  it  could  no  longer  be 
dcs::ril3ed  as  th.e  "  Plclir.bur^^h  tlieory ''  on  the  sulrcct.  Put 
MA'icars    earlier    w.jrk    is    the    more    thorou.^hgoing    and 


XII  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Britain  209 

philosophical  of  the  two.  It  is  full  of  wisdom,  and  contains 
much  relevant  criticism,  both  of  the  transcendentalists  and 
of  the  disciples  of  experience.  Its  division  into  four  parts — 
in  which  Beauty,  physical,  physiological,  and  ethical,  are 
considered  seriatim — is,  however,  an  unfortunate  one. 

}vI'Vicar  saw  clearly  that  if  "Beauty"  and  "Ugliness'"' 
were  matters  of  taste,  "Truth"  and  "Error"  must  be 
matters  of  opinion,  or  "  ways  of  viewing  things " ;  while 
"Good"'  and  "Evil"  would  be  accidents  of  custom;  and 
that,  therefore,  the  problems  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Beau- 
tiful "touch  the  first  principle  of  all  Philosophy"  (p.  11). 
He  also  saw  that,  if  we  are  to  succeed  in  finding  ou: 
"wherein  true  Beauty  lies,"  we  must  withdraw  it  from  the 
sphere  of  sense,  and  "  fix  it  amongst  the  permanencies  of  our 
intellectual  nature"  (p.  11).  The  emotion  of  the  Beauti- 
ful, instead  of  being  confined  to  the  imagination,  "  has  the 
range  of  the  whole  mind"  (p.  19).  It  is  also  "extremely 
varied  as  to  its  origin"  (p.  20).  It  "tends  to  diftuse  itself 
over  the  objects  which  awake  it "  (p.  21);  and  so  mankind 
has  come  to  believe  that  "  Nature  is  really  full  of  feeling, 
and  animated  either  by  one  Great  Spirit,  whose  expression 
in  every  region  is  always  kindred  with  the  scene,  or  by 
many  spirits,  each  of  which  has  its  own  peculiar  dwelling- 
place  "  (pp.  21,  22).  The  various  objects  in  Nature  that 
are  beautiful,  he  regards  as  so  many  "  natural  mirrors  that 
only  reflect,  and  do  not  utter  feeling  "  ;  and  he  goes  on  to 
unfold  what  he  calls  "the  law  of  imputation"  (p.  22),  by 
which  we  externalise  our  feelings.  Probably  the  law  of 
investiture  would  have  been  a  happier  phrase. 

In  the  next  chapter  M 'Vicar  classifies  the  various  sorts 
of  Beauty,  in  two  interesting  tables,  in  the  former  of 
which  he  divides  it  into  Beauty  derived  from  fitness,  utility, 
imitation,  reminiscence,  and  association,  and  as  therefore 
objective  ;  and  Beauty  that  is  factitious  and  subjective,  due 
to  organic  and  even  irrational  causes.  In  the  latter  table 
he  divides  it  into  (i)  simple  Beauty,  the  beauty  of  Repose, 
which  "awakens  disinterested  admiration";  and  (2)  express- 
ive Beauty,  the  beauty  of  association.  The  former  he 
subdivides  into  Beauty,  kaleidoscopic  and  arabesque  ;  and 

P 


2IO  TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

the  latter  into  Beauty,  picturesque  and  sublime.  His  his- 
torical and  critical  remarks  on  the  theories  of  Alison  and 
Jeffrey  at  this  point  are  excellent. 

In  his  analysis  of  beautiful  objects  M 'Vicar  distinujuishes 
the  way  in  which  their  constituent  parts  are  groujjed  to- 
gether from  the  elements  out  of  which  they  are  composed. 
It  depends  on  the  latter,  or  the  way  in  which  obiects  are 
composed,  whether  they  are  simply  beautiful,  or  picturesque. 
or  sublime  ;  and  he  thinks  that  "  smoothness  with  re_.,'"ard  :o 
surface,  and  simplicity  of  ratio  with  regard  to  structure,  are 
the  principles  by  which  Beauty  is  developed''  (p.  50;. 
This  is  just  the  unity  in  variety  of  the  ancients,  and  cf 
some  modern  writers.  It  is  the  principle  of  simple  in- 
expressive Beauty  only  that  leaves  the  emotions  in  a  state  "f 
repose.  But,  he  asks,  are  not  wreck  and  ruin  expre-;:ve, 
when  these  things  have  been  "  set  free  from  their  artincial 
symmetry''?  (p.  56).  While  conformity  to  symmetry  im- 
parts simple  Beauty,  departures  from  it  give  expression  ; 
and  "  as  obiects  lose  mere  beauty,  they  acquire  expression, 
and  from  ha\-ing  been  simply  beautiful,  they  become  pictur- 
esque or  sublime"  (p.  57).  Kaleidoscopic  beauty,  however 
pertect.  is,  ■■  after  all,  hard  and  stern-looking,  and  it  seals 
rather  than  opens  the  fountains  of  emotion ''  (p.  5^:).  •■  I'lie 
most  regularly  beautiful  countenances  are  usu;illy  tk,e  mo^t 
inexpressive."'  Expression  always  breaks  away  from  formal 
symmetry.  As  the  one  increases,  the  other  diminishes 
(p.  69).  .So.  in  landscape,  the  Dutch  is  symmetrical,  but 
there  is  no  expression  in  it;  or  (as  in  Claude  Lorrain) 
\ve  have  '•  sunny  serenit}"  and  sweet  re])o-e ''  (p.  ~'^,)'. 
whereas  in  Sah'ator  Rosa  we  ha\'e  compositions  that 
are  wild,  ;tnd  full  of  feeling.  The  same  is  true  (jf  musical 
compt)sitions. 

In  oilier  chapters  MA'icar  develojis  his  prir.cijjles  of 
Beauty  as  depending  either  on  angles  or  areas  (kaleldo- 
sc(i])ic  beaitiy),  or  on  lines  and  contours  (aralx-sqtte  bcaui\- .  ; 
a:ul  then,  in  what  he  calls  his  '•  j)hilosophicaI  secilon, '' 
('pp.  131-181),  he  discusses  the  relation  v.-hich  exists  (i) 
bet weeii  the  jjcauty  and  the  ec'^nomy  of  X.ature  ;  (2^  be- 
tween   tlie    bet'.iitiful,    jjicturcsque,    and    sublime,    ttnd    our 


XII  The  PJdlosophy  of  Britain  211 

mental  economy  ;  and  (3)  between  the  Beautiful  and  our 
organisation. 

He  asks,  luJiy  is  the  symmetry  of  objects  a  source  of 
Beauty  ?  and  luJiy  is  the  expression  of  objects  increased, 
when  their  mere  symmetry  is  destroyed  ?  He  answers 
that  symmetry  is  the  condition  of  perfection  in  organic 
bodies.  Nature  is  everywhere  endeavouring  to  realise 
equilibrium,  in  symmetrical  and  stable  products.  It  is  so 
from  the  structure  of  the  solar  system,  down  to  that  of 
the  flower.  Thus  simple  Beauty  has  its  signature  in  Nature  ; 
it  is  not  a  creation  of  the  mind.  Here  he  states,  how- 
ever, a  very  disputable  proposition,  viz.  that  it  is  the  func- 
tion of  physical  agencies  to  produce  symmetry,  but  of 
the  vital  agencies  to  produce  departures  from  it,  because 
they  impart  movement.  They  expand  and  vary,  while  the 
former  condense  and  confine.  But  surely  such  a  vital 
process  as  the  growth  of  a  rose  is  more  symmetrical  than 
such  a  physical  agency  as  the  rush  of  a  cataract,  while  the 
latter  may  be  far  fuller  of  expression  ?  M 'Vicar  is  clearly 
wrong  in  confining  simple  Beauty  to  the  physical  economy 
of  Nature,  and  expressive  Beauty  to  its  vital  economy. 

In  his  chapter  on  the  relation  between  the  Beautiful  and 
our  mental  economy,  he  r-  'ses  the  question,  how  it  comes 
about  that  Nature  often  charms  us,  in  spite  of  our  knowing 
nothing  as  to  what  it  is.  He  rejects  the  solution  of  habit 
(or  use  and  wont),  because  habit  often  operates  precisely  the 
other  way,  unfitting  us  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  Beautiful 
in  Nature.  On  the  other  hand,  we  constantly  appreciate  a 
new  thing  that  is  beautiful  the  moment  we  see  it.  Going 
straight  to  the  fountain-head,  he  finds  that  Beauty  lies  in 
the  unity  and  variety  of  Nature  ;  our  analysis  showing  the 
variety,  and  our  synthesis  disclosing  the  unity.  We  see  a 
"harmonious  variety  running  into  a  central  unity,  and  the 
central  unity  radiating  into  a  harmonious  variety"  (p.  152). 
That  is  the  symmetry  of  Nature. 

He  next  asks  how  it  is  that  objects  which  are  not  sym- 
metrical become  expressive  ;  and  he  answers  :  "  Their  char- 
acter is  either  that  of  a  variety  which  refuses  to  recognise 
a  preceding  principle  of  unity,    or   that  of  a  unity  which 


2  12  TJie  PJiilosophy  of  tJit  Beautiful  chap, 

refuses  to  expand  into  a  harmonious  variety''  (p.  157).  But 
how  does  all  this  develop  emotion  ?  It  is  partly  because  the 
demand  for  unity  in  variety  is  unsatisfied.  The  mind  moves 
on  from  point  to  point,  from  centre  to  centre,  and  is  not  at 
rest  ;  and  this  gives  rise  to  the  idea  of  many  separate 
powers  in  Nature,  centres  of  force  and  energy,  i.e.  to  a  poly- 
theistic interpretation  of  Nature.  So  much  for  the  cases  in 
which  the  mind  is  resisted,  but  not  overcome. 

But  now  suppose  that  the  object  is  a  unity  which  denes 
expansion  into  variety  {e.g.  the  boundlessness  of  space,  or 
of  the  Infinite),  then,  while  the  mind  is  unable  to  tal<e  in 
the  idea  as  a  whole,  or  to  get  round  it  by  imagination,  the 
judgment,  and  the  correlative  feeling,  are  those  of  the 
sublime  ;  and  this  connects  itself  with  the  monotheistic 
interpretation  of  Nature.  r^rVicar  acutely  points  out  that 
the  iudgment  and  the  feeling  of  the  merely  picturesque  in 
Nature  tends  to  a  polytheistic  view  of  the  universe,  while  that 
of  the  sublime  tends  to  a  monotheistic  one  (pp.  160,  161  ). 

In  a  subsequent  chapter,  on  the  relation  of  the  Beautiful 
to  our  organisation,  he  shows  the  influence  of  the  physique 
over  our  judgments  and  feelings  as  to  the  Beautiful.  fie 
finds  a  partial  explanation  of  the  curve  (or  Blogarth's  "line 
of  Beauty'')  in  the  form  of  the  spinal  cord,  which  is  -'the 
axis  of  the  organic  system''  (p.  172).  and  in  the  elliptic 
curves  of  the  brain.  •■The  architecture  of  tiie  rr.'.nd's 
palace,''  he  says,  '•  exhibits  the  lines  of  Beauty  on  all  hands  " 

(P-   ^l",)- 

M'\'icar's  book  has  not  received  the  attention  i:  deserxes. 
either  in  Britain,  on  the  Contir.ent,  or  in  America. 

In  1S42,  .Sir  Thomas  Dick  Lauder  prefixed  an  Ess/r.'  ivi 
tiie  Ch-igin  of  Taste  to  an  edition  of  Sir  Uvedaie  Price'? 
Essay  on  the  Picturesque,  and  some  others  of  his  Lssa\s. 
lie  defines  his  aim  as  an  attempt  to  get  Ijcyond  the  nvirc 
popular  views  of  Price  as  to  the  objects,  or  combination  of 
ol)iects,  which  excite  in  us  an  emotion  of  the  beautiful,  t'l 
the  philosophical  ground  on  which  the  principle  of  Beauty 
may  be  maintained  ;  but  it  is  in  the  style  of  the  doctrinaire 
that  Lauder  sets  forth  '"the  true  theory,''  and  denounces  tiie 
'•threat   error''  tha:  "there   exist  in  material  obiects  certain 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  213 

inherent  and  invariable  qualities  of  beauty,  sublimity,  and 
picturesqueness ''  (p.  2).  If  it  were  so,  he  thinks  all  tastes 
would  agree ;  and  so  he  falls  back  helplessly  on  the 
association  theoiy  of  Alison,  Jeffrey,  etc. ;  and  his  long 
essay  is  merely  a  restatement  of  that  theory  without  critical 
insight.  He  even  quotes  Robert  Burns  as  a  sudden  convert 
to  Alison's  theory  on  a  perusal  of  his  Essay,  not  perceiving 
the  delicate  irony  that  underlay  the  Scottish  bard's  letter  to 
the  Edinburgh  essayist. 

In  1846,  Mr.  D.  R.  Hay  of  Edinburgh  published  his 
First  Principles  of  Symmetrical  Beauty.  This,  with  his 
Science  of  Beatity,  as  developed  in  Nature,  arid  applied  in  Art, 
though  not  the  earliest,  was  the  most  important  of  numerous 
works  by  Mr.  Hay  on  the  science  of  the  Beautiful.^  In  it  he 
tries,  as  he  says,  to  develop  the  principles  of  Symmetrical 
Beauty,  and  their  application  to  the  Arts,  in  a  popular 
manner.  ]Mr.  Hay  knew  nothing  of  Plato  when  he  began 
his  studies,  but  he  worked  on  the  Platonic  lines.  He  believed, 
as  Sir  Isaac  Newton  did,  in  "  general  laws  with  respect  to 
all  the  senses,"  and  therefore  that  there  was  an  underlying 
analogy  between  the  principles  of  form  and  those  of  sound. 
He  laboured  very  much,  as  ?vlichael  Angelo  did,  with 
a  view  to  discover  the  principles  of  Beauty.  Of  /Esthetics 
he  says  :  "  In  this  science  the  human  mind  is  the  subject, 
and  external  Nature  the  object.      Each  individual  mind  is  a 

^  The  following  are  some  of  Mr.  Hay's  other  works  : — 

The  Laws  of  Harmo?iious  Colouring,  to  which  is  added  an  attempt 
to  depne  A^sthetical  Taste  (1820). 

The  Natural  Principles  and  Analogy  of  the  Harmony  of  Form 
(1842). 

Proportion,  or  the  geometric  p7'i7iciple  of  Beauty  analysed  (1843). 

An  Essay  on  Ornainental  Design  (1844). 

Principles  of  Beauty  in  Colouring  systematised  (1845). 

O71  the  Science  of  those  Proportions  by  %i'hich  the  human  liead  and 
countenance,  as  represented  i?i  ancient  Greek  Art,  are  distinguished 
from  those  of  ordinary  Nature  (1849). 

The  Natural  Principles  of  Beauty  as  developed  in  the  human 
figure  (1852]. 

The  Orthographic  Beauty  of  the  Parthenon,  referred  to  a  law  of 
.\'(7/?/rt' (1853). 

The  Harmonic  Law  of  Nature,  applied  to  Architectural  Design 
(1855)- 


2  14  The  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

world  within  itself,  but  the  individual  mind  and  the  world 
at  large  have  a  relation  to  each  other.  The  subject  is 
affected  by  the  object.  .  .  .  The  science  of  ;L-sthetic5  is 
devoted  to  the  investigation  of  the  mode  in  which  external 
objects  affect  the  mind,  to  please  or  to  displease  it,  to  produce 
a  sense  of  harmony  or  of  discord.  Harmony  is,  as  Aris- 
totle defines  it,  the  union  of  contraiy  principles  having  a 
ratio  to  each  other.''  --The  contrary  principles  are  tliose 
of  uniformity  and  variety,  which  give  rise  to  two  distinct 
kinds  of  beauty,  according  to  the  predominance  of  one  or 
the  other  of  them  in  an  object.  The  one  may  be  called 
symmetrical  beauty,  and  the  other  picturesque  beauty — the 
first  allied  to  the  principle  of  uniformity,  in  being  based 
u})on  precise  laws  ;  the  second  allied  to  the  principle  of 
variety  to  so  great  a  degree  that  no  precise  laws  can  be  laid 
down  for  its  production''  (pp.  20,  21).  He  proceeds  to 
show  the  operation  of  harmonic  ratios,  first  on  rectilinear 
figures,  and  then  on  curvilinear  ones  ;  and  tries  to  prove 
that  by  their  union  the  laws  of  harmony  are  cvc^lved 
(p.  40),  and  that  the  principles  of  harmony  which  he  has 
set  forth  are  ■•'  a  natural  and  an  inherent  cjuality  in 
geometry  "'  (p.  62). 

In  the  Si/ente  of  Bcnuiy,  as  de7'€lopcd  fn  Xa/i/>\\  aiu! 
applied  in  Art,  Mr.  Hay  expands  his  doctrine,  his  aim 
being  to  prove  scientifically  that  the  IJcautiful  in  Nature 
and  in  Art,  which  appeals  to  the  mind  through  the  eye.  is 
governed  by  the  same  laws  as  go\'ern  the  ear  ;  in  other 
words,  that  Beauty  must  conform  to  the  laws  of  Nature  in  the 
plastic  art  of  ])ainting,  as  well  as  in  the  sister  art  of  music. 
I  In  this  he  was  partly  anticii)atcd  by  a  work,  published  in 
I  83  I,  T/ie  Ml/sic  of  tJie  I-lyc  ;  or,  }-2ss<n's  on  tJic  Prijicipios  of 
tJic  Beauty  and  perfection  of  Areliitecture,  by  Peter  Lei^h, 
in  which  the  resemblance  of  music  to  Architecture  is  traced 
at  some  length.  Architecture  being  called  the  music  of 
the  eye.]  His  aim,  he  sa)'s,  is  "to  rise  superior  to  the 
idiosyncrasies  of  different  artists,  and  to  Ijring  back  to  one- 
common  type  the  sensations  of  the  eye  and  of  the  ear." 
He  repeats,  almost  vcrliatim,  the  analyses  and  the  conten- 
tion of  his  ftrnrer  book,  that  symmetry  gives  rise  to  beauty, 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  215 

and  variety  to  picturesqueness.  The  science  of  Beauty  is 
evolved  from  what  he  calls  the  "harmonic  law  of  Nature,'' 
which  is  based  on  the  Pythagorean  system  of  numerical 
ratios.  He  applies  it  first  to  Sound,  and  afterwards 
to  Form  (especially  as  seen  in  the  form  of  the  human 
head,  countenance,  and  figure),  and  lastly  to  Colour,  and 
the  proportions  of  ancient  Greek  vases  and  ornaments.  He 
considers  all  aesthetic  science  as  "  based  on  the  great 
harmonic  law  of  Nature,  which  pervades  and  governs  the 
universe  ;  and  which  lies,  as  such,  intermediate  between 
the  physical  and  the  metaphysical  sphere.'' 

In  an  article  in  the  EdmbiirgJi  Rcvietu,  October  1843, 
Sir  David  Brewster  wrote  an  elaborate  criticism  of  Mr.  Hay's 
books  on  Harmonic  colouring,  and  the  Harmony  of  Form, 
chiefly  from  the  scientific  side. 

In  1S48  an  Atiaiysts  a7id  Theory  of  the  Efiwfwns,  tuitJi 
dissertations  on  Beauty,  Sublimity,  and  the  Ludicrous,  -was 
published  by  George  Ramsay,  the  author  of  several  philo- 
sophical works.  "We  must  always  bear  in  mind  these 
two  things  :  first,  that  the  Beauty  which  we  feel  must  be 
distinguished  from  the  outward  cause  which  excites  it  ; 
secondly,  that  Beauty  is  an  emotion,  not  a  sensation  "  (p.  69). 
'•  Wonder  and  love  may  combine  with  Beauty,  and  so  en- 
hance the  feeling,  but  they  are  not  essential  to  it.'''"  "  It  is  a 
simple,  not  a  compound  emotion,  and  cannot  be  analysed.'' 
"Beauty  and  Sublimity  are  distinguished  from  all  other 
emotions  by  the  incorporating  process,  whereby  the  mind 
unconsciously  communicates  its  own  feelings  to  outward 
objects,  clothing''  dead  matter  with  the  nature  and  qualities 
of  spirit "  (p.  70).  Mr.  Ramsay  thought  that  Beauty  and 
Sublimity  were  quite  as  subjective  as  any  sensation,  or  as 
the  emotions  of  love,  hate,  fear,  and  wonder,  but  that  they 
were  distinguished  from  the  latter  by  this  incorporating 
process.  But  in  his  next  chapter,  "  on  the  source  of 
Beauty,"  he  opposes  the  association  theory  with  incisive 
vigour.  He  maintains  that  there  is  an  original  Cause  or 
Source  of  Beauty  in  the  world.  Association  cannot  create  ; 
it  can  only  arouse.  It  "may  change,  modify,  pre^•ent,  pro- 
vided there  is  something  to  be  changed,  modified,  prevented  " 


2i6  TJic  P]iilosophy  of  tlie  Beautiful  chap. 

(p.  76).  He  sees  that  the  theory  which  explains  the 
Beautiful  by  association,  must  deal  similarly  with  the  True  : 
and  that  neither  custom  nor  utility  can  account  for  the 
origin  of  Beauty.  In  his  third  chapter  he  deals  with  "the 
real  sources  of  Beauty."'  Premising  that  it  is  mjt  the 
ultimate  principle,  but  the  "proximate  causes'"'  that  he  is  in 
search  of,  he  traces  four  in  material  objects — viz.  ( i )  Colour. 
(2)  Form,  (3)  Outward  Texture,  and  (4)  Inward  Composi- 
tion. In  his  second  part  he  discusses  Sublimity,  and 
wherein  it  difters  from  Beauty.  He  thinks  that  the  emotion 
of  the  sublime  is  not  simple,  as  that  of  Beauty  is,  but  is 
••  a  compound  of  wonder  and  fear,  the  result  of  the  two 
united''  (p.  133).  There  is  in  it  an  alloy  of  pain.  It  is  a 
more  violent  and  less  durable  emotion  than  the  feeling  of 
Beauty,  and  it  is  aroused  in  us  by  things  great,  by  things 
rare,  and  by  things  dangerous  (p.  142).  Ramsay's  analysis 
of  --the  Ludicrous  emotion"'  (pp.  149-179)  is  a  useful 
.supplement  to  an  acute  discussion. 


9.  Carlyle  to  Raskin 

In  the  allusions  to  Art  scattered  throughout  the  writings 
(jf  Thomas  Carlyle,  we  find  the  germs  which  subsequently 
'oore  conspicuous  fruit  in  the  teaching  of  John  Ruskin.  In 
Sartor  Re  sari  us  (1S31),  in  the  chapter  entitled  "Symbols 
(Book  III.  ch.  iii.),  Carlyle  taught  that  it  is  tiirough 
symbols  that  we  pass  from  the  visible  to  the  invisible.  '•  In 
a  symbol  there  is  concealment,  and  yet  revelation.''  as  '•  liy 
silence  and  speech  acting  together  comes  a  doul)le 
-igmificance.'"  in  the  Symbol  proper  there  is  ever  more 
or  less  distinctly  and  directly  some  embodiment  and  revela- 
•.ion  of  the  Infinite.  "  T\\(t  Intinite  is  made  to  blend  itself 
wiih  the  finite,  to  stand  visible,  and  as  it  were  attainable 
there.  By  symbols  accordingly  is  man  guided  and  conv 
manded.  .  .  .  Xot  our  logical  mensurative  faculty.  l)ut 
our  imaginative  one  is  king  over  us."'  ''Sense  is  but  the 
■mplement  of  fancy.  ...  It  is  through  symbols  that  vr.\\\-\. 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  lives,  works,  and  has  his  l^emg.'' 


XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britabi  217 

it  is,  however,  when  the  Divine  manifests  itself  through 
sense  that  symbols  have  intrinsic  meaning.  "  Of  this  sort 
are  all  true  works  of  art.  In  this  (if  we  know  a  Work  of 
Art  from  a  Daub  of  Artifice)  we  discern  Eternity  looking 
through  time,  the  Godlike  rendered  visible.'' 

In  Past  and  Presetit  (1843),  Book  II.  ch.  iv.,  there  are 
some  thoughts  on  the  Ideal  "  shooting  forth  into  practice  as 
it  can,"  and  "growing  to  a  strange  reality.'"'  "The  Ideal 
has  always  to  grow  in  the  Real,  and  to  seek  out  its  bed  and 
board  there,  often  in  a  very  sorry  way."  "  By  a  law  of 
Nature,  all  ideals  have  their  fatal  limits  and  lot,  their 
appointed  periods  of  growth,  of  maturity,  of  decline,  de- 
gradation, death,  and  disappearance.''  In  Book  III. 
chap.  X.  he  tells  us  that  "  all  human  things  do  require  to 
have  an  ideal  in  them,  to  have  some  soul  in  them,  were 
it  only  to  keep  the  body  unputrefied  ;  and  wonderful  it  is  to 
see  how  the  Ideal  or  Soul,  place  it  in  what  ugliest  body 
you  may,  will  irradiate  said  body  with  its  own  nobleness.'' 

Again,  in  one  of  the  Latter -Day  Pamphlets,  entitled 
"Jesuitism"  (August  1S50),  he  admits  that  "it  is  to  the  Fine 
Arts  that  the  world's  chosen  souls  do  now  chiefly  take  refuge, 
and  attempt  that  '  worship  of  the  Beautiful '  may  thus  be 
possible  for  them.  .  .  .  Ever  must  the  Fine  Arts  be,  if  not 
veliginn,  yet  indissolubly  united  to  it,  dependent  on  it, 
vitally  blended  with  it  as  body  is  with  soul.''  He  sees,  how- 
ever, that  there  may  be  unveracity  and  even  "Jesuitism" 
in  the  Fine  Arts,  and  how,  in  that  case,  its  "  thrice-unblessed 
presence  smites  the  genius  of  mankind  with  paralysis,"  how 
its  worship  ends  in  mere  dilettantism  and  empty  talk. 
"  The  Fine  Arts  divorcing  themselves  from  TrutJi,  are  quite 
certain  to  fall  mad,  if  they  do  not  die."' 

In  SJiooting  Niagara  he  writes:  "All  real  Art  is  the 
disimprisoned  soul  of  Fact."' 

It  will  soon  be  seen  how  this  teaching  bore  fruit  in  the 
next  period  of  art-literature. 

From  1844  to  1848,  David  Scott,  one  of  the  most 
notable  of  Scottish  artists — in  ideality  of  design  perhaps 
the  most  original  of  them  all — wrote  what  he  called  "  Notes 
for  ?vIemory."  a  record    of  passing  thoughts,  feelings,  etc. 


2iS  TJie  Philosophy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

In  February  1845  he  jotted  down  a  "basis  for  a  Theory  of 
]5eauty.''  "  Beauty  is  not  dependent  on  any  combination 
of  sensuous  quaHties,  as  Burke  attempts  to  say  ;  nor  is  it 
dependent  on  association  with  other  perceptions  or  sensa- 
tions :  it  is  by  itself  and  ultimate.  It  may  terminate  in 
itself,  and  has  no  necessary  connection  with  other  qualities. 
mental  or  corporeal.  In  a  superhuman  existence  we  must 
imagine  it  always  present.  ...  A  confusion  of  tongues  on 
the  subject  has  resulted  from  the  so-called  difterences  of 
opinion  of  difierent  nations.  But  there  is  in  reality  no 
such  difterence  of  opinion,  except  in  the  degree  of  i^er- 
ception,  or  in  the  grounds  of  decision.  ...  If  a  negro 
thinks  the  black  the  handsomer,  he  still  gives  his 
preference  to  a  quality  similar  in  its  nature  to  that 
which  guides  the  decisions  of  the  white.  Beauty  of  form 
and  of  colour  are  founded  in  all  cases  on  the  same 
perception,  but  all  the  forms  and  colours  may  be  different 
degrees  of  it.  In  form  and  colour,  howe\er,  there  is  a 
higJicst^  and  here  lies  the  transcendental  root  of  the  matter. 
This  highest  is  purely  elemental  and  abstract — the  most 
primitive  sensations  in  both  resulting  from  lines,  and  the 
se\'eral  colours,  without  relation  to  combination  in  things. 
The  human  form  is  the  highest  combination.  We  can 
easily  refer  the  feeling  produced  in  us  by  it  to  certain  pro- 
perties, but  the  reason  of  this  feeling  is  beyond  the  under- 
standing"' (yMcnioir  of  David  Scott,  by  W'illiain  B.  Scott 
(1S50),  pp.  291.  292). 

]Mr.  Ruskin  has  done  so  much  for  this  generation,  and 
for  all  time,  by  his  art-criticism,  and  he  has  made  us  his 
delators  in  so  many  ways,  that  it  is  hard  to  deal  with  him  as 
a  philosopher,  in  the  same  way  as  we  deal  with  other  con- 
tem])oraries. 

As  the  second  volume  of  Modcr?!  Painters,  which  gi\'es 
us  ?vlr.  Ruskin's  view  of  the  Bjcautiful.  was  first  published 
in  1S46,  his  contributions  to  the  literature  of  J'.sthetics, 
extending  over  nearly  half  a  century,  may  be  considered  at 
this  stage. 

Perhaps  the  chief  value  of  Ruskin's  art-criticism  is  that 
it    goes   beyond   Art    to   life,  that    it    binds   the   ethical,  the 


XII  T/ie  Philosophy  of  B?-itat)i  219 

social,  and  the  artistic  within  one  supreme  category,  and 
that  it  is  so  varied  and  so  vital  in  reference  to  all  the  art- 
schools  of  the  world.  His  vindication  of  the  functions  and 
uses  of  Art  is  specially  noble,  because  he  is  much  more 
than  an  art-critic,  he  is  a  moralist  as  well,  and  it  is  from 
the  moralist's  point  of  view  that  he  almost  invariably  writes. 
A  somewhat  captious  critic,  who  writes  under  the  pseudo- 
nym of  Vernon  Lee,  has  remarked  in  Belcaro  that  he  has 
'•  made  Morality  sterile,  and  Art  base,  in  his  desire  to  sanctify 
the  one  by  the  other."  ^  In  opposition  to  this  verdict,  I 
would  say  that  Ruskin  has  almost  invariably  illumined  his 
art-criticism  by  his  subtle  side-glances  into  the  problems  of 
duty,  and  that  his  indirect  ethical  teaching — which  is  vastly 
superior  to  his  direct  moralising  —  has  lit  up  the  very 
foreground  of  the  field  of  Art.  Ruskin  is  not  a  moralist 
looking  down  on  Art,  or  an  art- critic  keeping  aloof  from 
moral  problems.  He  combines  the  two  functions  as  they 
have  never  been  combined  before.  Art  is  to  him,  at  its 
root,  not  only  moral  but  divine  ;  morals  are,  at  their  root, 
not  only  good  and  true,  but  beautiful. 

Plato  and  Plotinus  had  taught  that  Beauty  was  an 
emanation  from  the  Infinite,  and  a  disclosure  of  it.  They 
reached  this  by  a  speculative  intuition  from  above.  Our 
modern  art -teacher  has  reached  the  same  truth  from 
beneath.  He  holds  that,  in  the  perfectly  beautiful,  perfect 
goodness  lies  ;  so  that  men  may  buttress  their  lives  against 
the  inroads  of  selfishness  by  knowing  the  beautiful,  and 
loving  it  with  disinterested  emotion.  The  beautiful  and  the 
good  are  not  one,  but  diverse  ;  nevertheless  they  are 
kindred  at  the  root,  and  have  ver>-  subtle  affinities  and 
correspondences.  Suppose  a  moralist  to  raise  the  question. 
Why  should  I,  in  a  world  where  moral  evil  exists,  devote 
myself  to  the  Beautiful  at  all  ?  Ruskin's  answer  would  be. 
You  must  do  this,  in  the  very  interests  of  morality.  The 
Beautiful  must  not  only  be  known,  it  must  be  studied  and 
loved,  if  niorality  is  to  be  either  attractive  or  stable.  It 
is  the  ethical  undertone  of  Modern  Painters  that  is  the 
supreme  charm  of  the  book.  One  may  dissent  from 
1   "  Essay  on  Ruskinism,"  p.  225. 


2  20  The  Philosophy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

iiiany  of  its  judgments  as  to  art,  but  its  interpretation  of  the 
soul  of  Nature,  of  the  correspondence  between  man  and 
Nature,  and  of  the  voice  that  comes  out  of  all  high  artistic 
work — which  rebukes  our  egotism  and  condemns  our  selfish- 
ness— has  no  parallel  in  the  previous  criticism  of  Art. 

Ruskin  has  no  new  and  distinctive  art-theory  to  unfold. 
As  Mr.  Edward  Cook  well  says,i  "the  gospel  according  to 
Ruskin  is  one  of  glad  tidings,  not  of  news."  Of  his 
Moilc7-ii  Painters  the  author  said  himself:  "From  its  first 
syllable  to  its  last,  it  declares  the  perfcctncss  and  eternal 
beauty  of  the  work  of  God,  and  tests  all  work  of  man  Ijy 
concurrence  with,  and  subjection  to  that.''  And  yet  he  has 
given  us  no  satisfactory  definition  of  Beauty.  "Any 
natural  ol:)ject,"  he  says,-  "  wliich  can  give  us  pleasure  in 
the  simple  contemplation  of  its  outward  qualities  without 
any  direct  or  definite  exertion  of  the  intellect,  I  call  in  some 
way,  and  in  some  degree,  beautiful."  "  Ideas  of  Beauty,"  he 
adds,  "  are  the  suljjects  of  moral,  but  not  of  intellectual  per- 
ception."' The  discussion  of  "the  Ideas  of  Beauty"  in  the 
second  volume  (pt.  iii.)  is,  however,  ill  arranged,  and  some- 
what prolix.  Ruskin's  teaching  as  to  the  importance  of 
reality  or  Truth  in  Art  (notwithstanding  Carlylc's  praise  of  it 
as  a  "  divine  rage  against  falsity  ")  is,  after  all,  only  a  truism. 
His  criticism  of  inadequate  theories  of  the  beautiful  and  his 
exposure  of  the  craze  of  the  modern  "esthete"  (that  what 
pleases  the  senses  is  the  ultimate  criterion  of  all  good 
art)  is  excellent  ;  but  when  he  goes  on  to  say  that  there  is 
no  other  definition  of  the  Beautiful  than  that  it  is  "  what 
one  noble  spirit  has  created,  seen  and  felt  by  another  of 
sinfilar  or  ecjual  nobility,"  we  feel  that  this  is  nearly  as 
inade(|uate  as  another  of  his  dicta  is  meagre,  that  "all  great 
Art  is  praise." 

Beauty,  we  are  assured,  is  an  objective  reality,  and  it  is 
••the  expression  of  the  creating  spirit  of  the  universe."'  So 
far  well  ;  but  when  we  are  further  told  that  it  consists  (i) 
in  certain  qualities  of  bodies  which  are  types  of  what  is 
.v'/7'/;/d,',  and  (2)  in   "the   felicitous  fulfilment   of  function   in 

'   Sii/i/ifs  in  Kuski?!,  p.  3. 
-  M'\i':rn  Pointers,  vol.  i.  pt.  i.  cli.  vi. 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  221 

vital  things,"  we  do  not  find  ourselves  helped  forward 
theoretically.  Ruskin's  discussion  is  philosophically  unsys- 
tematic to  the  last  degree.  Though  lit  up  by  passages  of 
rarest  insight,  it  is  arbitrary  and  inconclusive.  It  lacks 
precision,  while  the  notes  to  the  last  edition,  which  fre- 
quently disown  the  conclusions  of  the  earlier  text,  are  some- 
what distracting.  Then  his  terminology  is  arbitrary.  Why 
should  he  call  the  aesthetic  faculty,  or  the  power  which 
deals  with  Beauty,  the  '••  tJicoretic  faculty '' .'^  The  division 
of  the  kinds  or  classes  of  Beauty  into  typical  and  vital ^  is 
also  open  to  criticism.  The  beauty  of  the  natural  inorganic 
world  he  calls  typical,  because  it  is  emblematic  of  tran- 
scendent beauty.  This  typical  beauty,  "  whether  it  occurs 
in  a  stone,  flower,  beast,  or  man,  is  absolutely  identical "' 
(;;  I,  ch.  iii.),  and  its  elements  or  constituents  are  In- 
finity, which  is  the  type  of  the  Divine  incomprehensibility: 
Unity,  which  is  the  type  of  the  Divine  comprehensiveness  ; 
Repose,  which  is  the  type  of  Divine  Permanence ;  Symmetry, 
the  type  of  Divine  Justice  :  Purity,  the  type  of  Divine 
Energy  ;  Moderation,  the  type  of  Divine  Government  by 
law  :  and  he  speaks  of  all  this  beauty  as  a  "characteristic 
of  mere  matter."  The  latter  class  of  Beauty  (vital  Beauty) 
is  "the  felicitous  fulfilment  of  function  in  living  things, 
more  especially  the  joyful  and  right  e.xertion  of  perfect  life 
in  man,"'  and  it  is  either  relative  or  generic. 

Having  finished  his  treatment  of  the  theoretic  faculty, 
Ruskin  goes  on  to  deal  with  the  imaginative.  He  says  that 
the  sources  of  Beauty  which  exist  in  the  external  world  are 
ne\er  put  before  us  in  a  pure  transci'ipt.  They  always 
receive  the  reflection  of  the  mind.  This  is  the  work  of  the 
imagination.  In  the  study  of  imagination,  the  metaphysicians 
afford  us  no  aid  whatsoever,  because  they  are  trying  to 
explain  to  us  the  essence  of  the  faculties,  whereas  the 
imagination  is  "  utterly  mysterious  and  inexplicable,  and 
to  be  recognised  in  its  results  only."  Surely  this  is  true  of 
all  the  faculties.  'Wx.  Ruskin  next  says  that  imagination 
is  the  source  of  all  that  is  great  in  Art,  and  departing  from 
the  agnostic  position  he  had  just  laid  down,  goes  on  to 
define    the    action    of    the    imagination    as    "penetrative. 


232  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

associative,    and    contemplative "    in    a    highly    suggestive 
analysis. 

Mr.  Ruskin  is  not  successful  as  a  speculative  philosopher. 
Indeed  he  expressly  forswears  metaphysics  ;  but  when  he 
keeps  to  art-criticism  and  ethical  teaching  in  detail  :  when 
he  shows,  for  example,  huw  Art  and  Religion  are  twin 
sisters  ;  how  you  cannot  understand  the  former  without 
reverencing  it  ;  how  the  reverence  that  comes  from  a  true 
perception  of  Beauty  is  religious  ;  and  how  the  beauty  of 
Nature  is  a  reflection  of  the  beauty  of  character — in  all  th's 
his  teaching  is  unique,  and  of  lasting  value. 


I  o.  Lord  Lindsay  to  Professor  Bain 

In  his  Sketches  of  the  History  of  CJiristian  Art  (1847) 
Lord  Lindsay  has  a  prefatory  note  on  "the  Ideal.''  His 
reading  of  the  history  of  the  race  as  a  whole,  is  not  so 
successful  as  his  subsequent  discussion.  He  thinks  that 
the  three  elements  of  Human  Nature,  '■  sense,  intellect,  and 
spirit,"  "had  their  distinct  development  at  three  distinct 
intervals,  and  in  the  personality  of  the  three  great  branches 
of  the  human  family.''  The  African  races  developed  the 
nr~r.  the  Greeks  the  second,  and  the  Jews  and  Christians 
the  third. 

■■  The  peculiar  interest  and  dignity  of  Art  consists  in  her  exact 
correspondence  in  her  three  departments  with  these  three  pericid^  of 
develupment,  and  in  the  illustration  she  thus  at'fjrdis — more  clearly 
and  markedly  even  than  Literature — to  the  trutli  th.at  men  stand  ^-r 
fall  according  as  they  look  up  to  the  Lleal,  or  not.''  "The  archi- 
tecture of  Lgypt,  her  pyramids  and  temples,  express  the  ideal  i^f 
sen~e.  Tlie  sculpture  of  Greece  is  the  voice  of  intellect  ar.d 
thought  ;  while  the  painting  of  Clnislendom  is  tliat  of  an  immortal 
spii'it.  The  Christian  is  superior  to  the  classic  Art,  because  the 
(Ireek  iileas  were  youth,  grace,  beauty,  thought,  digr.ity,  and 
power.  form,  C'">n-equeritiy,  or  the  expres.-ion  of  minil,  was  wiiat 
;i!'/y  chicdy  aimed  at,  ;-nd  in  this  they  reached  ]^crfection." 
■•  l-'aitli,  lio]>e,  and  charity — these  wings  of  innnortaliiy — as  yet 
-er>.  e  art.''  '•  It  is  not  .-ymmetry  of  form,  or  beauty  of  colouring.'' 
that  L-ive  to  the  Art  of  Clndsten.iom  its  vantage.      '•  It  is  the  deptli, 


XII  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Britain  223 

intensity,  grandeur,  and  sweetness  of  the  emotions  at  the  command 
of  the   Christian   artists,  as  compared  with   those   eUcited   by  the 

ancients"  (vol.  i.  p.  xv.). 

The  analogy  which  Lord  Lindsay  afterwards  draws 
between  Architecture,  Sculpture,  and  Painting,  and  the 
three  persons  in  the  Christian  Trinity,  is  more  than  un- 
fortunate. But,  wlien  he  leaves  these  generahsations, 
and  enters  on  his  criticism  in  detail,  his  analysis  is 
remarkable,  and  it  opens  up  a  new  track  in  the  historical 
study  of  Art.  His  ''general  classification"  of  Schools  and 
Artists  (vol.  i.  pp.  ccix.-ccxlvii.),  his  record  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  Architecture  of  Christendom  from  the  ancient 
basilica,  his  summary  of  Roman  and  liyzantine  Art 
generally,  his  account  of  the  rise  of  the  Lombard  style, 
and  then  of  the  Gothic  (both  north  and  south  of  the  Alps), 
are  all  extremely  learned  and  able  ;  while  his  analyses  of 
the  work  of  Xiccola  Pisano,  and  of  Giotto  (vol.  ii.  letters  3 
and  4),  are  fine  instances  of  subtle  discriminative  criticism. 
C)nc  sentence  from  his  account  of  Niccola  Pisano  may  be 
quoted  :— 

•'  Niccola's  peculiar  praise  is  this — that  in  practice  at  least,  if 
not  in  theory,  lie  first  established  the  principle  that  the  study  of 
Nature,  corrected  liy  the  i  jal  of  the  antique,  and  animated  by 
the  spirit  of  Christianity,  personal  and  social,  can  alone  lead  to 
excellence  in  Art  ;  each  of  the  three  elements  of  Human  Nature 
(Matter,  Mind,  and  Spirit)  being  thus  brought  into  union,  in  relative 
harmony  and  sulxjrdination.  It  was  in  this  that  Niccola  himself 
worked.  It  has  been  by  following  it  that  Donatello,  and  Ghiberti, 
Leonardo,  Raphael,  and  Michael  Angelo  have  risen  to  glory. 
The  Sienese  School  and  the  Florentine — minds  contemplative  and 
dramatic — are  alike  beholden  to  it  for  whatever  success  has 
attended  their  efforts.  Like  a  treble-stranded  rope,  it  drags  after 
it  the  triumphal  car  of  Christian  Art.  But  if  either  of  the  strands 
be  broken,  if  either  of  the  three  elements  be  pursued  disjointedly 
from  the  other  two,  the  result  is  grossness,  pedantry,  or  weakness  " 
(vol.  ii.  letter  3,  pp.   102,  103). 

If  sometimes  too  rhetorical,  Lord  Lindsay's  work  is,  in 
many  respects,  a  monumental  one. 

In  the  N()\-ember  number  of  the  Byiiish  Quart criy 
Rcvlciv  in  184S,  there  is  an  able  article  (No.  IX.)  on  '-the 


2  24  The  Philosophy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

Beautiful  and  the  Picturesque."  Their  difference  is  thus 
signahsed.  In  an  object  that  is  picturesque  the  details  arc 
never  grasped  in  their  entirety.  They  are  so  multiform 
and  varied,  that  the  mind-  is  not  quite  at  rest  regarding 
them.  With  an  object  that  is  beautiful,  on  the  contrary, 
the  whole  is  obvious  to  the  eye  at  once  ;  the  details  arc 
taken  in  with  ease.  Therefore  a  picturesque  object  is 
complex  and  manifold,  a  beautiful  object  is  simple,  uniform. 
and  regular.  Because  we  take  in  the  fonner  with  some 
difticulty,  it  excites  a  prolonged  or  continuous  interest,  and 
does  not  weary  us.  Apprehending  the  latter  with  ease,  it 
sooner  wearies  us.  An  oak  tree,  for  example,  is  picturesque, 
because  it  is  multitudinous  ;  a  beggar  is  picturesque,  because 
his  garments  are  irregular  and  various.  A  lily,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  beautiful,  because  it  is  a  whole  that  is  taken  in  at 
a  glance  with  ease  ;  this  ease  is  partly  the  source  of  our 
delight.  The  same  object  may,  however,  be  both  beautiful 
and  picturesque,  in  different  situations  and  circumstances 
— e.g.  a  sea  when  calm,  and  the  same  sea  disturbed  with 
storm  ;  ^  or  the  Parthenon,  which  when  newly  built  was 
beautiful,  but  now  in  ruin  is  picturesque.  The  distinction 
between  the  two  is  applied  —  (i)  to  Nature,  (2)  to  Art 
products,  (3)  to  the  human  figure,  and  (4)  to  patterns  in 
articles  of  dress  and  of  household  use. 

The  writer  then  applies  the  same  principle  to  Archi- 
tecture ;  and  explains  the  effect  of  the  Gothic  over  us. 
because  it  combines  the  beautiful  with  the  picturesi|ue.  In 
Greek  architecture  we  have  Beauty  alone,  in  Gothic  the 
two  are  combined.  He  also  says  that  we  may  explain  the 
difference  of  opinion  which  exists  as  to  the  Beauty  and 
Deformity  of  the  Human  Countenance,  not  only  from 
custom  and  fishion,  but  also  from  the  fact  that,  while  the 
Greek  ideal  of  regular  form  is  uncjuestionably  superior  to 
all  that  is  irregular,  expression  lighting  up  the  latter  (or 
even  an  otlierwise  ugly  countenance)  may  make  it  ajjpcar 
ilncr  than  one  that  is  perfect  in  form. 

In    1849,    Mr.    James    Ferguson    issued   A?i   Ilistorica!. 

^  '["akc  Pcelc  Clastic,  as  (lescribcd  by  Wordsworth  in  th(^  frst  and 
second  stanzas  of  his  poem,  or  the  !)icture  of  it  by  Sir  George  Beaumont. 


XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Br i tarn  225 

Enquiry  into  the  true  principles  of  Beauty  in  Art,  more 
especially  %vith  refere7tce  to  Architecture.  This  ^^■as,  in  some 
respects,  a  retrograde  work  ;  in  others,  a  real  contribution 
to  the  subject.  In  his  "  Introduction  "  (pt.  ii.  §  6)  he  dis- 
cusses the  "  Fine  Arts,"  and  affirms  that 

"  Beauty,  or  the  sense  of  Beauty,  means  really  nothing  more  than 
the  gratification  which  we  are  able  to  extract  out  of  every  useful 
function  we  perform.  ...  It  is  thus  that  all  the  useful  arts  are 
capable  of  becoming  Fine  Arts ;  or,  in  other  words,  besides 
ministering  to  our  necessities,  they  may  become  sources  of  pleasure. 
.  .  .  All  common  and  useful  things  may  be  refined  into  objects  of 
Beauty  ;  and,  though  common,  all  the  beautiful  and  high  in  Art  is 
merely  an  elaboration  and  refinement  of  what  is  fundamentally  a 
useful  and  a  necessary  act." 

In  the  Introduction  to  his  elal^orate  History  of  Archi- 
tecture in  all  Countries  (1874),  Mr.  Ferguson  restates  and 
condenses  his  view  ;  but  his  statement  of  it  is  frcslicst  and 
fullest  in  the  earher  work. 

The  v^•ant  of  success  in  attempted  definitions  of  "  Beauty 
in  Art  "  has  been  due,  he  tliinks,  to  the  very  erroneous  idea 
that  the  sense  of  Beauty  "  is  one  single  and  well-defined 
emotion,  whereas,  in  truth,  nothing  can  be  more  various." 
Beauty  lias  three  types  or  classes.  The  first  is  teclnrical  or 
mechanical  Beauty.  A  merely  useful  Art  can  belong  to 
this  class,  as  when  one  says  that  a  thing  is  beautifully  fitted 
for  its  purpose.  The  second  class  is  aesthetic  or  sensuous 
Beauty  ;  and  \\  hen  this  is  combined  witli  tcchnic  beauty, 
we  have  many  of  tlie  Fine  Arts,  e.g.  painting  and  music. 
The  third  is  intellectual  Beauty,  which  may  be  presented  to 
us  through  words,  or  conventional  signs  only.  The  most 
perfect  Art  is  a  combination  of  all  the  three  ;  and  one  work 
of  Art  is  more  perfect  than  another  in  proportion  as  the 
aesthetic  predominates  over  the  merely  technical,  and  the 
intellectual  predominates  over  the  merely  aesthetic.  These 
are  tlic  tlirce  great  types  or  classes  of  the  Beautiful  ;  but 
between  them  there  are  gradations  innumerable,  and  mani- 
fold combinations  and  shades.  We  may  ha\-e  mere 
technical  excellence  in  art,  we  may  have  the  sensuous 
element   in   excess,   or  the  intellectual   expression   all-domi- 

Q 


2  26  The  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Bamtifnl  ciiAr. 

nant.  In  the  sub-sections,  which  Ferguson  indicates,  there 
is  mucli  that  is  arbitrary,  with  much  that  is  suggestive,  and 
Ids  historical  criticism  is  very  A'akiable,  e.g.  in  tlic  com- 
parisons he  draws  Ijetween  the  Egyptian  and  Grecl-:  art,  in 
the  former  of  which  he  considers  that  the  technical  pre- 
vailed, and  in  the  latter  the  ctsthetic.  His  remarks  on 
association  are  also  good.  The  scenes  of  childhood,  national 
melodies,  etc.,  are  dearer  to  us  by  association  ;  and  in 
Architecture  and  .Sculpture  \'"e  are  under  the  slavery  of 
precedent.  "Though  I  am  far  from  denying.''  he  says, 
"  the  beneficial  imluence  of  association  in  Art.  when  propei'ly 
used,  it  is  at  best  only  a  sla\"ish  and  retrogrcide  source  of 
Beauty,  in  every  respect  inferior  to  tho^e  dcri\'ed  tVom 
perfection,  and  harmony,  and  imagination''  (pp.  145,  146). 

Form  and  Soinn^,  coji  tiicir  bcaufy  be  dcpoid-:}:!  cii  the 
same  pJiysical  la:js  ?  '-'a  critical  enquiry.''  by  Thomas 
Purdie,  published  in  1S4S,  is  the  record  of  a  controN'crsy 
with  .Mr.  Hay.  Mr.  Purdie  followed  Alison,  Prown.  and 
Jeffrey  in  their  as.-ociation  doctriric  ;  but  he  admits  that  the 
emotion  of  l]eaut\"  is  also  '•  direct  and  original,'''  and.  that, 
although  association  may  always  'Mentl  a  charm  to  bc;iuti- 
ful  things.'"  it  is  not  al'.\-ays  the  origin  of  the  emoti(.>n  of 
iieauty.  The  sensations  produced  in  us  by  natural  oljjects 
directly,  arc  also  one  source  of  the  emotions  of  tlie  Beautiful. 
There  ;ire  '-olyects,  the  beauty  of  which  addresses  the 
intellect  alone"  ([).  xli.j.  Peaiuy  is  as  well  entiilcd  to  be 
considiercd  a  primar\'  and  direct  emotion  as  fear.  li..-s.  lujpe, 
or  the  sense  of  tlie  lu.dicrous.  '•  .T.sthetics  and  ethiics  are 
entitled  to  hold  iirecisely  the  same  rank''  (p.  xl\";ii.y.  ••The 
liighest  of  ail  beauty  is  expre>-ion ''  (p.  xhii.).  Mr.  Purdie 
opi)03es  Cousin's  doctrine  of  Absolute  I'jeauty,  and  fdls  ijaek 
on  the  a,L;i'een';ent  of  mankind.  He  ([uestions  if  j)rimiti\'e 
man  had  any  idea  of  Pc.iuty,  and  considers  it  only  as  a 
state  of  mind,  not  as  a  quality  of  ol)jects.  lie  thinks  there 
:s  no  analogy  between  beauty  of  .Sou.nd  and  beauty  of  Porm  : 
ik.e  o'.ie  is  fixed  by  deiinite  rule  ;  the  other,  infinitely 
(li\-er.-iiied.  cannot  be  reduced  to  rule.  And  so  we  find  that 
tile  fundamental  prin<;iples  of  mu-ic  are  uni\'ersail\"  adnpied, 
\vh:]e  men  do  not  agree   as   to   beautv  of  form..      'I  lie   work 


XII  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Britain  227 

contains  much  acute  thinking-,  but  is  disfigured  by  the 
bitterness  of  its  attack  on  ]\Ir.  Hay. 

In  1850,  Lord  Iddesleigh  (then  Sir  Staftord  Xorthcote) 
gave  a  lecture  on  Taste  to  the  Literary  Society  at  Exeter. 
It  is  reprockiced  in  his  posthumous  Lectures  a?id  Essays 
(1887).  It  was  suggested  by  the  preparations  then  being 
made  for  the  first  International  Exhibition  of  Art  and 
Industry  in  1S51.  The  laws  of  taste  and  of  the  beautiful 
are  founded  on  the  study  of  Nature  ;  and  a  safe  test  of  good 
art  is  its  accordance  with  Nature.  Nothing  is  beautiful  that 
is  unnatural ;  but  this  does  not  mean  that  Art's  sole  function 
is  to  copy  Nature.  It  only  means  that  all  good  Art  is 
fashioned  on  the  same  principles  as  those  on  which  Nature 
is  constructed.  Ornamental  Art  does  not  merely  copy,  it 
creates;  but  the  ornament  "must  be  capable  of  removal 
without  impairing  the  utility  of  the  construction."  That  is 
the  first  great  rule  in  art  ornamentation  :  and  the  second  is 
that  the  ornament  must  not  destroy  or  even  interfere  with 
the  use.  The  fundamental  laws  of  Taste  are — (i)  truth  or 
honesty,  reality,  the  aljsence  of  pretence  ;  (2)  suitableness, 
a  leading  idea  being  present,  to  which  all  else  is  subordinate  ; 
(3)  the  love  of  Beauty  fin'  its  own  sake. 

In  1S52,  George  Butler,  of  Exeter  College,  Oxford, 
afterwards  Canon  of  Winchester,  published  four  lectures  on 
Tlie  Frinciptes  0/ Imitative  Art,  which  he  had  delivered  to 
the  Oxford  Art  Society,  and  elsewhere,  in  the  same  year. 
They  are  based  on  Aristotle's  theory,  as  unfolded  in  the 
Poetics.  He  held  that  all  art  is  the  imitation  of  an  image 
in  tlie  mind,  either  awakened  Ijy  an  external  object,  or 
arising  from  witliin.  In  discussing  the  question  what 
Beauty  is,  he  starts  from  the  groundwork  of  the  senses, 
which  in  the  main  suggest  the  same  ideas  to  different 
indi\-iduals  (p.  26).  He  then  explains,  and  in  the  main 
follows,  Burke's  theory,  but  at  the  same  time  admits  an 
external  standard  or  ''canon  of  proportion."  He  sinks 
back,  howe\-er,  without  reason,  to  the  doctrine  of  relativity, 
affirming  that  what  we  call  Beauty  is  really  our  feeling  for 
Beauty,  which  is  different  in  degree  in  different  individuals. 
The    Beautiful    is    various,    and    the    artist    should   aim    at 


2  2S  The  Philosophy  of  tJie  Beaiitif III  chap. 

variety,  finding  the  standard  of  Beauty  within  himself  On 
the  other  hand,  ]\Ir.  Butler's  width  of  view  comes  out  in  the 
admission  that  in  Art  '-we  look  for  something  beyond  ihe 
reproduction  of  the  actual '''  (p.  38). 

Some  of  the  re\icw  articles  on  the  subiect  of  the  Beautiful 
are  quite  as  valuable  links  in  the  evolving  chain  of  literary 
discussion  as  are  the  treatises  devoted  to  it.  There  was, 
for  example,  in  Blachi^'ood's  M''-i!;az:uc  for  December  1S53, 
a  review  of  Jeffrey,  ?^r\'icar,  and  Hay  vhich  was  as  go(jd 
as  many  a  volume.  The  writer  holds  that,  if  there  be  r.o 
standard  of  the  ]3eauiiful,  '-novelty''  is  all  that  is  left  to  us 
in  art-woriv.  We  can  no  longer  speak  of  the  great  masters, 
or  of  any  masters.  If  association  can  explain  the  beautiful, 
then  the  study  of /Esthetics  is  but  labour  lost,  (i)  Beauty- 
is.  on  the  last  analysis,  but  another  name  fir  perfection. 
The  beauty  of  individual  things  is  various  ;  but  the  beauty 
of  all  beautiful  things  agrees  in  this,  that  they  all  approach 
perfection,  and  delight  us  according  as  they  do  so.  (2) 
Beauty  (which  is  perfection)  is  '-as  diverse  in  its  forms  as 
the  several  faculties  and  organs  by  which  we  come  into  con- 
tact with  Nature.''  (3)  These  forms  of  the  Beautiful  are 
divisible  into  two  great  classes,  \\i.  the  intellectual  and  the 
material.  In  his  criticism  of  the  association  theory,  the 
writer  asks  how  it  comes  to  ])a-s  that  a  circle  is  regarded, 
"semper,  ubic[ue,  et  ab  omnibus,''' as  jnore  beautiful  than 
an  irregular  figure,  unless  there  be  a  standard  of  beauty  in 
the  mind  ?  So  alao  with  colours  an.d  sounds.  Dift'erenccs 
in  taste  prove  nothing  again.~t  a  standard  ;  because  each 
taste  may  have  a  standard  fir  itself  and  yet  th.cy  may  all 
vary,  just  as  (ireek  and  (lothic  architecture  vary,  or  as  the 
se\'eral  t\'})es  of  heroic  action  do.  The  \vritcr  atilrms  trtib- 
that  -'the  beautiful  and  the  good  star.d  together  on  the 
same  pedestal.''  We  cannot  hold  by  tlie  one,  an.d  despise 
the  other.  .\coustic  science  sh.ows  that  the  bcatitiful  in 
music  is  ba-ed  on  certain  obiecti\'e  harmonious  ratios  ;  so 
v.'ith  the  beauty  of  colours.  '■'  Unity  and  variety  arc  the 
fvo  grand  elements  in  all  fine  art  compnsitions  :  and  u.nity 
//.'  \-ariety  fin  otlier  words.  symmetr\")  is  the  first  th'.ng  to 
ije  atteniied  to  in  j.stlictical  science.'' 


XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britain  2  2  9_ 

The  principle  of  symmetry  in  material  Beauty  is,  in 
music,  the  fundamental  chord.  How,  and  why,  are  the 
fundamental  notes  in  music  more  pleasing  than  others  ? 
When  any  musical  note  is  struck,  other  notes  may  be  heard 
sounding  as  it  dies  away  ;  and  every  sounding  body  has  a 
tendency  to  excite  an  identical  note  in  all  sonorous  bodies 
near  it,  so  that  they  vibrate  in  unison  (or  nearly  so)  in 
varying  ratios — "the  notes  produced  being  called  respect- 
ively the  tonic,  the  mediant,  and  the  dominant,  which  in 
unison  with  the  keynote  form  the  fundamental  chord  in 
music."  These  harmonic  notes  please  us,  because  they 
sustain  to  each  other  the  simplest  and  most  perfect 
proportions. 

Ideal  Beauty  is  not  to  be  found  by  a  merely  eclectic 
combination  of  detached  excellences  existing  in  Nature. 
It  is  not  found  in  external  Nature,  but  in  the  mind  of 
man — 

On  Earth  there's  nothing  great  but  ]Man, 
In  Man  there's  nothing  great  but  Mind. 

Ideal  Beauty  is  reached  by  the  mind  either  through 
criticism  or  creation.  The  external  world  stirs  the  inner, 
and  the  latter  creates  objects  of  its  own,  as  vivid  and  real 
as  those  of  the  former. 

Typical  Forms  and  Special  Ends  iii  Creation,  by  Pro- 
fessors ivI'Cosh  and  Dickie  of  Belfest,  was  published  in 
1856.  It  is  a  treatise  on  Natural  History  and  Theology; 
but  in  Book  III.  chapter  ii.  sec.  4  there  is  a  discussion  of 
"  the  aesthetic  sentiments."  The  authors  affirm  that  the 
effort  to  find  out  in  what  physical  beauty  consists  has  been 
"  so  far  successful."  They  endorse  the  views  of  ?il  "Vicar  and 
I  lay  ;  but  they  affirm  that  even  if  physical  science  shall 
have  demonstrated  their  views,  the  phenomena  of  Beautj' 
will  not  be  fully  explained,  because  the  correlated  mental 
sentiment  has  also  to  be  explained.  They  think  that  mere 
perfection  of  form  is  insufficient  to  explain  the  feeling 
called  forth  by  the  beautiful.  It  is  only  "when  there 
is  something  to  indicate  that  there  has  been  more 
than  mechanism   at  work"  (p.  483)   that  we  recognise  the 


230  The  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

beautiful.  They  think  that  the  sense  of  beauty  in  organic 
objects  is  called  forth  by  the  union  of  the  n'-os  with  the 
ToVos,  the  typical  form  with  the  special  end  in  creation. 
They  admit,  on  the  one  hand,  an  original  principle  of 
beauty  in  the  world,  and  an  original  feeling  for  beauty  in 
man  ;  and,  on  the  other,  the  influence  of  association  in 
modifying  and  warping  the  faculties  ;  and  they  thus  account 
for  "what  is  fixed  in  cTsthetics — the  uniformity  of  judgment 
in  matters  of  taste,"  and  '-for  what  ditters  in  different  in- 
dividuals -■'  (p.  488). 

A  very  elaborate  and  valuable  work  on  llie  Grajjimar 
of  Onia/nctif,  by  Owen  Jones,  was  published  in  1S56.  His 
aim.  as  stated  by  himself,  was,  by  "bringing  into  immediate 
juxtaposition  the  many  forms  of  Beauty  which  every  style 
of  ornament  presents,''  to  "aid  in  arresting  that  unfortunate 
tendency  to  be  content  with  copying,  whilst  the  fashion 
lasts,  the  forms  peculiar  to  any  bygone  age,  without 
attempting'  to  ascertain  the  circumstances  which  rendered 
an  ornament  beautiful  because  it  was  appropriate."  He 
thought  that  if  a  student  of  the  lieautiful  would  search  out 
the  thoughts  of  the  past,  he  would  find  "an  ever-gushing 
fountain  in  place  of  a  half-filled  stagnant  reservoir.''  Mr. 
Jones  endeavours  to  establish  four  things — (i)  that  when 
any  style  of  ornament  is  universally  admired,  it  is  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  form  which  exist  in 
Nature  ;  (2)  that,  however  waried  the  manifestations  of 
ISeauty  may  be,  the  leading  ideas  on  which  they  are  based 
are  very  few  ;  (3)  that  the  changes  and  developments  of 
style  have  been  dwc  to  the  "sudden  throwing  off  of  some 
fixed  trammel,  which  set  tliought  free  f  )r  a  time,  till  the 
new  idea,  like  the  old,  became  again  fixed,  to  give  l)irth 
in  its  turn  to  fresh  inventions";  (4)  that  futm-c  progre-s 
is  only  to  be  secured  by  "a  return  to  Nature  for  fresh 
inspiration."' 

?vlr.  Jones  lays  down  37  Propositions,  embodying  general 
principles  as  to  the  arrangemera  of  Fi  irm  and  Coiour,  in 
architecture,  and  the  de^orati^"e  Arts,  in  wh.ich  therii 
is  a  great  deal  of  rcstlietic  wisdom  ;  c.jz-  (Proposition  4) 
"True    Peauty   results    from    that   repose   which    the    mind 


xii  The  PJdlosophy  of  Britain  231 

feels,  when  the  eye,  the  intellect,  and  the  affections,  are 
satisfied  from  the  absence  of  any  want."  "  Beauty  of 
Form  is  produced  by  lines  growing  out  one  from  the  other 
in  gradual  undulations  :  there  are  no  excrescences  ;  nothing 
could  be  removed  and  leave  the  design  cfjually  good  or 
better."  His  propositions  on  the  relation  of  Colour  to 
Form  are  extremely  valuable  ;  and  throughout,  his  demand 
for  general  principles  is  noteworthy.  He  says  (Proposition 
36)  :  "The  principles  discoverable  in  the  works  of  the  past 
belong  to  us  ;  not  so  the  results." 

The  discussion  of  ]\Ir.  Jones  and  his  friends,  on  savage 
Art,  on  Egyptian,  Assyrian,  and  Persian  ornament,  on 
Greek,  Roman,  Byzantine,  Arabian  Art,  etc.,  are  all  valu- 
able. Their  condensed  form  is  not  due  to  haste,  or  to 
want  of  thoroughness,  but  to  the  extent  of  research,  and  the 
power  of  epitomising  results.  The  pre-eminence  he  assigns 
to  Egyptian  Art,  however,  is  questionable.  He  places  it 
in  a  position  of  superiority  to  all  the  rest  of  the  art  of  the 
world.  If  other  styles  approach  perfection  only  in  so  far 
as  they  follow  the  Egyptian,  it  would  seem  that  the  race 
had  fallen  from  perfection.  The  Grammar  of  Oniamenf, 
like  Charles  Blanc's  book  (see  p.  12S),  is  a  standard  work 
on  its  subject. 

In  1S57,  Air.  A.  J.  .Symington  wrote  a  diffuse  though 
suggestive  book,  entitled  T/ic  Bcautful  in  Nature,  Art, 
and  Lfe.  It  is  full  of  appreciative  and  scattered  know- 
ledge of  all  kinds  ;  but  it  is  far  too  rhetorical,  too  full  of 
poetical  extracts  and  unverified  cjuotations.  It  has  proved 
a  useful  book  to  many,  and  if  one  goes  to  it  without  great 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  a  sympathetic  spirit  will  gain  much 
from  its  genuine  enthusiasm,  and  fi'om  the  idealism  which 
]:)ervades  it.  Mr.  Symington's  appreciation  of  the  musical 
schools  deserves  special  notice. 

A  short  treatise  on  The  Principles  of  Art,  by  John 
Addington  Symonds,  j\I.D.,  was  published  in  1857.  It 
had  its  origin  in  a  lecture  given  to  the  Canynge  Society, 
formed  for  the  restoration  of  the  Church  of  St.  Alary 
Redclift''e  in  Bristol,  and  is  in  the  main  an  exposition  and 
defence  of  Air.   Hay's  teaching  on  the  subject  of  Beauty, 


232  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beaittiful  chap. 

especially  his  theory  that  the  proportions  of  visible  beauty 
are  strictly  analo^'ous  to  the  ratios  which  govern  music  :  the 
author  thinking  that  }.Ir.  Ha.y  had  done  more  tlian  any 
other  writer  to  thxl  out  the  scientific  Ija-is  of  Beauty  of 
Form.  He  first  discu.,ses  the  Beauty  that  is  disclo-ed 
through  tlie  senses  of  sight  and  hearing,  noting  the  pleasure 
given  by  variety,  continuity,  and  similarity  in  the  sensations 
thence  arising''.  He  otters  a  pliy-io'cjgical  explanation  <  f 
th.e  pleasures  derived  from  Beauty  of  Form,  tracing  them  to 
rhythmical  muscular  action.  He  next  considers  intellectual 
and  moral  beauty,  and  what  he  calls  '•  the  associated 
emotions '''  ;  but  in  these  sections  he  deals  merely  wiih 
certain  powers  of  the  mind,  (jr  of  feeling,  the  exercise  (A 
which  gives  pleasure.  A  subsequent  section  is  devoted  to 
Ideal  Beauty,  which  is  due,  he  thinks,  to  the  activity  of  the 
Fmagination,  which  in  exercise  gives  rise  to  Art,  Poetry, 
etc.  Art  includes  Nature.  "  It  is  Nature,  and  something 
more.  Nature  is  substance  existing  in  certain  forms,  full 
of  forces  that  are  latent  or  actively  at  work.''  But  man  can 
••contemplate  these  objects  under  other  forms,  forms  of  his 
own  invention,  that  have  a  fascination  of  their  own,'"  and 
which,  though  "  taken  from  Nature,''  are  '•  ftiirer  and  grander 
than  Nature  can  supply''  (pp.  58,  59). 

In  1S5S,  J.  S.  Blackie,  Professor  of  Greek  in  the  l"ni- 
versity  of  Edinburgh,  published  three  discourses  On  r,LC.uly, 
deli\'ered  in  the  Uni\'ersity  of  Edinburgh,  witli  an  expusition 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  Beautiful,  accord.ing  to  Plato.  It  is 
an  enthusiastic  defence  of  the  Platonic  doctrir.e  of  Beauty, 
against  the  empiricists,  and  especially  th.e  associatiniialists. 
In  his  first  discourse  lie  deals  with  order,  symmetry,  pro- 
portion, and  congruity  ;  in  th.e  second,  with  the  ludicrous, 
!)crfection,  the  sublime,  audi  the  infinite  ;  in  the  third,  v/ith 
expressi\'enes~,  moderation,  smoothnc-s,  dcli':acy,  and  cur- 
wature,  \-ariet\-,  no\'eity,  contrast,  and  the  association  r^f 
i'leas  ;  anl  in  an  appendix  he  discusses  the  doctrine  (-f 
Piato.  It  has  the  merit  of  clefendir.g  the  Platonic  \ue\v  of 
Beauty,  with  ,L,reat  force  ar.d^  wealth  of  iHustratiffU,  again-t 
th,i-  d.egenerate  teaching  of  the  soi-d:saiit  Ediriburgh  school 
of  .-Mi^on  andi  jeffruy. 


XII  The  PhilosopJiy  of  Britain  233 

In  his  Evwtions  and  the  Will  (1859)  and  in  his  Menial 
and  Moral  Science  (1868)  Professor  Alexander  Bain  has 
discussed  the  subject  of  the  "aesthetic  emotions."  He 
defines  them  as  "  the  group  of  feelings  involved  in  the 
various  Fine  Arts."'  They  have  three  characteristics — (i) 
they  have  pleasure  for  their  immediate  end  ;  (2)  they 
have  no  disagreeable  accompaniments  ;  (3)  their  enjoy- 
ment is  not  restricted  to  one  or  two,  but  can  be  shared  by 
many.  The  eye  and  the  ear  are  the  tv/o  senses  through 
which  aesthetic  pleasure  reaches  us  ;  but  what  appeals  to 
the  other  senses,  and  reaches  us  through  them,  may  also 
become  the  subject  of  Art,  by  being  idealised.  The  source 
of  beauty  is  not  one  single  quality,  but  many  Cjualities. 
What  may  come  within  the  domain  of  Fine  Art  are — (i) 
the  emotions  of  eye  and  ear,  in  their  elements  ;  (2)  the 
intellectual  resuscitation  of  them,  other  senses  co-operating 
in  their  revival  ;  (3)  the  special  emotions,  wonder,  surprise, 
novelty,  etc.  ;  (4)  Harmony.  Mr.  Bain  next  discusses, 
with  some  repetition,  the  pleasurable  emotions  of  sound, 
with  their  harmonies,  and  the  pleasurable  sensations  of 
sight,  with  their  harmonies  ;  proceeding  thence  to  complex 
harmonies,  fitness  of  means  to  ends,  and  unity  in  diversity. 
He  then  considers  the  sublime  as  a  sentiment  due  to  the 
disclosure  of  power,  and  gives  an  epitome  of  theories  of 
the  Beautiful. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  in  reference  to  the  three  characteristics 
of  aesthetic  pleasure  mentioned  by  Mr.  Bain,  and  especially 
in  reference  to  the  third  of  them,  which  Aristotle  signalised 
so  well — viz.  its  disinterestedness,  or  its  being  sharable  by 
others — that  this  is  not  peculiar  to  aesthetic  pleasure.  It  is 
a  characteristic  of  all  intellectual  life,  of  scientific  knowledge, 
and  of  moral  as  well  as  of  JESthetic  pleasure. 


II.   WUliani  B.  Scolt  to  diaries  Dari^'in 

The  nineteenth  of  William  V>.  Scott's  Half-lloicr  Lectures 
on  tJie  History  and  Practice  of  tJie  line  and  Ornamental 
Arts  (1S61)  discusses  "Taste  and  Beauty."      It  has  special 


2  34  The  Philosophy  of  tJie  Beniitiful  chap. 

merit,  as  an  artist's  discussion  of  Art.  He  deals  with  the 
common  charc,^e  of  the  arbitrariness  of  taste  by  showing  that 
it  is  governed  by  law,  and  that  the  varieties  of  judgment 
are  due  to  ditTerence  of  organisation.  In  considering  the 
elements  of  Beauty,  he  l^egins  with  Iiar?!W!!y  of  payis  as 
"the  first  and  most  necessary  condition"  (p.  349),  all 
things  being  accordant,  and  a  unity  underlying  all  variety. 
The  second  condition  is  svJ'tmcfrj,',  "  every  living  creature 
being  composed  of  two  halves,  each  the  exact  counterpart 
of  the  other''  (p.  251).  When  there  is  a  want  of  this 
symmetn.-,  it  is  Ijccause  Nature  has  Ijcen  thwarted  by  opposing 
forces,  by  some  disturbing  or  alien  element.  "  All  architect- 
ure is  the  triumph  of  symmetry."'  It  is  "not  reproduction 
or  imitation  of  Nature  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  o\'ercomes  tlie 
law  of  gravitation  by  constructi\'e  devices."  Scott  afilrms 
that  the  good,  the  beautiful,  and  the  true  are  but  the  three 
forms  of  the  same  spirit;  and  that  the  Beautiful  is  "the 
appreciation  of  the  good  and  the  true  in  the  bodily  life  about 
us"  (p.  3  5  5)- 

In  June  of  the  same  year  (1S61),  W.  Barns,  author  of 
Pi'Cins  !/i  the  DorsctsJiirc  Dialect,  discussed  the  subject  of 
Beauty  and  Art  in  MtuDu'IIairs  Magazine.  His  detlnition 
is  a  very  vague  one,  and  may  be  quoted  as  a  foil  to  the 
definitions  gi\'en  h\  more  accurate  thinkers.  "The  beautiful 
in  Nature  is  the  unmarred  result  of  God's  first  creative  or 
forming  will,  and  the  beautiful  in  Art  is  the  rc-ult  of  the 
unmistaken  working  of  man  in  accordance  with  the  beauti- 
ful in  Nature."  To  affirm  that  Beauty  is  the  outcome  of  a 
foi'niing  will  defines  or  cxjjuiiris  notlfing.  Mr.  Barns  goes 
on  to  identify  the  Bcaiuiful  with  the  good  ar.d  the  fit.  The 
beauty  of  colours  lies  in  their  litness  or  harmony  ;  and  it  is 
the  same  with  the  beauty  of  landscape.  In  discussing  the 
beautiful  in  Art,  lie  (juotes  a  Wel^h  sentence  : — ■•The  tlnx-e 
main  neces.-ities  fijr  a  man  of  iiz.'oj  ("artistic  genius)  are  an 
eye  to  see  Nature,  a  heart  to  feel  Nature,  and  boldness  to 
f  illow  Nature."  Barns  also  tries  to  show  how  the  study  of 
.Art  gi\'es  keener  insight  into  tlie  beauties  of  Nature. 

In  1S65,  ?\Ii:-s  Frances  Bower  Cobbe  contrilnited  a  very 
able   article    to   I-^razer's  Magazine,   on    "the    Hierarchy   of 


XII  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  Britain  235 

Art,"  which  was  republished  in  her  Studies,  Ethical  a7id 
Social,  issued  in  the  same  year.  In  it  she  distinguishes 
three  orders  of  priesthood  "  in  the  sacred  service  of  the 
Beautiful" — (i)  the  primary,  or  creative  artists  :  the  poets, 
architects,  sculptors,  painters,  composers  of  music  ;  (2)  the 
secondary,  or  i^cproductive  artists  :  the  dramatic  performers, 
translators,  copyists,  engravers,  performers  of  music  ;  and 
(3)  the  tertiary,  or  receptive  artists:  the  dilettanti,  who 
merely  appreciate.  She  distinguishes  good  from  bad  art 
in  each  of  these  three  classes,  and  deals  with  them  in 
detail.  Her  remarks  on  the  primary  art  of  Poetry  are  ex- 
tremely good.  It  is  "  the  first  of  the  arts,  in  right  of  its 
instrument,  its  scope,  and  its  durability.  ...  It  is  the 
medium  between  mind  and  nature.  It  is  the  iog'os  whose 
father  is  spiritual  and  whose  mother  is  corporeal.  .  .  .  The 
true  poet  sees  all  history  as  an  epic  Odyssey  of  our 
humanity.  To  him  creation  itself  is  a  divine  drama  of 
Prometheus  unbound.  .  .  .  The  poetiy  of  Nature  and  the 
poetry  of  Art  alike  are  God's  revelations  of  the  Pjeautiful. 
...  It  is  by  revealing  Beauty  that  Art  fulfils  its  purpose." 
Professor  J.  F.  Seeley  contributed  a  very  interesting 
paper  on  the  Elementary  Principles  in  Art  to  Macmillan^s 
Magazine  in  May  1867.  "Art,"  he  says,  "is  one  of  the 
natural  forms  which  are  assumed  by  joy  ;  what  we  call 
the  arts  are  really  different  ways  of  being  happy."  They 
;ill  up  the  blank  spaces  of  our  lives,  and  save  us  from 
ODiiii  ;  they  lift  us  to  higher  levels,  and  send  us  forwai'd. 
?\Ir.  Seeley's  aim  is  to  show  that  there  are  laws  or  principles 
in  Art  and  to  determine  what  they  are.  He  seeks  for 
what  is  common  to  all  the  Arts,  and  ado]its  Schiller's 
doctrine  that  all  Art  is  play  or  sport.  The  Muses  are  the 
daughters  of  joy.  But  while  all  art  is  play,  it  does  not 
follow  that  the  artist  is  simply  one  who  amuses  himself. 
He  is  the  dispenser  of  joy,  and  in  order  to  be  so  he  must 
be  young  in  spirit.  But  play  is  not  mirth.  There  is  a 
serious  element  in  it,  a  strenuous  intense  element  (as 
even  in  games  of  skill)  ;  but  it  has  itself  for  its  end,  not 
anything  beyond  itself  "  When  the  powers  of  man  are 
at  the   highest,  his  gambols   are   not  less   mighty  than  his 


236  The  Philosophy  of  tlu  Beautiful  chap. 

labours. •'  All  Art  then  must  "in  its  total  effect  be  pleasur- 
able,'"' and  it  is  only  after  use  has  been  satisfied,  that  its 
function  bci,nns. 

The  different  Arts  answer  to  different  faculties,  but  in 
all  of  them,  delight  is  expressed  by  rhythm  or  prc^portion 
of  some  kind  ;  and  this  rhythm,  which  runs  thrcjuyh  (jur 
whole  existence,  and  without  which  life  would  be  comfort- 
less, is  the  principal  thin;^-  in  Art.  It  is  present  in  paintin,:^, 
sculpture,  and  architecture,  no  less  tiian  in  poetry,  music, 
and  dancing".  Khythm  is  regularity  in  Time  ;  and  regularity 
in  Space  is  Form.  This  gives  us  the  first  principle  in  Art  ; 
but  added  to  it  liicre  must  be  imitation.  This  is  the  second 
of  the  two  primary  principles.  It  is  imitation  which  is 
the  passive  principle  in  Art,  that  gives  to  it  its  boundless 
range  ;  whereas  the  other  (rhythm  or  proportion)  is  the 
active  shaping  principle.  I]y  the  one  we  find  what  exibts 
in  Nature,  and  reproduce  it  ;  by  the  other  we  give  a  new 
interpretation  to  what  we  find. 

In  another  Review,  the  Foriiii;j;]itly,  for  June  1S71,  Air. 
Edward  J.  Poynter  published  a  lecture  delivered  at  Alan- 
Chester  in  the  winter  of  the  same  year,  on  "  Ilcauty  and 
Realism  "  in  construction  and  decoration.  According  to  Air, 
Poynter,  "the  qualities  of  mind  required  to  produce  a  worl; 
of  Art  are  two — \'iz.  the  power  of  Design,  and  the  pcjwc;"  of 
Imitation.  The  power  of  Design,  again,  is  of  two  kind^. 
Constructive  and  Ornamental.  .  .  .  Amongst  unciviliseti 
peoples,  the  art  of  design,  b(jth  ornamental  and  cor.- 
structive,  is  generally  far  in  advance  of  that  of  imitation.  .  .  , 
If  we  examine  the  elements  of  Rcauty  in  constructive  desi-u 
^'.■e  find  that  two  things  are  essentia! — first,  fitness  for  the 
purpose  which  the  object  is  intended  to  fultil  ;  and  second, 
good  workmanship  in  making"  it.'' 

As  to  Beauty  in  constructive  design,  if  ccjlour,  form,  anrl 
workn"ianship  be  attended  to,  Nature  may  be  freely  imita'cd. 
In  oi"namciital  design,  the  imitation  of  Nature  is  a  principal 
aim  ;  and  "  truth  to  Nature  is  the  most  im[)ortant  necc-oity 
i'n  any  kind  of  work  which  professes  to  in"iitate  Nature.'' 
Ih.t  Air.  i^n-nter  thinks  that  the  distinction  betv,eei"i 
RealisHi    ar.d    Idealism    is    often    far    too    sliai"'jlv    drawn. 


XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britain  237 

They  should  not  be  set  hi  opposition  to  one  another.  It  is 
difficult  for  every  one,  and  impossible  for  the  untrained,  to 
decide  as  to  what  is  true  to  Nature,  and  what  is  not. 
Any  one  can  sec  the  broad  external  facts  of  Nature,  but  a 
lifetime  of  observation  is  required  to  see  its  deeper  truths, 
and  to  reproduce  them  in  Art.  IMr.  I'oynter's  remarks  on 
riiL;h  Art,  on  the  grand  style,  on  tcchniciue,  and  on  manner- 
ism in  Art,  are  all  admiral^le.  The  essay  is  an  excellent 
defence  of  realism  in  Art  in  its  profounder  aspects,  but  it  is 
such  a  realism  as  leads  to  and  involves  the  ideal.  ]\Ir. 
Poynter's  appreciation  of  Michael  Angelo  as  the  greatest  of 
the  realists,  is  excellent. 

Ten  Lectures  on  Art,  by  the  same  author,  published  in 
1S79,  are  on  Decorative  Art,  systems  of  art  education, 
objects  of  art  study,  the  study  of  Nature,  and  other  topics. 
In  the  lecture  on  Decorative  Art  he  affirms  that  "  an 
essential  element  of  beauty  in  the  art  of  Painting  is  realism" 
(p.  54).  But  as  tastes  ditTer,  he  asks  if  there  can  be  a 
standard  of  the  Beautiful,  and  in  reply  he  affirms  (i)  his 
distinct  consciousness  of  the  beauty  of  certain  things  (such 
as  a  lily  or  a  rose),  and  the  ugliness  of  others  {e.g.  a 
toad).  (2)  Differences  in  taste,  artificial  estiniates  of  the 
Beautiful,  do  not  warrant  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no 
external  standard  of  Beauty.  While  "truth  of  Nature  is 
the  most  important  necessity  in  any  work  which  professes 
to  imitate  Nature"  (p.  37),  too  much  distinction  has  been 
made  between  the  ideal  and  the  real,  between  the  imitation 
of  Nature  and  its  idealisation.  '•  The  highest  beauty  is 
attained  by  the  highest  application  of  the  realistic  or 
imitative  faculty "  (]).  39).  But  what  is  it  to  be  true  to 
Nature?  Realism  gives  the  "highest  form  of  Beauty"''  only 
if  we  "  search  througdi  Nature  for  the  most  beautiful  forms 
and  the  loftiest  characteristics"  (p.  43),  as  Raphael  and 
Michael  Angelo  did.  The  Greek  artists  of  the  Parthenon 
'•  liave  the  supreme  right  to  the  title  of  idealists." 
?\Iichael  Angelo,  on  the  other  hand,  was,  according  to  Mr. 
Poynter,  "the  greatest  realist  the  world  has  ever  seen" 
(p.  51).  He  considers  ^^lichael  Angelo  the  supreme 
master    in    the    world  of  Art,   both    in    grandeur   of  form. 


238  T/ie  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

and  expression  ;  and  his  idealism  was  only  a  higher  form 
of  realism.  lie  opposes  ]\Ir.  Ruskin's  view  of  Angclo  and 
Raphael,  and  his  doctrine  that  the  perception  of  some 
moral  quality  in  Beauty  is  essential  to  the  production  of  a 
great  work  of  Art.  He  holds  that  "the  moral  nature  of 
beauty  cannot  be  expressed  in  painting  or  sculpture."'  The 
beauty  must  be  expressed  in  the  work  of  Art  itself,  "and 
not  merely  exist  in  the  mind  of  the  artist  or  be  su])])!icd  by 
that  of  the  beholder.''  }*Ir.  Poynter's  book  is  slightly  di.-^- 
figured  by  the  bitterness  of  its  attack  on  ^Ir.  l^u^kin,  and 
its  excessive  eulogy  of  Michael  Angeio  as  "  on  the  solitary 
mountain  height,  vdiere  he  reigns  apart  from  and  above 
other  mortals"  (p.  241),  but  is  full  of  the  niost  valuable 
art-criticism. 

In  Charles  Darwin's  Descent  of  Man  (187  i)  the  sense  of 
Beauty  is  repeatedly  discussed.  The  author  of  I'iic  Ori-^iii 
of  Species  thinks  that  it  is  nf)t  a  sense  peculiar  to  man. 
Birds  ornament  their  nests,  and  appreciate  brilliant  colours 
in  their  mates  ;  while  some  animals  seem  to  have  a  greater 
sense  of  Beauty  than  some  men  (vol.  i.  pp.  63,  64). 
Although  it  is  difficult  to  distingui.-h  betv/een  what  is  merely 
curiosity  in  them,  and  what  is  admiration,  there  is  r.o  doubt 
that  the  Australian  bower-bird  posses^^es  the  sense  of  Beauty 
(vol.  ii.  p.  W'l).  Darwin  gi\'es  a  high  place  to  the 
"  inliuence  of  lieauty  in  determining  the  marria;^cs  ci 
mankind."  The  love  of  ornament  is  native  to  n.ian,  and 
primitive  art  is  decorative.  He  enlarges  very  much  on  the 
diversities  of  taste  as  to  Beauty  amor.gst  savages,  and  ends 
his  discussion  of  the  "  sexual  characters  of  man,''  in  his  nine- 
teenth chapter,  with  the  ])ri).*'ound  remark  that  "characters 
of  all  kinds  may  easily  b>e  too  much  developed  f)r  beauty, 
licnre  a  perfect  Beauty,  which  implies  many  characters 
n.io(ii;ied  in  a  particular  mam^.er,  \\\\\  in  c\x-r\-  race  be  a 
pro.,ligy.  As  the  great  anatomi-t  Bichat  lung  ago  said,  if 
every  one  were  cast  in  the  same  mcnild,  th.ere  wcnild  lie  no 
si;rh  tiling  as  ljeaut\".  If  all  our  W(imen  were  to  become  as 
bieautirii!  as  the  \"enus  de  .Medici,  we  should  for  a  time  be 
charmed  ;  jjut  \'."e  should  soon  wish  f  ir  wai'iet}'  ;  and  as  soon 
a-  we   had  (jbtained  wariety,  v,-c  should  wi-h   to   see  certain 


XII  T]ie  Philosophy  of  Britain  239 

characters  in  our  women   a  little  exaggerated  beyond  the 
then  existing  common  standard"  (vol.  ii.  p.  354)- 


12.  Herbert  Spcneer  to  Mr.  Sully 

In  the  second  edition  of  his  Principles  of  Psychology, 
Pt.  VIII.  ch.  xi.  (1872),  Air.  Herbert  Spencer  discusses 
the  "  /Esthetic  sentiments  " ;  and  in  his  Essays,  Scie7itific, 
Political,  and  Speculative  (1868),  there  are  several  papers 
on  aesthetic  questions,  e.g.  "  Use  and  Beauty,"  "  Sources  of 
x-lrchitectural  Types,"  "Personal  I>eauty,"  "Gracefulness," 
"  The  Origin  and  Function  of  Music."  In  a  chapter  of  his 
Principles,  oTi.  "/Esthetic  sentiment,"  i\Ir.  Spencer  adopts 
Schiller's  theory  of  the  play-impulse.  Pie  separates  the 
utilities  which  conduce  to  life,  from  those  which  conduce 
to  enjoyment.  The  energy  of  all  creatures  inferior  to 
man  is  spent  in  life-maintenance  and  race-maintenance  ; 
but,  in  the  human  race,  where  these  energies  are  satisfied, 
there  is  leisure  for  something  more.  Nevertheless  it  is 
the  old  energy  finding  a  new  outlet.  Play  of  all  kinds  is 
the  "  superfluous  and  useless  energy  of  the  faculties  that 
have  been  quiescent"  (p.  630).  The  "useless  activity  of 
unsound  organs  "  is  play.  Play  is  "  simulated  actions  in 
place  of  real  actions."  From  the  sport  ot  kittens,  or 
children,  or  boys,  up  to  the  playful  conversation  of  adults 
in  a  wit-combat,  it  is  the  same.  The  impulse  is  carried 
on  for  the  sake  of  pleasure,  not  for  any  lower  utility.  If 
a  feeling  has  any  aesthetic  character,  it  has  no  "  life-serving 
function."  Sensations  of  taste,  which  are  useful,  have  no 
cT2sthetic  character.  What  reaches  us  through  the  eye  and 
ear,  having  less  of  a  life-serving  function,  has  more  esthetic 
character.  Passing  from  sensation  to  sentiment,  the  love 
of  possession  has  no  .'esthetic  character.  A  rich  man  is 
not  an  object  of  the  aesthetic  sense.  But  a  man  who 
shows  prowess,  or  excels  in  a  deed  of  daring,  is.  That  the 
object  matter  of  the  .aesthetic  feelings  is  things  in  them- 
selves, not  their  uses,  is  further  seen  from  the  fact  that  many 
of  them    tend    out    to    other   people.      What    "  brings    the 


240  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Bcaiitifnl  chap. 

sensory  ;ipparatus  into  the  most  eftcctual  unimpeded  action  " 
(p.  636)  is  the  ori;_,nn  of  Beauty,  as  regards  that  sense, 
especially  in  rc-ard  to  the  eye  and  ear.  He  admits  the 
very  great  influence  of  association  in  helping  the  primary 
physical  clement,  which  is  the  source  of  beauty. 

The  primary  source  of  aesthetic  pleasure  is  that  element 
or  Cjurdity  in  an  object  "  whicii  exercises  the  faculties  affected 
in  the  most  complete  ways,  with  the  fewest  drawbacks  from 
excess  of  cxerci-e''  (p.  63S).  A  secondary  source  is  the 
'•  difference  of  a  stimulus  in  large  amount,  which  awakens 
a  glow  of  agreeable  feeling";  and  a  third  is  the  partial 
revival  of  the  same,  with  special  combinations.  A  hierarchy, 
or  scale  of  ;csthetic  pleasures,  is  given  us  thus — (i)  the 
])Icasurc  of  simple  sensation,  odours,  colours,  sounds  ;  (2) 
the  pleasure  which  arises  from  a  perception  of  the  com- 
bination of  lights  and  shades,  colours,  cadences,  and  chords, 
and  more  cspeciall)'  in  '•  structures  of  melody  and  harmony  "' ; 
(3)  the  pleasure  which  results  when  sensation  and  percep- 
tion combine,  and  the  representative  element  is  predominant, 
and  high  emotion  results.  The  highest  state  is  that  in 
which  all  of  these  conjoin  and  ccvoperate.  The  asth.ctic 
emotions  are  not  different,  "  in  origin  or  nature,"'  from  any 
others.  They  are  only  "particular  modes  of  excitement  of 
our  faculties.''  They  differ  from  our  non-;esthctic  sensations 
perce]5t;ons  and  emotions,  which  are  tran?itory.  in  tliat  they 
are  "  kc))t  in  consciousness,  and  dwelt  upon"  (p.  647). 

In  his  essay  on  Personal  1  Scanty,  Mr.  Spencer  makes 
the  suggestive  remark  that  "  F.x})ression  is  feature  in  the 
making.'' 

The  TJu'ory  of  the  BcaKtifut^  a  .Sattu'driy  lecture 
deli\'cred  at  Trinity  College,  Dublin,  by  John  Todh.unter, 
M.D.,  Professor  of  Pnigiish  Literature,  Alexandra  College, 
iJublin  (1S72),  is  a  specially  valuable  essay,  and  one  of  tlie 
n.iost  condensed  in  our  literature.  It  is  a  defence  of  the 
transccndeni;d  idealism  of  PL'ito.  Schclling,  and  liegcl,  witii 
Jouffroy's  Coiirs  i!' J'.sti'.tii'juc  as  his  '■  guide-book. "'  'J'lie 
lleautiful  is  defined  as  the  irifnite  loveliness  A\-hich  we 
apjirehend  both  by  reason  and  by  "the  pure  enthr.^iasm  of 
lu\e,'"  "l^nowinL;"  and  frclinu'  beinu'  necessary  to  each  other, 


XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britain  241 

and  simultaneous"  (p.  i).  To  a  certain  extent  each  man 
has  his  own  canons  of  taste,  and  there  is  no  recognised 
infalhble  authority  to  which  we  can  refer  for  g-uidance '"' 
(p.  9)  ;  but  it  is  the  same  with  our  ethical  judgments.  In 
both,  however,  there  is  "an  approach  to  unanimity,"  and 
the  more  cultivated  men  are,  the  more  they  agree  as  to 
Beauty.  The  variability  in  taste  depends  on  us,  and  on 
defects  in  us,  not  upon  the  Beautiful  itself 

Dr.  Todhunter  discusses  (ist)  the  characteristics  of 
objects  in  which  Beauty  exists,  and  (2d)  the  eftects  pro- 
duced in  us  by  them.  He  reduces  the  miscellaneous  mass 
of  beautiful  things  to  two  categories — (i)  beauty  of  form 
and  colour,  and  (2)  beauty  of  rhythm  and  sound.  He 
asks  if  we  can  abstract  form  from  colour  and  rhythm  from 
sound,  and  a  beauty  remain  in  each  of  them.  He  main- 
tains that  there  is  a  beauty  of  pure  form  apart  from  colour, 
and  a  beauty  of  pure  sound  apart  from  rhythm.  A  design 
drawn  on  a  white  ground  with  black  ink,  a  bit  of  blue  sky, 
silent  symmetrical  movement  seen  at  a  distance,  and  a 
single  pure  note  of  an  instrument  are  cases  in  point.  But 
he  goes  on  to  affirm,  with  some  contradiction,  that  there  is  a 
form  inseparable  from  colour,  and  a  rhythm  which  reveals 
itself  in  hue.  Form  and  rhythm  respectively  divide  space 
and  time  ;  they  also  measure  them.  Form  is  a  statical 
idea,  and  expresses  molecular  rest  ;  rhythm  is  a  dynamical 
idea,  and  expresses  molecular  motion.  All  form  and  all 
rhythm  are  not  beautiful  ;  the  form  must  be  symmetrical, 
and  the  rhythm  must  be  harmonious.  Dr.  Todhunter 
makes  some  acute  remarks  on  the  relation  of  the  seven 
colours  of  the  spectrum  to  the  se^■en  notes  of  the  musical 
scale.  He  finds  that  Order  and  Proportion  are  conditions 
of  the  Beautiful — Order  being  Symmetn'  (or  the  interdepend- 
ence of  parts  by  which  each  contributes  to  the  perfection  of 
the  whole)  ;  and  Proportion  being  Harmony  (or  the  inter- 
dependence of  parts  which  most  satisfies  the  mind)  ;  and 
both  together  resulting  enabling  the  objects  that  possess 
them  to  fulfil  their  function  in  the  universe.  Every  object 
that  has  beauty  has  also  expression.  A  poem,  a  piece  of 
music,  a  statue,  a  beautiful  face,  "  all  bring  us  into  contact 

R 


242  TJie  Philosophy  of  the  Bea^itiful         chap. 

with  other  minds  besides  our  own"  (p.  i6).  But  ''the 
sunset  and  the  landscape  do  not  express  the  human  mind.'' 
.  .  ■•  What,'"  he  asks,  "  if  the  beauty  itself  be  the 
expression  of  something  behind  this  material  world,  some 
character  of  that  Invisible  of  which  the  visible  is  the  reve- 
lation ?"  (p.  17). 

Passing  to  a  consideration  of  the  effects  produced  in  us 
by  objects  that  are  beautiful,  he  says  they  may  be  all 
summed  up  in  the  one  word  "joy.''  But  joy  and  pleasure 
are  different  things,  and  all  that  gives  pleasure  is  not 
Ijeautiful.  Pleasures  are  either  interested  or  disinterested. 
The  things  that  give  us  interested  pleasure  are  not  beautifi:!. 
although  the  same  thing  may  be  both  beautiful  and  useful. 
The  use  and  the  beauty  are  not  the  same,  else  they  would 
always  coexist,  and  would  increase  and  diminish  together. 
But  we  have  disinterested  pleasures  which  are  purely  sympa- 
thetic, and  which  take  us  out  of  ourselves  altogether.  The 
emotion  of  the  beautiful  is  one  of  them.  It  is  not  only  dis- 
interested, it  has  in  it  an  element  of  worship.  We  revere 
it,  and  yet  we  long  to  be  absorbed  into  it.  There  is  more 
than  sympathy  in  the  emotion  of  the  beautiful.  Sympathy 
unites  similar  personalities,  but  love  unites  dissimilar  ones. 
Transcending  experience,  it  carries  us  into  the  region  of  the 
unknown.  It  is  "a  rapture  of  love,  like  that  of  Endymion 
for  his  goddess,  of  a  mortal  for  an  immortal,  who  perpetu- 
ally melts  from  his  embrace"  (p.  20). 

In  his  concluding  section  Dr.  Todhunter  asks  what  this 
is  intrinsically  "which  speaks  to  us  through  forms,  colours, 
sounds  r  and  what  docs  it  say  to  us  ? ''  He  answers  that  it 
is  not  something  merely  pleasant  to  the  senses,  or  interest- 
ing to  the  intellect,  or  delightful  to  the  emotions,  it  is 
"something  that  we  instinctively  recognise  as  good  and 
right  in  aixl  for  itself  It  is  the  "revelation  of  a  mnre 
perfect  order  of  things,"  "no  product  of  l:ilind  forces,  Ijut 
of  I'lrces  working  intelligently,  and  with  mutual  helpfulness 
towards  a  dennite  end.''  Through  it  we  pass  beyond  our- 
selves to  the  Divine.  But  it  is  a  double  revelation.  Beauty 
al-o  reveals  ugliness  ;  the  cosnios  discloses  its  opposite,  a 
chaos  ;   and  "the  mystery  of  Harmony  is  that  its  perfecti'^n 


XII  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britairi  243 

consists  in  its  being  imperfect.  It  proceeds  by  the  endless 
resolution  of  discord.  There  is  always  a  remnant  of  dis- 
cord to  be  removed,  and  this  suggests  higher  harmonies  " 
(pp.  22,  23).  "The  essence  of  Harmony  is  that  it  unites 
dissimilar  elements,  so  that  by  the  very  clashing  of  their 
natures  they  enhance  each  other's  perfection.  ,  .  .  Beauty 
is,  in  fact,  the  reconciliation  of  contradictions,  a  Hegelian 
identity  of  opposites'"'  (p.  23).  Further,  it  is  a  progressive 
idea.  "  It  must  include  more  and  more  in  its  signification, 
as  our  knowledge  of  the  mysteries  of  the  universe  becomes 
more  profound"  (p.  25). 

The  last  essay  in  ^Ir.  James  Sully's  Sciisatioi  and  Intui- 
tion;  Studies  in  Psychology  and  ^"Esthetics  (1874),  is  "On 
the  possibility  of  a  science  of  /Esthetics."  Essays  7,  8, 
and  9  are  on  the  basis  of  musical  sensation,  the  aspects 
of  Beauty  in  ^Musical  Form,  and  the  nature  and  limits  of 
musical  experience;  while  Essays  10  and  11  discuss  the 
itsthetic  aspects  ot  Character,  and  the  representation  of 
character  in  Art. 

Mr.  Sully  is  a  representative  English  writer  on  the  sub- 
lect  of  aesthetics,  and  no  one  has  done  better  service  to  the 
school  which  he  champions,  although  many  will  dispute  the 
conclusions  at  which  he  arrives. 

He  afiirms — with  notable  catholicity — that  no  one  prin- 
ciple of  .Esthetics  has  absolute  validity,  but  that  relative 
validity  is  all  we  need,  alike  in  Ethics  and  yEsthetics. 
He  provisionally  defines  the  essence  of  Art  as  "  the  produc- 
tion of  some  permanent  object,  or  passing  action,  which  is 
fitted  not  only  to  supply  an  active  enjoyment  to  the  pro- 
ducer, but  to  convey  a  pleasurable  impression  to  a  number 
of  spectators  or  listeners,  quite  apart  from  any  personal 
advantage  to  be  derived  from  it."'  He  thinks  (and  here 
many  will  disagree  with  him)  that  the  labours  of  meta- 
physicians to  discover  the  source  of  Beauty  are  of  no  use 
towards  a  science  of  Art,  because  the  properties  of  Art  "  are 
innumerable,  and  can  only  be  subsumed  under  some  such 
conception  as  pleasurability."  Its  essence  is  to  "  gratify 
certain  emotional  susceptibilities."  "Art,  in  its  first  and 
simplest    aspect,   is    a    mere    variation    and    expansion    of 


244  ^/^^  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

pleasures  imparted  to  the  eye  and  ear  hy  nature."  Tic 
refers  to  the  labours  of  Alison,  Bain,  and  Spencer  in  classif\- 
ing  pleasures,  and  then  gives  what  he  regards  a.^  a  more 
complete  system  of  aesthetic  pleasure— (i)  Trimary  plea- 
sures   of   stimulation,    due  to  single    organic   impressions ; 

(2)  secondary  ones,  due  to  a  plurality  of  impressions;  (3) 
ideal  revivals  of  these,  when  the  idea  is  one  of  immediate 
inference  ;  (4)  pleasures  of  ideal  recollection  ;  (5)  pleasures 
of  intuition  ;  (6)  pleasures  of  imagination. 

In  discussing  these  pleasures  we  get  "  the  first  dimen- 
sion in  the  aesthetic  measure,  viz.  extension."  It  will  be 
noted  that,  in  pointing  out  what  falls  to  be  discussed  under 
some  of  these  heads,  ^\x.  Sully  takes  up  the  despised 
metaphysical  problem.  The  important  result,  however,  is 
that  we  reach  "  certain  approximately  universal  laws  of 
pleasurable  impression "  ;  e.g.  it  is  possible  to  define  the 
organic  conditions  of  pleasure  in  sound  and  in  colour  ; 
further,  a  variation  of  the  elements  of  sensation  and  emotion 
is  always  necessary  for  clearness  and  intensity  of  conscious- 
ness ;  and,  in  addition,  feeling,  once  excited,  tends  to  persist. 
These  are  "  constant  laws  of  aesthetic  enjoyment,"  and  every 
work  of  Art  must  conform  to  them.  So  much  for  '•  the 
dimension  of  extension.'' 

But  in  addition  to  this.  Art  demands,  in  the  next  place, 
"a  dimension  of  intention,  or  degree'';  and  this  !\lr.  Sully 
finds  (i)  in  the  utilitarian  rule  of  the  greatest  hajipincss  of 
the  greatest  number.  He  would  measure  the  vrdue  of  an 
esthetic  pleasure  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  a  woik  of  Art  on 
the  other,  by  their  respective  universality  and  permanence. 
(2j  Some  aesthetic  pleasures  are,  in  their  nature,  purer,  more 
durable,  and  more  easily  recovered  tlian  others  arc  ;  and 
therefore  a  work  of  Art  is  higher  than  others  according  as 
it   aftbrds   a  purer  pleasure  to"at}'pical  icsthetic  nature.'' 

(3)  If  the  first  condition  seems  too  concrete,  and  the  second 
too  abstract,  a  tlurd  lies  midway  between  them.  It  seeks  to 
separate  what  is  "  large  and  abiding ''  in  a-sihetic  tendency, 
from  what  is  "  variable  and  transient '"  ;  thus  giving  a  c(jn- 
crete  basis  to  the  a'Sthetic  ideal  and  to  Aii. 

Hence   the   imj)oriance   of  a   study  of  the   development 


xii  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  245 

of  the  EESthetic  tendencies  of  the  race,  as  seen  in  the 
history  of  Art.  Mr.  Sully  finds  that  there  has  been  a  pro- 
gressive growth  in  the  number  of  esthetic  pleasures,  and  in 
their  variety  ;  and,  in  comparing  the  lower  stages  with  the 
higher  ones,  there  is  "  an  immense  increase  in  the  quantity 
of  pure  enjoyment." 

What,  however,  are  the  essential  features  of  the  pro- 
gress 1  Slightly  modifying  ^Ir.  Spencers  classification,  Air. 
Sully  holds  that  our  aesthetic  feelings  become  more  refined, 
intense,  and  frequent,  (i)  according  as  we  discriminate 
things  more  accurately  and  assimilate  them  more  rapidly, 
and  (2)  according  as  our  powers  of  retention  and  reproduc- 
tion increase.  For  example,  the  distinction  of  shades  of 
colour,  and  of  sound,  open  up — to  the  artist's  eye  and  to 
the  musician's  ear — pleasures  of  which  others  have  no  con- 
ception. Hidden  sources  of  pleasure  are  thus  discerned  ; 
while  the  power  of  retaining,  and  of  rapidly  reproducing  old 
experiences,  or  of  bringing  former  pleasures  again  on  the 
stage  by  vividness  or  alertness  of  faculty,  is  a  new  source 
of  pleasure.  Signs  that  awaken  no  feeling  to  the  ordinary 
mind,  suggest  a  train  of  ideas  to  the  cultivated  eye,  and 
widen  the  area  of  pleasure.  Therefore,  according  to  the 
refinement  and  the  complexity  of  pleasures,  they  may  be 
arranged  in  an  ascending  scale,  and  the  higher  pleasures 
are  not  only  more  permanent,  but  they  tend  to  recur  more 
frequently. 

Air.  Sully  gives  his  final  definition  of  sesthetics  in  these 
terms  : — "  A  work  is  aesthetic  which,  through  impressions  of 
the  eye  or  of  the  ear,  satisfies  some  pleasurable  suscepti- 
bility, and  satisfies  some  universal  law  of  pleasurable 
impression  ;  highly  artistic,  when  it  aftbrds  a  large  number 
of  such  pleastu'able  impressions  ;  further,  when  these  feel- 
ings are  either  permanent  emotional  needs  of  the  human 
heart,  or  refined  and  complex  products  of  mental  develop- 
ment.'' He  subsequently  deals  with  what  he  regards  as 
■•the  second  branch  of  aesthetics,"  viz.  artistic  eft'ect. 

Mr.  Sully  has  also  discussed  the  subject,  on  similar  lines, 
in  his  Outlines  of  Psychology  (18S4).  in  numerous  essays  in 
Mind — especially   one    on    '-The    Harmony    of   Colours" 


246  Tlie  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  ckaf. 

(April  1879) — and  in  his  article  on  "/Esthetics''  in  the 
Encyclopadia  Britannica.  In  the  latter  he  g"i\'e5  an  excel- 
lent summary-  of  the  history  of  opinion,  so  far  as  it  goes. 
Mr.  Sully  naturally  emphasises  the  views  of  writers  to 
which  a  representative  of  the  opposite  school  will  attach 
little  importance,  and  he  omits  the  names  of  many 
authors  whose  writings  seem  of  great  value  to  idealists. 
He  has,  however,  done  nothing  so  complete  as  the 
thirteenth  essay  of  his  Soisaiioii  and  Ijifuition  (1S24;. 

Some  will  doubtless  feel,  after  the  most  careful  perusal 
of  his  book,  that  his  elaborate  tracing-  of  the  source  of 
pleasure,  his  analytic  study  of  the  separate  strands  of  sensa- 
tion, emotion,  imagination,  and  thought — all  of  which  enter 
into  our  complex  enjoyment  of  the  Beautiful — is  outside  the 
main  problem  of  a:-sthctics.  It  is  extremely  interesting  a:> 
a  psychological  analysis,  but  a  series  of  measurements  of 
pleasure  is  not  the  whole  even  of  cesthetic  Science  ;  while 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  essays  something  very 
different.  The  outcome  of  his  teaching  is  hostile  to  any 
standard  of  Beauty.  Beauty  is  not  an  intrinsic  cpaality  of 
objects.  The  hamiony  of  the  pleasures  of  sense,  intellect, 
and  feeling  is  all  that  we  are  conscious  of;  and  the  whole 
effect  of  Beauty  comes  to  be  the  pressure  on  us  of  '•  a  nias? 
of  pleasurable  stimulus  for  sense,  intellect,  and  emotion.'' 


13.  Canon  Mozlcy  to  Mr.  Grant  Altai 

In  Professor  J.  B.  IMozley's  Sermons  prcacJicd  bforc  tt.t. 
University  cf  Oxford,  published  in  1S76,  there  is  one  on 
"Nature"  which  contains  a  distinct  contribution  to  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful.  "  Nature,''  says  Dr.  ?^Iozley. 
"has  two  great  revelations  —  that  of  Use,  and  that  of 
Beauty;  and  the  first  thing-  we  obseiwe  about  these  tw. ,• 
characteristics  is  that  they  are  bound  together,  and  tied  tri 
each  other.  .  .  .  But,  united  in  their  source,  in  themsehx-- 
they  are  totally  separate.'"  The  laws  of  Nature  throw  on" 
Peauty.  He  (observes  that  a  new  passion  for  scenery,  and 
for  natural   beauty,    has   sprung   up   in   our   time   and  pcne- 


XII  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  Britain  247 

trated  to  the  masses  of  society.  This  has  given  rise  to  a 
new  and  vast  fabric  of  poetical  language,  in  which  Nature 
is  regarded,  not  as  useful,  but  as  pictorial.  Yet  the  two 
are  one,  and  the  picture  is  as  immediate  a  vision  of  the 
Divine  as  the  utilities  of  Nature  are.  Beauty  in  Nature  is 
an  exi}'a,  which  baffles  the  materialist.  "  Physical  science 
goes  back  and  back  into  Nature"'"  :  but  here,  on  "the  front 
of  Nature,"  not  in  its  interior  recesses,  lies  a  raiment  of 
Beauty,  "the  garment  we  see  Him  by."  Beauty  in  Nature 
is  the  visible  disclosure  of  Reason  ;  and  while  a  study  of 
the  phenomena  of  Nature  discloses  their  multitudinous  uses, 
these  phenomena  do  not  explain  the  beauty  that  is  in  it. 
"  The  glory  of  Nature,"  says  ?^Ir.  Mozley,  "resides  in  the 
mind  of  man  ;  there  is  an  inv.-ard  intervening  light  through 
which  the  material  objects  pass  ;  a  transforming  medium 
Avhich  converts  the  physical  assemblage  into  a  picture. ■•' 
These  material  objects  are  transformed  by  the  light  which 
comes  from  within  the  percipient.  "  Nature  is  partly  a 
veil,  and  partly  a  revelation."  IMr.  Mozley  unites  this  semi- 
Berkeleyan  doctrine  with  a  more  explicit  Platonism.  All 
Nature  is  symbolic  of  man.  We  cannot  describe  Nature 
without  the  help  of  terms  that  are  human,  although  we 
cannot  tell  how  it  is  that  material  things  are  emblematical 
of  man.  Nature  inspires  us  both  with  awe  and  with  a 
sense  of  greatness  and  glory.  How  ?  Because  it  utters  a 
language,  which  speaks  to  us  of  the  Divine,  and  because 
its  dumb  hieroglyphics  "surpass  its  speech."  Nature  is 
full  of  enigmas,  but  its  spirit  addresses  us  through  symbols, 
and  "  creates  in  Nature  a  universal  language  about  itself" 

Canon  Mozley  has  endeavoured  to  broaden  the  basis  of 
Natural  Theology  by  taking  in  more  than  the  teleological 
view  of  adjustment,  and  by  arguing  directly  from  the  Beauty 
that  exists  in  the  world  to  a  Source  that  is  infinitely 
beautiful. 

In  his  Natural  Theology  of  Natural  Beauty,  Mr.  St. 
John  Tyrwhitt  has  amplified  the  teaching  of  Mr.  Mozley. 
He  adopts  the  physical  explanation  of  the  origin  of  a 
sense  of  beauty  ;  and,  while  he  does  not  think  it  proved 
that  birds  have  been  guided  in  choosing  their  mates  bv  the 


248  TJie  Philosophy  of  tJic  Beautiful         chap. 

selection  of  the  most  brilliant  colours,  or  bees  by  selecting 
the  brightest  ilower,  he  says  that  if  it  were  so,  it  "  unuld 
only  prove  that  Beauty  was  a  rule  of  natural  selection.'' 
We  cannot  bring  man  into  the  categon,-  of  the  lower  animals, 
•' whether  we  level  upwards  or  downwards,''  until  "a  dog 
or  an  elephant  can  be  shown  to  be  aftected  by  the  c(3iours 
of  sunrise  and  sunset,  or  by  a  starry  night'"  (p.  23).  He 
regards  the  sense  of  Beauty  in  man  as  "a  spiritual  supple- 
ment to  the  sense  of  sight  "  fp.  24;.  If  Beauty  be  obiecti\"e 
and  subjective,  objective  Beauty  is  the  "power  with  v.hich 
natural  objects  are  endov.-ed,'''  subiective  beauty  includes 
'•  our  ideas  of  Beauty,  with  the  whole  lield  of  art'''  (p.  27). 

Mr.  Tyrwhitt's  historical  section  is  meagre  and  rhetori- 
cal, but  his  chapter  entitled  •'  Design  within,  and  Beau"\- 
without  "  is  much  better,  and  his  remarks  on  Turner  and 
Ruskin  are  the  best  in  his  book.  His  argument  is  that 
the  visible  and  natural  discloses  the  invisible  and  super- 
natural ;  and  that  this  is  done  by  the  disclosure  (i)  of 
mind,  as  seen  in  structural  design,  and  (2)  of  Beauty,  as 
seen  in  form  and  colour. 

In  ThongJits  on  Art,  PJiilosopJiy,  and  Reliyi'  n,  by 
Sydney  Dobell,  jjublished  posthinnously  in  1S76.  there  is 
a  chapter  on  ••  Beauty,  Love,  Order,  Unity."  Beauty  is 
defined  as  '•  the  harmony  of  rhythmic  parts."  Its  ••  primary 
principles  are  order  and  unity.  But  it  is  not  enou.^h  for 
Beauty  that  it  embody  the  primary  principles.  .  .  .  When 
an  object,  having  order  and  unity,  has  \'ariety  and  a  grada- 
ti'in  of  change  that  can  be  percei\'ed  without  violent  action.'' 
the  result  is  beauty.  There  is  much,  however,  that  is  fanci- 
ful in  the  detached  thoughts  of  Dobell. 

The  Fim  jlrts.  and  iJicir  i'ses,  by  Mr.  William  Bellars, 
1876.  In  this  book  are  discussed — (i)  •■Principles."  (2) 
v.-hat  are  called  '•  the  fugitive  Arts,"  (3)  '-'the  permanent  -^rts," 
and  (4)  '•  the  subsidiary  Arts."  The  first  section  deals  with 
Beauty  and  .Sublimity.  The  disrus^irin  is  too  rhetorical 
and  the  classification  of  theories  (>(  Beauty  as  those  which 
■■niake  Taste  a  matter  of  the  intellectual,  the  physical,  ami 
the  moral  nature''  (p.  S3)-  '-^  "''-'""  "^  Ivdppy  one.  --The 
e^^ence  of  Beauty  would  seem  to  lie  in   its  aft'ecting  us  v.-i-.h 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  249 

pleasure,  immediately  and  intuitively."  This  may  be  a 
condition  of  our  recognising  it,  but  it  can  never  be  its 
"essence."'  It  is  elsewhere  defined  as  "the  instinctive 
perception  of  goodness."  If  we  follow  the  Beauty  developed 
for  us  in  Nature,  we  cannot  go  wrong  ;  but  all  Nature  is 
not  beautiful  ;  some  of  it  only  has  an  "  aesthetic  value '' 
(p.  63).  It  is  by  comparing  one  of  Nature's  products  with 
others,  that  we  find  the  standard  of  Beauty;  and  those 
things  in  Nature  which  are  not  useful  "are  sure  to  be 
beautiful.''  Decay  in  Nature,  for  example,  is  beautiful.  "If 
the  sense  of  Beauty  be  the  instinctive  perception  of  good- 
ness, that  of  sublimity  is  the  instinctive  perception  of  great- 
ness "  (p.  68),  the  recognition  of  superiority. 

In  the  same  year  (1876),  The  IVii/iess  of  Art,  or  the 
Legend  of  Beaidy,  by  ?ilr.  Wyke  Bayliss,  appeared.  The 
ami  of  this  book  is  conveyed  in  the  following  sentence  : — 
"  The  language  of  Art  is  not  simply  a  dialect  through  which 
we  transmit  our  own  thoughts.  It  is  the  one  universal 
tongue,  which  has  never  been  confounded.  ...  It  is  the 
logos,  through  which  the  silence  of  Nature  speaks  to  us  " 
(p.  15).  To  find  the  standard  of  Beauty,  we  must  look 
elsewhere  than  to  our  untaught  instincts  of  liking  and  dis- 
liking (p.  20).  The  book  contains  a  comparison  between 
the  Greek  and  the  medieval  artists  of  the  Beautiful.  The 
aim  of  Greek,  and  of  classic  Art  generally,  was  to  reach  the 
ideal,  "  the  passionless  splendour  of  ideal  beauty."  It  was 
cold;  it  had  no  e.xpression  (p.  57);  "sorrow  and  pain 
were  excluded  from  it"  (p.  60).  While  the  Christendom  of 
the  early  centuries  had  no  art  at  all,  in  the  renaissance  Art 
we  find  the  glow  of  devotion,  and  the  suft'ering  of  Chris- 
tianity embodied.  "  Passionate  expression  "  is  the  dominant 
note  of  Christian  Art.  This  degenerated  in  the  later  schools  : 
and,  as  a  reaction  from  it,  we  find  that  the  life  and  strength 
of  modern  Art  consists  in  its  direct  appeal  to  Nature,  where 
the  ideal  is  sought  in  the  manifold  and  varied  types  of  the 
natural  world. 

In  his  P Iiy si 0 logical  Esthetics,  published  in  1877,  Mr. 
Grant  Allen  followed  in  the  track  opened  up  by  Mr.  Sully. 
His   book    is    an  attempt    to   reply  to   the  question  which 


250  TJie  PJiilosophy  of  the  Beautiful  cmap. 

Darwin  had  left  unanswered,  viz.  why  man  (and  the  lower 
animals)  prefer  certain  brilliant  colours  and  rhythmical 
sounds  to  others  that  are  not  brilliant  or  rhythmic.  His 
inquiry  might  either  be  called  a  psychological  or  a  physio- 
logical one,  because  he  tries  to  show  that  all  our  '-ai-sthetic 
feelings  are  constant  subjective  counterparts  of  certain 
definite  nervous  states"  (p.  viii.) — a  proposition  which  no- 
body can  deny.  He  seems  to  think  that  his  "not  being 
an  excessive  devotee  of  fine  art  in  any  form.''  is  a  qualifica- 
tion which  helps  him  in  his  psychological  analysis  ;  and  be- 
thinks he  has  solved  the  mysteries  of  the  problem  by 
proving  that  our  likings  and  dislikings  as  to  lieauty  are 
"  the  necessary  result  of  natural  selection."  He  tries  to 
prove  "  the  purely  physical  origin  of  the  sense  of  beauty, 
and  its  relativity  to  our  nervous  organisation"  (p.  2).  and 
this  with  the  view  of  dealing  in  the  same  way  "  with  the 
intellect  and  the  affections."  He  explicitly  announces  him- 
self as  a  follower  of  .Messrs.  "  Spencer,  Bain,  and  Maudsley.'' 
and  informs  us  that  he  regards  the  aesthetic  feelings  as 
intermediate  links  between  the  bodily  senses  and  the  higher 
emotions,  all  of  which  he  proposes  to  "  affiliate  upon  a 
physiological  law  of  pleasure  and  pain." 

The  rock  on  which  his  theory  sutlers  shipwreck  is  seen 
in  his  definition  of  aesthetic  pleasures  and  j^ains.  as  those 
'•  which  result  from  the  contemplation  of  the  beautiful  or 
ugly  in  Art  or  Nature.''  He  starts  by  taking'-  for  granted 
the  existence  of  what  he  at  once  tries  to  explain  away.  He 
begins  by  an  analysis  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  general.  AI! 
pain  is  due  to  waste,  or  the  arrested  action  of  sentient 
tis>ue.  All  pleasure  is  due  to  the  normal  action  of  tissue  : 
it  is  its  refiex.  Lut  the  ditterentia  of  .usthetic  pleasure  must 
be  found  out.  Mr.  Allen  distinguishes,  as  Mr.  .Spencer  had 
done,  the  labour  that  is  spent  on  providing  for  our  physical 
wants — the  life-sustaiiiing  and  life-giving  processes,  entered 
upon  for  a  definite  purpose,  from  those  activities  which  are 
entered  upon  '•  merely  for  the  gratification  which  the 
activity  affords"  (p.  32).  The  latter  is  of  two  kinds^ — (i) 
tlie  play-impulse,  (2)  that  which  gives  rise  to  Art  and  to 
;c5thetic  pleasure.      Loth  have  pleasure  for  their  immediate 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britai7i  251 

end ;  but  the  first  is  active,  while  the  second  is  passive. 
When  we  actively  exercise  our  limbs  and  muscles  for  the 
sake  of  pleasure,  the  play-impulse  is  at  work  ;  when  we 
passively  exercise  our  eyes  and  ears,  the  aesthetic  impulse 
is  at  work,  which  Mr.  Allen  defines  thus — "the  subjective 
concomitant  of  the  normal  amount  of  activity,  not  directly 
connected  with  life-serving  function,  in  the  peripheral  end- 
organs  of  the  cerebro-spinal  nervous  system"  (p.  34). 

It  is  "  when  we  arrange  certain  colours,  or  musical  notes 
in  certain  orders,  expressly  for  the  pleasure  which  their 
perception  will  give  us,  that  we  call  the  result  Art"  (p.  37). 
But  'Six.  Allen  does  not  admit  that  there  is  anything  in- 
trinsic in  objects  which  calls  forth  this  aesthetic  pleasure. 
"The  xsthetic  c]uality  of  objects  is  so  slight  that  it  requires 
the  exercise  of  attention  to  bring  it  definitely  into  con- 
sciousness." It  only  amounts  to  this,  that,  when  "  the 
sensational  wave  is  very  great,"  it  gets  the  better  of  the 
intellectual  wave,  and  "hence  arises  the  apparent  object- 
ivity of  Beauty  and  ugliness."  "The  aesthetically  beautiful 
is  that  which  affords  the  maximum  of  stimulation  with  the 
minimum  of  fatigue  or  waste.  .  .  .  The  aesthetically  ugly 
is  that  which  fails  to  do  so  ''  (p.  39).  After  referring  to 
the  disinterested  character  of  all  aesthetic  feeling,  he  dis- 
cusses the  variety  of  tastes.  The  blind  and  the  deaf  are 
of  course  cut  off  from  certain  aesthetic  feelings  ;  so  are  the 
colour-blind.  Tastes  must  differ  with  difterences  of  organ- 
isation ;  but  there  is  a  common  element  in  them  all,  with- 
out which  Art  "would  be  impossible" — a  major  unity 
within  the  minor  variety.  It  is  easy  to  explain  the 
variety  by  structural  peculiarities  in  physique.  Taste  too 
can  be  educated  ;  and  while  we  cannot  impose  a  standard 
on  any  one,  we  must  accept  as  a  relative  standard,  valid 
for  all,  "  the  judgments  of  the  finest-nurtured  and  most 
discriminative"  (p.  48).  These  create  the  taste  of  the  next 
generation.  i\Iinute  beauties,  which  are  overlooked  by 
the  uneducated,  are  noticed  by  the  trained  eye  and  ear  ; 
and  as  we  compare  our  own  judgments  as  to  beauty  with 
those  of  others,  our  standard  is  raised.  To  what,  for  ex- 
ample, is  the  appreciation  of  the   "great  masters"  in  Art 


252  The  PJiilosophy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

due?  To  the  influence  and  association  of  an  ever-widening 
experience.  Passing  over  his  analysis  of  the  special  senses, 
and  what  he  ranks  as  the  ••lower  senses"' — touch,  hearing, 
and  sight — which  are  all  ''of  unmistakably  bodily  origin,'' 
he  deals  next  with  those  which  are  ••ideal  or  mental,"  in 
order  to  see  if  these  can  be  brought  into  accordance  with 
his  main  principle.  He  irnds  that,  when  gratincation  is 
connected  with  our  own  personality,  the  pleasure  is  -'too 
monopolist  to  reach  the  ccsthetic  level  ;  but  when  it  is  un- 
connected in  thought  with  our  own  personality,  it  becomes 
a  subiect  of  cesthetic  employment''  (p.  21  r).  It  is  thus 
that  he  explains  the  origin  of  the  sister  arts  of  poetry  and 
painting. 

Two  years  after  the  publication  of  his  PJiysioIo^ica! 
.-EstJtctics,  in  1879.  Mr.  Allen  issued,  in  what  he  called 
"An  Essay  on  Comparative  Psychology,"  some  of  the 
materials  which  he  had  collected  for  his  former  book,  but 
had  not  made  use  of,  and  which  he  then  called  TJic  Colour 
Sense  J  its  Origiii  and  Developjncnt.  They  were  origin- 
ally designed  for  a  chapter  on  "The  Genesis  of  .-Esthetics.'' 
Mr.  Allen's  primary  idea  was  that  the  taste  for  bright 
colours  was  derived  by  man  from  his  "  frugivorous  an- 
cestors "  ;  and  that  he  was.  in  this  respect,  on  a  par  v,-i:h 
all  flower-i"eeding  and  fruit-eating  animals,  who  showed  it  in 
the  -election  of  their  mates. 

Two  books  which  appeared  after  the  FJiysiological  .-Es- 
thetics controverted  this  position.  Dr.  H.  IMagnus.  in 
his  Geschichte  E)itivickelu7iy  des  F'Xr(-;?isiiitn,  maintained 
that  the  colour  -  sense  of  mankind  originated  about  t::e 
Homeric  period  :  and  Mr.  Alfred  Russell  Wallace,  in  his 
Tropical  Xature,  attacked  the  theory  of  sexual  selection 
altogether.  To  reply  to  these  books.  The  Ceilnir  Sense  was 
written.  It  is  an  extremely  able  book  ;  and  its  conclusions 
mi.,ht  be  accepted  without  scruple  by  those  who  do  not 
believe  that  evolution  is  the  same  thing  as  derivation.  Mr. 
.■\lien  afnrms  that  the  highest  resthetic  products  of  the  race 
are  only  the  "last  link  "f  a  chain  whose  first  link  began 
with  the  insect's  selection  of  bright-hued  blossoms  ''  (p.  281  1. 

In  connection  with   Th.e  Co'our  Sense,  a  very  able  article 


XII  TJie  PhilosopJiy  of  Britain  253 

by  Mr.  Sully  in  Mind  (^\-^x\\  1S79),  on  "The  Harmony  of 
Colour,"'  should  not  be  overlooked. 

Mr.  Allen  has  contributed  many  articles  on  ^Esthetics 
to  Mind:  one  on  "  The  Origin  of  the  Sublime  "  (July  1878), 
another  on  "  The  Origin  of  the  Sense  of  Symmetry  "  (July 
1879),  a  third  on  "The  /Esthetic  Evolution  of  ]Man '' 
(Oct.  18S0).  Seeking  for  the  primary  source  of  the  appre- 
ciation of  Beauty  by  man,  he  thinks  it  best  to  begin  with 
its  foreshadowings  amongst  the  lower  animals,  in  their  taste 
for  sj-mmetry,  colour,  and  lustre,  and  also  for  sound.  He 
notes  the  fact  that  every  animal  instinctively  regards  its  own 
species  with  approval,  and  that  each  individual  thinks  its 
mate  beautiful.  Further,  the  typical  form  of  each  species 
is  the  most  beautiful  ;  and  this  normal  type  is  preferred 
in  all  healthy  natures.  Natural  selection  and  sexual  selec- 
tion co-operate,  and  the  strongest  and  best  physical  struc- 
tn:es  are  usually  the  niost  beautiful.  The  jirimitive  ideas 
of  beauty  "gathered  mainly  round  the  personality  of  man 
and  woman."  There  was  very  little  api^reciation  of  the 
beauty  of  Nature,  but  a  link  of  connection  between  the  two 
was  found  in  personal  decoration.  The  feelings  vaguely 
aroused  by  beautiful  objects  were  transferred  to  ornaments, 
and  thus  diverted  into  new  channels  ;  and  the  appreciation 
of  beauty  in  Handicraft  led  on  to  an  appreciation  of  it  in 
Nature.  After  personal  adornment  came  the  decoration 
of  weapons,  and  domestic  utensils,  the  home,  etc. 

An  article  on  ■■  The  Evolution  of  Beauty.'-  by  F.  T. 
Mott.  published  in  Tiie  Journal  of  Science  (July  1878).  is  a 
notewiHthy  contribution  to  the  general  question.  Mr.  [Mott 
says  we  can  only  explain  organic  phenomena  by  taking 
into  account  "  the  internal  sources  of  activity,"  as  well  as 
the  external  ones.  "  The  visible  beauty  of  the  organic  world 
depends  upon  the  correlation  between  the  sense  organs  of  the 
human  race,  and  the  concentrating  wave  of  organic  force"' 
(p.  380),  that  builds  up  each  structure  into  its  form,  as  an 
organic  whole.  That  an  object  should  appear  beautiful  is 
not  the  result  of  accidental  surroundings,  nor  of  "  any  super- 
ficial garment  spread  over  an  ugly  or  repulsive  interior. 
The  elements  of  the  beautiful  are  inherent  in  all  things  '' 


2  54  The  P/iilosop/i)' of  the  Beautiful         chap. 

(pp.  3 So,  381).  Beauty,  says  Mr.  Mott,  is  an  abstract  idea 
like  Truth  and  Goodness,  and  what  causes  it  to  arise  in  us 
is  our  perception  of  "  ordered  activity,''  or  unity  in  variety. 
All  objects  that  appear  beautiful  must  be  compounded  of  a 
varietyof  parts,  and  the  mind  that  perceives  the  beautiful  must 
be  "  sensitive  to  small  shades  of  diflerence  "  in  the  parts. 
The  active  and  rapid  discernment  of  these  minute  shades  of 
difference,  which  exist  in  every  object,  is  the  first  condition 
of  a  recognition  of  the  Beautiful  ;  but  there  is  more  than 
this.  There  must  not  only  be  a  perception  of  difference,  but 
also  of  similarity  under  the  difference,  of  identity  in  sunie 
things  and  of  difference  in  others,  of  like  in  difference.  If 
phenomena  form  a  group,  and  appear  as  a  unity  (whether 
of  form,  colour,  motion,  or  purpose),  the  object  is  recog- 
nised as  beautiful.  !Mr.  r^Iott  thinks  that  "  a  mind  abso- 
lutely sensitive  to  all  shades  of  difference,  and  to  all  degrees 
of  relationship  at  the  same  time,  would  see  everywhere 
throughout  creation  variety  bound  up  in  unity,  would  find 
neither  monotony  nor  change,  discord  nor  ugliness,  but  only 
a  universal  beauty"'  (p.  382).  Beauty  is  "inherent  in  every 
object.''  Its  presence  is  "  an  index  of  organic  maturity.'' 
It  is  -'only  unseen  during  embryonic  stages"  (p.  3S3). 


14.   William  Morris  to  W.  P.  Ker 

In  187S-1881,  Mr.  William  Morris,  author  of  TJic 
Earthly  Paradise,  delivered  five  lectures  in  Birmingham, 
London,  etc.,  on  what  he  called  Hopes  and  Fears  fr  Art. 
These  lectures  were  published  in  iSSi.  His  paper  on 
■•  The  Lesser  Arts,"  and  another  on  '■  The  Beauty  of  Life,'' 
are  of  great  value.  In  the  year  1878  he  published  T!:e 
I ^eeoreitivc  Arts,  in  one  section  of  which,  on  "The  Aims 
•  A  Art,"  he  affirms  that  in  the  lives  of  all  men  there 
ire  moods  of  energy  and  moods  of  idleness,  recurrent  or 
comljined,  and  that  this  explains  why  they  have  always 
cheri.-hed  and  practised  Art.  The  restraining  of  rest- 
lessness is  one  of  the  essential  aims  of  Art.  "To  in- 
'rcase    the    happiness    of  men   by   giving   them    beauty   to 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  255 

amuse  their  leisure,  and  to  prevent  them  wearying  even 
of  rest,  and  giving  them  hope  and  pleasure  in  work  ;  or, 
shortly,  to  make  work  happy  and  rest  fruitful,"  that  is  the 
aim  of  Art.  Genuine  Art  is  thus  an  unmixed  blessing  to 
the  race.  It  has,  however,  at  the  present  time  deteriorated, 
and  is  disesteemed  ;  but  "  the  springs  of  art  in  the  human 
mind  are  deathless.'"'  In  the  ]\Iiddle  Ages,  when  the  work- 
men who  produced  it  were  serfs,  Art  flourished  ;  and  then 
it  was  social,  hopeful,  joyous,  and  progressive.  Now  it  is 
"retrospective  and  pessimistic."  The  haste  of  our  modern 
life,  its  stress  and  strain,  is  alien  to  Art.  The  world  is 
everyvdiere  growing  uglier  and  more  commonplace.  It  is 
the  greed,  the  haste  to  be  rich,  which  disiigures  our  nine- 
teenth century,  which  has  wounded  Art  to  its  death.  "  The 
monster  who  has  destroyed  Beauty  is  Comvterczal  Profit."' 
?\Ir.  Morris  warns  us  against  trj-ing  to  revivify  it  "  by 
dealing  with  its  dead  exterior. '"''  "  It  is  the  aims  of  Art  that 
we  must  seek,  rather  than  the  Art  itself"  ;  and  if  we  reso- 
lutely set  ourselves  against  all  sham  and  unreality  in  it, 
we  will  enter  into  our  inheritance  of  courage,  and  hope,  and 
eager  life. 

The  Science  of  Beauty,  aft  Ajialyticai  Inquiry  into  the 
Laxus  of  ^'Esthetics,  by  Mr.  Avery  W.  Holmes-Forbes,  was 
published  in  1S81.  ]Mr.  Forbes  is  an  idealist,  who  denies 
the  inherent  beauty  of  objects.  He  starts  from  the  position, 
which  he  calls  a  metaphysical  principle,  but  which  is  only 
a  psychological  assertion,  that  all  our  knowledge  is  know- 
ledge of  self  in  its  various  modes.  The  "beautiful  qualities"' 
of  objects  are  therefore  "mental  creations."'  "An  object 
which  we  call  beautiful  must  be  endowed  with  this  quality 
by  the  mind,  and  then  resorted  to  by  the  mind,  as  though 
the  object  possessed  that  quality  inherently  and  independ- 
ently "  (p.  10).  !Mr.  Forbes  then  puts  forth  what  he  calls 
■•a  code  "  of  laws,  on  the  subject  of  the  beautiful,  as  follows : — 

(i)  The  subjective  element  of  beauty  consists  in  the 
emotion  of  admiration.  (2)  The  objective  element  of  beauty 
consists  in  the  quality  of  suggestiveness.  (3)  Beauty  attaches 
only  to  utility.  (4)  The  appearance  of  beauty  varies  in- 
versely with  the  appearance  of  utility. 


256  The  PhilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  thap. 

In  his  discussion  of  the  objective  elements  of  Beauty  he 
advances  what  he  considers  to  be  a  new  theory-  of  Poetry, 
viz.  that  it  "  consists  in  the  Hberation  of  beautiful  analoL;'ies.'' 
What  is  true  in  this  is  not  new,  and  what  is  new  is  not 
true.  But  in  his  discussion  of  the  subjective  element  in 
Beauty,  the  chapter  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the  ilieury 
that  the  appearance  of  Beauty  varies  inversely  with  the 
appearance  of  utility  (pp.  132-156)  contains  much  that  is 
excellent.  In  chap.  viii.  there  is  a  discussion  on  Sublimity  : 
and  as  to  it  Mr.  Holmes-Forbes'  propositions  are — (i)  that 
Sublimity  attaches  only  to  Power,  and  (2)  that  the  ap]5car- 
ance  of  Sublimity  varies  inversely  with  the  appearance  of 
})ower. 

In  the  Jourtial  of  Science,  February  and  March  1SS2. 
Mr.  F.  Ram  discusses  "Beauty  in  the  eyes  of  an  evolu- 
tionist.'" He  derives  it  altogether  from  the  operation  of 
the  principles  of  Natural  and  Sexual  Selection.  It  is  im- 
portant to  state  his  theory  impartially,  but  its  statement 
contains  its  disproof  Those  who  delight  most  in  the 
qualities  which  make  an  individual  the  fittest  to  survive  in 
the  struggle  for  existence  will  have  a  more  numerous  ott'- 
spring  than  those  who  do  not,  and  by  their  survival  a  taste 
will  be  created  !  It  is  those  qualities  which  have  tended  to 
produce  "  the  largest  number  of  descendants  in  any  race 
that  constitute  Beauty  among  that  race"  (p.  78).  ■•  If  there 
had  never  been  sexual  selection,  there  would  ha\'e  been  rm 
beauty"  (p.  79).  The  beauty  of  a  good  complexion  is  due 
to  the  rapidity  with  which  the  red  corpuscles  of  arterial 
blood  are  carried  to  the  extremities.  '•  The  physical  fact 
creates  the  beauty.'"  Whatever  physical  arrangement  would 
give  ])romise  of  many  descendants,  or  facilitate  the  increase  of 
the  species  in  the  greatest  degree,  would  ipso  facto  becom.e 
the  most  beautiful  !  Beauty  is  thus  not  only  wholly  ex- 
trinsic, but  wholly  due  to  physical  causes,  and  these  the 
most  utilitarian  possible. 

Art  a?id  the  For»iiitio}i  of  Taste,  by  Mi^s  Lucy  Crane, 
was  published  in  1882.  Miss  Crane  points  out  that  Art 
originally  meant  force  or  strength,  man's  work  on  Nature, 
'•a    world   of   itself,    created    out   of    Nature    bv   the    hand 


XII  The  PhilosopJiy  of  Britain  257 

of  the  artist-workman."  "  To  it  we  owe  everything  which 
appeals  to  the  sense  of  beauty"  (p.  5).  Its  aim  is  "to 
give  pleasure  by  transforming  the  things  of  Nature  into 
the  beauty  of  picture,  statue,  or  building.  ...  It  is  Beauty 
that  is  sought  for  in  all  these"  (p.  7).  Art  is  to  be  con- 
sidered in  three  stages — (i)  in  its  original  stage,  purely 
necessary  and  useful  ;  (2)  Art  decoration  ;  (3)  Fine  Art. 
"The  general  aim  of  Art  is  Beauty;  and  the  appreciation 
of  that  Beauty,  the  true  enjoyment  of  it,  is  Taste  ;  and 
there  are  certain  principles  by  which  Taste  may  be  formed 
and  guided"  (p.  48).  "Art  is  a  universal  language,  intelli- 
gible to  the  whole  world  alike"  (p.  242).  Decorative  Art 
yields  Beauty  of  Form  and  Beauty  of  Colour.  The  Fine 
Arts  —  Poetry,  Painting,  Sculpture,  "Music,  Architecture — 
"exist  for  Beauty  alone."  They  are  "the  very  head  and 
crown  of  all  that  man  has  ever  achieved''  (p.  153).  They 
are  "the  most  lasting  and  stable  things  in  the  world's 
history."  She  thinks,  however,  that  there  can  be  "no 
universal  formula  "'  of  the  Beautiful.  Mr.  Ruskin's  "  thing 
by  itself,"  j\Ir.  Darwin's  "sense  of  beauty  in  its  simplest 
form  is  nothing  more  than  the  reception  of  a  peculiar  kind 
of  jileasure  fix^m  certain  colours,  forms,  and  sounds,"  do  not 
help  us  much.  She  falls  back  on  "  the  opinion  of  the 
majority,"  i.e.  of  the  educated  race.  But  beauty  "is  not  to 
be  explained.  When  we  have  said  that  some  forms  and 
colours  are  agreeable,  while  others  are  disagreeable,  we 
iiave  said  all  vs-e  can"  (p.   160). 

These  lectures,  however,  though  defective  in  tlieir  funda- 
mental basis,  and  slightly  put  together  for  popular  uses,  arc 
full  of  information  and  of  real  insight,  especially  on  the 
subjects  of  sculpture  and  architecture  ;  while  ]\Iiss  Crane's 
pictures  of  the  three  great  Florentines,  Leonardo,  ^.lichael 
Angelo,  and  Raphael,  based  upon  a  sketch  by  Vi.  Clement, 
arc  extremely  vivid  delineations. 

In  a  \olume  of  Essays  in  PJiilosopliical  Criiicisni.,  pub- 
lished in  1SS3,  Professor  W.  P.  Ker  contributed  one  on 
"  tlie  Pliilosfjphy  of  Art."  lie  thinks  that  all  Plato's 
A'arious  teacl;ing  on  Art  is  the  expansion  of  a  saying  of 
Socrates   in   the  Proiayoras  that   discussion   on  poetry  and 

S 


258  Tlic  PJiilosopJiy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

its  meaning  should  be  left  to  those  whose  education  is  not 
finished.  Art  with  all  its  excellence  could  not  sufnce  for 
man  without  philosophy.  Plato's  philosophy  of  Art  was 
almost  wholly  negati\'e.  The  outcome  of  his  teaching  is 
"  that  there  is  one  idea  of  IJeauty,  eternal,  the  same  with 
itself,  consisting  not  in  the  likeness  of  anything  in  heaven 
or  earth,  and  that  earthly  beauty  is  a  stage  on  the  way 
to  this"'  (p.  163).  The  theory  tiiat  Art  is  but  a  stage 
toward  true  knowledge,  and  its  value  niainly  educative. 
Mr.  Ker  regards  as  a  meagre  and  an  incomplete  theory, 
and  one  that  is  '-of  \'cry  doul^tful  value  if  taken  Ijy  itself'' 
(p.  164).  Art  is  not  an  education  for  an  end  different 
from  Art  itself  (p.  166);  and  the  ]:)roblem  which  tliC 
philosophy  of  Art  has  to  solve  is  "what  is  the  kind  of 
end  which  the  artist  attains  ?  •"'  (p.  167).  Art  and  Science 
are  very  similar  at  the  outset,  but  completed  Science  difters 
from  completed  Art.  In  the  former,  individual  tilings,  pheno- 
mena, are  of  use  only  as  yielding''  laws  and  principles.  In 
Art  the  particular  things  have  a  reality,  an  interest,  and  a 
•^'alue  of  their  own.  A  scientific  fact  is  explained  by  its 
relation  to  other  things  ;  an  artistic  product  explains  itself 
••  Science  has  to  go  on,  increasing  the  sum  of  "knowledge, 
without  drawing  any  nearer  the  end.  Art  is  an  attempt  to 
find  a  cure  for  this.  It  is  a  mode  in  which  the  mind  can 
make  part  of  the  objective  world  intelli.^ible  to  itself  without 
being  trouljled  Ijy  continual  reference  to  other  parts  of  tlie 
objective  world  l)eyond  tlie  limits  it  has  cho-en.  It  is  a 
return  of  tlie  mind  to  itscif  from  seel^in.g  fact  after  f  Kt,  and 
law  after  law,  in  th.e  objec:tive  world  ;  a  recognition  tb.at  the 
mind  itself  is  an  end  to  itself,  and  its  own  law''  Cp.  173). 
••  In  Art  the  opposition  between  the  one  and  the  niany, 
between  the  law  and  its  manife-tation,  between  the  subjet  t 
and  the  object,  is  overcome,  not  by  the  abtjlition  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  them,  Ijut  by  so  u.niiing  tliem  that  earn 
receives  the  meaning  of  the  otiier "'  {\i.  176).  Art  is  both 
a  re\'clation  arid  the  \-ind:':aLinn  of  freedom.  It  is  not  to  Ije 
explaiiied  by  the  rateg(jries  of  the  finite,  stiil  less  by  phy-'o- 
fjgi'al  detail,  which  refer  only  to  its  conditions.  It  is  =e'f- 
sun";..;;ng.  and  there  is  an  infinite  element  in  it,  because  it  :s 


xii  The  Philosophy  of  BritaiJi  259 

"  free  from  the  darkness  and  incomprehensibility,  which 
is  the  curse  of  finite  things"  (p.  178).  It  is  higher  than 
science,  because  it  is  "  not  hmited  by  an  objective  world," 
and  "can  boast  of  conc^uests  which  are  absolute."  The 
philosophy  of  Art  is  less  abstract  than  pure  metaphysics  or 
ethics.  It  deals  with  its  creations,  not  in  their  universality, 
but  in  their  individuality.  Its  philosophy  is  a  philosophy 
of  History  as  well  ;  and  explaining  the  causes  which  led  to 
the  rise  of  particular  arts  at  particular  times,  it  shows  their 
relation  to  the  universal  life  and  the  organic  thought  of  the 
world.  I\Ir.  Ker's  is  one  of  the  ablest  of  modern  essays, 
to  be  ranked  with  Dr.  Todhunter's  lecture  (see  p.  240). 


15.  IV.  G.  Colliiigwood  to  J.  A.  Synionds 

TJie  PJiilosopJiy  of  Ornaincni  (18S3) — eight  lectures  on 
the  History  of  Decorative  Art,  given  at  University  College, 
Liverpool— by  W.  Gershom  Collingwood,  is  one  of  the  very 
best  discussions  of  the  subject  in  our  literature.  It  deals 
with  the  earliest  beginnings  of  Art,  with  that  of  Egypt  and 
Assyria,  Persia,  China,  and  Japan,  with  Greek  and  Gothic 
Art,  with  the  cincjue  cento  renaissance,  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries,  and  with  the  art  of  the  present  day. 
It  is  doubtful  if  in  any  compend  on  the  subject  there  is  such 
a  jihilosophic  grasp  of  principles  and  such  condensed 
exposition  of  detail.  The  title  of  the  book  is  aptly  chosen, 
because  these  unpretentious  lectures  are  fertile  with  the 
germs  of  a  profound  philosophy  of  Art.  It  will  live,  when 
more  ambitious  treatises  are  forgotten. 

In  the  same  year  (1883)  ^Iv.  T.  C.  Horsfall,  of  ^lan- 
chcster,  issued  a  little  book,  ^\hich  he  called  T/te  Study  of 
Beauty  a?id  Aj-t,  in  Ldrj^-e  Toi^ns,  with  an  Introduction  by 
Mr.  Ruskin.  Though  he  says  it  is  impossible  to  give  an 
exact  definition  of  Beauty,  he  thinks  it  is  possible  to  advance 
some  -'unquestionable  truths  respecting  its  nature."  He 
finds  a  close  analogy  between  the  beauty  which  appeals  to 
the  eye  and  that  which  appeals  to  the  ear.  What  he  calls 
Sensuous  Beauty  owes  its  charm  to  "giving  to  our  nervous 


26o  TJic  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Bcautif?il  chap. 

system  an  activity  which  is  conducive  to  health."  lie  next 
says,  somewhat  vaguely,  that  an  important  element  in 
]5eauty  is  rightness,  i.e.  the  object  regarded  by  us  as  beauti- 
ful must  have  "the  qualities  v.hich  it  ought  to  have.''  Yir. 
Horsfall  shows  how  the  love  of  Beauty  gives  knowledge, 
and  still  better,  he  shows  how  by  a  strong  love  of  Beauty 
beautiful  things  become  part  of  ourselves  ;  v.hile  to  love 
Beauty  is  to  see  it  almost  ever\-where.  Mr.  liorsfall  has 
been  the  life  and  soul  of  the  mo\'ement  in  ?\Ianchesier  to 
establish  an  Art  Museum  for  the  people,  and  its  remarknljle 
success  is  almost  exclusively  due  to  his  continuous  labour 
in  the  cause. 

In  1SS5  a  volume  appeared  on  7'/!c  Xiitiirc  of  fJic  I'luc 
Ar/s,  by  Mr.  II.  Parker.  It  discu.sses  Art  and  Science. 
Theory  and  Practice,  Realism,  Taste,  and  the  several  arts. 
It  is  full  of  scattered  wisdom,  but  is  ill  arrang"ed  :  and  even 
in  each  chapter  the  discussion,  abounding  in  wealth  of  illus- 
tration, is  inconsecutive.  It  abandons  a  theory  of  the 
Beautiful  in  favour  of  a  critical  discussion  of  the  Arts. 

In  a  series  of  eight  articles  contributed  to  I\i!o:c!cd^e 
(from  loth  .April  to  22d  May  1SS5)  the  late  }>Iiss  Constance 
C.  \V.  Xaden  expanded  an  address  which  she  originally 
read  to  a  meeting  of  the  ?\Iason  Science  College  Union 
at  Birr.vingh.an.i  in  the  pre\'ious  year.  These  ])a];crs  contain 
one  of  the  ablest  statements  of  the  experiential  theory  of 
the  origin  of  Beauty,  and  our  appreciation  of  it  ;  and  it  is 
to  be  regretted  that  they  were  not  reproduced  in  the  ^■olume 
of  INIiss  Xaden's  cssa}-s.  ])osthumously  issued.  Th.ey  are 
of  much  greater  value  than  the  otlier  jjapers  which  have 
been  published. 

Miss  Xaden  begins  liy  provisionally  defining'"  Beauty  as 
''  that  quality  or  assemblage  of  qualities  which  please  the 
eye,''  but  ]n-ocecds  at  once  to  try  to  answer  the  (juc-tion 
of  the  origin  of  tlic  sense  of  1  beauty,  and  how  it  has  been 
e\"ol\x-d  ;  and  she  seems  to  identify  this  inquiry  at  the 
outset  with  the  fjuestion.  "Why  we  take  ])lea.-ure  in  object-; 
natural  and  artificial. '"'  She  deals  first  v.'ith  the  pleasures  of 
Colour,  and  secondly  with  tho.-c  of  Form. 

Bc'dnnim/  with   the   lilies   of  tlie   fiL-id   and  tlie   fowls   cf 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  261 

the  air,  she  asks  how  the  former  have  gained  their  variety, 
dehcacy,  and  briUiancy.  Insects  seek  out  flowers  that  are 
conspicuous  ;  and  the  flowers  that  are  conspicuous  possess 
a  charm  simply  because  of  their  conspicuousness.  Similarly, 
the  fowls  of  the  air  obtain  their  brilliancy  of  plumage  by 
courtship.  She  follows  Mr.  Allen  in  believing  that  the 
colour-sense  in  insects  has  been  developed  in  connection 
with  the  flowers  on  which  they  feed,  and  that  of  birds  and 
mammals  in  connection  with  fruits.  Bright  flowers,  these 
writers  say,  attract  insects,  and  therefore  the  brightness 
increases  from  generation  to  generation.  But  the  radical 
question  is,  What  led  to  the  first  attraction  in  the  primitive 
brightness  ?  and  that  question  is  not  answered  by  either  of 
them. 

]\Iiss  Naden  starts,  as  Islr.  Allen  does,  from  the  physio- 
logical fact  that  the  normal  exercise  of  every  function  gives 
pleasure,  and  that  joyous  life  is  the  normal  activity  of  the 
senses  ;  but  she  alters  ]Mr.  Allen's  formula,  "  the  maximum 
of  stimulation  with  a  minimum  of  fatigue,"  by  substituting 
the  phrase  "the  maximum  of  activity."  In  order  to  this 
maximum  of  activity  there  must  be  (i)  variety  in  the 
stimuli,  and  (2)  "  smoothness  or  continuity."  She  states, 
and  adopts  as  a  workable  hypothesis,  the  Young-Helmholtz 
theory  of  ether-waves,  producing" — according  to  their  re- 
spective lengths — the  sensations  of  red,  green,  and  violet. 
A  single  bright  colour  pleases,  because  it  stimulates,  yet 
permits  of  rest ;  but  a  contrast  of  colours  gives  more  pleasure, 
because  it  gives  more  easy  and  varied  action.  She  criticises 
Mr.  Allen's  theory  that  the  prolonged  contemplation  of  a 
colour  overworks  the  nerves,  and  therefore  lessens  its  brilli- 
ancy. Her  theory  is  that  the  fibres  of  the  retina  which 
have  been  excited  by  one  colour,  when  summoned  to  re- 
spond to  waves  of  light  of  a  different  length,  feel  discomfort 
from  the  new  stimulus,  which  lasts  till  the  old  stimulus 
ceases,  and  the  fibres  are  tuned  to  the  new  one,  and  so  on 
with  other  vibrations.  Easy  gradations  from  one  colour  to 
another  being  the  condition  of  pleasure,  the  enjoyment  of 
light  and  shade  is  due  to  "a  gradual  passing  of  action  into 
rest,  and  rest  into  action." 


262  The  Pliilosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

In  reference  to  the  second  set  of  pleasures  Miss  Xaden 
follows  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  in  his  explanation  of  the  relish 
for  varieties  of  Form  —  curved  lines  being  preferred  to 
straight  or  angular  ones  —  as  due  to  the  easier  action  of 
the  ocular  muscles.  The  gratification  thence  resulting  is 
both  physical  and  mental.  She  credits  the  '•  cerebral 
hemispheres''"  with  •■  taking  note  of  the  similarities  and 
dissimilarities  of  surrounding  objects."'  '-They  receive  the 
intellectual  stimulus."'  "A  taste  for  new  combinations," 
developed  in  the  bird,  gives  rise  to  all  the  varieties  of  colour 
and  form,  which  are  the  outcome  of  a  healthy  and  \'igorous 
life. 

r^Iiss  Xaden  believed  that  the  ajsthetic  sense  in  man 
sprang  originally  from  very  simple  germs,  but  that  it  has 
been  subjected  to  numerous  and  complex  influences,  which 
have  increased  in  number  and  complexity  as  ci^■ilisation 
has  advanced.  The  energies  at  first  needed  exclusi\e!y  for 
the  maintenance  of  life,  were  ga-adually  set  free  for  its 
advancement.  Gradually  subtle  shades,  and  gradations  of 
Beauty,  began  to  be  noted.  Colours  came  to  have  emotional 
meanings.  The  appreciation  of  beauty  in  human  form 
followed,  and  when  mind  was  seen  to  be  more  powerful  than 
brute  force,  intellectual  features  were  preferred  to  animal 
ones  in  man. 

Some  light  has  been  car^t  on  the  evolution  of  th.e  Cireek 
ideal  of  Beauty  by  Sir  Francis  Dalton's  composite  photo- 
graphy. By  throvving  a  number  of  different  portraits 
rapidly  on  a  sensitised  })hot('graphic  plate,  we  ha\-e  for 
result  a  generic  portrait,  with  the  peculiarities  of  each 
removed,  and  the  type  of  all  preserved.  This  illustrates 
the  formation  of  generic  ideas.  Individual  features  are 
removed,  and  the  compound  image  which  results  is  the 
incarnation  of  the  best  or  finest  features  of  thousands  of 
indi\'iduals. 

At  the  close  of  her  discussion,  ]\Iiss  Xaden  succumbs 
somewh.at  helplessly  to  the  influence  of  her  tutors,  and  her 
essay — brilliant  and  suggc-iivc  ;is  it  is — ends  in  rlutnrical 
commonplace. 

In  a  critical  essay  on  Tlie  Sii^nficatioi  and  Priiiciplcs  of 


XII  The  Philosophy  of  Britain  263 

Art  {iZZb),  Mr.  C.  H.  Waterhouse  tries  to  determine  the 
essential  nature  of  the  Fine  Arts,  to  distinguish  them  from 
other  modes  of  human  activity,  and  to  discover  the  founda- 
tion of  Art  in  the  nature  of  man  and  of  the  world.  Art  is 
the  apprehension  of  the  Beautiful,  through  the  avenues  of 
sense.  The  artist  differs  from  the  scientific  inquirer  in  that 
he  creates.  Art  implies  a  formative  faculty  as  well  as  an 
aesthetic  sense;  and  the  artist  studies  Form  —  through 
which  feeling  finds  expression — for  its  own  sake.  It  is  the 
intrinsic  attractiveness  of  Form  that  gives  to  the  Fine  Arts 
their  raison  d'etre.  Instructive  is  distinguished  from  Fine 
Art  in  the  same  way  that  use  is  distinguished  from  orna- 
ment. When  Writing  (a  useful  Art)  becomes  Illuminating, 
it  is  a  decorative  Art  ;  so  when  Building  becomes  Archi- 
tecture the  tdilc  gives  place  to  the  dulce.  The  work, 
however,  is  too  dift'use  and  repetitive. 

An  English  translation  of  the  introductory  part  of 
Hegel's  Philosopliy  of  Fine  Art  was  issued,  with  notes 
and  a  prefatory  essay,  by  ^Ir.  Bernard  Bosanquet  in  1886. 
Earlier  in  the  same  year  a  translation  of  ?vlichelet's  summary 
of  Hegel's  system,  by  AV.  Hastie,  was  published  along  with 
a  part  of  Heg"ers  own  Introduction  to  his  Acsthctik,  Mr. 
Hastie  writing  an  Introduction  to  both.  These  books  are 
extremely  serviceable,  and  of  greater  use  to  the  student  of 
the  subjec*-  than  three  similar  contributions  to  American 
literature  referred  to  at  p.  279.  ]Mr.  Bosanquet's  short 
Introduction  to  his  version  of  Hegel  is  excellent,  and  must 
raise  special  expectation  in  reference  to  his  forthcoming 
Histojy  of  /EstJietic.  Had  the  latter  work  been  already 
issued,  it  would  probably  have  rendered  the  present  His- 
torical Outline  superfluous. 

In  his  Sententiac  Artis  (1886),  I\Ir.  H.  Quilter  gives,  as 
his  first  principle  of  Art,  that  it  is  an  expression  of  life  with 
all  its  varying-  emotions.  ■'  Deep  down  in  the  nature  of 
man  there  lie,  sometimes  half-hidden,  certain  verities  which 
are  uni\'ersal  in  their  appeal,  immutable  in  their  reality  : 
and  it  is  to  shadow  forth  these  in  its  unspoken  language  that 
Art  lives — lives  to  express,  as  no  other  manifestation  of 
humanity  is  able,  the  triple  connection   of  sense,  spirit,  and 


264  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

intellect"  (p.  3).  ••  There  is  nothing  that  \v.:\.\\  has  ever 
dreamed,  or  hoped,  or  feared,  suffered,  enJ!)}'ed,  or  siniied 
in,  'vvhich  is  not  a  subject  matter  for  Art  ;  nor  is  there  a 
single  aspect  of  the  mind  or  spirit  which  has  not,  or  ma}' 
not  have,  some  analogue  in  form  and  colour ''  (p.  4). 
■'Every  great  picture  is  a  record,  not  only  of  sight,  but  (  f 
insight,  and  perh;ips  the  ratio  of  its  greatness  is  in  dirci;; 
proportion  to  the  complexity  of  its  meaning''  (p.  6).  ■•.'1 
great  picture  is  like  a  skeleton  key,  in  that  it  may  have 
been  made  for  a  special  purpose,  and  yet  will  unlock  many 
doors''  (p.  7).  He  distinguishes  acutely  between  things 
which  are  '•  beautiful  in  tliem^elves,  and  those  v.hich  art 
beautiful  in  spite  of  themselves  "  (p.   i  3 ). 

Tlie  Dc\'c!opnic}it  of  Taste,  ami  oiJicr  :itiidiLS  in  ACsiJieiics., 
by  Mr.  \V.  I'roudfoot  I^egg  (1S07),  deals  with  the  develop- 
ment of  a  sen-e  of  Beiiuty  in  Xature — (i)  am.ongst  the  lower 
animals,  prehistoric  man,  savages,  and  the  Egyptians  and 
Assyrians;  (2)  amongst  the  Hebrews;  (3)  amongst  the 
(Greeks,  and  (4)  the  Romans  ;  (5)  throughout  English  litera- 
ture ;  and  (6)  in  modern  tinies.  He  then  discusses  the 
standard  of  Taste,  the  origin  of  our  ideas  of  Beauty,  the 
association  theory,  the  nature  of  the  beautiful,  the  pictur- 
esque, the  sublime,  and  the  general  subject  of  the  uni'.x-r- 
sality  of  Beauty.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  detached  and 
stimulating  thinking  in  the  ccsthetic  studies  of  Mr.  Begg. 
The  historical  knowledge,  both  of  philosopliy  and  literatm-e. 
is  much  g'reater  than  appears  upon  tlie  surface. 

In  the  Fo}-ti:i^':tiy  Rcvic-.\  October  iS:S:.  ?^Ir.  Walter 
Pater  contriljuted  an  article  on  "The  Sclion]  of  Giorgionc.'' 
in  which  he  ;tdvocates  an  art-tlieory  at  the  opposite  pole 
from  that  of  iMatthew  Arntild.  (An  earlier  discus  =  ion  by 
Mr.  Pater,  his  Roiaissancc,  Sfiiiiics  in  Art  and  !'•  ct?y, 
1S77,  s!ir)uld  be  mentioned,  espcdaliy  fn-  its  admiralilc 
study  of  Winckelmann.)  In^te;'.'.!  of  making  tlic  intel- 
lectual element  the  major  one  in  art,  Mr.  Pater  make- 
the  sensuous  all-domin;int.  He  at'ilrnis  that  all  the  arts 
len.d  "toward--  the  principle  or  condition  of  music,''  in  vdiich 
the  di-tir.ction  l;etv,een  matter  rmd  firm  is  ob,literated. 
■•  Pii   its   ideal,  the  end   is  not  di.-;tinct  from  tlie  n.ieans,  the 


XII  The  PJiilosophy  of  Britain  265 

form  from  the  matter,  the  subject  from  the  expression. 
lliey  inhere  in,  and  completely  saturate  each  other";  and 
althotiyh  the  several  arts  have  each  its  distinct  area,  and 
its  incommunicable  element,  they  all  tend  towards  this  goal, 
'•which  music  alone  completely  realises.''  In  all  high 
Art,  therefore,  the  intellectual  element — thought — sinks  to 
tlie  background,  while  the  sensuous  element  occupies  the 
foreground.  This  is  }.Ir.  Pater's  theory.  It  is  not  that 
matter  and  form  blend  perfectly  in  perfect  art,  and  cannot 
be  sundered  without  injury  to  both  ;  it  is  that  art  approaches 
perfection  the  vaguer  and  mistier  it  is,  when  "  definite 
meaning  almost  expires,  or  reaches  us  through  ways  not 
traceable  by  the  understanding."  This  is,  however,  a  sect- 
arian theory,  if  applied,  as  Mr.  Pater  would  apply  it,  all 
round  the  circle  of  the  Arts.  Not  only  is  poetry  in  its 
nature  a  more  intellectual  art  than  music,  which  is  more 
sensuous  ;  but  both  in  poetry  and  music  there  are  intellectual 
and  sensuous  elements,  and  it  is  possible  for  us  by  means  of 
music  to  be  borne  into  a  region  of  clearest  intellectual  vision, 
and  contrariwise  to  be  carried  through  poetry  into  the  land 
of  the  lotus-caters,  if  not  to  one  resembling  the  Buddhist 
nirvana. 

In  the  Transactions  of  tJic  National  Association  for  tlie 
Acl-i'ancenient  of  Art,  a?id  its  application  to  hidustry, 
which  was  founded  in  1 888,  there  are  many  papers  of 
value.  They  all  touch  the  subject  of  ^Esthetic  less  or 
more,  and  the  addresses  of  the  Presidents  of  the  several 
sections,  in  the  three  years  during'  which  the  society  has 
been  in  existence,  as  well  as  those  of  many  of  the  members,  if 
not  contributions  to  the  theory  of  Art,  are  excellent  illustra- 
tions of  it.  r\Ir.  Alma  Tadema,  3.1r.  Holman  Hunt,  Air. 
William  ?\Iorris,  Mr.  Briton  Riviere,  ?vlr.  G.  F.  Watts,  and 
other  representative  artists  and  art-critics,  have  contributed 
to  these  Transactions. 

Principle  in  Art^  etc.,  by  Coventry  Patmore,  was  pub- 
lished in  1889.  He  discusses  many  subjects  besides  Art, 
but  the  paper  which  gives  its  title  to  the  volume  is  a 
vindication  of  "  principle  "  as  superior  to  mere  "  taste  '"'"  in 
Art.      Bad  Art,   he   says,   collapses  before  good  criticism  ; 


2  66  TJic  Philosophy  of  tJic  Beautiful  chap. 

and  "  although  good  criticism  cannot  produce  Art,  it  re- 
moves hindrances  to  its  production."  Mr.  Patmore  tliinks 
that  there  exist  "in  the  writings  of  Aristotle,  Hegel, 
Lessing,  Goethe,  and  otliers  ''  the  "  materials  necessary  for 
the  formation  of  a  body  of  Institutes  of  Art,  which  would 
supersede,  and  extinguish  nearly  all  the  desultory  matter, 
which  now  passes  for  criticism,  and  which  would  go  far 
to  form  a  true  and  abiding  popular  taste."  This  may 
be  very  warrantably  doubted,  especially  its  finality  clause. 
The  most  useful  essay  in  Mr.  J'atmore's  book  is  that  on 
"Architectural  .Styles"  (pp.  160-201). 

The  Rev.  ?^Iichael  Maher,  in  his  rsyc]ioIo;j;y  (1890),  in 
the  Stonyhurst  Scries  of  Manuals  of  Catholic  Philoso]3h\', 
discusses  '-the  .Esthetic  Emotions''  towards  the  close  of  his 
book.  The  tlrst  and  essential  property  of  Beauty  is  that  it 
pleases.  Usually  two  things  unite  to  produce  this  pleasure — a 
sensuous  charm,  and  an  exercise  of  the  imagination.  Unity 
in  variety  is  the  most  universal  feature  in  beautiful  ol^ijects. 
Symmetiy,  order,  fitness,  harmony,  and  the  like,  are  but 
special  forms  of  this  unity  in  the  manifold.  On  the  one 
hand,  monotony  wearies  us  ;  on  the  other,  chaotic  variety 
and  incessant  change  distract,  and  pre\"ent  a  coherent  grasj) 
of  things  ;  but  when  variety  is  presided  over  by  unity,  it 
produces  in  us  '-'the  luxurious  feeling  of  delight"  (p.  411). 
?^Ir.  ?vlaher  then  refers  to  utility,  and  emphasises  the  well- 
known  rule  of  (jotliic  Art  that  no  ornament  is  to  appear  f  )r 
the  sake  of  ornament.  He  distinguishes  between  relative 
and  aljsolutc  beauty,  and  discusses  bcnh  the  sublime  and 
the  ludicrous. 

l^.ssays.  Speculative  and Suyycsti7-c,  is  the  title  v.hich  ?vlr. 
John  Addington  Symonds — the  author  of  the  Rcjiaissancc 
ill  Italv^  etc.  —  gives  to  two  volumes  of  admirable  criticism 
puljlislied  in  1S90.  The\- were  wiitten  from  Mr.  Symonds' 
retreat  at  I)a\'o/.  and  relate  to  the  ]jhiloso]:)hy  of  e\'oh!- 
tion,  to  the  pro\'inces  of  the  several  Arts,  to  Idealism  and 
Realism,  to  Reauty,  Style,  Expression,  Poetry,  Music, 
Xature-myths,  and  Allegories.  He  thinks  that  tlie  accept- 
ance of  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  instead  of  crushing  the 
as])iration-    of  men,    ar.il    reducing   our   conceptions    of  tlie 


xn  TJie  Philosophy  of  Britain  267 

world  to  chaos,  may  be  expected  to  reanimate  religion,  and 
to  restore  spirituality  to  the  Universe.  In  his  work  on  the 
Rcnaissa?tce,  and  his  Essays,  Mr.  Symonds  had  touched  the 
subject  of  Beauty  from  many  points ;  but  he  has  done 
nothing  better  in  literary  and  philosophical  criticism  than  in 
his  latest  volumes. 

The  essay  on  "Realism  and  Idealism"  is  an  effective 
vindication  of  both  as  tendencies  and  principles  of  Art. 
This  is  further  developed  in  his  essay  on  "Beauty 
Expressions,  etc."  Mr.  Symonds  thinks  that  in  one  sense 
Art  can  never  rival  Nature  in  Beauty,  because,  as  he  puts 
it,  "  Man  has  not  the  means  at  his  command  to  do  so — 
not  the  material  for  sculpture,  which  shall  reproduce  flesh 
surface — not  the  pigments  for  painting,  which  shall  render 
light  and  darkness,  atmosphere  and  colour,  as  they  truly 
are"  (vol.  i.  p.  214).  But  then,  per  contra,  Mr.  Symonds 
finds  that  "there  is  a  Beauty  which  is  never  found  in 
Nature,  but  which  requires  a  working  of  human  thought  to 
elicit  it  from  Nature  ;  a  beauty  not  of  parts  and  single 
persons,  but  of  complex  totalities,  a  beauty  not  of  flesh  and 
blood,  but  of  mind,  imagination,  feeling.  It  is  this  synthetic, 
intellectual,  spirit  -  penetrated  beauty  to  which  the  arts 
aspire.''  He  refers  to  the  Panathenaic  procession,  and  to 
the  sculptures  by  Phidias  on  the  frieze  of  the  Parthenon,  and 
says  :  "  No  procession  could  have  made  such  music  to  the 
understanding  as  the  sculpture  does.  In  compensation  for 
that  which  art  must  miss  when  matched  with  life,  something 
has  been  added — permanent,  enduring,  tranquil,  inexhaust- 
ible in  harmonies"  (p.  216). 

Mr.  Symonds  states  the  positions  of  the  Idealists  in  Art 
so  well,  that  it  is  better  to  quote  his  words  than  to  translate 
and  comment  on  them.  "The  mind,  reflecting  upon 
Nature,  and  generalising  the  various  suggestions  of  Beauty 
which  it  has  received  from  Nature,  becomes  aware  of  an 
Infinity  which  it  can  only  gn-asp  through  thought  and  feel- 
ing, which  shall  never  be  fully  revealed  upon  this  earth,  but 
which  poetry  and  art  bring  nearer  to  our  sensuous  percep- 
tions. ...  It  is  the  function  of  all  true  art  to  add  'the 
gleam,  the  light  that  never  was   on   sea   or  land '   upon   the 


2  68  TJic  PhilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful        cii.  xii 

things  which  have  been  observed  in  Nature.  It  is  the 
function  of  x\rt  to  give  the  world  a  ghmpse  and  foretaste 
of  that  universal  beauty  by  selecting  from  natural  objects 
their  choicest  qualities,  and  combining  these  in  a  harnrony 
beyond  the  sphere  of  actual  material  things"  (p.  218). 


CHAPTER    XIII 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    AMERICA 

I.   I  Si  J  to  iS4g 

TiiE  earliest  discussion  of  the  subject  of  Beauty  in  American 
literature  would  seem  to  be  in  the  fifth  volume  of  the 
Portfolio,  published  at  Philadelphia  in  1815,  in  which 
there  are  two  articles  entitled  "Thoughts  of  a  Hermit.'' 
It  is  an  acute  criticism  of  the  association  theory  of  Alison 
and  Jeffrey.  The  writer  maintains  that  the  eye  is  "  sus- 
ceptible of  direct  organic  pleasure,"  that  the  "  physical 
beauty  of  visible  objects  consists,  first,  in  their  power  of 
reflecting  soft  light  ;  secondly,  in  certain  colours  ;  thirdly, 
in  particular  outlines  and  forms  ;  and  fourthly,  in  variety 
produced  by  a  mixture  of  shade  with  light,  or  by  combina- 
lion  of  difterent  colours,  or  of  different  forms''  (p.  150). 
These  "principles  of  visual  beauty"  he  illustrates  in  detail. 
(i)  The  beauty  of  the  diamond  is  due  to  its  "permanently 
reflecting  a  more  vivid  light  than  any  other  body";  so  v.ith 
other  genis,  even  with  cut  glass,  and  icicles.  Lustre  is 
intrinsically  beautiful.  (2)  As  to  Colour,  he  maintains  that 
no  colour  is  beautiful  everywhere,  but  that  each  colour  is 
beautiful  in  its  way,  and  in  particular  places  and  relations. 
(3)  Under  Form  he  analyses  the  beauty  of  the  cone,  the 
sphere,  the  cylinder,  the  circle,  the  oval,  which  are  all 
superior  to  the  triangle  or  the  square.  In  the  second 
article  he  afflrms  that  though  difterent  persons  judge  differ- 
ently of  the  same  object,  and  the  same  persons  judge 
differently  of  difterent  things  in  the   same  object,  or  of  the 


270  TJic  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

same  thing  in  different  objects,  it  docs  not  follow  that 
Beauty  is  not  intrinsic,  any  more  than  that  diiTerences  in 
physical  tastes  make  what  we  perceive  by  means  of  them 
altogether  relative.  He  also  directs  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  term  "Beauty''  has  been  extended  from  objects 
the  presence  of  which  gives  pleasure  to  the  senses,  to  other 
objects  which  give  us  similar  pleasure,  and  so  we  come  to 
speak  of  the  beauty  of  a  poem  or  of  a  theory. 

In  the  Xoftk  A/itc7-icaii  Rci'icw,  Xo.  XIX.  (May  iSiS). 
there  is  an  article  on  Beauty,  in  criticism  of  the  discussion 
by  Jeft'rey  in  the  supplenient  to  the  Encyclopadia  Britajuiica, 
December  1S16,  but  it  is  on  the  whole  an  echo  of  Jeffrey's 
teaching.  The  writer  holds  tliat  we  cannot  resolve  the 
elements  of  beauty  into  any  one  principle  of  our  nature, 
that  they  are  "essentially  dissimilar  and  distinct.''  It  does 
not  follow  that  because  v/e  class  the  beautiful  things  that 
please  us  under  a  common  term,  they  have  anything  in 
common:  any  more  than  because  the  term  "good"'  is 
apijlied  to  many  things,  they  have  necessarily  anything  in 
common.  "  When  we  seek  for  the  substance,  the  very 
essence  of  beauty,  we  lose  ourselves  in  abstract  subtilties.'" 
'•  Beauty  is  not  the  same  thing  in  a  tune  and  a  statue,  in  a 
theorem  and  a  poem.''  "  Indeed  the  dift'ercnce  between 
what  is  beautiful  and  not,  is  often  but  a  difference  of 
degree.''  "  Of  the  beautiful  in  the  abstract  we  can  acquire 
no  fuller  knowledge  than  the  progressive  generalisations  of 
the  term.  The  subject  only  admits  of  philological  research  '' ! 
f^rcjm  these  extracts  it  will  be  seen  that  the  writer  merely 
adojjts  the  doctrine  of  the  Scottish  associationalists  with- 
out adding'  anything  of  value  to  it. 

Ralph  AVc'ildo  Emcrsnn  discr.ssed  the  subject  of  Beauty 
in  two  essays — the  first  in  his  book  on  ^^"c?A'/;v  (published  in 
1836),  and  the  second  in  his  Co)idiict  of  Life,  issued  in 
1S60.  In  his  first  essay,  Ilmerson  affirms  that  Xature 
■■  satisfies  us  by  its  loveliness,'''  without  any  reference  to  its 
utility  ;  and  that  it  utters  it-clf  at  tinnes  in  ways  that 
'•  Homer  or  .Shakespeare  could  not  re-form  for  us  in  words." 
He  recognises  its  changcfulness — "  E\-ery  hour  there  is  a 
picture,  which  was  nesx-r  seen  beiore,  and  which  shall  ne\er 


XIII  TJic  Philosophy  of  America  271 

be  seen  again."  "Go  forth  to  tlnd  it,  and  it  is  gone." 
Beauty  is  "a  marl-:  set  upon  virtue."  "The  creation  of 
Beauty  is  Art.''  "A  work  of  art  is  an  abstract  or  epitome 
of  the  world,  an  e.xpression  of  nature  in  miniature." 
"  Nothing  is  quite  beautiful  alone  :  nothing  but  is  beautiful 
in  the  whole.  A  single  object  is  only  so  far  beautiful,  as  it 
suggests  universal  grace."  "  In  its  largest  and  profoundest 
sense,  it  is  one  expression  for  the  universe.  Truth,  and 
goodness,  and  beauty  are  but  different  faces  of  the  same 
All." 

In  his  second  essay,  in  the  Conduct  of  Lfe,  Emerson 
says  that  it  is  to  Winckelmann  that  we  owe  the  rise  of 
enthusiasm  in  the  study  of  Beauty,  "  side  by  side  with  the 
arid  departmental  post-mortevi  science."  He  tells  us  that 
Beauty  takes  us  out  of  surfaces  to  the  foundation  of  things. 
He  does  not  attempt  a  definition  of  Beauty,  but  prefers 
to  enumerate  its  qualities.  "  We  ascribe  Beauty  to  that 
which  is  simple  ;  which  has  no  superfluous  parts  ;  which 
exactly  answers  its  end  ;  which  stands  related  to  all  things  ; 
which  is  the  mean  of  many  extremes.  It  is  the  most 
enduring  cjuality,  and  the  most  ascending  quality."  "All 
beauty  is  organic  ;  outside  embellishment  is  deformity." 
'•  Beautiful  as  is  the  symmetry  of  any  form,  if  the  form  can 
move  we  have  a  more  excellent  symmetry.  This  is  the 
charm  of  running  water,  sea  waves,  the  flight  of  birds,  and 
the  locomotion  of  animals."  He  quotes  a  saying  of  Michael 
Angelo  that  Beauty  is  "the  purgation  of  superfluities." 
"  There  is  not  a  particle  to  spare  in  natural  structures.  The 
art  of  omission  is  a  chief  secret  of  power."  Beauty  in 
Nature  is  but  the  shadow  and  fcH'crunner  of  beauty  in  man. 
But  nothing  is  truly  beautiful  until  it  "  speaks  to  the 
imagination,"  and  this  explains  how  Beauty  defies  analysis. 
Wherever  it  exists,  it  lifts  the  (jljjcct  in  which  it  appears 
out  of  its  isolation,  and  unites  it  with  the  uni\'ersal. 

In  the  first  part  of  a  \\ork  written  by  Samuel  Tyler,  of 
the  Maryland  bar,  Nov.'  York,  184S,  and  entitled  Robey-t 
B:irns,  as  a  I'ocf  and  as  a  Man,  \\c  find  the  theory  announced 
that  "the  subliiraty  of  the  materird  world  is  derived  from 
association    with    man,    and    his    spiritual    characteristics  ; 


272  Tlie  Pliilosopliy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

and  the  beauty  of  the  material  world  is  derived  from 
association  with  woman,  and  her  spiritual  characteristics." 
"What  I  mean  by  the  Ijeautiful,''  he  says,  "is  whatever  in 
the  material  world  produces  impressions  within  us  analo- 
gous to  those  awakened  in  us  by  our  intercouise  with 
woman.''  "  In  fact  I  make  woman  the  spiritual  dispenser 
of  beauty  to  the  world."  This,  which  is  the  most  puerile 
of  theories,  is  taken  from  Kaydon.  Haydon  held  that 
Eeauty  resided  only  in  the  female  form,  and  that  when  we 
see  it  elsewhere,  it  exists  in  proportion  to  the  resemblance 
of  the  beautiful  thing  to  female  beauty  1  But  surely  the 
latter  is  a  composite  beauty,  due  to  the  union  of  many 
qualities  or  elements  each  separately  beautiful.  Women 
are  beautiful  because  of  the  possession  of  certain  cjualitics. 
Tiie  qualities  arc  not  beautiful,  because  we  find  them  in 
women. 1 

Mr.  Hope,  reviewing  this  work  in  the  Pri)iccto)i  Rciiczj 
(April  1S49;,  fills  back  upon  an  ultimate  law  of  our  nature, 
by  which  we  receive  pleasure  from  external  objects  which 
contain  beauty.  But  he  says  ;  "  Th,e  exercise  of  taste  in  man 
is  complex,  and  includes  other  elements."'  "  The  human 
mind  is  not  like  a  Ijuilding  made  up  of  separate  and 
independent  apartments,  each  of  v.hich  is  appropriated  to  a 
separate  mental  faculty,  but  like  a  single  chamber,  into 
which  light  streams  through  \-arious  windows  of  differently 
coloured  glass.  There  are  not  so  many  distinct  images 
f  jrmed  by  each  faculty,  but  one  sin^:;le  image,  formed  by  the 
ij'.ending  of  the  several  1)eams  admitted  through  each 
aoL-rture.  In  other  words.  Beauty  is  never  seen  through 
;i  pure  aesthetic  medium,  but  a  mediu.m  that  is  tinged  with. 
trie  varied  hues  of  h.uman  thought  and  feeling,  which  ema- 
nate from  tlie  iiiteliectual  and  moral  nature  of  the  beholder 
himself.      The  sense  of  Ijeauty  is  therefcn'e  a  hi-h,ly  complex 

1  A  Dr.  J.  Y?.v.,  in  !.;<  A>::::.'V-y  of  the  cxicr/i  :!  F.  ym  -/  .1/';;;. 
ii-'.-riJ,\l fvr  th''  u;r  (f  Aiiisfs,  J'jintry-,  C7ij  S:iil:'.y:~  (Loiid  j;i  \c^'_,\, 
l:-'l'".i  ll;at  th'j  bc.iiitv  of  tb.o  human  form  is  (i;;e  to  the  concealnvnt  of 
t!.'  r.r.durlyini^  jihysical  structure  by  a  suiface  raiment  C'f  siriootli  lic=h. 
I  ir.  kfibcrt  Knr,x  'Dr.  J'an's  editor)  a'ir,:its  liis  tlicory,  and  concurs 
v.'t'i  Ilaydon  t::at  ' '  tli'- ai.-' .iutciy  1 -eaut:f;;i  "  is  to  he  f  jund  oniV  in  the 
f.;'i-i:r-/.vn  woman  —  a  ino~t  sectarian  arl-liicorv. 


xni  The  P]iilosop]iy  of  Amefica  273 

thing."  jNIr.  Hope  thinks  that  the  attempts  of  philosophers 
to  get  at  one  single  principle  of  Beauty  have  failed  (i) 
because  they  have  been  too  restricted  and  too  artificial, 
and  (2)  because  they  have  made  too  little  of  the  ultimate 
fact  that  Beauty  exists  as  a  Cjuality  in  natural  objects, 
antecedent  to  and  independent  of  all  association. 

In  1S56,  Professor  James  C.  IMoffat  wrote  An  Introdiic- 
iio)i  to  the  Study  of  A^stlietics.  It  is  slight,  but  it  has  the 
interest  and  the  merit  of  being  the  pioneer  work  on  the 
subject  in  American  literature,  so  far  as  systematic  con- 
struction goes. 

In  1867,  Professor  John  Bascom,  President  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Wisconsin,  issued  at  Boston  an  ^-Esthetics,  or  the 
Science  of  Beauty.  He  maintained  that  Beauty  was  an 
uncompounded  essence,  which  could  not  be  analysed  into 
simpler  elements.  We  cannot  define  it,  but  we  can  state 
the  conditions  of  its  presence.  It  is  "  the  utterance  in 
visible  form  of  some  thought  or  feeling"  (p.  14),  and  objects 
become  beautiful  in  proportion  as  they  express  thought 
and  feeling.  It  is  the  presence  of  vital  force  in  the  organic 
world  that  makes  its  products  beautiful  (p.  27),  and  in  the 
natural  world  "  the  acceptance  of  the  law  of  reason,  the 
victory  of  the  right  in  the  midst  of  conflict ''  (p.  44). 
Expressiofi  is  the  first  condition  of  beauty  in  objects,  but 
a  second  is  Unity,  or  unity  in  variety.  This  is  simply  "  the 
method  of  expression,  the  form  which  utterance  assumes  " 
(pp.  45,  46).  Its  third  characteristic  is  TrutJi  (p.  62). 
"  This  again  is  subordinate  to,  and  modifies  the  expression. 
Unity  was  its  method.  Truth  is  its  means.  It  is  its 
utterance,  through  natural  and  real,  not  through  artificial 
and  arbitrary  signs"  (p.  67).  As  to  the  faculty  by  which 
Beauty  is  reached  and  discerned.  It  is  not  by  the  senses, 
nor  is  it  by  reasoning  ;  it  is  by  '■  an  internal  intuition '' 
(P-  95)- 

2.   1867  to  iS-j6 

In  1867,  President  George  W.  Samson,  at  that  time 
head  of  the  Columbian  College,  Washington,  published  his 

T 


2  74  The  Philosophy  of  tJie  B  emit  if  id  chap. 

Rlcnicnis  of  Art  Criticisni.  In  the  Introduction  he  tells  r.s 
that  ■•  the  design  of  the  treatise  is  to  present  in  their  con- 
nection the  elementary  principles  on  which  is  founded  a 
just  criticism  of  Art,  and  to  illustrate  these  princijiles  in  the 
history  of  Art  execution."  There  are  seven  Books  in  this 
treatise.  The  ist  is  on  the  Principles  of  Criticism,  the 
2d  on  Drawing,  the  3d  on  Sculpture,  the  4th  on  Archi- 
tecture, the  5th  on  Painting,  the  6th  on  Landscape  Garden- 
ing, and  the  "th  on  the  Decorative  Arts.  ''Art,'''  says  .Mr. 
.Samson,  "  addresses  the  mind  through  some  one  of  the 
bodily  organs.  Its  appeals  are  distinguished  from  purely 
intellectual  or  spiritual  impressions,  in  that  they  are  always 
accompanied  by,  and  are  produced  through,  a  sensation 
of  the  bodily  organs,  as  of  sight  or  hearing''  (p.  i  i).  The 
world  without  us  is  made  for  the  enjoyment  of  Art.  All  the 
inferior  senses — smell,  taste,  touch — contribute  indirectly 
to  the  impressions  made  by  Art  ;  but  the  higher  senses — 
sight  and  hearing — contribute  much  more.  He  considers 
the  in(|uiry,  "  What  is  Beauty  ? ''  howe\'er,  to  be  as  irrational 
as  the  inquiry,  "What  is  Truth  ?"  '•  If  any  reply  be  gi\en 
to  the  questions.  What  is  Truth,  Beauty,  Goodness,  arid 
Right  ?  it  can  only  be  stated  thus.  Truth  is  that  in  the 
essence  of  a  thing  which  corresponds  with  the  conviction  of 
our  understanding;  Beauty  is  that  in  the  qualities  of  an 
object  which  aftbrds  pleasure  to  our  sensibilities  ;  (ioodness 
iS  that  in  tlic  rcIati(Vi  of  one  thing  to  another  which  secures 
the  ^velfare  or  promotes  the  interest  of  the  latter  ;  and 
Right  is  that  in  the  act  of  an  intelligent  being  which  corre- 
sponds wiih  our  conviction  of  the  responsibility  of  oriC 
moral  being  to  another''  (liook  I.  ch.  \-.  p.  129).  He 
defines  Taste  \ery  vaguely  as  the  power  of  the  mind  which 
,4i\-es  rise  to  the  idea  of  the  i'.cautiful.  His  di.-^cussion  (if 
iibjccti\"e  Beauty  is  not  profound.  He  follows  the  more 
])opular  and  conventional  authors.  ,I^sthetic  judgment  is 
:b.at  •'  piiwer  of  the  mind  h\  which  we  decide  that  an  ol)iect 
is  beautiful  ''—--not  a  \'cry  luminous  detinition  certainly  '.  In 
his  treatment  of  the  .Arts,  in  which  lieauty  linds  e.xjiression, 
-Mr.  .Sams(jn  is  more  successful  than  he  is  in  his  discussion 
ol  first  ju'inciplcs. 


XIII  TJie  Philosophy  of  America  275 

Art;  its  Lares,  and  flic  Reasons  for  tlicvi  is  the  title  of 
a  Avork  by  Samuel  P.  Long,  published  in  1S71.  Pie  dis- 
cusses the  principles  of  Beauty  and  of  Art,  and  then  of  the 
works  of  artists.  He  holds  that  Beauty  is  an  inherent 
element  in  ol^jects,  and  hence  that  a  standard  of  Beauty  is 
possible,  and  real  ;  but  he  thinks  that  the  evolution  of 
Beauty  is  inconsistent  with  such  a  standard,  and  therefore 
opposes  it. 

In  the  following  year  (1872),  Professor  Henry  N.  Day 
published  The  Scie7ice  of  ^Esthetics ;  or  the  Nahcre,  Kinds, 
Lazus,  and  Uses  of  Beauty.  Mr.  Day  holds  (i)  that 
Beauty  is  objective  and  real,  and  (2)  that  it  embraces 
three  elements — the  first  ideal,  the  second  material,  the 
third  formal  ;  thought,  matter,  and  form  giving  rise  respect- 
ively to  these  three.  (3)  That  the  laws  of  Beauty  are 
those  of  Production  and  of  Interpretation ;  and  he  dis- 
cusses them  both  intrinsically,  and  in  their  relation  to  the 
Fine  Arts. 

A  lecture  originally  delivered  at  the  University  of  Ver- 
mont, by  Professor  Joseph  Torrey,  was  published  in  1874, 
under  the  title  of  A  Theory  of  Fine  Art.  It  discusses  the 
characteristics  both  of  Beauty  and  Sublimity,  the  relation  of 
Beauty  to  Nature,  and  the  several  Arts  in  detail.  It  also 
treats  of  the  cultivation  of  Taste.  "  The  end  of  all  the 
imaginative  Arts,"  the  author  writes,  "  is  to  express  the 
truth  of  things  in  sensible  forms,  and  in  such  a  way  that 
their  forms,  so  far  as  Art  is  concerned,  have  no  other  use 
or  purpose  than  simply  to  serve  as  the  expression  of  Truth 
in  its  unchanging  nature."  But  while  this  may  be  ad- 
mitted, we  surely  require  something  more  in  a  theory  of 
Fine  Art  than  the  affirmation  that  the  Beautiful  is  the  True, 
reaching  us  through  sense  or  imagination,  and  felt  rather 
ihan  understood.  That  seems  rather  an  abandonment  of 
riieory,  than  an  attempt  to  construct  one. 

A  lecture  by  George  S.  Tvlorris  on  "The  Philosophy  of 
Art  ''  is  published  in  ihc  Journal  of  Spcctdative  Philosophy 
for  January  1876.  It  is  a  criticism  of  M.  Taine's  Philo- 
sophie  de  PArt  en  Italie,  and  contains  an  effective  defence 
of  idealism  as  against  the  imitative  theory  of  art.     Art  is  not 


276  TJie  PJiilosophy  of  tJie  Bcaiitifnl  chap. 

"  the  representation  of  something  seen,  but  the  represent- 
ation of  something  which  we  would  Hke  to  see,  which  is 
akin  to  our  nature,  towards  which  our  truest  being  strives. 
The  Apollo  Behidere  does  not  interest  us  as  the  likeness 
of  any  one  who  probably  ever  existed,  but  as  expressing  a 
]:)hase  of  noble  humanity,  a  germ  of  divinity.  The  Sistine 
Madonna  does  not  please  us,  as  being  a  fair  representation 
of  the  way  in  which  the  \'irgin  Mary  looked,  but  as 
pourtra\"ing  the  parent  of  divine  qualities  ''  (p.  9).  Lut  the 
true  artist  is  the  interpreter  of  true,  real,  and  essential 
being  ;  and  the  "  greatest  strokes  of  genius,  in  all  the  arts, 
impress  us  as  being  the  simplest  and  most  natural  things  in 
the  world.  ...  It  is  that  our  inner  selves  are  at  home, 
however  unconsciously  to  ourselves,  in  an  ideal  realm  of 
perfect  being." 

In  the  succeeding  number  of  the  same  yf'//;7/^?/ (April 
1S76),  the  editor,  Mr.  W.  T.  Harris,  contributes  a  ^•ery 
suggestive  paper  on  the  relation  of  Art  to  Religion. 

Contributions  by  English  writers  to  American  journals 
must  be  regarded  as  American  literature,  and  they  occur 
frequently.  In  an  article  published  in  the  Eclectic  Maj^a- 
zi)u\  Xew  York,  ]\Iarch  1876.  an  English  statesman,  Mr. 
W.  \\.  Ciladstone,  discusses  '•  .Science  and  Art,  Utility  and 
Beauty."  In  it  he  writes  :  "  Here  lay  the  secret  of  the 
paramount  excellence  of  the  Greek,  that  his  Art  was  ever 
aiming  at  the  ideal,  and  the  infinite.  And  the  true  cause 
of  this  remarkable  direction  of  the  Artist's  purpose  was,  and 
is  to  be  found,  unless  I  am  much  mistaken,  in  the  specific 
character  of  his  religion.  Humanising  the  god,  he  was 
constrained  to  divinise  the  man.  to  invest  his  form,  the 
central  type  and  norm  of  Beauty,  with  the  strcn^^th.  the 
majesty,  the  beauty,  and  the  grace  of  the  supeihuman. 
The  effect  was,  that  he  was  always  seeking  something  more 
than  he  had  reached  ;  like  in  this  to  the  miser  and  to  the 
saint,  in  both  of  whom  the  ap])etitc  grows  with  what  it  feeds 
upon  '■'  (])p.  293,  294).  A  \-ery  elo(juent  plea  follows  for  the 
alliance  of  ISeauty  with  Utilit\-,  the  ideal  with  the  useful,  in 
all  industrial  work  ;  in  other  words,  for  the  introduction  of 
the  tine  arts  within  the  useful  ones. 


TJic  Philosophy  of  A  mcrica  277 


3.  iSSo  to  iSgo 

In  iSSo,  Professor  John  Steinfort  Kedney  (Fairbault, 
Minnesota)  published  TJic  Beautiful  and  t/ie  Sublime,  an 
analysis  of  these  emotions,  and  a  deter'mination  of  the 
objectivity  of  Beauty.  This  is  a  constructi\-e  attempt  to 
reach  first  principles  in  .-Esthetics.  Mr.  Kedney  holds  that 
Beauty  is  both  subjective  and  objective,  (i)  The  former 
(subjective  beauty)  is  grasped  by  us  in  our  pursuit  of  ideals, 
which  \ve  always  objectify,  or  incarnate  in  some  visible 
form.  We  succeed  so  far,  in  our  pursuit  of  the  ideal  ;  and 
in  this  we  lind  the  Beautiful.  But  when  we  also  lind  that 
it  is  only  very  partially  grasped  by  us,  and  that  it  transcends 
us,  in  this  we  tind  the  Sublime.  Sublimity  is  of  two  kinds, 
mathematical  and  dynamical.  The  moral  ideal  gives  rise 
to  moral  beauty  and  sublimity.  (2)  Objective  Beauty  is  a 
disclosure  to  us  of  the  soul  of  the  Universe,  in  its  manifold- 
ness.  It  is  always  mo\"ing  on,  developing  new  phases  ; 
while  the  actual  approximates  to  the  ideal.  Professor 
Kedney's  is  one  of  the  laest  books  on  the  subject  which 
America  has  produced. 

In  1S80,  Dr.  James  ?vI'Cosh,  President  of  Princeton 
College,  published  a  work  on  TJie  Emotions.  In  the  third 
chapter  of  the  2d  Book  he  discusses  the  aesthetic  emo- 
tions, which  he  describes  generally  as  the  "emotions 
called  forth  by  inanimate  objects.'"  He  thinks  the  term 
''  Kallology ''"  \vould  be  the  best  to  describe  the  science  ; 
but  it  is  too  cumbrous,  and  the  verdict  of  time  is  already 
against  it.  Pie  arranges  the  theories  of  the  Beautiful 
under  three  heads  —  (i)  those  which  represent  it  as  a 
nrental  quality  in  objects,  perceived  by  the  mind  ;  (2)  those 
which  regard  it  as  an  objective  quality  in  things  themselves; 
and  (3)  those  which  consider  it  to  be  the  product  of 
association.  Pie  admits  that  many  of  our  aesthetic  emotions 
start  from  sensation.  Sweet  sounds  and  rich  colours  con- 
stitute an  earthly  paradise,  which  ma}'  become  the  soil  in 
which  the  plant  of  ethical  beauty  may  grow.  In  this 
section  Dr.  M'Cosh  seems  to  endorse  the  teachinQ-  of  Mr. 


278  The  PhilosopJiy  of  tJie  Beautiful  chap. 

Grant  Allen,  in  his  Physiological  j-Estlictics.  He  rises  from 
Physical  to  Intellectual  Beauty,  and  under  the  latter  head 
traces  (i)  sameness  in  dilierence  ;  (2)  the  relation  of  whole 
and  parts,  and  means  and  ends  ;  (3)  resemblance  in 
co-ordinated  classes  ;  (4)  space  relations  ;  (5)  time  rela- 
tions ;  (6)  relations  of  cjuantity  ;  (7)  relations  of  actixe  pro- 
perty ;  and  (8)  the  ideas  raised  in  us  by  causality  or 
power.  He  maintains  that  the  sentiment  of  Beaut}'  '"  may 
vary  infinitely  by  reason  of  the  mixture  of  its  elements." 
He  admits  the  truth  in  the  theory  of  Association,  and 
enlarges  again,  in  a  distinct  chapter — but  quite  suj^erfiuoush- 
— on  "the  complexity  of  the  lesthetic  aftection."  The  pic- 
turesque, the  ludicrous,  and  the  sublime  are  all  discussed  : 
but  there  is  no  thorough  grappling  with  the  difiiculties  of 
the  problem.  Though  superior  to  ^Ir.  Symington's  dis- 
cussion of  the  subject.  Dr.  ]\I'Cosh's  book  is  in  some 
respects  its  American  representative  or  equiwalcnt.  Bart  of 
the  discussion  is  merely  that  of  the  topographical  guide-book. 
The  Natii7-c  and  Function  of  Art,  more  especially  of 
ArcJiiicctU7'e^  by  ]\Ir.  Leopold  Eidlitz,  iSSi.  \\\  the  first 
part  of  this  book  its  author  discusses  the  condition  of  Archi- 
tecture in  his  own  time  ;  in  the  second  part  he  deals  with 
the  nature  and  function  of  Art  ;  in  the  third  he  returns  to 
Architecture,  and  discusses  its  nature.  He  gives  a  sketch 
of  Art  theories,  but  he  is  not  luminous  in  this,  or  in  his 
estimate  of  Beauty.  Its  power  of  producing  pleasurable 
emotion  is  the  test  by  which  we  judge  a  work  of  Art  ! 
The  liook  is  crude  and  cum])rous.  Its  character  max* 
be  judged  by  the  following  quotation  : — '■  The  nature  of 
Beauty  is  to  be  found  in  the  successful  expression  of 
an  idea  in  matter.  The  idea  itself  may  be  the  reverse  of 
beautiful,  or  true,  or  moral.  The  objects  selected  for  the 
purpo-e  of  representing  the  idea  may  be  ugly  ;  yet  the 
result  of  all  this  is  beauty,  if  the  idea  is  successfully 
represented.  Objective  beauty  consists  in  the  capacity  ot 
an  organism  to  perform  a  function,  and  in  the  clear  expres- 
sions of  this  capacity  in  its  form  ;  and  Ix'auty  in  art  is  the 
rentlering  of  this  form  in  matter  for  the  purj)0se  of  ex- 
pressing the  function  "  (pp.   1S6.   1S7). 


XIII  Tlie  Pliilosophy  of  America  279 

In  two  articles  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative  Pliilosophy 
(April  and  July  1882)  Mr.  Meads  Tuthill  discusses  "Use, 
Beauty,  Reason  ;  or  Science,  Art,  Religion.''  He  thinks 
that  Beauty  rises  from  utility.  It  is  born  of  use,  yet  is 
something  quite  independent  of  it — its  soul  or  spirit.  "It 
floats  in  the  ether,  as  a  being  apart  and  different.'"'  ■'  Its 
use  is  for  itself  alone.  It  does  not  perish  in  the  using,  but 
lives  in  the  thought  which  alone  can  use  it.''  It  is  this 
that  makes  it  universal.  Its  use  always  limits  an  object. 
It  is  only  when  every  special  or  particular  use  has  dis- 
appeared from  an  object,  and  ceased  to  limit  it.  that  its 
beauty  is  universal,  or  for  all  men.  It  thus  partakes  of 
infinitude  ;  and,  in  pursuing  it,  we  are  identified  with  it. 
For  the  time  being,  it  transforms  the  beholder.  In  discern- 
ing it,  he  discerns  the  Infinite,  and  his  relation  to  it — his 
oneness  with  it.  But  he  does  not  do  this  always.  It  is 
not  a  permanent  consciousness,  but  comes  and  goes  ;  and, 
in  contact  with  the  Infinite,  man  is  cut  ofi:"  from  the  object 
of  his  knowledge,  as  well  as  united  to  it.  Thus  the  con- 
sciousness of  Beauty  becomes  a  sort  of  tv.'o-edged  sword, 
tliat  divides  the  spirit  from  its  object ;  and,  out  of  the 
intense  craving  to  recover  what  is  lost,  Art  arises.  It  is 
creative,  because  we  desire  to  record,  to  externalise,  and  to 
preserve  what  we  first  perceive  within,  i.e.  to  create  and  to 
preserve  it,  not  for  ourselves,  but  for  all.  The  very  principle 
which  at  first  guided  the  artist  to  perceive  the  Beautiful 
impels  him  afterwards  to  re-create  it,  and  guides  him  in 
the  art  of  creation. 

Reference  should  also  be  made  to  the  translations,  in  the 
American  four?ial  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  of  portions  of 
Hegel's  Aesthctik — (i)  the  transcript  of  the  French  version 
of  Ch.  Bt'nard,  by  J.  A.  Martling,  in  ten  sections  (1S67- 
1S69);  (2)  the  sections  on  Chivalry  translated  from  the 
German  by  S.  A.  Longwill  (i  872-1  873)  ;  (3)  those  portions 
of  the  Aestlictik  dealing  with  Symbolic.  Classical,  and 
Romantic  Art,  translated  by  W.  ]\I.  Bryant  (1877-1S79). 
It  need  hardly  be  said  that  a  translation  from  a  translation 
is  seldom  satisfactory,  and  a  translation  of  Hegel  coming 
through   the    French    into    English  —  though    not    quite    so 


28o  TJic  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful  chap. 

bad  as  the  filtration  of  Aristotle's  Greek  into  scholastic 
Latin  through  the  Arabic  version  of  Averroes  and  his 
school — is  not  condticive  to  the  clear  grasp  of  a  systeni 
that  is  in  itself  somewhat  obscure. 

In  13S5.  Professor  Kedney.  whose  work  on  the  Beautiful 
and  the  .Sublime  is  referred  to  at  p.  277.  wrote  ••  a  critical 
exposition'''  of  Hegel's  .-Esthetics.  It  is  partly  a  translation, 
partly  a  reproduction,  in  part  a  summary,  and  to  a  certain 
extent  a  commentary  on  the  original. 

In  the  second  part  of  Professor  J.  Clark  Murray's 
Handhook  of  Psychology  (Montreal  1SS5J,  on  ••Special 
Psychology,"  there  is  a  chapter  on  Idealisation,  and  in  it  a 
section  on  ■•  the  .Esthetic  ideal."  With  many  other  writer-. 
Mr.  ^ilurray  begins  by  noting  the  disinterested  nature  of  the 
cesthetic  feelings.  They  are  free  from  any  alliiy.  either  of 
egoi-m  or  altruism  ;  and  he  conjoins  with  this  the  play- 
impulse  of  Schiller.  But  it  is  more  than  feeling.  It  has 
an  intellectual  element  also,  and  invrdves  the  consciousness 
of  an  object,  viz.  Beauty.  By  rearranging  the  materials 
received  by  the  mind  from  sense,  the  plastic  imagination 
creates  new  forms.  The  composite  whriles  v.hich  are  decom- 
posed or  analysed  into  parts,  in  order  that  they  may  net 
agMin  recombined.  are  of  two  kinds,  quantitative  and  quali- 
tative. The  attribute  of  Beauty,  which  the  intellect  dis- 
cerns, and  with  which  it  clothes  its  objects,  is  unity  in 
variety.  The  Fine  Arts  are  distinguished  from  the  useful 
and  mechanical  ones,  but  they  are  often  combined,  and 
enhance  each  other  :  utility,  or  the  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends,  being  an  illustration  of  unity  in  variety.  Mr.  Murray 
next  deals  with  the  several  .Arts  in  detail — (i)  those  which, 
addre-s  themselves  to  the  eye.  v'z.  Sculpture,  .Architecture. 
,ind  Painting--  :  (2)  that  which  aiidres-;es  the  ear.  \'iz.  Music  : 
and  (3)  that  which  uses  language  as  its  medium,  and  has 
its  outcome  in  Poetry  and  tlie  Belles  Lettres. 

In  1887,  John  T)e^\■ey.  Assistant-Professor  of  Philosophy 
in  the  University  of  Michi,_;an,  issued  a  te\t-b<,iok  on  I'.y- 
cJmloyw  the  hfteenth  chapter  of  which  is  de\"oted  to 
••  .E-thetic  Feeling."  He  first  analyses  :esthetic  feciing'- 
ir.to    its    various    elements,   and    after    considering    it    as    a 


xiii  The  Philosophy  of  America  281 

spring  to  activity  in  the  Fine  Arts,  he  deals  with  sesthetic 
judgment,  or  taste.  Both  knowledge  and  character  {i.e. 
the  true  and  the  good)  are  felt  to  be  beautiful  as  well  as 
objects  in  external  Nature,  when  a  sense  of  satisfaction  is 
felt  in  them.  There  is,  however,  in  all  Art  a  sensuous 
element,  which  is  the  vehicle  for  presenting  the  ideal. 
Purely  realistic  and  purely  idealistic  art  are  both  equally 
impossible.  .-Esthetic  feeling  is  universal.  The  lower 
senses  contribute  nothing  to  it,  and  it  excludes  the  feeling 
of  ownership,  as  well  as  of  utility,  or  subservience  to  ends 
external  to  itself  Its  most  general  property  is  harmony, 
or  unity  in  variety,  and  especially  the  harmony  of  the  object 
recognised  as  beautiful  with  the  nature  recognising  it.  But 
.esthetic  feeling  is  not  merely  passive,  it  also  actively 
creates  :  and  the  outcome  of  its  creative  activity  is  the  Fine 
Arts.  /Esthetic  judgment,  or  taste,  has  two  sides,  an 
objective  and  a  subjective  one.  On  its  objective  side  it 
attributes  Beauty  to  objects  ;  on  its  subjective  side,  it  is 
admiration  or  delight  in  objects.  We  gather  our  principles 
of  ta^te  from  a  reflex  study  of  the  way  in  which  our  feelings 
spontaneously  and  naturally  express  themselves  ;  but  our 
ideal  of  I!eauty  is  not  a  fixed,  but  an  ever-progressive  ideal. 
Professor  George  Trumbull  Ladd,  of  Yale  University, 
has  just  issued  an  Ijitrodzictioii  to  PhilosopJiy.,  the  twelfth 
chapter  of  which  is  devoted  to  "  .Esthetics. "  He  considers 
that  the  problems  which  arise  in  this  section  of  Philosophy 
are  similar  to  those  which  meet  us  in  Ethics.  "The 
Beautiful  is  one  form  of  the  Good  ;  to  be,  and  to  enjoy,  that 
^\•hich  is  beautiful  is  to  share  in  the  reality  of  the  good." 
The  beautiful  must  be  agreeable  ;  but  as  an  ideal  it  may  be 
defined,  as  Hegel  states  it,  ••the  sensible  manifestation  of 
the  idea."  All  objects  which  are  beautiful  produce  in  us 
pleasurable  feeling  ;  but,  although  it  is  difficult  to  draw  a 
line  of  separation  between  them,  the  beautiful  is  distin- 
guished from  the  agreeable  by  two  things — (i)  by  its  object- 
ive reality,  and  (2)  by  its  ideal  worth.  It  is  probably  the 
agreeable,  and  not  the  beautiful,  that  exclusively  influences 
the  life  of  the  lower  animals  ;  but,  with  man,  each  one  of  the 
lowest  appetites  may  be  transfigured  by  its  aesthetic  signifi- 


282  The  PJiilosopJiy  of  the  Beautiful       cii.  xiii 

cance.  Besides,  pleasurable  experience  may  iisclf  become 
beautiful.  The  standard  of  Beauty  varies  with  individuals 
more  than  the  standard  of  the  Good.  "  It  cannot  be  said 
that  the  voice  of  beauty  comes  to  the  soul  in  the  form  of  a 
categorical  imperative''  (p.  333)  ;  and  yet  "the  feeling  for 
the  beautiful  is  a  very  powerful  stimulus  and  guide  of  human 
conduct."  The  life  of  the  individual  percipient  of  Beauty  is 
projected  into  the  life  of  the  objects  he  perceives.  Mr. 
Ladd  seems  doubtful  of  the  possibility  of  determining  the 
universal  and  real  essence  of  Beauty.  It  might  be  easier 
to  say  what  is  the  specia,!  essence  of  each  of  the  separate 
Arts  which  disclose  it.  The  final  difficulty  is  jiartly  due  to 
the  very  nature  of  the  suliject.  The  feeling  for  the  ideal, 
and  its  pursuit,  are  phases  of  the  soul's  yearning  for  some- 
thing higher  than  it  has  attained  to  ;  ideal  Beauty  being  the 
goal  of  all  our  varied  strivings. 

As  the  sheets  of  this  volume  are  passing  through  the 
press,  a  small  book  has  been  received  entitled  ^■Kst/iclics ; 
its  Problems  and  Literature,  by  Fred.  X.  Scott,  Assistant- 
Professor  of  Rhetoric  in  the  University  of  Michigan,  in 
1S90.  He  divides  the  prolslems  thus — (i)  Physiological. 
the  question  of  the  origin,  and  nature  of  the  thrill  of 
pleasure  given  by  the  objects  which  we  recognise  as 
beautiful  ;  under  which  he  has  twelve  dift'erent  subsidiary 
problems,  relating  to  the  nervous  system  and  its  stimuli. 
etc.  ;  (2)  Psychological,  the  nature  of  aesthetic  feeling,  and 
of  the  correlated  facts  of  consciousness  ;  under  which  there 
are  ten  subsidiary  problems,  referring  to  sensation,  per- 
ception, imagination,  will,  etc.  ;  (3)  Speculative,  the  nature 
(jf  Beauty,  and  its  ftsthetic  value,  its  kinds,  and  their 
relation  to  Nature  and  to  Art.  The  literature  nf  .]-^sthetics 
he  ranges  in  two  sections,  and  gives  a  \  ery  ample  catalogue 
of  writers  in  English,  French,  and  (lerman. 

This  is,  howe\-er,  given  with  greater  elaboration  and 
detail  in  A  Guide  to  tJic  IJterature  of  ^d£st/teties.  l)}-  C.  M. 
Gayley,  Professor  of  English  Language  and  Literature  in 
the  University  of  California,  and  F.  X.  Scott,  [Michigan, 
also  just  publi.-hed  at  Berkeley.  U.S.A. 


INDEX 


Addison,  Joseph,  167 

Akenside,  M. ,  204 

Albani,  Cardinal,  53 

Albcrti,  Leon  Battista,  143,  144, 

145 
Alficri,  151 
Alison,   J.,    187,   202,    205, 

226,  232,  269 
Allen,  G. ,  246,  249,  261 
Alphen,  H.  van,  154 
Amiel,  H.  F. ,  120 
Andre,    Pere,    91,   93,    100, 


Angelo,  Michael,   145,  213, 

238,  257,  271 
Anselm,  St.,  152 
Apelles,  41 
ApoUonius,  42 
Aquinas,  Thomas,  4,  44,  45 
Aristippus,  22 
Aristotle,  27,  28,  29,  30,  32 

41,  132,  142,  266,  280 
Arnold,  Matthew,  xi.  264 
Arrian,  41 
Ast,  67 
Augustine,  St.,  ix.  4,  43,  44 

lor,  112,  117 
Augustus,  40 
Averroes,  280 

Bacox,  F.  ,  164 
Bain,  A.,  233 
Balzac,  91,  92 
Bardon,  D.,  97 


213. 

102, 
237. 

136 
39. 

,  9t. 


Barni,  Jules,  117 

Barns,  W. ,  234 

Barrowes,  173 

Bascom,  J. ,  273 

Batteux,  52,  loi,  103,  155 

Baumgarten,  vii.  51 

Bayliss,  \V. ,  349 

Beattie,  J.,  184 

Beaumont,  Sir  G. ,  224 

Begg,  W.  P.,  264 

Bell,  Sir  Charles,  195 

Bellars,  W. ,  248 

Bellegarde,  Abb6,  95 

Bellori,  J.  P.,  144,  145 

B(5nard,  Charles,  142,  279 

Bergmann,  J.,  88 

Berkeley,  E. ,  170 

Blackie,  J.  S.,  232 

Blane,  Ch.,  128,  231 

Bocchi,  F. ,  143 

Bodmer,  J.  J.,  53 

Boileau,  87,  93,  94,  108,  132 

Bolzano,  B. ,  65 

Bosanquct,  B.,  263 

Bouterwek,  F. ,  64 

Brewster,  Sir  D. ,  215 

Brown,  Thomas,  204,  205,  22 

Browning,  R.,  112 

Bryant,  W.  M. ,  279 

Buffier,  I'ere,  97,  loo,  179 

Buffon,  94 

Burger  (see  Thori^),  127 

Burke,  E.,  175 

Burns,  R. ,  21-5 


!84 


hid  ex 


Butlei 
Bvck, 


G.. 


227 
142 


Calker,  F. ,  64 

Calkoen,  J.  F.  \"an  B, ,  156 

Carlyle,  I'homas,  216 

Carneri,  B. ,  142 

Carracci,  the,  145 

Carriere,  M. ,  77 

Cassiodorius,  44 

Castiglione.   145 

Catullus,  37.  38 

Cherbuliez,  C.  \'. .   122 

Chevreul,  M.   E. ,  113 

Chrysippus,  42 

Cicero,  35,  39 

Clemens  Alexanclrinus,  43 

Clement,  M. ,  257 

Ciito,  22 

Cobbe,  F.  P. ,  234 

Cohen,  H. ,  59  {note'] 

Coleridge,  S.  T. ,   198 

CoHingT.vood,  G. ,  259 

Comte,  A.,   in,  142 

Condillac,  146 

Constable,  201 

Cook,  E.,  220 

Corneille,  93 

Correggio,  203 

Coster,  G.  H.  de.  133 

Cottle,  J.,  19S  iiiute) 

Cousin,    Victor,     ;i,     106,     in, 

226 
Crane,  L. .  256 

Crousaz,  J.  I',  de,  95.  100,  102 
Cunningiiam,  A.,  201  (nvte) 

lJ'Al,EMI;ERT,    102,    196 

Daniiron,  M.,   114 

iJante,  46 

Darwin,  Charles,  233,  257 

iJarwin,  Erasmus,  193 

iJa    Vinci,    Leonar.lo,    144,    145, 

203,  257 
Day,  H.   X.,  275 
1  )e  Brosses,   loo 
Deliico,   146 
D"  cjuincey,  C'     icg 


Descartes,  4,  91,  138 

Dewey,  John,  280 

Dickie,  229 

Diderot,   61,  87,    103,    104,    io5, 

196 
Diodorus  Siculus,  40 
Dobell,  S.,  248 
Dodsley,  172 

Donaldson,  John  11751-1801),  184 
Dryden,  96.   164 
Dubos,  Abbe,  96 
Dufresnov,    Chas.    A.,    96,    164, 

1S2 
Durer,  Albrecht,  48 

Eberhard,  J.  A.,  55 
Edelburg,  E.  von,   143 
Eidlitz,  E. ,  278 
Eliot,  George,  xii. 
Em6ric-David,  T.  B. ,  ic3 
Emerson,  R.  \V. ,  270 
Epictetus,  41 
Erigena,  80,  146 
Euphranor,  36 

Fan,  J.,  272  inofc) 
Fechner,  G.  T. ,  86,  90 
Ferguson,  J. ,  224 
Ferrari,  G.  S.,   152 
Ferri,  L.,  152 
Fichte,  56.  67,  69 
Fischer,  E.  K.  B. ,  76,  77 
Flaxman,  201 
Fock,  A.  E.,  159 
Formey,  J.  15.  H. ,  102 
Foster,  F.  W. ,  xii. 
Fouillee,  M.  A.,  139 
Friediandcr,  59 
Puseli,  96,   194 

Galex,  41,  42 
Galuppi,  P.,  146 
Gautier,  M.  T. ,  128 
i    Gayley  and  Scott,  xii.  283 
Gerard,  A.,   179 
Gilpin,  \V. ,  1S9,  197 
Giobcrti,  V. ,  146,   148 
Giotto,  223 


Index 


285 


Gladstone,  W.  E.,  276 
Goethe,  xi.  60,  64,  105,  140,  266 
Guizot,  112 
Guyau,  T.  M. ,  138 

Hamanx,  60 

Hamilton,  Sir  \V. ,  206 

Harris,  J.,  172 

Harris,  \V.  T. ,  276 

Hartniann,  E.  von,  80 

Hastie,  W. ,  266 

Hay,  D.  R.,  144,  213,  226,  22S, 

231,  232 
Haydon,  B.  W. ,  272 
Hazlitt,  \V.,  202 
Hegel,  6,  43,  70,  74.  j6,  77,  78, 

95,  142,    263,    266,    2; 


2ao, 
261 


Helmholtz,  H.  L.  F.  von 

Hemsterhuis,  F. .  153 

Hennequin,  E. .  141 

Hensde,  Ph.  W,  van,   \^j 

Herbart,  J.  F. ,  67,  6g,  88 

Herder,  J.  G. ,  59 

Hettner,  H.,  54 

Hippias,  23,  24 

Hippocrates,  41 

Hirt,  36 

Hoare,  P.,  195 

Hoficling,  H.,  90 

Hogarth,     William,      173,     196, 

212 
Holmes-Forbes,  A.  \\.,  255 
Homer.  33 
Hope,  272 
Horace,  37,  38,  39 
Horner,  L.  and  J.  B. ,  89 
Horsfall,  T.  C.,  259 
Houssaye,  M.  Arsene,  128 
Howard,  Henry,  205,  206 
Hugo,  Victor,  142 
Humljoklt,  W.  von,  17,  64 
Hume,  D.,  176 
Hunt,  Holman,  265 
Hutcheson,  F. ,  137,  169 

iDDESLEKiH,   Lord,   227 
Imhoft",  P.,  116 


Jacobi,  60,  64,  170 

Jeffrey,  F. ,  187,    188,    213,    226, 

228,  232,  269,  270 
Jones,  Owen,  10,  13,  230 
Jouftroy,  Th.,  iii,   114 
Jungmann,  J.,  88 

Kaxt,  vii.  6,  56,  62,  64,  66,  67, 
69,  78,  88,  90,  III,  116,  136; 
170 

Kedney,  John  .'^teinfort,  277. 
280 

Kepler,   144 

Ker,  W.  P. ,  257 

K6ratry,  116 

Kirkman.   T.,  142 

Knight,  Payne,  190,   191,   195 

Knox,  R. ,  272  [note) 

Kostlin,  K..  76 

Krantz,  !■]. ,  138 

Krause,  K.  C.  F. ,  69 

Ladd,  G.  T.  ,  281 

La  Harpe,  108 

Lamennais,  F.  R.  de,   113 

Land,  J.  P.   X.,   161 

Lang,  A. ,  9 

Lauder,  Sir  Th.  Dick.  190,  212 

Laugel,  ^L  A.,  129 

Lavater,  194 

Lee,  Vernon,  219 

Legh,  P. .  214 

Leibnitz,  4,  50,  51,  67 

Lessing,  G.  E. ,   54,   62,    77,   78 

97,  172,  266 
Lev  uque,  6,  iii,  123 
Lichtental,  P.,  148 
Lindsay,  Lord,  222 
Long,  S.  P.,  275 
Longhi,  G. ,  146 
Longinus,  33 
Longwill,  S.  A, ,  279 
Lorme,  ^L  de,   114 
Lorrain,  Claude,  210 
Lotze,  68,  82,  121 
Lucretius,  35,  36,  37,  38 
Liidwig,  H. ,  144 
Lysippus,  41 


286 


Index 


M'CosH,  225,  277 

MacDougall,  P.,  205 

Mackenzie,  G.  S.,  201 

M  A'icar,  20S,  228 

Magnus,  H.,  250 

Maher,  M.,  266 

Malebranche,  loi 

Mamiani,    Count    Terenzio,    146, 

151 
Manclcville,   168 
Marniontel,  Jean  Francois,    107, 

108 
Manianus  Capel'ia,  44 
Martling,  J.  A. ,  27c, 
Mason,  \V. ,  96,  1S2 
Massano,  M. ,  145 
Maxinius  Tyrius,  42 
Medici.  Coiiiio  de,  46 
Meier,  F. ,  52 
Mendelssolm,  Moses,  55 
Mengs,  A.  R. ,  55,  195 
Merz,  T.,  50 
Mill,  James,  20; 
Miinian,  H.  H. ,  200 
Milsand,  T.,   126 
Moffat,  J.  C,  273 
Montaigne,  92 
Montesquieu,  106 
Morris,  G.  S. ,  275 
Morris,  W. ,  2:4.  265 
Moti,  F.  T.,  2^3 
Moz'icv,   T.  B.,  246 
Muller,  Max,  17 
Murray,  J.  C.,  280 

Xaden,  C. ,  260 
Xa\'iile,  E'iouard,  14 
Newton.  Isaaj,  213 
Xiccola  I'isano,  223 
Xicoiai,  F.,  52 
Xicole.    P. ,   94 
Xipirus.  A. ,  144 
Xu-^t.  T.,  97 

Oi-;rsi  i:u,  37,  89 
Oo.'ir  K;i.''-.'\'L';ni.  viii. 
Upzoon.er,  C.  \V.,   158 


Pamphilus,  27 
Parker,  H. ,  260 
Parrhasius,  27 
Pascal,  132 
Pater,  \\". ,  264 
Patmore,  C. ,  265 

Pericles,    23 

Perponcher,  W.  E.  de,  155 
Piiidias,  i;,  21,  39,  41.  14:;, 

267 
Philostraius,  36,  42 
Pictet,  A.,  118 
Pietro,  Sac.  S.  di,  152 
Plato,  ix.    4,   23,  24,  26,  27 

=  9.  30.  33.  41.  47.  &7.  ^5 
91,    100,    loi,  142,    163, 
213,  219.  232,  257 

i'lautus,  36 

Pliny,  27,  36,  41,   198 

Plotinus,  30,  32,  33,  37,  199 

Poiycleitus,  42,  206 

Polygnotus,  41 

Poynter,  E.  J.,  236 

Praxiteles,  206 

Price,  R. ,  178,  179 

Price,     Sir     Uvedale, 


•15 


^9,     197. 


Proclus,  33,  34,  37 
Purdie,  T. ,  226 

QuiLTEK,  H.,  263 
Cjuintilian,  27,  41 


R  A  i;  1:1.  A  I. 5,  92 
Racine,   io3 
Ram.   1-".,   256 
;<anis,!y,  G. ,  215 
i-iapha-l,  145,  203 
Reid,  1'.,  98,  105, 
Reinhold,  56 
Rcni,  Guido,  145 
Repton,  PL,  ico 
Revnolds,  Si 


-hi 


IcO,    194,    19': 


Richter,  J.  P.,  6-^ 
Riedel,  ]■■.  J,,   154 

Rig,   ]v:^^■^,    142 


Index 


.87 


Rio,  M.,  46,  120 

Riviere,  ]'),,  265 

Rollin,  100 

Rosa,  Salvator,  210 

Rosenkrantz.  J.  K.  F. ,  76 

Rosmini-Scrnati,  A.,  147 

Rousseau,  87 

Royer-Col'.ard,  iii,  113 

Rubens,  145 

Ruskin,  Jolm,  216,  218,  238,  248, 


Saixte-Bkuve,  114 

Saint-Hilaire,  J.  B. ,  33  [note] 

Saisset,  E.,  114 

Samson,  C).  \\'. ,  273 

Sauvagart,  D. ,  142 

Savonarola,  46,  47 

Schellint;.  6,  65,  67,  69,   70,   74, 

III 
SciviUcr,  S,   5i,    64,    70,    77,    90, 

05,  105,  III,  137,  139,  235 
Sc'nlegol,   Friedrich  von,   63,    66. 

67,  69 
Schleierniaclicr,  70 
Schnasse,  C,  83 
Schopenhauer,  A.,  78 
Scott,  David,  217 
Scott,  F.  X.,  282 
Scott,  William  B. ,  218,  233 
Seailles,  G. ,  142 
Seelev,  T-  F. ,  235 
Sellar,  \V.  Y.,  37,  38 
Seneca,  41 

Shaftesbury,  Lord,  87,  164 
Shakespeare,  77 
Shenstone,  W. ,  183 
Smith,  Adam,  179 
Socrates,  22,  23,  24,  257 
Solger,  U.  W.  F. ,  63,  70 
Spence,  |. ,   172 
Spencer,  IF,  139,  239,  245,  250, 

262 
•Spinoza,  69,  So 
Stein,  H.  von,  87 
Stewart,  Dugald,   196 
Sully,  J.,  243 
Sulzer,  J.  G.,  52 


Superville,  H.  de,  156 
Symington,  A.  J.,  231,  278 
Symonds,  John  Addington,  M.D. , 
231,  266 

Tadema,  a.,  265 

Taine,  AF,  124,  275 

Talia,  146 

Tennyson,  A. ,  vi. 

Thor^,  T.  [sec  Biirger),  127,  129, 

133 
Thomson,  William,  192 
Tieck,  L.,  67 
Todhunter,  J. ,  240,  259 
Topffer,   loS,  117 
Torrey,  J. ,  275 
Tremblay,  J.  F.  du,  95 
'Fucker,  A. ,  183 
Turner,  J.  ^F  W. ,  201,  248 
Tuthill,  ^F,  279 
Tyancus,  A.,  145 
Tyler,  S. ,  271 
Tylor,  Edward,  10 
Tyrwhitt,  St.  J.,  247 

Vallet,  Abh6  P.,  45,  133,  135 

Vandyke,  145 

\'enanzio,  G. ,   146 

Veron,  Eugene,   130,   142 

Vico,  146 

Vilete,  j\F  C.  de  la,   100 

Vinci,    Leonardo    da,    144,    145, 

203,  257 
Vinct,  A.,   121 
Virgil,  35,  36,  37,  38 
Vischer,     F.    Theodor,    74,     77, 

85 
Visconti,  E. ,  146 
Vitruvius,  ^L   V.    Pollio,   40,  48, 

144 
Vloten,  J.  van,  160 
Voltaire,  103,  11 1 

Wagner,  84 
Wallace,  A.  R.,  252 
Waterhouse,  C.  H.,  263 
Watts,  G.  F. ,  263 


288 


Index 


Weisse,  Ch.  H. ,  76,  77 
Weyland,  M. ,  116 
Wilkes,  173 
Wilkie,  D.,  201 
Wilson,  John,  205 
Winckehnann,     Johann    J.,     53, 

66,    95,    III,    194.    196,    264, 

271 
AVordswonh,  W. ,  224  [?iote) 


Wyndham,  the  Right   Hon.  W. 
192 

Xenophox,  22,  27 

Zeising,  a.,  68,  86 
Zeuxis,  206 
Zimmermann,  R.,  68 
Zuccala,  G.,  148 


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At  the  same  time  they  take  their  place  in  t!ie  University  Series  by  reason 
ot'the  e.xceptional  educational  value  they  have,  and  will  be  found  to  aftbrd 
not  merely  an   introduction  to  psychology  and  also  to  philosopliy,  but  an 
introduction  to  jihilosophy  by  wa\-  of  ps\cholo>(y.     No  othertwo  manuals 
so  adapted  liave  \el  appeared. 


2  THi:    UXIVKRSnV    SERIKS 

OUTLINES    OF   ENGLISH    LITERATURE 

I>y  William  Rentox,   Lecturer  to  the  Scottish  L"ni- 
versities.      i2mo,  with  Diagrams,  $i.oo  7iet. 

Cdntent.s:  First  Period  [600-1600],  pages  9-1 12:  I.  The 
Old  English  Metric  and  Chronicle  [600-1350],  a.  Anglo- 
■Saxon;  /'.  Anglo-Xorman — II.  The  Renascence  [1350-1500] 
—  III.  The  Reformation  [1550-1600] — IV.  The  Romantic 
Drama  [1550-1650],  Second  Period  [1600-1900],  pages 
132-232 — V.  The  Serious  Age  [1600-1700] — VI.  The  Age  of 
Gaiety  [1650-1750] — VII.  The  Sententious  Age  [1700-1S00] — 
VIII.  The  Sympathetic  Age  [iSoo-igoo] — Appendix:  Litera- 
ture of  America  [1600-1900] — Index  :  Conspectus  of  British 
and  American  Poetry. 

The  general  arrangement  of  the  book  and  valuable  diagrams  showing 
the  division  of  literature  according  to  ages  and  charai  terisiics  combine  to 
make  this  manual  especially  fitted  to  use  in  the  class-room. 

Criticism  is  supplemented  by  e.xposition,  with  extracts  to  exhibit  the 
fishion  of  a  period,  or  the  style  of  a  master.  The  number  of  authors 
indicates  the  importance  of  a  period,  and  intrinsic  power  the  importance 
of  an  author.  .-Imerican  literature  is  considered  as  a  part  of  the  whole, 
but  a  brief  summary  of  its  history  and  general  characteristics  is  also  gi\-en. 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE    BEAUTIFUL 

T]y  William  Knight,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the 
L'niversity  of  St.  Andrews.  In  two  parts.  i2mo, 
each  $1.00  net. 

(Part  I.  Its  History.)  Contents:  Introductory — Pre- 
historic Origins — Oriental  Art  and  Speculation — The  Phil- 
osophy of  Greece — The  Xeoplatonists — The  Grseco-Roman 
Period — Mediasvalism — The  Philosophy  of  Germany — of 
France — of  Italy — of  Holland — of  Britain — of  America. 

(Part  II.  lis  Theory  and  Its  Rel.viton  10  hie  Arts.) 
CoNiENis:  I.  Prolegomena — II.  The  Nature  of  Beauty — HI. 
The  Ifieal  and  the  Real — 1\'.  Inaderjuate  or  Partial  Theories 
of  Beauty — \'.  Suggestions  towards  a  more  Complete  Theory 
')f  Beauty — VI.  Art,  Its  Nature  and  I-\incti<ins — \TI,  The 
Correlation  of  the  Arts — \'III.  P(-ctry,  a.  Definitions  and 
Distinctions;  /'.  Tlu-ories  of  Poetrv  ;  c.  A  Suggestion  :  (/.  T  he- 
Origin  of  Poetry — IX.  Mti-ic,  a.  Its  Nature  ;ind  Essence  ;  /•. 
The  Alliance  of  Music  with  Poetry  ;ind  the  other  Arts  ;  c. 
The  Origin  of  Music — X.  Architecture — XI.  Sculpture — XII. 
P.uiuing — XIH.  Dancing — Apjiendix  .\  :  Russian  Aesthetic 
— A[:)pendix  15  :   Danish  Aesthetic. 


THE    UXIVERSITY    SERIES 


THE  USE  AND  ABUSE  OF  MONEY 
By  Ur,  W.  CunxinghAiM,  Cambridge.    i2mo,  $i.oo  net. 

A  popular  treatise,  and  the  headings,  Social  Problems,  Practical  Ques- 
lions,  and  Personal  Duly,  give  a  broad  view  of  the  scope  of  the  book. 
The  subject  is  Capital  in  its  relation  to  Social  Progress,  and  personal  re- 
^()onsibility  enters  into  the  questions  raised.  The  volume  contains  a  syl- 
labus of  subjects  and  a  list  of  books  for  reference. 

THE  PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  SENSES 

J5y  John  McKendrick,  Professor  of  Physiology  in 
the  University  of  Glasgow,  and  Dr.  Snodgrass, 
Physiological  Laboratory,  Glasgow.  127  Illustra- 
tions,     i2mo,  340  pages,  81.50  net. 

The  aim  of  this  book  is  to  give  an  account  of  the  functions  of  the 
organs  of  sense  as  found  in  man  and  the  higher  animals.  Simple  experi- 
ments are  suggested  by  which  any  one  may  test  the  statements  for  him- 
self, and  the  book  has  been  so  written  as  to  be  readily  nmlerstood  by 
those  who  !ia\o  not  made  physiology  a  special  study.  It  will  be  found  a 
suitable  preparation  for  entering  upon  the  questions  that  underlie  physio- 
logical psychology.     Excellent  illustrations  abound. 


ENGLISH  COLONIZATION  AND  EMPIRE 

\\y  Alfred  Cael^ecott,  St.    John's    College,    Cam- 
bridge.   T2mo,  with  Maps  and  Diagrams,  $t,oo  net. 

The  diffusion  of  P'uropean.  and  more  particularly,  of  English,  ci\iliza- 
tioii  is  the  subject  of  this  book.  The  treatment  of  this  great  theme  covers 
the  origin  and  the  historical,  political,  economical  and  ethnological  devel- 
opment of  the  English  colonies.  There  is  thus  spread  before  the  reader  a 
bird's-eye  view  of  the  colonies,  great  and  small,  from  their  origin  until  the 
I>resent  time,  with  a  summary  of  the  wars  and  other  great  events  which 
liave  occurred  in  the  progress  of  this  colonizing  work,  and  with  a  careful 
i-\amination  of  some  of  the  most  important  questions,  economical,  com- 
mercial, and  political,  which  now  affect  the  relation  of  the  colonies  and 
the  parent  nation. 

THE  JACOBEAN  POETS 

By  Edmund    Gosse,    Hon.     M.A.,    Trinity    College, 
Cambridge.     i2mo,  $1  00  net. 

This  little  volume  is  an  attempt  to  direct  critical  attention  to  all  that 
was  notable  in  English  poetry  from  1603-1625.  It  is  the  first  book  to  con- 
centrate attention  on  the  poetry  produced  during  the  reign  of  James  I. 
Many  writers  appear  here  for  the  first  time  in  a  book  of  this  nature.  The 
aim  has  been  to  find  unfamiliar  beauties  rather  than  to  reprint  for  the 
tho\isandth  time  what  is  alread\-  familiar. 


THE    UNIVERSITY    SERIES 


THE  FINE  ARTS 

By  (i.  Baldwin  Brown,  I'rofessor  of  Fine  Arts  in  the 
University  of  Edinbur^^li.  i2mo,  with  Illustrations, 
$i.oo  net. 

CoNTKNis  :  Part  I.— An  as  the  Expression  of  Popular 
Feelinfjs  and  Ideals: — The  Beginnings  of  Art — The  Festival 
in  its  Relation  to  the  Form  and  Spirit  of  Classical  Art — 
Mediaeval  Florence  and  her  Painters.  Part  II. — The  Formal 
Conditions  of  Artistic  Expression: — Some  Elements  of  Effect 
in  the  Arts  of  Form — The  Work  of  Art  as  Significant — The 
Work  of  Art  as  Beautiful.  Part  III. — The  Arts  of  Form  : — 
Architectural  Beauty  in  Relation  to  Construction — The  Con- 
ventions of  Sculpture — Painting  Old  and  New. 

Valk  .\rt  School.  Ni:\v  !I ave.s".  Conn. 
Messrs.  Charles  Scribner's  Sons, 

Gentle7nen: — .-\s  a  text-book  for  the  study  of  the  "  Fine  Ans,  there 
is  iiothiii.i;  in  tiie  literature  of  the  subject  tliat  answers  the  requirements  as 
this  little  book. 

The  originality  of  Professor  Bro\vn's  work  is  apjiarent.  Out  of  a  wide 
familiarity  with  tlie  classical  literature  of  the  subject  lie  has  sifted  the  essen- 
tial truths.  And  of  the  modern  writers  on  aesthetics  he  knows  and  digests 
everything  from  Winkelmann  to  Whistler.  But  what  distinguishes  this 
book  from  others  and  gives  it  a  special  value  is  the  treatment  of  the  "Fine 
Arts  "  from  their  technical  side.  This  is  especially  e\ident  in  his  chapter 
on  painting,  which  contains  many  suggestions  of  value  to  the  young  artist 
and  amateur. 

Respectfullv  yours,  JUHN   H,  NIEMEVER. 


THE  LITERATURE  OF  FRANCE 

By  H.  ("r.  Keene,  Hon.  M.A.  Oxon.  i2mo.  $1.00 
net. 
Contents:  Introduction — The  Age  of  Infancy  (</.  Birth) 
—  The  Age  of  Infancy  (/'.  Growth) — The  Age  of  Adolescence 
(Sixteenth  Century)  — The  Age  of  Glory,  Part  I.  Poetry,  etc. 
—The  Age  of  Glory,  Part  II.  Prose — The  Age  of  Reason, 
Part  I. — The  Age  of  Reason,  Part  II.  —  The  Age  of  "  N'ature  " 
— Sources  of  Modern  French  Literary  Art:  Poetry — Sources 
of  Prose  Fiction — .Appendix — Index. 

Edward  S.  JijVnks,  Professor  of  Modern  Lanjjuajfes.  South  Caro- 
lina Collesre. — "  My  first  impressions  are  fully  confirmed.  The  boolc  is 
interesting  and  able.  It  would  be  difficult  to  compress  into  equa  com- 
pass a  more  satisfactory  or  suggestive  view  of  so  great  a  subject.  As  an 
introductory  text  for  schools  and  colleges  or  private  readers,  I  have  seen 
nothing  so  good.  The  book  deserves,  and  I  hope  will  receive,  a  wide 
welcome." 


THE    UNIVER?TTV    SERIF.S 


THE    REALM    OF    NATURE 

An  Outline  of  Physiography.  By  Hugh  Robert 
Mill,  D.Sc.  Edin.;  Fellow  of  the  Royal  Society 
of  Edinburgh  :  Oxford  Lecturer.  Maps  and  68 
Illustrations.      lamo,  $1.50  net. 

Contents  ; — Story  of  Nature — Substance  of  Nature — 
Power  of  Nature — The  Earth  a  Spinning  Ball — The  Earth  a 
Planet — The  Solar  System  and  Universe — The  Atmosphere 
— Atmospheric  Phenomena — Climates — The  Hydrosphere — 
Bed  of  the  Oceans — Crust  of  the  Earth — Action  of  Water  on 
Land — Record  of  the  Rocks — Continental  Area — Life  and 
Living  Creatures — Man  in  Nature — Appendices — Index. 

Prof.  W.  M.  Davis,  of  Harvard. — ".An  excellent  book,  clear,  coin- 
[irehensive  and  remarkably  accurate.  .  .  .  One  wbo  reaches  a  good 
understanding  of  the  book  may  regard  himself  as  having  made  a  real 
advance  in  his  education  towards  an  appreciation  of  nature." 

Prof.  James  D.  Dana,  Yale.  —  "  Evidently  prepared  by  one  who  under- 
stood his  subject." 

Journal  of"  Educatkjn. — "  It  should  not  only  be  read,  l)ut  owned  by 
e\erv  teacher." 


THE   ELEMENTS    OF   ETHICS 

An  Introduction  to  Moral  Philosophy.  By  J.  H. 
MuiRHEAD,  ]\LA.,  Royal  Holloway  (College,  Eng- 
land.    i2mo,  $1.00  net. 

Contents:  Book  L  The  Science  of  Ethics  :  Problems  of, 
Can  there  be  a  Science  of,  Scope  of  the  Science — Book  IL 
Moral  Judgment  :  Object  of,  Standard  of,  Moral  Law — Book 
in.  Theories  of  the  End  :  As  Pleasure,  as  Self-sacrifice, 
Evolutionary  Hedonism — Book  IV.  The  End  as  Good  :  As 
Common  Good,  Forms  of  the  Good — Book  V.  Moral  Prog- 
ress :  Standard  as  Relative,  as  Progressive,  as  Ideal — Bibli- 
ography. 

The  .Acaiiemy,  London.—"  There  is  no  other  introduction  which  can 
be  recommended." 

Prof.  J.  .K.  Quari.es,  Washington  and  Lee  University .—"  \  am 
pleased  with  Muirhead's  'Elements  of  Ethics.'  It  seems  fresh,  bright, 
thoughtful,  stimulating.     I  shall  use  it  probably  next  year." 

Prof.  J.  Stearns,  University  of  IVisconsin. — "  An  admirably  clear 
presentation  and  criticism  of  the  teacliings  of  the  chief  schools  of  thought 
upon  the  leading  points  of  ethical  theory." 

Prof.  George  S.  Fu[.lerton,  University  of  Penn.—"  I  find  the  book 
very  clear,  simple,  and  forcible,  and  I  shall  take  pleasure  in  recommenciing 
it  to  mv  students." 


THE    UNIVERSITY    SERIES 


THE    STUDY    OF    ANIMAL    LIFE 
By  J.  Arthur  'I'homson,  M.A.,  F.R.S.E.,  University 

of  Edinburgh.  T2mo,  Illustrated,  $1.50  7iet. 
Contents:  Part  I.  The  Everyday  Life  ok  Animals. 
The  Wealth  of  Life— The  Web  of  Life— The  Struggle- 
Shifts  for  a  Living — Social  Life — Domestic  Life — Industries. 
Part  IL  The  Powers  of  Life.  Vitality— The  Divided 
Labors  of  the  Body — Instinct.  Part  III.  The  Forms  of 
Animal  Life.  Elements  of  Structure — Life  History — Past 
History — The  Simplest  Animals — Backboneless  Animals — 
Backboned  Animals.  Part  IV.  The  Evolution  of  Ani- 
mal Life.  Evidences  of  Evolution — Evolution  Theories — 
Habits  and  Surroundings — Heredity.  Appendix  I.  Ani- 
mal Life  and  Ours.  Appendix  II.  "Best  Books"  on  Ani- 
mal Life. 

Prof.  J.  H.  Co.MSTOCK,  Leland  Stanford.  Junior,  University. — "I 
have  read  it  with  great  delight.  It  is  an  admirable  work,  giving  a  true 
view  of  the  existing  state  and  tendencies  of  zoology  ;  and  it  possesses  the 
rare  merit  of  being  an  elementary  work,  written  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  most  advanced  thought,  and  in  a  manner  to  be  understood  by  the 
beginning  student." 

THE   FRENCH    REVOLUTION 
By  Charles    E.  AL^llet,    Balliol    College,    Oxford. 
i2mo,  $1.00  net. 

This  book  has  a  special  value  to  students  and  readers  who  do  not  own 
the  great  works  of  such  writers  as  De  Tocqueville,  Taine,  Michelet,  and 
\'on  Sybel.  Mr.  Mallet  presents  economic  and  political  aspects  of  society 
before  the  Revolution  ;  attempts  to  explain  why  the  Revolution  came;  why 
the  men  who  made  it  failed  to  attain  the  liberty  they  so  ardently  desired,  or 
to  found  the  new  order  which  they  hoped  to  see  in  France  :  by  what  arts 
;ind  accidents,  owing  to  what  deeper  causes,  an  inconspicuous  minority 
gradually  grew  into  a  victorious  party;  how  external  circumstances  kept 
the  revolutionary  fever  up,  and  forced  the  Revolution  forward.  History 
oilers  no  problem  of  more  surpassing  interest  and  none  more  perjilexing 
or  obscure. 

GREECE  IN  THE  AGE  OF  PERICLES 
By  Arthur  ].  Craxt  of  King's  College,  Cam- 
bridge. 121110,  with  Illustrations,  $1.25  7iet. 
Contents;  I.  The  Essentials  of  Greek  Civilization — II. 
The  Religion  of  the  Greeks — III.  Sparta — IV.  The  Earlier 
History  of  Athens — V.  The  Rivalry  of  Athens  and  Sparta — 
VI.  Civil  War  in  Greece — VII.  The  Athenian  Democracy — 
VIII.  Pericles:  His  Policy  and  his  Friends — IX.  Society  in 
Greece — X.  The  Peloponnesian  War  to  the  Death  of  Peri- 
cles—  XI.  The  Peloponnesian  War — XII.  Thought  and  Art 
ill  .Athens. 


THE    UNIVERSITY    SERIES 


LOGIC,   INDUCTIVE   AND   DEDUCTIVE 

By  William  Minto,  M.A.,  Hon.  LL.D.,  St.  An- 
drews, Late  Professor  of  Logic  in  the  University 
of  Aberdeen.  With  Diagrams.  385  pages.  i2mo, 
$1.25  net. 

FROM  THE  PREFACE.— '  In  this  little  treatise  two  things  are 
attempted.  One  of  them  is  to  put  the  study  of  logical  formula-  on  a 
historical  basis.  The  oth^r,  ithich  might  at  fiist  appear  inconsistent 
with  this,  is  to  increase  the  power  of  Logic  as  a  practical  discipline. 
The  main  purpose  of  this  practical  science,  or  scientific  art,  is  con- 
reived  to  be  the  organization  of  reason  against  error,  and  error  in  its 
various  kinds  is  made  the  basis  of  the  division  of  the  siibject.  To  carry 
out  this  practical  aim  alo?/g  with  the  historical  one  is  not  hopeless, 
because  throughout  its  long  history  Logic  has  been  a  practical  science  ; 
and,  as  I  have  tried  to  shozv  at  some  length  in  introductory  chapters, 
has  concerned  itself  at  different  periods  with  the  risks  of  c>  ro)'  peculiar 
to  each." 

CHAPTERS  IN  MODERN  BOTANY 

By  Patrick  Geddes,  Professor  of  Botany,  Univers- 
ity College,  Dundee.      i2mo.  Illustrated,  $1.25  net. 

Beginning  with  some  of  the  strangest  forms  and  processes  of  the 
vegetable  world  [Pitcher  Plants],  it  exhibits  these,  not  merely  as  a  vege- 
table menagerie,  but  to  give,  as  sjjeedily  and  interestingly  as  may  be  : 

(a)  Some  general  comprehension  of  tlie  processes  and  forms  of  vege- 
table life,  and,  from  the  very  first, 

(b)  Some  intelligent  grasp  of  the  experimental  methods  and  reasoning 
employed  in  their  in%'estigation. 

Other  Insectiverous  Plants,  with  their  Movements  and  Nervous  Ac- 
tion, are  discussed.  The  Web  of  Life,  Relations  between  Plants  and 
Animals,  Spring  and  its  Studies,  Geographical  Distribution,  Landscapes, 
Leaves,  etc.,  form  the  subject  of  other  chapters,  and  handled  in  a  way  to 
open  the  general  subject  of  systematic  botany  most  invitingly. 

THE  EARTH'S  HISTORY 

An  Introduction  to  Modern  Ceology.  By  R.  D. 
Roberts,  M.A.,  C'amb.,  D.Sc.  Lond.  With  col- 
ored Maps  and  Illustrations.      i2mo,  $1.50  7iet. 

A  sketch  of  the  methotls  and  the  results  of  geological  inquiry  to  help 
those  who  wish  to  take  up  the  study  in  its  most  interesting  features.  The 
purpose  is  to  answer  such  questions  as  readily  suggest  themseU'es  to  the 
student,  among  which  may  be  mentioned  the  following  :  What  is  the  nature 
of  the  crust  movements  to  which  the  laiul-areas  and  mountain  ranges  are 
due?  What  was  the  distribution  of  land  and  water  that  obtainea  in  the 
area  when  each  group  of  rocks  was  formed  ?  What  was  the  condition  of  its 
surface,  and  what  the  forms  of  life  inhabiting  it?  What  were  the  oceanic 
conditions  :  the  depths  in  different  parts  ;  tlie  fi3rms  of  life  inhabiting  the 
water:  and  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  materials  brought  down  by  the 
rivers  that  poured  into  the  seas  from  the  land-areas  of  that  period  ? 


THE    UNIVERSITY    SERIES 


THE  ENGLISH  NO\EL 
Being  a  Short  Sketch  of  its  History  from  the  Ear- 
liest 'I'imes  to  the  Appearance  of  Waverley.  By 
\\'alter  Raleigh,  Professor  of  Modern  Litera- 
ture at  University  College,  Liverpool.  i2mo, 
$1.25   net. 

The  book  furnishes  critical  studies  of  the  work  of  the  chief  English 
novelists  before  Scott,  connected  by  certain  general  lines  of  reasoning  and 
speculation  on  the  nature  and  development  of  the  novel.  Most  of  the 
material  has  been  given  by  the  author  in  the  form  of  lectures  to  his  classes, 
and  possesses  the  merit  of  being  specially  prepared  for  use  in  the  class- 
room. 

HISTORY   OF   RELIGION 

A  Sketch  of  Primitive  Religious  Beliefs  and  Prac- 
tices and  of  the  Original  Character  of  the  Great 
Systems.  By  Allan  Menzies,  D.D,,  Professor  of 
liiblical  Criticism  in  the  University  of  St.  Andrews. 
i2mo,  43S  pages,  $1.50  net. 

This  hook  makes  no  pretence  to  be  a  guide  to  all  the  mythologies  or 
lo  all  the  religious  practices  which  have  prevailed  in  the  world.  It  is 
intended  to  aid  the  student  who  desires  to  obtain  a  general  idea  of  com- 
parative religion  by  exhibiting  the  subject  as  a  connected  and  organic 
whole,  and  by  indicating  the  leading  points  of  view  from  which  each  ol 
tlie  great  systems  m,i\-  Ic  '-'est  under:?t>')od. 

L.ATIN    LITERATURE 
By   J.   W.    ^LxcKAiL.      Sometime    Fellow   of    Balliol 
College,  O.xford.     i2mo,  2S6  pages,  $1.25  net. 

Prof.  Tracy  Pp:ck,  Yale  l')iive>  sity. — "  I  know  not  where  to  find  in 
such  a  con%-enient  compass  so  clear  a  statement  of  the  peculiar  qualities 
of  Rome's  Literature,  and  such  sympathetic  and  defensible  iudgitient  in 
the  chief  authors.'' 

SHAKSPERE  AND  HIS    PREDECESSORS 

By  Frederick  S.  Boas.  Formerly  Fxhibitioner  at 
Balliol  College,  Oxford.      i2mo,  Si-5o  r.ct. 

Shakspere's  writings  are  treated  in  this  work  in  tlicir  aijproxiniate 
chronological  order.  The  relation  d  the  writings  tij  their  sources,  their 
technique  and  general  import,  and  their  points  of  con;;!Ct  with  tlie  litera- 
ture of  their  own  anrl  earlier  times,  engage  the  author's  attention.  The 
Kis'_-  iif  the  English  Dr.ama  is  clearh  sketclied.  while  Shakspere's  kinship 
to  his  iiredccessors  is  giwn  much  greater  prominence  than  is  usual. 

Charles  Scribner's  Sons 

1^3-157   Fii'iH   A\'i.:.:  !,  -  -  Ni.\v  YuKK  Criv 


Date   l)\         uc  southern  regional  library  facility 


AA      000144135    i 


3   r2l0  0(^1^9  4601 


